- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
Civil Service System in Macao 547
Table 26.5 Pay Scale for Macau’s Leaders and Directors
|
|
|
Grade |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Before the 2009 Reform |
|
After the 2009 Reform |
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Title |
1 |
2 |
|
1 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Director |
920 |
1000 |
|
1015 |
1100 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Deputy director |
820 |
870 |
|
905 |
960 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Department head |
770 |
– |
|
850 |
– |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Division head |
700 |
– |
|
770 |
– |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sector head |
650 |
– |
|
735 |
– |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Section head |
430 |
– |
|
495 |
– |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: The Legal Framework of Public Service (Decree 86/89/M), Appendix I, Table 3, available at the Government Printing Bureau website, http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/89/51/ declei86_cn.asp (accessed January 10, 2008); Decree 25/97, available at the Government Printing Bureau website, http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/97/25/declei25_cn.asp (accessed January 10, 2008); Stipulation on General Principle for Leaders and Directors (Law 15/2009), Appendix I, available at the Government Printing Bureau website, http:// bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2009/31/lei15_cn.asp (accessed September 16, 2009).
tively. Each of these subsidies is equal to a month’s salary; in other words, civil servants receive a salary for 14 months each year.
26.2.4 Personnel Management
The government’s personnel management is decentralized. Bureaus and departments are responsible for the recruitment and promotion of civil servants. Prior to 1983, there was no central agency coordinating civil servants’ affairs. The Macao government established the SAFP to reform the civil service in 1983 (Decree 42/83M). The SAFP formulates civil service policy, coordinates personnel affairs of departments, and organizes training programs for civil servants. However, individual departments manage their own personnel affairs although they are expected to abide by the relevant rules and regulations. For instance, the departments administer the recruitment and promotion examinations: they publicize the event, establish the examination committee, and conduct the examination. They seek assistance from the SAFP when necessary; for example, the SAFP may conduct psychological testing for recruitment to the security branch. Each department must also inform the SAFP of its personnel situation (detailed information is required for each civil servant, but is voluntary for non-civil servants from labor/service contracts). In other words, the SAFP maintains information on all civil servants, but it does not have complete records of workers under labor and service contracts.
Unlike many Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Macao has not set up an independent commission to review the civil service system. For example, the British Civil Service Commission is an independent agency that reviews the civil service system; the Civil Service Commission and Merit System Protection Board are responsible for reviewing and suggesting personnel policy for the US government (OECD 1995; OECD 1996). The
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
548 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Table 26.6 Fringe Benefits for Macao’s Civil Servants
Item |
Content |
|
|
Annual leave |
22 days per year |
|
|
Maternity leave |
Female: 90 days (at least 60 days after |
|
the birth of baby) |
|
Male: 15 days (after the birth of baby) |
|
|
Marriage leave for those who are going to marry |
10 days |
|
|
Marriage subsidy for those who are going to marry |
MOP$2300 |
|
|
Leave for bereavement for those whose parents |
7 days |
pass away |
|
|
|
Christmas subsidy |
One extra month salary payable in |
|
November each year |
|
|
Holiday subsidy |
One extra month salary payable in |
|
June each year |
|
|
Family subsidy (spouse and parent) |
MOP$170 per spouse/parent per |
|
month |
|
|
Family subsidy (offspring) |
MOP$220 per child per month |
|
|
Housing subsidy |
MOP$1000 per month |
|
|
Baby-born subsidy |
MOP$2300 per baby born |
|
|
Funeral subsidy for those whose family member |
MOP$2700 |
passes away |
|
|
|
Medical care |
Free of charge for medical services |
|
from government hospital |
|
|
Source: General Principle for Macau Public Servants (Decree 87/89/M), Sector 3, Chapters 2–6, and Appendix I, Table 2, available at the Government Printing Bureau website, http:// www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/89/51/estatuto_cn.asp (accessed January 10, 2008).
Japanese National Personnel Authority is responsible for the recruitment examinations of civil servants (Nakamura 2005). South Korea established an independent Civil Service Commission to make civil service policy in 1999 (Pan 2005, 69). The government of Hong Kong, another SAR of the PRC, inaugurated many committees to revise the civil service system in various areas (Burns 2004). Certainly, the MSAR government has also set up consultative bodies with members outside the administration for civil service reform. In 2002, the government inaugurated the Public Administration Observatory: the elite were appointed to the commission to make suggestions for reform of the civil service. In January 2008, the government abolished the Public Administration Observatory and launched a new Public Administration Reform Consultative Commission. However, MSAR has not yet institutionalized the role and function of an independent commission to revise the civil service system. For example, no agency exists to revise the salary of civil servants regularly; instead, the adjustment is rather arbitrary. In 1989, the Macao Legislative Assembly suggested an annual adjustment to the salary of civil servants in accordance
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in Macao 549
with the inflation rate (Tang 2005, 49). However, to stabilize the administration during transition, the government increased salaries at a higher percentage than the inflation rate (see Table 26.7). In the late 1990s, the domestic economic downturn necessitated that the government froze the pay rate. In 2005, the MSAR government raised the salary of civil servants. Arguably, the adjustment compensated civil servants as they had been required to pay income tax since October 2003. The adjustments in 2007 and 2008 were due mainly to the relatively high inflation in Macao and to pressure from civil servants. Indeed, Macao has not yet established an independent commission for the regular review of the civil service.
26.3 Problems in Macao’s Bureaucracy
During the colonial era, Macao’s civil service was harshly criticized for its inefficiency and poor quality of service. The MSAR chief executive, Edmund Ho, made the following remark while conducting the Chief Executive Election in 1999:
It is no doubt that residents, tourists and foreign investors in Macau have many opinions against the efficiency of Macau’s public administration, the quality of civil servants as well as their working attitude. Indeed, the administration’s low efficiency and bureaucratic attitude have brought inconvenience to residents and hindered the economic development for a long time. (Ho 1999, 16)
Ho’s remark recalls the deep-rooted problems in the civil service that the Portuguese left behind.
The inefficiency of the civil service is partly due to the poor quality of personnel. First, many civil servants received inadequate education. Before the handover, nearly half of Macao’s civil servants received only a secondary school education or below (see Table 26.8). The lack of education may account for their poor work ethic (tardiness, insolence, and disrespect) (Lo 1995, 120; Choy 1993, 59). The Macao Civil Servant Association, a labor union of civil servants, publicly stated that the civil service has a poor attitude (Choy 1993, 59). Further, the colonial government did not conduct sufficient training to improve the quality of civil servants. The colonial government did improve the language capacity of civil servants in preparation for the handover, so that civil servants could use both Chinese and Portuguese in the MSAR era (see Table 26.9). However, the Portuguese did less to enhance the working capacity of the civil service through training. Since most colonial civil servants had the “through train” of automatic transfer to the MSAR administration, their attitude problems were simultaneously passed on to the newly established SAR administration.
The Portuguese also conducted a very slow localization of the Macao administration, causing performance problems for the MSAR administration. In the colonial government, all senior positions were occupied by Portuguese. The middle-ranking posts were fi lled by Macanese, who are hybrids of Portuguese and Chinese. Local Chinese worked at the street level inside the government (Yee 2001, 41–56). The Portuguese accelerated the localization of the civil service and promoted more local Chinese to higher ranks late in the transition. As a result, many low-ranking Chinese officials were promoted to senior positions to fi ll up the vacancies left by the Portuguese. However, many of them did not possess sufficient management experience. The MSAR government was further weakened by this cadre of inexperienced officials. For instance, the Audit Commission of the MSAR investigated the financial account and management of the Organizing
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
550 |
Public Administration in Southeast Asia |
|
|
||
Table 26.7 Adjustment of Civil Service Salary |
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Year |
|
Value of Each Salary Point |
|
Growth (%) |
Inflation Rate (%) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1985 |
|
20 |
|
11.5 |
– |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1986 |
|
22 |
|
10.0 |
+10.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1987 |
|
24 |
|
9.1 |
+9.1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1988 |
|
24 |
|
0.0 |
+8.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1989 |
|
26 |
|
8.3 |
+8.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1990 |
|
29 |
|
11.5 |
+8.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1991 |
|
32 |
|
10.3 |
+9.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1992 |
|
35 |
|
9.4 |
+7.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1993 |
|
38 |
|
8.6 |
+6.7 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1994 |
|
41 |
|
7.9 |
+6.3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1995 |
|
44 |
|
7.3 |
+8.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996 |
|
47 |
|
6.8 |
+4.8 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997 |
|
50 |
|
6.4 |
+3.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
+0.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
–3.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
–1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2001 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
–2.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
–2.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
–1.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2004 |
|
50 |
|
0.0 |
+1.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005 |
|
52.5 |
|
5.0 |
+4.4 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006 |
|
52.5 |
|
0.0 |
+5.2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007 |
|
55 |
|
4.8 |
+5.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008 |
|
59 |
|
7.3 |
+8.6 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009 |
|
59 |
|
0.0 |
+3.3a |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Figures between 1985 and 1988 are from Tang On Ki, “Dui Aopu Guanzhi Houqi Aomen Gongwuyuan Xinchou Zhidu de Huigu” [Revisit the Pay Scheme of Macau Civil Servants in the Portuguese Colonial Era], Aumen Yanjiu [Macau Studies], December 2005, 31(48); data for 1999 onward are from newspapers and are available from the Statistics and Census Bureau website, http://www.dsec.gov.mo/Statistic.aspx (accessed September 16, 2009).
