- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
408 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
visionary and reform-minded local chief executives to implement innovative programs in pursuit of local development objectives and raise the performance levels of their respective LGUs.
A number of these initiatives are widely acclaimed and multi-awarded within and outside the country, such as the performance and transformation of Naga City under the leadership of Mayor Jesse Robredo. The Naga City government demonstrated how the full potential of the various offices and of the entire city can be tapped for effective and efficient delivery of public services that meet the requirements of the population. It focused on getting optimum outputs with minimum expenditures and producing desired quality results as planned. It succeeded in making services not only accessible, but also acceptable on the basis of the greatest good for the greatest number (UNDESA, 1997: 105–6).
Mandaluyong City embarked on a BOT scheme to construct a public market. In partnership with the private sector, the LGU built a public market with a mall that approaches world-class standards. It provided the land while the private sector built and operated the market. The revenues of the city increased because of the numerous business and license taxes collected from the establishments in the market/mall (UNDESA, 1997: 105). These innovations are reflective of NPM, which encourages private sector methods and broadening citizen participation.
20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
To seize the potentials of information and communication technology for national development, President Ramos approved and adopted the National Information Technology Plan (NITP) 2000 and established the National Information Technology Council in 1994 (RP, 1994). In October 1997, he further adopted the updated NITP 2000 that reoriented and revitalized public service delivery through information technology (IT). The computerization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), the revenue generating arms of government, contributed a great deal to the improvement of their operations (Carlos, 2004: 58).
To standardize the processing time for the bidding and award process for infrastructure, construction work, and consultancy service contracts of the national government, President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 129 on May 16, 1994.
20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
Government efforts to improve the performance of the bureaucracy that are reflective of NPM principles are anchored on the legal foundations built after the restoration of democracy in 1986.
20.4.2.1 Financial Management
There are four major processes in financial management: budget making; budget implementation; accounting; and audit (OECD, 2001: 17). Several oversight agencies share responsibility for financial management in the Philippines. Revenue generation, cash management, borrowings, and oversight over the finances of GOCCs and LGUs rest with the DOF and its agencies. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM), on the other hand, is responsible for the budget, organizational management, and compensation policy for the public sector. Meanwhile, in addition to its audit functions, the COA issues accounting rules and regulations. This fragmentation of responsibilities for financial management has put considerable strain on government agencies that have to deal with numerous, overlapping, and oftentimes conflicting policies, guidelines, and reportorial requirements (GOP, WB, ADB, 2003: 67).
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Performance Management Reforms in the Philippines 409
20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
To strengthen public fiscal accountability, the COA introduced a new accounting system (NGAS) in November 2001, to replace the “outmoded” 50-year-old accounting system. The COA mandated all national agencies and LGUs to implement the NGAS, which is based on a modified accrual accounting system that follows international accounting standards. The NGAS simplifies accounting concepts and procedures, ensures correct, complete, and timely recording of government financial transactions, facilitates the timely preparation of financial reports, and presents a clearer picture of the government’s financial position. It adopts responsibility accounting that is activity-based, a feature not present in the old system (Carague, 2009: 73–75; Carague, 2004: 46–47; GOP, WB, ADB, 2003: xi). In contrast to cash accounting, which registers costs when payments are made and revenues when they are received, accruals accounting records costs and revenues as they are incurred or earned. Advocates of accruals accounting argue that “it yields improved management information” and “facilitates a closer integration of financial and performance measures” (OECD, 2001: 19).
The old accounting system deviated from common accounting practices. It was complex and thus caused problems in compliance with reporting requirements. It did not accurately reflect the full cost of agency operations and was unable to allow benchmarking of costs with the private sector (NEDA, 2001: 262). It produced a balance sheet and a statement of operations, but the latter was neither an income statement nor a cash flow statement, much less a funds flow statement. By contrast, the NGAS produces a balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, and generates financial information in real time, which is vital to decision making.
Prior to the NGAS, the various agencies, the Bureau of Treasury, and the COA kept separate sets of accounting records. The lack of regular reconciliation procedures resulted in large amounts of unreconciled balances, “which cast doubt on the accuracy of the financial reports that the system produced” (NEDA, 2001: 262). The NGAS has harmonized the accounting systems of national agencies, LGUs, and GOCCs, thus facilitating evaluation of financial performance. The NGAS has made some report requirements of oversight agencies redundant (Carague, 2009: 73–79).
To guarantee correctness, reliability, completeness, and timeliness, the COA funded the development of electronic accounting software (e-NGAS) from its own savings. In October 2003, only the Office of the President, the CSC, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and two LGUs applied the e-NGAS. By 2007, 207 national and local government agencies and GOCCs had the e-NGAS installed. This, however, represents only 10% of all government agencies. The rest are still using the manual version of the NGAS.
It is still too early to say whether the NGAS will be sustained after a change in the COA leadership without the required legislation. Furthermore, the estimated cost of shifting to e-NGAS for the remaining 90% of agencies is a staggering Php850 million (Carague, 2009: 79), something the government can ill afford at this time.
The COA has restructured its offices across the regions to strengthen the performance of its audit functions. It is also moving toward value-for-money auditing and developing a risk-based auditing model.
20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
A key component of the Philippine government reform program is Public Expenditure Management (PEM). The government has been implementing reforms in PEM since 1998, as advocated by the World Bank, to pursue fiscal discipline, allocate resources efficiently, and obtain the best value for
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
410 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
money. The DBM, the DOF, and the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the highest economic planning agency of the government, are jointly responsible for PEM, which emphasizes the importance of performance-based or results-based budgeting.
The MTPDP is the blueprint for Philippine development that guides the economy. To better support the government’s development strategy, PEM establishes a results-based MTEF, which involves the development of performance indicators and a performance measurement system, and consists of fiscal and investment components (Boncodin, 2004: 4). Figure 20.2 reflects the various components of the MTEF.
The fiscal component of the MTEF includes a more realistic medium-term fiscal plan (MTFP). The MTFP is the fiscal blueprint for a 6-year period. It is made up of an explicit statement of medium-term fiscal targets on a macro level in terms of deficit reduction, revenue and disbursement, and the overall debt management strategy. It includes an estimate of the cost of ongoing and committed programs that impact on the medium-term position of the government. This cost estimate is reflected in the annual budget submitted to and approved by Congress. PEM uses the budget as an instrument for ensuring desired results. A 3-year rolling budget was introduced in 2001 to cost ongoing as well as proposed programs, activities, and projects (PAPs) (Boncodin, 2004: 2–4; GOP, WB, ADB, 2003: xix). The 1-year budget has been criticized for its tendency to allocate resources for agency programs and for its lack of a system of prioritization. The multi-year budget links budgeting decisions to medium-term fiscal targets.
The MTFP establishes clear targets and assessment mechanisms, strengthens incentive structures, and enlists the support of civil society to monitor results. It includes a clear set of rules for updating revenue and cost estimates such as how to balance the national budget and reduce the public debt to GDP ratio.
The investment component consists of the medium-term public investment program (MTPIP). It lists the broad investment requirements to support growth, the programs and projects that
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Figure 20.2 Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. (Boncodin, E. T., Introducing ResultsBased Approaches into Public Sector Management Processes: The Philippine Experience. Paper presented during the 2nd International Roundtable on Management for Development Results, Marrakech, Morocco, February 5, 2004, 3.)
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Performance Management Reforms in the Philippines 411
will be pursued over a 6-year period, and the possible modes of funding them. An important component of the MTPIP is the Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF). The OPIF identifies and prioritizes the investment programs that best contribute to the medium-term development goals. It shifts indicators from inputs to output/outcome performance indicators. It enables agencies to focus efforts and resources on core functions and undertake high impact activities at reasonable costs. A key element of the reform is the separation of administrative priority setting from political priority setting. Agency outputs are identified separately from the identification of the outcomes that result from these outputs.
The OPIF is a roadmap that defines where government and its instrumentalities should direct their development efforts. It focuses on objectives and the corresponding outcomes to be achieved and clarifies the expected performance and accountability of government agencies. The OPIF establishes an integrated performance management system (PMS) where organizational performance targets are cascaded down to lower level units and used as a basis for performance-based compensation. The PAPs of the different government departments and agencies should be able to show how these contribute to the achievement of the societal, sectoral, and organizational goals and objectives. The activities involved in the OPIF are outlined below (Boncodin, 2004: 2–6; GOP, WB, ADB, 2003):
(1)The oversight agencies and the line agencies identify desired outputs and outcomes on a parallel basis
(2)This includes the identification of major final outputs measured in terms of quality, quantity, timeliness, and cost
(3)Harmonization workshops level the understanding of these targets for both the oversight agencies and the line agencies
(4)Programs and projects that contribute to the realization of the major final outputs are identified
(5)The performance indicators for each major final output are identified
The OPIF is applied to only about 42% of the national budget, however, and does not include the Special Purpose Fund, which is Php850 billion. The 42% represents the budget of line agencies, not all of which are using the OPIF. It is tedious to apply, not to mention the difficulty of determining the major final outputs and identifying relevant performance indicators rather than simply process outputs or work counts. For instance, what would be a quality indicator for a justice program? In 2004, only six departments had completed their OPIF (Boncodin, 2004: 7) and by 2007, the number more than doubled.
The Sectoral Effectiveness and Efficiency Review (SEER) is a tool for regularly assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of ongoing PAPs of an agency and their actual contribution in attaining desired sectoral outcomes. It enables the government to review priorities to determine what will be discontinued, downscaled, or continued over the medium term and to redirect its resources and strategic programs. An assessment of the PEM revealed that oversight agencies have been more advanced than line agencies in implementing the SEERs because the former have better skills and greater capacity to do so. The implementation of the SEER has led to the termination of projects, restructuring of others, and the cancellation of excess fi nancing of projects.
The Agency Performance Review (APR) complements the SEERs through a more detailed assessment of the specific agency’s performance, particularly their budget utilization and whether funds should be released to them (Boncodin, 2004: 8).
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC