Chapter 19

Public Ethics and Corruption

in the Philippines

19.1 Introduction

Corruption is a failure of public ethics, and generally holds back growth and progress. For developing countries, learning the right development lessons requires ensuring that gains from economic growth do not shake themselves free of high ethical standards. Yet at the same time, their future

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382 Public Administration in Southeast Asia

options in fighting corruption are constrained by particular country contexts. The Philippines typifies this quandary, although there are ways of getting out of it.

Conditions in the Philippines point to a systemic failure, where institutional safeguards work in fits and turns and reforms may not be working. Worse—in the clearest indication that the problem is embedded in the country’s heritage of clientelism—institutions are vulnerable to political capture by predatory interests. An inconsistently functioning legal system, weak accountability structures, and inadequate financial transparency are just some of the flaws that negate the country’s attempts at institutional effectiveness and credibility. As a result, scattered initiatives, including those in fighting corruption, left to run their own course, often run aground.

Indeed, since the late 1990s, the “ethics barometers” of both the World Bank and Transparency International have indicated that the overall quality of Philippine public ethics has slipped (Figure 19.1). The Philippines also comes out in between the scores of its more affluent neighbors (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) and the emerging economies (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). As the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2007) notes, the Philippines’ loss of momentum is apparent (Figure 19.2). Its scores aptly put the Philippines in a middling status, unable to soar but risks going under unless thoroughgoing institutional and policy reforms are introduced. Thus, the country has little choice but to push ethical reforms much harder than usual to break out of this crippling bind.

Windows of opportunity for meaningful reforms intermittently open up to major breakthroughs, but only up to a point. It is important to acknowledge that the lack of a disciplined and capable bureaucratic culture, deficiencies in legislation and law observance and enforcement, and collusion by public officials with powerful persons—characteristics that typify a “soft state” (Myrdal, 1970)—will work as powerful brakes on anti-corruption initiatives, eroding their efficacy

Corruption indicators, Philippines, 1996–2008

Figure 19.1 Corruption control: A declining trend in the Philippines.

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Public Ethics and Corruption in the Philippines 383

Control of Corruption (2008)

Comparison between 2008, 2003, 1998 (top-bottom order)

Singapore

Malaysia

Thailand

Indonesia

Philippines

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Myanmar

Figure 19.2 A middling status of the Philippines in Southeast Asia. Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2009: Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996– 2008. Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the world Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

and sustainability. Anti-corruption policies thus should be crafted around realistic “litmus tests” that recognize the qualifying factors in the Philippine political and social environment.

Although corruption is a complex problem, it is important to isolate the underlying factors influencing the “right” behavior in the public service. This can be done, following Bertok (2000), through a range of approaches—an ethical infrastructure—that can keep back undesirable acts and provide the correct incentives for professional performance. Three building blocks hold the infrastructure up—control, guidance, and management of official conduct in the public management context (Mills, 1998; Bertok, 2000). According to Mills, all components must hang together, as each one would rely on the rest to succeed. But emphasis may vary. If a strong directed change is needed, it might be important to take steps to reinforce professionalism through training. On the other hand, clear evidence of wrongdoing may shift anti-corruption strategies toward oversight and control.

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC