- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Chapter 22
History and Context of Public
Administration in Macao
Liu Bolong |
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Introduction................................................................................................................... |
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22.2 |
History........................................................................................................................... |
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22.3 |
Major Reform Measures since the Handover................................................................... |
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22.4 |
Analysis of the Reform Roadmap................................................................................... |
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22.5 |
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... |
472 |
References ................................................................................................................................ |
473 |
22.1 Introduction
It has been 10 years since Macao’s return to China under the political framework of “One Country Two Systems.” Macao was governed by Portugal for over 400 years and its citizens received mixed cultural heritage of both Chinese and Portuguese characteristics.1 In the Macao government, the public administration has been heavily influenced by its Portuguese administrative culture, which has its own merits of easiness and relaxation, but lacks discipline and formalization as modern management science requires. In comparison with the Anglo-Saxon administrative culture, the Latin style represents intimate personal relations, a lax working attitude, and to some extent, it is easy to induce corruption. At the time of handover, the Macao civil service was mainly occupied by such a mixed administrative culture, which was strongly criticized by citizens and scholars. “Prior to the beginning of the transition period in 1987, Macao’s civil service had several characteristics. These included inefficiency, insufficient training, low educational level, corruption, frequent reorganization, recruitment and promotion on the basis of political patronage rather than merit, and intense bureaucratic infighting among government departments. … From a Weberian perspective, Macao’s
1Macao differed from Hong Kong as Hong Kong was under British colonial rule while Macao was administered by Portugal over the last 400 years without access to the sovereignty of the enclave.
463
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
464 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
bureaucracy arguably remains underdeveloped and backward.”2 Although the Portuguese government made efforts to improve the situation before the handover, things have remained more or less the same because of the low educational level of civil servants in general and the political sensitivity of handover on the part of the Portuguese high officials who have to train local Chinese to replace them after the handover. Who would be glad to train successors to replace themselves?
After the handover, the newly appointed Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR) chief executive, Edmund Ho, was reluctant to carry out major reform measures because he understood that at the beginning of SAR government, maintaining the morale of local civil servants was key to his governance as a new government. The civil service underwent several phenomenal reforms but remained largely intact. In 2002, with the opening of the gambling franchise, the economic transformation proved to be quicker than most people expected. Citizens and investors’ expectations of public administration were higher than the reality could provide. Citizens complained about corruption practice, inefficiency, and policy incompetence on the part of major government officials. Recently, midway through the chief executive’s second term, the Macao SAR government was determined to launch full-scale administrative reform and promulgated its roadmap in this respect. Why did the government decide to push forward major reforms 8 years after the handover? Will it succeed? The author discusses public administration in Macao, its strengths and weaknesses and analyzes major reforms necessary to ensure that the SAR government improves its governance capacity.
22.2 History
At the time of handover, the Macao public administration was characterized by the Portuguese administrative heritage of low efficiency and corruption. The preparatory work for the handover was not a success. The then-Portuguese Macao government concentrated its efforts on ‘localization,’ the training of Chinese civil servants to replace the leaving Portuguese expatriates. However, localization encountered many problems, including the questionable quality of some local bureaucrats and translators, opposition from the Portuguese on the measures facilitating localization, the half-hearted attempt at bilingualism, and losing quality engineers and technicians to the private sector, etc.3 However, there are positive sides to Portuguese-style public administration in Macao. For example, in Portuguese culture, respect for the law is strong. Once a policy is formulated and becomes law, civil servants tend to follow the letter of the law and implement it. The rule of law remains at the center of European cultural tradition, which has substantial influence over Macao administrative culture.
The scale and structure of the Macao public administration was characterized as oversized and in urgent need of reform. In Macao, the total population of half a million needs to support a civil service of more than 18,000, a much higher ratio in comparison with neighboring areas of Hong Kong and Singapore. Also, public administration has been characterized by frequent organizational restructuring. As a practice, many Portuguese governors came to Macao and changed the structure of policy secretaries and bureaus casting to their own expectations. Before handover, each governor dispatched to Macau by Lisbon reshuffled his management team, arbitrarily adding or reducing the number of undersecretaries and bureaus, which caused chaos and dissatisfaction among Macau civil servants and citizens. To address this, the Basic Law of Macao restructured the
2 Lo Shiu Hing, Political Development in Macao, Hong Kong: The China University Press, 1995. p. 116. 3 Ibid., p. 25.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Context of Public Administration in Macao 465
newly born SAR government. The SAR established new institutions, such as the Public Security Police Force and the Macao Customs, merging the two city councils into a general one for the purpose of simplification and efficiency, and placing Macao’s anti-corruption body under the direct leadership of the Macao chief executive, and changed the number of policy secretaries from seven (under the Portuguese government before handover) to five (Figure 22.1). Macao citizens at large welcomed some of the restructuring measures . However, some academics doubted the negative effectiveness of reduction at the policy secretary level.