a Figure is for the first quarter of 2009.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Table 26.8 Education Background of Macao’s Civil Servants
|
Primary |
Secondary |
Postsecondary/ |
College/ |
|
|
|
|
School Level |
School Level |
Vocational |
University |
Postgraduate |
|
Total Number of |
Year |
(%) |
(%) |
Training (%) |
Level (%) |
Level (%) |
Others (%) |
Civil Servants |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996 |
27.8 |
21.4 |
31.9 |
15.8 |
0.0 |
3.0 |
16,992 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997 |
28.0 |
21.5 |
31.4 |
17.4 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
17,589 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998 |
28.0 |
20.7 |
31.2 |
17.6 |
0.1 |
2.4 |
17,037 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999 |
27.7 |
19.3 |
30.7 |
19.6 |
0.4 |
2.3 |
17,239 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000 |
27.5 |
17.5 |
30.1 |
21.8 |
0.6 |
2.6 |
17,412 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2001 |
26.7 |
16.3 |
28.1 |
24.8 |
0.7 |
3.5 |
17,533 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002 |
25.4 |
18.6 |
25.8 |
26.0 |
1.0 |
3.2 |
17,368 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003 |
24.3 |
18.2 |
25.6 |
27.3 |
1.8 |
2.8 |
17,496 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2004 |
22.9 |
16.7 |
26.0 |
28.9 |
2.9 |
2.6 |
17,778 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005 |
21.4 |
15.9 |
25.8 |
30.4 |
3.9 |
2.7 |
18,250 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006 |
19.0 |
14.9 |
26.0 |
33.1 |
4.8 |
2.3 |
18,958 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007 |
17.7 |
13.6 |
24.8 |
36.2 |
5.5 |
2.2 |
19,629 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008 |
16.4 |
13.2 |
24.0 |
38.6 |
6.1 |
1.7 |
20,653 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Figures for 1996–2005 are from SAFP, Macau Special Administration Region Public Administration Human Resources Report 2005 (Macau: 2006), 159. The 2006–2008 figures are from SAFP, Macau Special Administration Region Public Administration Human Resources Report 2008 (Macau: 2009), 163.
551 Macao in System Service Civil
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Table 26.9 Number of Training Courses Organized by the SAFP for Civil Servants
Courses |
|
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Special |
No. of courses |
12 |
23 |
25 |
9 |
10 |
126 |
259 |
290 |
267 |
186 |
154 |
150 |
193 |
|
training |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No. of |
261 |
475 |
636 |
209 |
182 |
3,709 |
7,973 |
8,326 |
8,696 |
4,202 |
3,110 |
4,240 |
5,548 |
||
|
|||||||||||||||
|
participants |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Language |
No. of courses |
100 |
143 |
121 |
109 |
103 |
90 |
69 |
45 |
85 |
65 |
83 |
90 |
98 |
|
training |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No. of |
1,951 |
2,487 |
2,273 |
1,964 |
1,798 |
1,175 |
1,201 |
826 |
1,268 |
859 |
1,164 |
1,205 |
1,529 |
||
|
|||||||||||||||
|
participants |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Professional/ |
No. of courses |
81 |
171 |
210 |
83 |
102 |
96 |
117 |
105 |
57 |
104 |
62 |
56 |
107 |
|
vocational |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No. of |
1,305 |
2,870 |
3,521 |
1,413 |
2,167 |
2,951 |
2,499 |
2,038 |
1,294 |
2,241 |
1,127 |
1,050 |
2,133 |
||
training |
|||||||||||||||
participants |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
No. of courses |
193 |
337 |
356 |
201 |
215 |
312 |
445 |
440 |
409 |
355 |
299 |
296 |
398 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(Growth in %) |
– |
(74.6) |
(5.6) |
(–43.5) |
(7.0) |
(45.1) |
(42.6) |
(–1.1) |
(–7.0) |
(–13.2) |
(–15.8) |
(–1.0) |
(34.5) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No. of |
3,517 |
5,832 |
6,430 |
3,586 |
4,147 |
7,835 |
11,673 |
11,190 |
11,258 |
7,302 |
5,401 |
6495 |
9,210 |
|
|
participants |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(Growth in %) |
– |
(65.8) |
(10.3) |
(–44.2) |
(15.6) |
(88.9) |
(49.0) |
(–4.1) |
(0.6) |
(–35.1) |
(–26.0) |
(20.3) |
(41.8) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Figures for 1996–2005 are from SAFP, Macau Special Administration Region Public Administration Human Resources Report 2005 (Macau: 2006), 164. The 2006–2008 figures are from SAFP, Macau Special Administration Region Public Administration Human Resources Report 2008 (Macau: 2009), 163.
