- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
History and Context of Public Administration in Malaysia 145
politicians to get their training on how government works. The British took note of this and made special provisions for these links to continue. For example, in the first general election in Malaya in 1955, the colonial government allowed Malay civil servants to retire if they wished to stand as a candidate. This was in stark contrast to Britain where civil servants had to resign if they wished to take part in active politics. Of the 103 Malay candidates who stood in the 1955 elections, 53 were ex-civil servants [8].
7.4Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
The civil service continued to be closed to the non-Malay community until the 1950s. Even when the British decided to prepare Malaya for independence, they were of the opinion that the civil service, especially the upper echelons, be reserved for the Malays. Owing to security fears, the British were especially sensitive to the large number of Chinese entering the service. From the late 1940s onward, there was a serious communist challenge to the state. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led by ethnic Chinese, launched an armed insurrection against the British in 1948, claiming that they were fighting for independence and the end of colonial rule. In such a climate, it was not surprising that General Gerald Templer, the British high commissioner, introduced a quota system in the MCS. The quota was set at one non-Malay to every four Malays, with the result that at the upper echelons of the MCS, it was always 80% Malay [9]. Although attempts were made to extend this quota to the professional and technical services, this was not successful as there were not enough qualified Malay candidates.
In 1963, the year the Federation of Malaysia was established, Malays constituted 86.2% of the MCS. In 1969, for the whole civil service the ethnic composition was 60.8% Malay, 20.2% Chinese, 17.4% Indian, and 1.6% others [10]. Three decades later in 2005, the comparative figures were 77.3%, 9.37%, 5.12%, and 7.77% [11].
On May 13, 1969, serious racial riots broke out in the capital Kuala Lumpur and several other urban areas. The causes of the riots are complex, but for the most part it was political competition between the Chinese and the Malays. The main Chinese opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), made major gains at the expense of the Alliance. UMNO and the Malay community saw this as a direct challenge to them. Fights between proand anti-government supporters broke out during victory parades held by the opposition. This led to much bigger crowds and mass rioting between the Malays and non-Malays.6
The Malays claimed that as the indigenous people of Malaya, this was their land and the concept of ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) cannot be challenged by the non-Malays [14]. With several hundred dead, the government had little choice but to suspend Parliament and impose emergency rule. An official report, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report, claimed that the economic disparity between the Malays and the non-Malays (read Chinese) was the main cause of the riots [15]. The report argues that the Malays were unhappy that they were shut out of the economy due to Chinese dominance of the economy.
In 1971, the government recalled Parliament and passed several laws to restrict public discussion on “sensitive” issues such as race relations, religion, the sultans, and Malay special rights. The
6Today, there is no clear account of who started the conflict. The most authoritative account of the rioting can be found [12]. For a completely different perspective, and one that argues that the rioting was deliberate and planned [13].
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146 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
government also launched the New Economic Policy (NEP), supposedly to correct the imbalance in the economy as identified by the May 13 report [16]. The NEP set out in clear terms the government’s commitment to eradicating poverty and restructuring society by ensuring that all ethnic groups were represented in all professions [17]. Unfortunately, the NEP never lived up to its own stated goals. Rather, the NEP was used as a policy to reinforce the special rights of the Malay and bumiputera community in all social, economic, and political spheres. These special rights were defined broadly as meaning that the Malay community were entitled to preferential treatment by the government in all its activities. A quota was established for bumiputera entry to universities, bank loans, scholarships, business licences, etc. A special bumiputera-only tertiary institution, Institut Teknologi MARA (now called Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM)), was establish to provide Malays with opportunities to get a tertiary education. The non-Malays who were excluded saw this policy as nothing more than state-sanctioned racism and discrimination [18].
While the NEP was a political document, its impact was widely felt in the civil service, as the civil service was the main agency tasked with implementing the NEP. Overnight, the civil service and government-linked institutions, such as statutory boards, became an almost exclusive Malay environment. New intakes in the civil service were almost all bumiputera with a token few non-Malays. Since the inception of the NEP, the proportion of Malays in the civil service has grown from 60% to 77%. The elite ranks of the civil service, Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik (PTD) or the Administrative and Diplomatic Service7 became 85% Malay, or had six Malays for each non-Malay [19]. The quota system created by the British for the MCS was not only kept, but also increased from one non-Malay to four Malays, to one non-Malay to six Malays.
PTD officers occupy all key senior positions in the federal bureaucracy, including the ministries and departments staffed mainly by professionals, leading to one scholar who served as a consultant to the Malaysian civil service calling the PTD “the strategic point of control” in the civil service [20]. Another scholar, Lim Hong Hai, reported that, “of the 21 Ministries, only the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment has a Chinese as its Secretary General and the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development has an Indian as its Secretary General. These Ministries also have a total of 41 Deputy Secretaries General, only three of whom are Chinese. All or nearly all of the 19 bumiputera Secretaries General and 38 Deputy Secretaries General are Malays [21].”
The dominance of the Malays in the civil service was a reflection of the new political reality in the wider political arena. UMNO, the main Malay party in the BN coalition, became its key anchor and undisputed leader. In 1974, the Alliance was reconstructed and became known as the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front. All parties were invited to join the BN, and although the BN was a coalition, it was clear that UMNO was the acknowledged leader of the coalition [22]. Since the 1974 general elections, the number of UMNO and Malay-majority seats constitutes the majority of seats won by the BN. In addition, UMNO alone command very close to half the seats in Parliament. For example, in the 2004 general election, UMNO won 109 out of 219 seats. As a whole, the BN coalition has never lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament until 2008. This allows it to amend the Malaysian constitution at any time.
In other words, the unspoken truth was self-evident—UMNO could rule Malaysia on its own. More than half the cabinet members came from UMNO, and UMNO occupied all the key posts such as those of the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, finance minister, foreign minister, home minister, and internal security and defence minister. The other BN parties, such as the MCA and MIC, could take part in the government as long as they did not challenge the ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy) concept. Although the non-Malays in government were
7 The PTD is the successor to colonial-era elite MCS.
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History and Context of Public Administration in Malaysia 147
allowed to air their political wants and grouses, UMNO alone decided on the outcome of key government policies. Some concessions were granted to the non-Malays as UMNO did not want the non-Malays parties in the BN, such as the MCA, Gerakan, and MIC, to totally lose the support of their communities [23].
With UMNO dominating all levels of the political system, Malaysia is often called a semidemocracy or soft authoritarian state. The Malaysian prime minister (all UMNO presidents since independence) yields more executive power over the political system, especially the civil service, than any other institution in Malaysia. Although in theory there was an independent Service Commission—Public Service Commission (PSD), the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, the Police Force Commission, and the Education Service Commission—the appointment of the commissioners who sat on these commissions was often the prerogative of the minister and the prime minister. In all cases, the chairmen of these commissions were ethnic Malays although there was always (at least) one non-Malay member.
7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
No discussion of the Malaysian civil service is complete without mentioning the role of Dr. Mahathir. Mahathir, the fourth prime minister of Malaysia, is also the longest-serving prime minister. He served from 1981 to 2003, a period of 22 years. Much of the civil service we see today bear his imprint. When he came into power in 1981, he introduced several changes in order to cement his control over the civil service—then widely seen as dramatic. Using the slogan, “Clean, Efficient and Trustworthy,” all civil servants were made to wear name tags, they had to punch-in time clocks, and they had to undergo regular training and reviews. He strengthened the prime minister’s department control over the entire civil service through the Malaysian Administrative and Planning Unit (MAMPU), which began to review and restructure departments in order to make them more efficient. He gave more powers to the National Bureau of Investigations (NBI)8 and reactivated the Public Complaints Bureau (PCB). He promised to fi ght corruption in the public service [24]. Mahathir vigorously pursued heavy industrialization using Japan and Korea as a model (so called “Look East” policy). Within the civil service, he pursued a privatization policy that saw many public utilities becoming privatized. One justification Mahathir used for the privatization exercise was the creation of a Bumiputera Industrial and Commercial Community (BICC). Many of these privatized corporations were given to selected bumiputera entrepreneurs while the government retained ownership of the larger ones. The end result was that many civil servants found themselves working under private sector conditions. More than 500 government-linked companies (GLCs) were established as a result of Mahathir’s privatization policies [25].
Many of Mahathir’s key projects were controlled by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the prime minister’s department. With billions worth of privatization projects at stake, Mahathir, through the EPU, became extremely powerful. The EPU serves as the center of national planning, in particular, the national 5-year plans. Projects over a certain size initiated by other departments and ministries require the approval of the EPU before they can be implemented. All private sector proposals submitted to the government for approval must be cleared by the EPU before they go to cabinet. Needless to say, the EPU reports directly to the prime minister, i.e., Mahathir. For a time, Mahathir was also finance minister, ensuring that he controlled the entire financial process.
8Later renamed the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) and Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC).
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC