- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
554 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
that the poor quality of Macao civil servants was due partly to nepotism and personal networks in the recruitment process in which candidates with higher qualifications were usually excluded. Although there was a mechanism for evaluating the performance of civil servants, it was not practiced in a rigorous way. To maintain good relationships with subordinates, many office supervisors over-graded the latter (Chan 2007, 38–42). Some appraisees were expected to “shine the shoes” of their superiors for their excellence in performance appraisal. Macao’s civil service has not yet established Weberian bureaucracy, which adheres to strict rules and regulations (Choy 1993, 63).
Third, the MSAR government is not internally coherent nor does it possess the capacity for interdepartmental cooperation and coordination. In the colonial era, the economic coordination and administration sub-secretary and the statistics and census sub-secretary in customs service (Macao Development Strategy Research Center 1996, 37) shared an overlapping responsibility. The Identification Bureau and the Security Branch were responsible for residents’ identification affairs (ibid). However, there was a lack of coordination among the police units on security affairs. This overlap of function and responsibility between departments may delay service delivery, as administrative procedures must go through various departments. Further, the overlap also allows departments to shift responsibility away from themselves. The lack of coordination among government departments persisted into the SAR era. The protection of sight lines around the Guia Fortress is an example. There was simply no communication between the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau to balance land development initiatives with the protection of Macao’s World Heritage sites. The latter approved a project to build skyscrapers that would block the sight line of Guia Lighthouse, part of Macao’s World Heritage Program. The Cultural Affairs Bureau, which watches over the World Heritage sites, did not interfere until civil society protested and launched a complaint with the United Nations. The event demonstrated the lack of coordination between the two departments. In another instance, the Labor Affairs Bureau, Judiciary Police, and Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau failed to cooperate in a conflict over illegal workers in casinos. While each of the three departments had jurisdiction, they passively resisted enforcing the law in the casinos; instead, each tried to shift responsibility to the others. In another instance, transportation issues continue to worsen while three departments: the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau, the Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau, and the Public Security Police Force take no steps to cooperate and correct the problem. While the government does plan to establish a new bureau for traffic and transportation, there is no indication that coordination between departments will be enhanced. Organizational disarticulation is rampant within the government. Departments ignore existing regulations and develop their own administrative practices. The government suffers from parochialism and ethnocentricity, which prevent communication and cooperation among departments and inhibit performance.
26.4 Civil Service Reform
Like many governments, the MSAR government adopted the principles of the new public management (NPM) to improve the performance of the civil service. These efforts commenced after the handover. In his fi rst policy address, the chief executive, Edmund Ho suggested a reform of the bureaucracy through four major strategies: (1) departmental restructuring, (2) establishment of a customer-oriented culture, (3) the use of technology, and (4) strengthening the training program for civil servants (Government Policy Plan for the Year 2000 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 2000, 6; see also Chou 2005, 73–75).
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in Macao 555
The MSAR government emphasized the customer-oriented principle of NPM to change the attitude of civil servants and to improve bureaucratic performance. In 2001, 16 departments launched a performance pledge system that promised high quality service to the public (Macau Yearbook 2002, 65), and all government departments established their performance pledge program at the end of 2003 (Lam 2005, 33). Government agencies were also encouraged to adopt the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) system to guarantee their performance by constructing a standardized work procedure. By 2007, 60 public agencies had acquired ISO certification (Government Policy Plan for the Year 2008 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 1013). Departments conducted opinion surveys on the public’s attitude toward public services, and those with poor results were pressured to improve their services. Also, one-stop service centers were introduced so that residents could apply through a single gateway for services that involved multi-departments (Reschenthaler and Thompson 1996).7 Finally, the MSAR authorities developed e-government applications, including an Intranet in 2004 and a website for civil servants in 2007 to improve communication among departments as well as with civil servants (Government Policy Plan for the Year 2004 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 2005, 1011; Government Policy Plan for the Year 2008 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 1010). Specific details of these efforts are discussed in the chapter on performance management reform.
From the perspective of civil service reform, the importance of these efforts has been in training, rather than reward structures. Although the MSAR government adjusted the pay scale of civil servants in the 2009 reform, it emphasized the training of civil servants. Before the handover, the training of bureaucrats focused mainly on language, but this may have been insufficient to enhance managerial and administrative capacity. After the handover, the MSAR government launched different programs to train middleand upper-ranking officials for leadership advancement. For instance, the Management and Development Program for Middle and Upper Rank Civil Servants was initiated in 2001; 255 officials were sent to Singapore and Beijing to study (Macau Yearbook 2001 2002, 66). In 2007, over 500 middleand upper-ranking officials were invited to study in Beijing. The SAFP also organized various annual conferences and seminars for all civil servants to enhance their knowledge of public administration. Indeed, the MSAR authorities launched training programs to improve attitude as well as managerial capacity of civil servants and thus improve the performance of the administration. Some streetlevel bureaucrats told the author that their attitude toward the public had changed since the handover. They admitted that they had been unreceptive to public demands in the colonial era; whereas under the MSAR regime they were encouraged to be responsive and polite to residents. Indeed, the authorities trained civil servants to treat residents as customers, to be receptive and accommodating to their demands.
The customer-oriented reform changed the layout of government services and improved the public image of civil servants to an extent. MSAR’s various initiatives won some public recognition
7For instance, receiving a restaurant license application involved many departments: the Civil and Municipal Affairs Bureau; the Fire Services Bureau; Land, Public Works and Transport Bureau; Labor Affairs Bureau; Macao Economic Services; Macau Government Tourist Office; the Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau; and the Health Bureau (Government Policy Plan for the Year 2004 Financial Year of the Macau Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China 2003, 1005–6). In the past, businessmen applying for restaurant licenses had to visit the above-mentioned departments and submit documents to individual offices for license approval. In 2003, these government agencies inaugurated a one-stop service gateway. Various one-stop service gateways have been established for 26 services, involving 11 departments (Macau Yearbook 2005, 67).
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
556 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
of the civil service reform. The average mark on government performance was 3.28 on the 5-point scale; only 13.7% of respondents were dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with the performance. However, those measures did not greatly enhance government efficiency and performance; they aimed to change the public perception of public authorities.8 Like the puzzle of reform contended by Osborne and Gaebler (1992), the authorities introduced various reform plans and projects but failed to recognize objectives. The emphasis on the use of labor and service contracts is a good example. As discussed above, the civil service system allowed departments to use contractual terms to hire civil servants. However, the system was misused so that most civil servants on contractual terms were employed in the bureaucracy for many years. A new contract system that used labor and service contracts was favored after the handover. Labor and service contracts allowed officials to circumvent the personnel system, which had become complicated and triggered division among government workers. Departments were encouraged to initiate reform programs but many lost sight of the goals of reform.
In a nutshell, after the handover, the government’s reform focused on enhancing the caliber and attitude of the civil servant. The MSAR authorities sought to legitimize themselves through various reforms in the new political era. Therefore, they favored programs that were easy to achieve. In this way, they sought to win public support and to stabilize the MSAR regime (Leng 2002, 6). Reforming the attitude of civil servants as well as the organization of public services was undertaken with few difficulties (Tian and Leong 2009), while the rooted irregularities of the bureaucracy and the problems of parochialism went unheeded. Chief executive Edmund Ho seldom criticized Macao’s civil service. Rather, he recognized its contribution to society in the early years after the handover. However, he did mark the various bureaucratic problems that plagued the civil service in his platform during the 1999 election. The Hong Kong SAR’s experience suggested that bureaucratic reform immediately after the handover might antagonize civil servants, thereby triggering instability in the administration (Scott 2005, 29–62). Not until various government scandals (the Ao Man-long case and overspending in the East Asian Games) caused a public outcry did the government initiate reform of bureaucratic irregularities. Indeed, these events compromised the legitimacy of MSAR’s authorities.
To tighten bureaucratic controls, the government revised and improved the civil service appraisal system, which was implemented in 2005. The old appraisal system was seen as unfair as the appraiser may have been biased toward individual subordinates due to a personal relationship (Chan 2007, 37–46). The new system aimed at: (1) motivation, (2) improving performance, (3) improving communication between managers and subordinates, (4) improving human resources management, and (5) advocating good public services (Appraisal System for Public Servants, Article 2, Law 8/2004). It introduced various elements to reduce the influence of preferential treatment and motivated officials to improve their performance by using the carrot and stick approach. It is noteworthy that the old appraisal method adopted a 4-point scale (excellent, good, fair, and poor). If a civil servant received a fair or poor grade in his/her
8For instance, Iong (2004) illustrated that e-government development had not yet facilitated interdepartmental cooperation in Macao. José Maria Pereira Coutinho, a legislator and the president of the Macao Civil Servant’s Association, indicated that one-stop service gateway had failed to improve interdepartmental cooperation (Personal Interview with José Maria Pereira Coutinho, November 8, 2007). Departments still examined each application on an individual basis. There was no interdepartmental communication even when problems arose. Kwan Tsui Hang, another legislator, argued that the government established a company to organize the Games and aimed to allow flexibility for the management, but, in reality, the company abused its autonomy, resulting in serious overspending. The government failed and lacked capability to check and balance the public corporations.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in Macao 557
evaluation, disciplinary action would have to be initiated. Those with a poor evaluation would be dismissed immediately. As a result, most appraisers tried to give good and excellent evaluation to their subordinates in order to maintain harmony in the office while some might abuse their authority and threaten their subordinates for cooperation in possible irregularities in the office. By contrast, the new system adopts a 5-point scale (excellent, very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied). A retraining program as well as job reassignment will be given to improve civil servants with performance problems. No disciplinary action will be taken immediately unless an official continues his/her poor performance over several years. Yet, poor performance does not necessarily mean the dismissal of officials while they will have chances for improvement.
Furthermore, the principle of management by objective was absorbed into the new appraisal system. There will be three meetings between appraiser and appraisees each year. The work plan of subordinates will be discussed in the first meeting at the beginning of each year. The second meeting, in the middle of the year, will assess work progress. Finally, there will be a year-end evaluation. Appraisal advisory committees are installed in bureaus and are responsible for complaints of unfair treatment in the evaluation.
Second, the government published a Consultative Paper for the Amendment of General Principle for Leaders and Director (September 2007), which recommended various measures to restrict the power of the agency head. A job rotation system was recommended for all agency heads so that they could explore the work in various units at 3- to 5-year intervals and enrich their experience within the administration (Consultative Paper for the Amendment of General Principle for Leaders and Director 2007, 14). It was also reasoned that job rotation would decrease bureaucratic corruption as individuals would be less able to fi nd loopholes and build a personal network in the shorter tenure. Third, a Roadmap for Public Sector Reform (2007) was also proposed, and various reform items were listed for bureaucratic enhancement. For example, a centralized recruitment process was advocated to undermine nepotism and personal networks in personnel management. Fourth, to promote interdepartmental cooperation, Residents Service Centers were installed in some districts in Macao so residents could receive services from locally based departments. In August 2007, the Commission Against Corruption, which is the anti-corruption agency of the MSAR government, initiated measures helping 50 government departments design internal regulations and mechanism against bureaucratic bribery. Indeed, in his second term, chief executive Edmund Ho focused efforts to remedying officials’ methods and conduct.
Unfortunately, these measures have not yet yielded fruitful result. Chen’s study (2007) on the new appraisal system indicated that many civil servants said the system remained unfair; they perceived the persistence of personal relationships. Moreover, sanctions have not yet been detailed for the punishment of officials who continue their poor performance over years. The new appraisal system is practiced as a formality by officials. The Roadmap for Public Sector Reform was criticized as substandard in mapping out the reform plan. Although the document identified many items targeted for reform, neither the plan nor the schedule was detailed or elaborated. The various reforms are a far cry from what was expected.
26.5 Conclusion
In many former colonies, reform of government administration was essential and inevitable after decolonization. In the case of Macao, the MSAR authorities have sought the advancement of the civil service after the handover. The civil service has been underdeveloped since the colonial era. Weber’s model of bureaucracy, stipulating checks and controls on officials as well as career
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC