- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
|
|
Civil Service System in Hong Kong |
319 |
||
Table 16.1 Prestige of Various Occupations in Hong Kong, 2004 |
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rank |
Occupation |
Mean |
Standard Error of Mean |
|
Median |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1 |
Doctor |
1.99 |
0.049 |
|
1.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
Teacher |
3.58 |
0.068 |
|
3.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
Civil servant |
4.44 |
0.069 |
|
4.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
Politician |
4.48 |
0.105 |
|
4.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
Politically appointed |
4.84 |
0.105 |
|
5.00 |
|
principal official |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
Businessman |
4.84 |
0.083 |
|
5.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
7 |
Technician |
5.44 |
0.075 |
|
6.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
8 |
Sales assistant |
7.05 |
0.057 |
|
8.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
9 |
Cleaner |
7.53 |
0.086 |
|
9.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Public Opinion Program, University of Hong Kong, March 5, 2004 in Burns, J. P., Government Capacity and the Hong Kong Civil Service, Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 2004.
Note: Question “Rank order the following occupations by level of prestige going from most prestigious to least prestigious.” The survey was carried out from March 1 to 3, 2004 by telephone using the standard Public Opinion Program telephone sampling method (telephone numbers were selected randomly from telephone directories and mixed with additional numbers generated by computer). There were 1031 successful cases; the response rate was 63.7% and standard error <1.6%.
16.3 Administrative Values
Despite 150 years of British rule, to a large extent Hong Kong Chinese subscribe to a Confucian world view (Lau and Kuan, 1988, 83). Confucianism holds that society is bureaucratic and hierarchical with the state being stronger than civil society (Dao, 1996, 48). “The Confucian model of government is bureaucratic and unitary. In this model, political order is remarkably monolithic, with all political power and actions centered in a single bureaucracy headed by the Emperor” (Dao, 1996, 51). In Confucian states, the division between civil servants and politicians is blurred and the bureaucracy tends to be more powerful and autonomous than in Western states (Dao, 1996, 58). Entry into the bureaucracy is based on merit for a career in an organization that is highly prestigious. In the Confucian states, graduates of elite universities staff the bureaucracy. The Confucian concept of governance requires that the bureaucracy be staffed by superior men of talent. Although the consent of the governed is important for the legitimacy of government (and is obtained by a government that cares for the people and develops the country), Confucian government is not democratic. In this view, the people give their consent but do not participate in government. This world view resonates well with the experience of governance in Hong Kong.
Administrative values in Hong Kong include hierarchical loyalty, efficiency, meritocracy, and political neutrality4 (Lui, 1988, 137–40; Scott, 2005, 64–87). In 1988, Terry Lui wrote that, “the
4Scott (2005, 65–80) identifies Hong Kong civil service values as small government, fiscal frugality (both arguably related to efficiency), centralization, rule by an administrative elite, merit, hierarchy, tenure, rule of law, corruption prevention, and political neutrality.
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320 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Hong Kong civil service demonstrates remarkable compliance with hierarchical authority. Line implementation is highly effective. Insubordination is uncommon, and ‘whistle blowing’ among serving officials is almost unheard of…” (Lui, 1988, 139). The importance of hierarchical loyalty has changed little since then. As Lui (1988, 139) points out, the readiness of civil servants to accept orders from their superiors is “largely attributable to conventional Chinese attitudes of respect for authority and avoidance of conflict.” Compliance is reinforced by strict adherence to bureaucratic rules and regulations and an incentive system that highly values promotion. Again from the vantage point of the 1980s, “efficiency is of overriding importance to government officials in Hong Kong,” evidenced by the extraordinary attention paid to the input phase of the administrative process and the detailed scrutiny paid to government expenditure within government (Lui, 1988, 137). The Audit Commission’s value-for-money audits reinforce the government’s preoccupation with efficiency. Official emphasis on small government and fiscal frugality continue to the present day.
Entry into Hong Kong’s civil service is highly competitive and for the most prestigious posts (e.g., in the Administrative Service), those holding the appropriate educational qualifications are required to pass a battery of examinations, tests, and interviews with a success rate of no more than 0.2%. Despite the low success rate, from 10,000 to 12,000 apply each year for 25 to 30 AO posts, indicating the continuing attractiveness of the positions even in the face of civil service reforms that abolished pensions and reduced benefits and other changes that since 2002 have put the top policy-making positions in the hands of political appointees, not civil servants. Merit within the civil service is largely defined in terms of seniority, however, where position-based rewards are the norm.
Although Hong Kong’s political system does not include well-developed political parties, official policy highly values political neutrality. Senior civil servants are prohibited from campaigning for candidates in Hong Kong’s elections or standing for election to the Legislative Council or District Councils without first resigning from the civil service.5 Moreover, no civil servant of whatever rank may engage in any activity that would jeopardize the impartiality of government or that might lead to a conflict of interest (Lui, 1988, 138; Burns, 2004, 62–63; Scott, 2005, 77).6 These regulations, however, have not prevented a pro-big business orientation within the government that has kept direct taxes and welfare payments low, delayed the introduction of a competition law, and occasionally led to charges of business-government collusion (e.g., over the construction of the Cyberport, a large property and business development project handed to tycoon Li Ka-shing’s son without competitive bidding).
Hong Kong civil servants’ utility maximizing orientation operates within the value milieu outlined above and also within a bureaucratic culture that values harmony and good co-worker relations.
16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in policy making has gone from one of almost complete bureaucratic domination during the colonial period to one of shared roles since 2002.
5This prescription applies especially to all administrative officers, directorate officers, police officers, and information officers.
6Hong Kong’s political neutrality was referred to as “British practice” by officials in China in 2003. Political neutrality is not carried out on the mainland (see Burns, 2004, 63).
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Civil Service System in Hong Kong 321
The turning point came when the government introduced the Principal Official Accountability System (POAS) and replaced civil servants in the most senior policy-making roles with political appointees.
In the pre-2002 period, political power was concentrated in the hands of a single political appointee: the British governor until 1997 and the chief executive from 1997 until 2002. The evidence suggests that although they had the power to make policy and give directions to the civil service, they were highly dependent on the civil service for policy advice. Only occasionally did these single-appointee political executives dominate policy making. During the recent colonial period, among British governors, Murray MacLehose (1971–1982) was decisive in at least one area, the decision to establish the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1973 (Scott, 1989, 146–52). MacLehose was also influential in other policy domains, such as various decisions to expand public services, including public housing, compulsory 3 years of secondary education, and social welfare. More recently, Chris Patten (1992–1997) put his personal stamp on reforms of Hong Kong’s political system in the run up to the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. Hong Kong’s first post-1997 chief executive, Tung Chee Hwa (1997–2005), attempted to make his mark on housing policy only to be undone by the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Tung’s supporters complained that the civil service failed to support the chief executive and obstructed his policies, leading the central government in Beijing to urge the civil service to better support Tung (Ming Pao 27.9.2000). Still, Tung was able to introduce the POAS in 2002, the prospect of which had prompted the head of the civil service, Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang, to resign a year earlier.
Despite their constitutional position,7 governors/chief executives have been highly dependent on the civil service, which has, for the most part, dominated policy making. Governors were outsiders who brought with them only a very small staff. Until 2002, all the top positions, except for the position of governor/chief executive and one or two personal assistants, were held by civil servants. The chief secretary (a civil servant) chaired the Policy Committee (made up of policy secretaries, all of whom were civil servants until 2002) that made policy before it was endorsed by the Executive Council, an advisory body appointed by the governor/chief executive. Senior civil servants were drawn almost exclusively from the Administrative Service. Because of its disconnect from the people, the civil service-dominated government, in the words of one pre-2002 policy secretary, sometimes made policy that “did not meet the expectations of the people.”
In July 2002, to gain tighter control of the civil service, the government introduced reforms (the POAS) that added a political layer (policy secretary) on top of the most senior civil service positions (permanent secretary). As originally conceived, the chief executive would nominate the politically appointed policy secretaries from among outsiders who, because of their standing in the community or professional accomplishment, would introduce reforms that would improve the popularity of the government. From 2002 to 2005, when Tung resigned, half of the policy secretaries were appointed from among experts who came from outside government. They brought with them ideas about reform and attempted to implement their proposals with varying success. Relations between the outsiders and the civil service varied from conflict and hostility as some new appointees sought to gain control of their portfolios, to cooperation and partnership based on agreed divisions of labor, depending in large part on personal style. The outsiders for the most part apparently perceived some deficiencies in the generalist orientation of the senior civil servants they worked with and in many cases a kind of “Yes, Minister” relationship developed with permanent
7According to the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions for the pre-1997 period and the Public Service (Administration) Order for the post-1997 period the tenure of civil servants is insecure. In practice, however, civil service positions have been “iron rice bowls” and dismissals or terminations of employment rare.
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