22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
Since the handover, the central government in Beijing has kept its promise of a high degree of autonomy for the Macao SAR.4 Th e Macao SAR government has total autonomy concerning public administration reforms. The chief executive, Edmund Ho, decided to take a gradual attitude toward public administrative reform. For him, Macao needs to create a situation of stability to support his SAR government after its handover. He stressed that to put forward administrative reform, the SAR government needs to maintain stability of the society and the government as its first priority. He pointed out that Macao must take a prudent attitude and gradual approach in administrative reform.5 In other words, the chief executive deeply understood the fundamental shortcomings of the present civil service regulations and felt reluctant to undertake drastic measures which could create chaotic situations that he would find difficult to control. Following this policy, the Macao SAR did create a stable civil service that could operate normally when Macao continued to tide over the economic difficulties at the beginning of the new SAR government.
The Macao SAR government did make several administrative reforms after the handover, e.g., the performance pledge and the ‘one dragon’ service.6 Before the handover, the Macao civil service had an inefficient organizational culture, which was frequently complained about in the Macao media. For example, the civil servants never started work on time. They needed a cup of coffee and breakfast before work. The citizens had to wait half an hour, watching them fi nishing breakfast. The Macao media was full of stories of ill-treatment written by citizens who suffered such an ordeal. This has much improved since the handover.
Now all civil servants have to be at work on time and are no longer allowed to eat breakfast when it is time to go to work. All government employees must wear name badges at work. In this way, citizens can complain about them easily when they are treated impolitely, or praise them when they are greeted warmly. In the government, measures were taken to adopt the performance pledge as practiced in Hong Kong and elsewhere.7 The government is pursuing a policy aimed at imposing government efficiency and providing greater convenience for investors and citizens in applying for procedures in the various organizations of the Macao government. According to government information, by the end of 2007, 44 government departments had practiced 990 items of the performance pledge.8 Especially in important economic sectors, such as license approval in
4 The stated policy is that China will never interfere in the internal affairs of Macao with the exception of national defense and diplomacy as stipulated in the Macao Basic Law.
5 Macao Justice Daily, February 6, 2003, p. 1.
6The one dragon service refers to the government policy of one-window services for applications through government departments.
7 In Macao, the performance pledge is a major reform measure that is widely welcomed by citizens.
8Macao Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, fi le://c:DOCUMENT\BLLW\LOCALS~1\TEMP\ A68WR6NF.htm. January 18, 2008.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
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Macao Economic and Trade
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O ce of the Macao Special
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Identification Bureau
Printing Bureau
International Law O ce
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Statistics and Census Bureau
Labor A airs Bureau
Gaming Inspection and
Coordination Bureau
Social Security Fund
Pension Fund
Consumer Council
Supporting O ce to the Secretariat of China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries Economic Cooperation Forum
Financial Intelligence O ce
Human Resources O ce
Macao Trade and Investment
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Macao Post |
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Academy of Public Security |
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Macao Sports Development |
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Tertiary Education Services |
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Institute for Tourism Studies |
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Macao Tourism and Casino |
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Energy Sector Development |
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Macao Grand Prix |
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Transport Infrastructure |
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Macao Tourism Promotion and |
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Environmental Protection |
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Information Centre in Portugal |
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University of Macao |
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Civil Aviation Authority |
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Macao Monetary Authority
Figure 22.1 Macao government structure (2007). Source: Macao SAR Public Administration 2007.
Asia Southeast in Administration Public 466
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Context of Public Administration in Macao 467
the restaurant industry, Bureau for Foreign Investment, Tourism Bureau, Economic Department, etc., investors and citizens can go to various departments and get approval within the promised time. For example, in the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau, the renewal of licenses for street peddlers is completed within 10 working days.9
Another item is having “one-stop” procedures for running businesses in government. Before this policy, investors and citizens have to go to many government departments to get approval for one license. For example, before a person can open a restaurant legally, he/she must go to dozens of government departments to get licenses for fire prevention, sanitary conditions, tax bureau, etc., a process that could take months, not days. With one-stop service, one only needs to apply through one window to get all licenses approved if he/she is ready with all the documents. Owing to technical difficulties, by the end of 2006, only 10 departments accomplished 26 items in this report.10 Today, procedures are clearer, more accurate and faster,11 and comparable to those in Hong Kong, though Macao is still lagging behind Hong Kong in policy-making capabilities. Hong Kong is famous for its policy-making procedures and outcome while Macao is still addicted to the old practice of elite thinking and individual decision making. Macao law is old-fashioned, rough, and ambiguous, sometimes subject to the random decisions of major government officials. Macao has a long way to go as far as substantial reform measures are concerned, but these reforms greatly improved government efficiency and helped Macao in gaining necessary capital and expertise in its economic development. As one newspaper commented, “Many government bureaus have practiced ‘one-stop’ service and won the praise of Macao citizens. For example, in restaurant industry which is essential to Macao economy and tourism, the SAR Government intends to fulfill ‘one-stop’ procedure in the first half of this year, which will be considered good news for the whole industry and Macao.”12
Another achievement concerns the revision and modernization of the Macao Civil Service Charter, which was drafted long ago and many provisions need to be modernized to meet the need of civil servant management in contemporary Macao. The charter sets out the enrollment, internal management, and retirement policies for the civil service, but its obsolescence perpetuates ‘irrationality’ and low morale among civil servants. For example, employee recruitment is delegated to bureaus causing corruption, unfair competition, and favoritism. Macao media publishes this kind of story from time to time. The old regulation in this respect needs to be improved and revised to change the negative image of corruption and abuse of power.
Since the handover, especially in the second term of the present chief executive, some aspects of the civil service charter have been put under scrutiny and revision. The government began to revise the position and rank system, salary and welfare, retirement and early leave, and rewarding and punishment. A striking example is in the field of civil servant evaluation. This is an important policy item that could ensure a sense of justice among the staff and promote a spirit of hard work and dedication. The SAR government revised the general assessment policy and promoted a more regulated and justifiable system in 2005. Over the two years of the experiment, the new system is clearly much better than the old one. However, our investigation reflected that most civil servants do not think the new system is advantageous in promoting morale among the staff.13 This
9 Ibid., January 18, 2008.
10Ibid., January 18, 2008.
11Hong Kong was the first to practice the performance pledge with satisfactory results.
12Macao Justice Daily, February 6, 2003, p. 1.
13In a recent survey organized by the University of Macao, over 60% of the civil servants questioned believed that the new evaluation system does not progress substantially and needs to be further revised.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
468 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
is because the law needs to implement further and detailed regulation, as the new system is more complicated and easy to cause complaints. For example, each bureau head has to write a detailed working plan for civil servants under his or her supervision and evaluate them twice every year. The bureau head spends the last month of each year writing detailed evaluation, and appeals can be long and result in legal processes. To avoid trouble, supervisors often write favorable remarks regardless of individuals’ real performance. In general, the modernization of the civil service charter has not been systematic and has caused discontent and unease among staff. But apart from this, the SAR government has organized major reforms in the field of application of computer knowledge in applying for government licenses and practicing ISO quality management. Some forms of restructuring of government organizations after the handover. Also, the Macao SAR government adopted a new Provident Fund system under which more than 6,000 government employees who were excluded in the old retirement system have achieved a retirement guarantee under this new retirement scheme.14 Before handover, two thirds of civil servants were contracted under the system and were not provided with a retirement scheme.
Have the piecemeal measures achieved satisfactory results? Media comments and citizens’ opinions suggest that the answer is ‘no’. On the one hand, citizens feel comfortable with the reform measures and phenomenal progress as discussed before. On the other hand, they know that many deep-rooted problems have not been solved and could cause grave concern and discontent in Macao society, especially under the context that Macao has opened its gambling franchise and the pace of economic development has been quickened. The citizens’ opinions were reflected in call-in programs on Macao Radio from 8:00 to 10:00 a.m. every weekday. Most of the calls have complained about chaotic policy formulation and implementation, and inefficient bureaucratic processes. When the Macao gambling franchise was opened in 2002, the tranquil and backward situation was broken. Before the opening of the gambling franchise, Macao witnessed consecutive years of negative growth rate and economic recession. The opening of the gambling franchise was a successful process. Many international entertainment conglomerates successfully bid for gambling licenses and began to invest large amounts of money in Macao. Major Las Vegas players, like Wynn Cooperation, Las Vegas Sands, and MGM established hotel and casino businesses in Macao. The Macao economy witnessed double-digit growth for several years and Macao began to receive world attention with heavy American investment. Since the opening of the gambling franchise, CNN has reported many stories about Macao. The investment and leap forward of the Macao economy called for an early overhaul of administrative reforms, as investors expected a responsible and efficient government to support their business expansion and citizens raised their aspirations for the government because they hoped that the newly established SAR government could help them to confront the challenges bestowed on Macao local businesses. With accelerated growth and the need for human resources from the big investors, Macao local businesses felt the pain brought about by economic prosperity, which doubled property prices and employee salaries in a short time. They demand government help for survival. Many small family restaurants and shops have shut down because of the higher employee salaries and rental costs. Public transportation is congested, and taxis are difficult to find in the old town of Macao. Buses cannot cope with the large numbers of tourists and citizens. Employees find it difficult to get to work on time and students to get to school. Citizens have demanded help from Macau SAR government. It is the responsibility of the government to manage the situation and govern the city in an orderly way. However, because Macao’s public administration did not carry out systematic reforms, the old administrative culture has remained and old regulations have not been revised substantially.
14 Overseas Chinese Daily, June 29, 2007, p. 1.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC