- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
514 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
people, and it seems an inconceivable excuse that they place their private interests above those of the public.
24.4 Conclusion
Citizens may have hoped that the establishment of the CAC after the handover and the laws enacted to combat graft and corruption would relegate these notorious practices that were common under the Portuguese regime to a bygone chapter of Macao history. However, responses to ethical crimes since the handover have disappointed. The Ao Man Long case and other incidents reveal the insufficiency of a clear division of functions and job descriptions, institutional structures, political neutrality, ethical and disciplinary problems of officials and the concept of rule of law among the civil service. Civil servants are supposed to carry out their duties in accordance with the regulations, rules, instructions, and orders made by the administration given that they are legal and executable. In addition, those legal administrative instructions are expected to be executed in the absence of personal affections and gains. Notwithstanding, it is a duty of civil servants to work under due supervision, it is also a duty of civil servants to report illegal behaviors to the pertinent monitoring institutions irrespective of the rank and position of the accused officer. Obviously, some civil servants in Macao choose to tolerate and accept these administrative “deviations” as usual practices.
The chief executive incident may be an isolated case and made by excusable mistake, but a clarification or explanation by the CAC has yet to be made. The absence of such actions increase community concerns that patron-client politics and flattering culture at among civil service managers. Even worse, one may argue that such phenomena may be more prominent in disciplinary forces like the police force or Custom and Excise as these kinds of organizations emphasize the class system and obedience. All these elements, if applicable, diminish the success of the CAC and worsen the impartial reputation and credibility of this anti-corruption organ. Although the CAC has done a lot of promotion and drafted a series of anti-corruption publications to educate the public as well as civil servants on the importance of a clean society, it is regretful to observe that anti-corruption outcomes attain only a little public recognition. The CAC should carry out decisive and forceful steps to strengthen its effectiveness and rebuild its public image in wider ways, such as taking the initiative to investigate public rumors about major illegal behaviors in the public and private sectors; playing a leading role in civil servants training and refresher courses on public ethics education; prosecuting those witnesses who allegedly carried out illegal instructions in Ao’s case; enhancing transparency and attending Legislative Assembly Q&A sessions quarterly; and expanding its personnel establishment and functions through legal means. All in all, the performance of the CAC falls short of public’s expectations as well as objectives. In addition to the organizational and ethical issues discussed above, quanxi politics arising from patron-client relations may perhaps become another principal priority for the administration to solve so as to maintain a clean and institutionalized government.
References
1.Lo, S.H., Political Development in Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995).
2.Lo, Political Development in Macau, pp. 179–86.
3.Policy Address for the Fiscal Year 2000 (MSAR Printing Bureau, 2000: 9).
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Public Ethics and Corruption in Macao 515
Appendix A
Abstracts of the General Regulations Governing the Staff of the Public Administration of Macao
Codes |
Abstracts |
|
|
Conflict of interest |
• Referring to conflict between the personal interests of a |
|
public servant and the interests of the government and of |
|
the departments/institutions. |
|
• Personal interests include interests (both property and |
|
non-property interests) of a public servant, his family, |
|
relatives, friends, associations to which he belongs and |
|
those with whom he has either a hostile or an intimate |
|
relationship. |
|
• Conflict of interest may give rise to acts of corruption, fraud, |
|
and abuse of power. Public servants shall always stay alert |
|
and take precautions to prevent any situations that may lead |
|
to actual or predictable conflict of interest. |
|
• A public servant who abuses his power or violates the duties |
|
inherent in his functions, with the intent to seek illegitimate |
|
interests for himself or for a third party or to cause damage |
|
to another person, commits the crime of abuse of power. |
|
|
Handling of advantages |
• A public servant who, personally or through an intermediary, |
received |
solicits or accepts an undue advantage for himself or for |
|
another person as a reward for performing or refraining |
|
from performing an act, no matter how much the value is |
|
and whether the act or the omission is in breach of his |
|
official duties, commits the crime of passive corruption, |
|
which does not rule out his disciplinary liability. |
|
• Public servants shall not accept directly or indirectly any |
|
money or other advantages derived from the exercise of |
|
their official duties, which are undue according to the law. |
|
They should treat all citizens with objectivity and impartiality. |
|
• If a public servant (or his spouse, lineal relative by blood or |
|
affinity) has accepted gifts offered by an interested person |
|
before or after the commencement of an administrative |
|
procedure, he should recuse himself from that particular |
|
procedure. Failure to do so constitutes a breach of official |
|
duties. |
|
• Advantages include: |
|
1. Gifts |
|
2. Money |
|
3. Hospitality |
|
4. Rewards |
|
5. Commissions |
|
|
|
(continued) |
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
516 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Appendix A (continued) |
Abstracts of the General Regulations Governing the Staff of the |
||
Public Administration of Macao |
|
||
|
|
|
|
Codes |
|
|
Abstracts |
|
|
|
|
|
|
6. |
Special offers |
|
|
7. |
Discounts |
|
|
8. |
Services |
|
|
9. |
Transportation and accommodation |
|
|
|
|
Outside employment |
|
• Public servants perform their official duties on the “principle |
|
|
|
of exclusiveness.” This means that public servants “serve |
|
|
|
exclusively the public interest” and they have the duty of |
|
|
|
“not engaging in incompatible activities.” In other words, |
|
|
|
besides their official duties, they should not take up any |
|
|
|
other public positions or private practices without prior |
|
|
|
authorization. |
|
|
|
• Public servants are permitted to take up concurrent pubic |
|
|
|
offices or positions only in the following exceptional cases: |
|
|
|
1. |
Inherent functions |
|
|
2. |
Professional training activities, which require prior |
|
|
|
authorization from the superior |
|
|
3. |
Teaching activities, which require prior authorization from |
|
|
|
the superior and shall not exceed the limit of 11 hours per |
|
|
|
week |
|
|
4. |
Other situations considered conductive to public interest |
|
|
• Exceptions are made to public servants being permitted to |
|
|
|
engage in private practices when all the following |
|
|
|
requirements are met: |
|
|
|
1. |
Previously authorized by the superior |
|
|
2. |
Not conflicting with the working hours of the public |
|
|
|
position |
|
|
3. |
Not compromising the duty of impartiality |
|
|
4. |
Not prohibited by special law |
|
|
• Public servants are prohibited from engaging in private |
|
|
|
practices on a freelance basis unless otherwise permitted by |
|
|
|
special laws. |
|
|
|
• Directors and chiefs are absolutely prohibited from |
|
|
|
engaging in private practices. |
|
|
|
• According to the Law of Declaration of Incomes and |
|
|
|
Properties, public servants must declare all their outside |
|
|
|
positions, functions, and activities that are remunerated or |
|
|
|
rewarded with property advantages. |
|
|
|
|
|
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
|
|
Public Ethics and Corruption in Macao 517 |
Appendix A (continued) |
Abstracts of the General Regulations Governing the Staff of the |
|
Public Administration of Macao |
||
|
|
|
Codes |
|
Abstracts |
|
|
|
Recusal system |
|
• Public servants are required not to participate in or handle |
|
|
administrative procedures or acts that may trap them in role |
|
|
conflicts. The objectives are to ensure that the |
|
|
administrative authorities and their staff carry out |
|
|
administrative activities with objectivity and impartiality and |
|
|
to avoid public servants falling into embarrassing and |
|
|
suspicious situations. |
|
|
• Mandatory recusal—a public servant is legally impeded and |
|
|
cannot participate in an administrative procedure in certain |
|
|
situations prescribed by law. |
|
|
• Self-recusal—when it happens that the situation may give |
|
|
rise to reasonable doubt about the impartiality and the |
|
|
integrity of a public servant in an administrative procedure, |
|
|
the public servant concerned should recuse himself from |
|
|
the procedure. |
|
|
|
Duty of confidentiality |
|
• Public servants should keep in professional confidence the |
|
|
non-public information acquired in the course of their |
|
|
official duties. |
|
|
• A public servant who, without being duly authorized, |
|
|
discloses secrets that come to his knowledge in the course |
|
|
of official duties, with the intent to seek benefit for himself |
|
|
or for another person, or knowingly causes damage to the |
|
|
public interest or to a third party, commits the crime of |
|
|
violation of secrecy. |
|
|
|
Use of department/ |
|
• Public servants should not, for their benefit or the benefit |
institution property and |
|
of another person, misappropriate public or private |
resources |
|
money or movable property entrusted to them, in their |
|
|
possession or to which they access by virtue of their |
|
|
positions, otherwise they commit the crime of |
|
|
embezzlement. |
|
|
• Public servants, when using or allowing the use of public |
|
|
or private vehicles or other movable property of |
|
|
considerable value entrusted to them, in their possession |
|
|
or to which they have access by virtue of their positions, |
|
|
should ensure that the property is used for the intended |
|
|
purposes. Failure to do so constitutes the crime of |
|
|
embezzlement by use. |
|
|
• Public servants should also use public money in accordance |
|
|
with the law. If public money is spent not on justifiable |
|
|
grounds of public interest and for a public purpose different |
|
|
from the one prescribed by law, it also constitutes the crime |
|
|
of embezzlement by use. |
|
|
|
|
|
(continued) |
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
518 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Appendix A (continued) Abstracts of the General Regulations Governing the Staff of the Public Administration of Macao
Codes |
Abstracts |
|
|
Legal liability |
• If a public servant performs an act in breach of his official |
|
duties, the department/institution may institute a |
|
disciplinary proceeding against him, hold him liable for the |
|
act, and apply a written reprimand, fine, suspension, |
|
compulsory retirement, and dismissal. |
|
• If a public servant commits a crime during the performance |
|
of his duties or by taking advantage of his official capacity, |
|
even though it does not involve any acceptance of |
|
advantages, he may be subject to disciplinary liability due to |
|
violation of such duties as zeal, loyalty, and confidentiality, |
|
etc. |
|
• If a public servant violates the criminal law, whether it is an |
|
occupational crime or a crime of other nature, he may be held |
|
criminally responsible. |
|
• Disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings are |
|
mutually independent. If a public servant performs an act |
|
that violates disciplinary and criminal provisions |
|
simultaneously, he shall be subject to both disciplinary and |
|
criminal liability. |
|
|
Duty to report and relevant |
• According to the General Regulations Governing the Staff of |
channels |
the Public Administration of Macao and the Panel Procedure |
|
Code, public servants should report all the offences that |
|
have come to their positions even though they may not |
|
know the identity of the offenders. If the offences involve |
|
the use of official positions for personal gain, particularly if it |
|
is related to the acceptance and solicitation of advantages, |
|
they should report immediately to their superiors or to other |
|
competent entities (such as the Commission Against |
|
Corruption.) |
|
• Those who fail to report the offences that they know, or they |
|
pretend that they do not know, are subject to disciplinary |
|
liability even though it does not involve an offer or |
|
acceptance of any advantage. Failure to report for the |
|
purpose of either benefiting or prejudicing someone leads |
|
to criminal liability. |
|
• “Ignorance of the law” is not an excuse for not fulfilling the |
|
duty to report since this act is in breach of the duty of “zeal” |
|
of public servants and leads to disciplinary liability. |
|
|
Source: General Regulations Governing the Staff of the Public Administration of Macao at “Publication” of Commission Against Corruption website: http://www.ccac.org.mo.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC