- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
30 |
Public Administration in Southeast Asia |
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2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, |
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Centralization, and Big Government ....................................................... |
41 |
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2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business |
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Interests................................................................................................ |
42 |
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2.2.5 Citizens as Master (1997–present)......................................................................... |
42 |
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2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and |
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Thai Realities.......................................................................................... |
42 |
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2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters .............. |
44 |
2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context ......................................................................... |
46 |
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2.4 |
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... |
48 |
References ................................................................................................................................. |
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Appendix A ............................................................................................................................... |
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2.1 Introduction
The practice of public administration in Thailand is a product of a long evolutionary process dating back at least 800 years. It is a mix of five systems of public administration that were designed by five “masters” of the Thai bureaucracy. These “masters” are: kings, military elites, politicians, big businessmen, and citizens. While each new master tries to implement his own version of public administration, the legacies of past public administrations with their own traditions, culture, and values linger on. Therefore, the present public administration in Thailand manifests characteristics of all five systems of public administration (see Appendix A for a chronological development of public administration in Thailand).
The history of public administration in Thailand is conceptualized as a continuing manifestation of the struggle for power among these five masters. The strength of each master changes in the course of time. At any particular moment, the stronger masters are likely to overshadow the weaker ones. It is within this unique political context that public administration has developed for eight centuries in Thailand.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part outlines the historical development and legacies of the five systems of public administration: kings as master; military elites as master; politicians as master; big businessmen as master; and citizens as master. The second part summarizes the traits of governmental culture that have evolved from the five masters of the Thai bureaucracy. The third part explains the unique political context of public administration in Thailand.
2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
2.2.1 Kings as Master (1238–1932)
Thailand was under the rule of absolute monarchs for 700 years. In 1238, independent city-states were weakened with the establishment of absolute monarchy under a powerful Sukhothai king. From then on until 1932, public administration was under the rule of absolute monarchs: from the Sukhothai period (1238–1438) to the Ayudhya period (1350–1767), the Thonburi period (1767– 1782), and the early Bangkok (Ratanakosin) period (1782–1932). It is therefore a long tradition for Thailand to have “kings as master.” Kings who were founders of dynasties were warrior kings who fought battles to amalgamate neighboring city-states or expel foreign attacking forces such as the Burmese invaders. After victory, they then proclaimed themselves as kings and embarked on their own dynastic rule. Successive kings of a dynasty were sons or bloodlines of former kings.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 31
Siamese kings and court nobles set up the royal bureaucracy as an essential instrument to exercise control and administer the country (Graham 1912, 237–96; Wales 1934, 69–101; Reeve 1951, 60–63; Damrong Rajanubhab, 1927). The king appointed royal kinsmen and court nobles to all high positions in the royal bureaucracy. Bureaucrats were royal servants (karachakan) who served the absolute monarch. In theory, the Siamese kings had absolute power to appoint, promote, and dismiss all royal servants according to ancient laws and traditions. In practice, the power of the monarch was sometimes challenged by princes, nobles, and local provincial elites. The struggle for high positions in the royal bureaucracy took place in the palace among the various patrons and factions of the royal kin and court nobles (Wyatt, 1976).
During seven centuries of absolute monarchy, major government reforms took place that laid the foundations for the present public administration. From that long period, several legacies linger on till now.
2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
“The King as Leader” is part of Thai traditional political culture. There are two models: the Father King and the Divine God King. The legacy left by the Sukhothai period is the Father King or Paw Kun model, which portrayed kings as paternalistic and benevolent Buddhists. The father-figure king ruled in accordance with the ten Buddhist virtues, called totsapit raja dharma. Under the father-son administrative system, the Sukhothai kings were like a father to the bureaucrats and the Thai people. The father-figure king exemplifies a good king. The current monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej or Rama IX, is also regarded as a “Royal Father” (Paw Luang) by Thais.
Conversely, kings of the Ayudhya period were seen as divine god kings. Not only were they Buddhist kings who ruled according to dharma, but they were also devaraja or god-kings whose sacred power was associated with the Hindu gods Indra and Vishnu. The administrative system changed from the father-son model of the Sukhothai era to an administration based on divine right that owed its origins to Cambodian and Hindu influences. The concept of divine kingship meant that the king was like a semi-god worshipped by the people. The king was master, and the rest, including bureaucrats, were his servants.
The Ayudhyan bureaucracy consisted of a complex hierarchical administrative system of ranked and titled officials, all of whom had varying amounts of sakdina (assumed landholding by rank) (Phumisak, 1957). From the Ayudhya period to the reign of King Rama IV in the Bangkok period, royal bureaucrats, freemen, and slaves would have to prostrate themselves in front of the king; they were not allowed to look at him (Rabibhadana, 1976).
King Bhumibol Adulyadej or Rama IX (1946–present) is the longest reigning monarch of Thailand. His Majesty is much loved and revered by the Thais (Suwannathat-Pian, 2003). His development role through thousands of royal projects has brought the monarchy close to the people. He has strictly maintained his figurehead role as head of state, except in times of extreme political crisis, when he has come to the rescue. For instance, during the 1973 student-led mass demonstrations, the king asked Field Marshals Thanom and Prapass to go abroad; in May 1992, following mass demonstrations against General Suchinda, the king had to step in as arbiter by summoning General Suchinda and his rival Lieutenant-General Chamlong to an audience shown on live television; and during the Thaksin crisis in 2006, the king told senior judges in an audience to solve the nation’s political crisis by using legal means.
To be a strong king, one has to be both a father and divine god to the people. Nowadays in Thailand, there are practices that indicate that the idea of seeing the king as divine god is very much alive. Thais worship the king’s portrait at home. Buddha amulets are sometimes made with
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
32 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
the king’s emblems. Royal customs regarding the birth, marriage, and cremation of the king and royal families indicate strong divine god tradition. Dissatisfied with elected politician bosses, Thai bureaucrats will identify themselves as karachakarn (royal bureaucrats) of the king, not of the elected minister. When a bureaucrat passes away, it is a tradition for his relatives to inform the king of his death (“to ask for his majesty’s permission to die”). If you are a high-level bureaucrat, you will receive a “prestigious” gold-plated royal urn according to your rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Graduates of all public universities in Thailand receive their diplomas from His Majesty or from his representative (usually the crown prince or one of the royal princesses). All land in Thailand technically belongs to the king. A royal-sponsored wedding is considered to be prestigious and an honor to the families of the bride and groom. The royal decorations a bureaucrat is entitled to depend on his rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Another consequence of the divine god tradition is the controversial and sensitive lese majeste issue. Thai constitutions specify that it is not allowed for anyone to criticize the monarchy. In Thai politics, lese majeste has sometimes become a political instrument for a party to level accusations against its opponents.
2.2.1.2Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
The second legacy is the practice for rulers to expand the bureaucracy and enhance the grip of a few ruling royalty and court nobles over the bureaucracy. For seven centuries, Thailand was under the rule of a small group of royal kin (chao) and court nobles (kun nang). The king would appoint his favorite relatives to become “master of the department” (chao krom), who would have a free hand in managing their organizations. However, the king had absolute power to appoint and remove persons to these senior positions anytime he wanted (Englehart 2001, 12–13; Crawford 1915, 121; Bowring 1857, 93–169; Terwiel 1989, 251).
From the Ayudhya period to the reign of King Rama IV of the Bangkok period, the central administration consisted of two great ministries: the defense ministry (kalahom) headed by the samuha phra kalahom minister whose jurisdiction covered the South, and the interior ministry (mahatthai) headed by the samuha nayok minister covering the North and the East. The other four ministries were the phra klang (fi nance) in charge of territories south of the capital; the krom muang (capital) looked after the area around Bangkok; krom wang (palace) ministry was in charge of royal ceremonies, royal administration, and legal disputes; and krom na (cultivation) ministry of “rice fields” or lands oversaw rice and crops cultivation, and supplying food to the capital. This model of six ministries was originally implemented by King Baromtrailokanart in the Ayudhya period (1448–1488) (Dhiravegin 1992, 22–62).
On April 1, 1892, King Chulalongkorn or Rama V introduced a major structural reorganization of government. The original six ministries were replaced by twelve ministries: interior, defense, foreign affairs, royal household, metropolitan, agriculture, finance, justice, war, public works, public construction, and privy seal. The first cabinet in 1892 consisted of nine of the king’s sons and three court nobles.
During the time of absolute monarchy, the king would appoint his brothers, cousins, and relatives to high positions in these ministries. It was customary for the king to have many wives and children. As the royal bureaucracy expanded, there was more need for princes to fill in positions in the ministries. For example, Kings Rama I, II, III, IV, and V had 42, 73, 51, 82, and 77 children, respectively (Premchit 1971, 70–72, 180, 237, 342, 471, 525). Kings would send their sons to study abroad in various fields of study with the expectation that they would help the king run the country once they graduated. Some examples are given.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand 33
HRH Prince Rachaburi Derekrit, the fourteenth son of King Rama V, was sent to study law at Oxford University in England. Among other things, he became the minister of justice and is known as the “Father of Thai Law.” HRH Prince Mahidol Adulyadej, prince of Songkhla, was the sixty-ninth son of King Rama V who was sent to study at a military academy in Berlin. Later he went on to study medicine at Harvard University. He is known as the “Father of Thai Medicine.” His Royal Highness Chumporn Ket Udomsak, the thirty-first son of King Rama V, studied at a navy school in England and became the Navy commander. He is known as “the Father of the Navy.” His Royal Highness Chiraprawat Voradej, the seventeenth son of King Rama V, studied military science in Denmark and became minister of defense. He is known as “the Father of the Army.” His Royal Highness Kittiyakorn Voralak, the twelfth son of King Rama V, read oriental studies at Oxford University and later became minister of commerce.
For seven centuries under absolute monarchy, administrative power was centralized in the hands of the king. The idea of an authoritarian rule under a single center of power is deeply rooted in Thai political and administrative history. Western ideas about a society with strong local government, an active civil society, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are something new to Thailand. Recent efforts to introduce decentralization have faced strong resistance from the traditional Thai bureaucracy, especially from conservative bureaucrats in the Ministry of Interior.
Government centralization reached its heights during the reign of King Chulalongkorn or Rama V (1869–1910). During his 42-year rule, King Chulalongkorn successfully centralized public administration. First, the enormous power of court nobles such as the Bunnag family at the beginning of the Bangkok era was gradually curtailed. Second, western-style ministries were introduced. King Rama V appointed his sons and cousins to run these ministries. Third, King Rama V consolidated his power in the capital and provinces by setting up a modern civil service system with remuneration. He abolished the practice of assigning bureaucrats to oversee the provinces without remuneration and gave them the right to extract taxes from the people as much as they wanted as long as their tax collection met the minimum requirement set forth by the king. Fourth, he replaced provincial rulers with salaried bureaucrats answerable to the Ministry of Interior in Bangkok. Fifth, a modern army under his command was established to maintain national security and suppress unrest in the provinces. Sixth, he abolished slavery and corvee, thus creating the opportunity for increasing numbers of freemen to enter the bureaucracy and the economy (Wales 1934, 21–68).
A further effort to centralize government during the reign of King Rama V was to organize provincial administration. King Rama V introduced the regional system (monthon tesabhiban) by dividing provinces into 18 regions (Damrong Rajanubhab, 1966; Wales 1934, 107–34; Bunnag, 1977; Noranittipadungkarn, 1984). Below the regions were cities (muang), districts (amphoe), subdistricts (tambon), and villages (mu ban). At the tambon and village levels, elections of sub-district and village headmen were held on a trial basis. Provincial governors were under the close supervision of the regional officials. They could no longer practice kin muang (or the practice of “eating cities”), which provided a free hand to the provincial leader to run the provinces and collect taxes at will. Limited local government was experimented with by introducing sanitation administration.
Nationalism also helped tighten centralization. King Vajiravudh or Rama VI (1910–1925) introduced “official nationalism,” which incorporated old symbols of monarchy and new symbols of nation. By instilling a strong sense of nationalism, local and regional ethnic identities were broken down. There was strong anti-Chinese sentiment. Provincial elites were sidelined.
Considering that Thailand has had a long and strong tradition of authoritative rule, centralization, and big government, it is not surprising to find how difficult it is to introduce west- ern-style governance reform into the present Thai public sector. Efforts to disperse political and
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC