- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
212 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
under British rule for over 100 years. Thus, by the time the country gained independence, the administrative machinery of the country was already in place based on the British colonial influence. Among others, the British had instituted the District and Land Offices, and had formed the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) as the main administrative body of the country. The federal-state system of government was already in place with a cabinet that comprised the Department of Internal Affairs, Department of Economy, Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Department of Education, Department of Health, Department of Industry and Social Relations, Department of Land, Mining and Communication, and the Department of Housing and Public Works [2]. When the country gained independence in 1957 as the Federation of Malaya, the system of administration was naturally that of an extension of the British administration.
The constitution of 1957 that allowed for an independent Malaya, gave the states equal constitutional status and relations to one another. All states were also equal in their relations to the center, but they were not equal to the center except in constitutional recognition. The powers of the federal government were enhanced on matters such as financial provision since the central government is the main taxing authority of the country. The states are only allowed taxing rights over revenue from land and forests. The constitution also allowed for emergency provision to rest with the central authority and this clearly gave the federal government enhanced power over the states [3]. The 1957 constitution provided the basis for the Federation of Malaysia Constitution of 1963 with the admission of three new states, i.e., Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah into the federation. Singapore eventually left the federation in 1965 to be an independent nation in its own right.
Three main government systems evolved against the historical backdrop of the country; constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy and federalism. The three systems looked after the interests of all parties—the position of the Malay rulers of the states, the autonomy of the state government, and the interests of a multi-racial society with Malays, Chinese, and Indians as the main racial groups. The three governing systems have allowed for the country to have stability over the years since its independence in 1957, and this stability has, in turn, allowed for economic progress and development to take place.
11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
Civil service in Malaysia is carried out at both the federal and state level. At the federal level, the administration of the country is performed by the various ministries and departments, while at the state level, the civil service system comprises the local government and local administration. The number of public sector employees was once the biggest in the country, although a dwindling of its size has been observed in recent times. During the early post-colonization era, the civil service formed the largest employment in the country, employing about 300,000 or 16% of total employment. In 1997, the number reached almost 700,000. Following the country’s privatization exercise and an emphasis on the private sector as the country’s engine of growth, the number has been decreasing, currently standing at about 650,000 [4]. Still, if the armed forces and police force are included, the Malaysian civil service numbers about 1.2 million employees.1
Employees of the Malaysian civil service can be broadly grouped into two categories, the Managerial and Professional Group; and the Support Group. The Managerial and Professional Group requires a university degree as entry qualification. Senior officers from the Management and
1The Star Online, May 8, 2007, http://thestar.com.my/news/story (accessed October 1, 2009).
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
|
|
Civil Service System in Malaysia 213 |
|
Table 11.1 Civil Service Structure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Categories |
Group |
|
Entry Qualification |
|
|
|
|
Managerial and |
Premier civil service |
|
Promoted from professional and |
professional group |
position |
|
management group |
|
|
|
|
|
Professional and |
|
University degree |
|
management group |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Support group |
Support Group I |
|
College diploma or higher school |
|
|
|
certificate |
|
|
|
|
|
Support Group I |
|
Secondary school certificate or |
|
|
|
lower school certificate |
|
|
|
|
Professional Group are promoted to the rank of Premier Civil Service positions or Jawatan Utama Sektor Awam (JUSA). These positions are most coveted in terms of salary, perks, and responsibilities, and are often referred to by the acronym JUSA. The Support Group on the other hand is further categorized into two, i.e., Support Group I and Support Group II. The entry qualification for Support Group I is college diploma or higher school certificate, while the entry qualification for Support Group II is secondary school certificate or lower school certificate. The Managerial and Professional Group serves as officers in the Malaysian civil service, while the Support Group serves as assistant officers. There are 246,202 officers in the Management and Professional Group and 1,603 in the Premier Civil Service positions2; while the rest are the Support Group employees. The structure is depicted in Table 11.1.
Malaysia’s civil service is much influenced by its colonial past, a legacy left by the British. It must be noted that among the purposes of British colonization policy was for colonized countries to provide raw materials needed for the booming industrial sector in Britain. Thus, Malaya was developed by the British as a major producer of raw materials such as rubber and tin. This move saw mass migration of Chinese and Indians to work in the tin mines and rubber estates, respectively [5]. The resultant effect was ethnic segregation along economic functions, with the Chinese as traders and tin miners; the Indians in rubber plantations and as white-collar workers; and the Malays in the rural areas as farmers and fishermen. As the Malays became more concerned with being economically marginalized in their own country, this was, among others, placated by the British by opening the civil service to the Malays. The recruitment quotas for the administrative elite were introduced in 1952, and the practice continued unaltered after independence [6]. This historically sets the basis for the country’s civil service to be gradually dominated by the Malays, and continues today. Table 11.2 shows the proportion by ethnicity on entry to the Administrative and Diplomatic Service (ADS).
While the practice was acceptable during the early post-colonial period as part of the bargaining arrangement between the Malays, Chinese, and Indians; the situation has changed after more than half a century of independence. There is now greater pressure for the composition of the civil service, particularly the elite ADS, to reflect the ethnic composition of the country. The government has responded accordingly. In 2007, non-Bumiputra composition in the civil service increased to 15.3%; and assurance was given by the Chief Secretary to the Government that
2The Malaysian Bar, May 22, 2007, http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/news (accessed September 30, 2009).
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
214 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Table 11.2 Entry to the Administrative and Diplomatic Service (1998, 2001–2003)
|
Bumiputra: Malay, |
Non-Bumiputra: |
Non-Bumiputra as |
Year |
Sabah, Sarawak |
Chinese, Indian |
Percentage of Total |
|
|
|
|
1998 |
72 |
8 |
10.0 |
|
|
|
|
2001 |
229 |
15 |
6.1 |
|
|
|
|
2002 |
286 |
35 |
10.9 |
|
|
|
|
2003 |
241 |
34 |
12.4 |
|
|
|
|
Source: McCourt, W. and Foon, L. M., Malaysia as model: Policy transferability in an Asian country,
Public Management Review, 19, 2, 222, 2007.
recruitment and promotion within the civil service will not be based on racial considerations.3 However, job applications into the civil service from ethnic groups other than Malays are low to begin with. In 2003, only 1.9% and 2.2% of the 350,000 civil service applicants were Chinese and Indians, respectively [7]. It has also been noticed that since the 1990s the number of Chinese applicants has been decreasing for the technical and professional positions as well, such as accountants, engineers, and scientists, which they used to dominate [8]. A number of reasons have been attributed to this. One is the social belief that Chinese in particular are not interested in working for the government because of pay. Although a sharp salary revision carried out in July 2007 has made civil service pay more attractive, it is still a little early to see its impact. But sentiment deeply rooted in the historical divide of the Malays being in government, the Chinese in business, and the Indians in the plantations has also been reasoned as to why other ethnic groups are keeping away from the civil service [9].
In general, civil service pay has been much less than that of the private sector. This has led to a situation where the civil service was not able to attract the best talent, or as mentioned earlier, also made it less attractive to the other ethnic groups in the country. But a healthy trend toward it becoming the career of choice among graduates has been observed in recent times. It is now fast becoming very competitive to join the public service, as can be seen in the number of applicants as opposed to the number of vacancies for selected positions in Table 11.3.
The notion that a government job does not pay well and is not attractive, no longer holds, especially following the sharp salary revision in July 2007, discussed further. Factor in the very generous pension scheme and housing loan, numerous perks such as medical benefits that extend to the spouse, children and parents; opportunities to further studies on government scholarship, and various allowances such as a housing allowance and a cost of living allowance; and critical allowance for some services; certainly the Malaysian civil service package has come of age. Thus, greater competition to join the civil service will be the order of the day.
The main central agency for human resource in the Malaysian civil service is the Public Service Division (PSD) or Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (JPA). All human resource policies and implementation are centralized under the PSD, and are transmitted to the various ministries and departments through administrative circulars issued by the PSD. Another central agency that is involved in human resource functions of the civil service is the Public Service Commission (PSC). However, unlike the PSD’s comprehensive responsibilities over human resource management, the
3China Press, January 11, 2008, Regardless of race, gender, only the best will be employed and promoted, http:// www.pemudah.gov.my/China_press_110108_exclusive interview with KSN.asp (accessed January 28, 2008).
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Table 11.3 Response to Vacancies in the Public Sector in 2006
Graduate Post |
Ministry/Department |
No. of Vacancies |
No. of Applicants |
|
|
|
|
Accountant |
Accountant-Generals’ Department |
14 |
8,114 |
|
|
|
|
Economic affairs officer |
Entrepreneurial Development and |
9 |
20,752 |
|
Cooperative Ministry |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Research officer |
Fisheries Department |
2 |
21,941 |
|
|
|
|
Corporate communications officer |
Human Resource Ministry |
13 |
19,325 |
|
|
|
|
Counselor |
Public Service Department |
17 |
10,106 |
|
|
|
|
Factory and machinery maintenance |
Human Resource Ministry |
8 |
4,065 |
|
|
|
|
Information technology officer |
Public Service Department |
100 |
12,937 |
|
|
|
|
Law officer |
Attorney-General Department |
146 |
2,357 |
|
|
|
|
Electronic engineer |
Railway Department |
1 |
3,705 |
|
|
|
|
Investigation officer |
Anti-Corruption Agency |
33 |
12,055 |
|
|
|
|
Administrative and diplomatic officer |
Public Service Department |
350 |
44,758 |
|
|
|
|
Research officer |
National Remote Sensing Center |
1 |
22,218 |
|
|
|
|
Source: The Star Online, December 16, 2007, The civil service beckons, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/story (accessed December 10, 2009).
215 Malaysia in System Service Civil
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