Asia Southeast in Administration Public 552
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Civil Service System in Macao 553
Commission of the East Asian Games, which was fully funded by the MSAR government for the 2005 East Asian Games in Macao (Yu 2007, 437). The Audit Commission alleged that various malpractices by the Games’ organizer had resulted in serious over-budgeting problems. According to the Commission’s report, the overall expenditure for the Games was MOP$4.4 billion, 50.6% over the budget. Moreover, the Games’ organizer had squandered government resources. Many facilities for the Games had to be reconstructed due to defective designs. Such mistakes not only wasted government funds, but also delayed the completion of facilities. The authorities attributed the malpractice to the inexperience of officials. Indeed, the MSAR administration encountered a civil service that was inexperienced and often poorly educated and trained.
Second, bureaucratic irregularities are another source of administrative ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Corruption as well as nepotism in personnel appointments is obvious in the Macao civil service. Bureaucratic corruption had been very serious since the colonial era. There have been several corruption cases involving senior officials (Lo 1995, 171–96). Choy (1993, 59) argued that corruption had become part of the daily activity in the colonial Macao bureaucracy. Although the Macao government took various measures to control bureaucratic corruption after the handover, irregularities could not be suppressed. The Ao Man-long case demonstrated that the Macao administration was still at high risk for corruption because of the wide discretionary powers that individual officials held. Ao was the former secretary for transportation and public works who was bribed by land developers and government project contractors. During the court trials, officials who were responsible for land projects and government project tenders indicated that they were required by their superiors, who were instructed by Ao, to adjust the grading of particular bidders so that these bidders would win government contracts. As a result, the government contracted out projects with higher cost while lands were sold to developers at lower prices. Ao’s case demonstrated that authorities could easily change the criteria and grading standards without checks from other agencies. Indeed, Ao’s case illuminated the immense discretionary powers within the bureaucracy.
Macao’s personnel management is always criticized for nepotism and irregularities. In the colonial era, nepotism was prevalent in personnel appointments. As indicated above, the Portuguese appointed their friends and supporters to the government (Lo 1995, 120–27; Wu and Chen 2000, 41–42). Whenever the Portuguese appointed a new governor, he would substitute the existing officials with his own supporters. In turn, the newly appointed leaders would recruit their own friends into their divisions. Although open examination was essential for the recruitment and promotion of civil servants, the public would not be informed of the examinations. Additionally, the examinations were tailor-made for the candidates identified by the authorities. These irregularities continued in the MSAR. For instance, there were allegations that leaders from the Identification Affairs Bureau, Cultural Affairs Bureau, Labor Affairs Bureau, Finance Services Bureau, and Housing Bureau appointed their friends and relatives to senior positions (Journal Informacao, September 7, 2007, 1). In addition, the Macao prison was charged for failing to have open recruitment for clerks. Lee Kam-cheong, director of Macao prison, explained that open recruitment would involve a great deal of administrative work as well as an increase in government expenditure. Therefore, instead of using open recruitment, the department adopted internal promotions to fill vacancies (Journal Informacao, January 28, 2006, 1). The former director of the Finance Services Bureau, Carlos Fernando de Abreu Ávila, warned openly that some agency heads had recruited and promoted their friends and relatives in the civil service, and such phenomena had already altered the government administration (Journal Informacao, April 24, 2004, 1). Although civil service laws include principles for fair and open recruitment (Wu and Chen 2000, 26), there are no formal institutions to guide and regulate the bureaucracy to fulfill these principles. Lo (1995, 120–22) explained
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC