- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
342 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Apolinario Mabini, Aguinaldo’s controversial adviser and generally regarded as “the brains of the Revolution,” advocated in his draft constitution a provision under Article 22 “that all the offices in the government that were not elective were to be filled by competitive examinations, and no holder of an office could be removed except for cause” (Majul, 1998: 54). Mabini also carefully distinguished between appointive positions and elective positions in government. In his own work, La Revolucion Filipina (The Philippine Revolution, 1935), Mabini denounced what he saw as the practice of appointing personnel not acquainted with the country and relieved at every change of ministry.
Even the patriot, Jose Rizal, executed by the Spanish regime on December 30, 1896, expressed his disapproval for the sale of offices in the bureaucracy. In his celebrated novel, Noli Me Tangere, Rizal made fun of Capitan Tiago, one of the characters and “objected to the sale of office or appointments to private persons, presumably belonging to [Capitan Tiago’s] group” (Majul, 1996: 65). All these point to the fact that the Filipinos already had a vision, if not an insight, toward an administrative system. Unfortunately, the fledgling republic was frustrated under the Treaty of Paris when Spain, in consideration of 20 million dollars, ceded the Philippines to the United States. In February 1899, war broke out between the United States and the Philippines, but quickly ended with the capture of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in March 1901. Filipino resistance to the American colonial regime continued however, with hard-core leaders resorting to guerilla warfare. The resistance was effectively contained in 1902.
In that same year, the Philippine Commission, the assembly established to act as the government of the Philippines under authority from the president of the United States, certified to the existence of “general and complete peace” (Corpuz, 1957: 159).
17.6American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
The American takeover of the Philippines upon the pacification of the islands in 1902 was auspicious for the Philippines because the Americans introduced a civil government that was in marked contrast to that of Spain. The Americans established a political system in the Philippines patterned after the republican and democratic characteristics of the U.S. government. Where the Spanish regime exerted efforts to deny ordinary Filipinos the right to an education and to speak the Castilian language, the Americans introduced an extensive public educational system and even required the teaching of English. But one of the most important contrasts was the separation of church and state. Thus, Endriga provides the following critique:
Politically speaking, the contrast with the unlamented Spanish regime was glaring. The separation of church and state, the completely secular character of the latter, the political participation of the Filipinos in all levels of government were a world apart from the Spanish system where the power of the priests and the minimal participation of natives in government gave the Filipinos practically no experience in running their own affairs. (Endriga, 2003: 400)
It was also during this period that public administration was professionalized. It is instructive to note here that the United States had just undergone a critical period of civil service reform after decades of dominance of patronage and spoils in its own bureaucracy. The spoils system was
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Development of Public Administration in the Philippines 343
legitimized as a government policy during the presidency of Andrew Jackson in 1829, who sought to democratize positions in bureaucracy as part of what is now known as “Jacksonian democracy” (Reyes, 2003b).
Jackson rationalized that the duties in the federal bureaucracy were simple and did not demand education or prior experience. He also argued that it was only proper that a sitting president and the political party in power must have the leeway to appoint federal jobs supporters, protégés, or recommendees of the administration. Jackson believed that by doing so, he was making available to ordinary citizens the opportunity to serve in government. The result was a decline in the professional competence of those manning the bureaucracy and gained prominent attention and concern in 1881 with the assassination of President James Garfield by a disgruntled office seeker (Reyes, 2003b).
The Pendleton Act of 1883 subsequently established a professionalized civil service in the American bureaucracy that ended over five decades of the spoils system. This was soon followed by the Gilded Age in America, which saw increasing prosperity and modernity of American society. Thus, it was understandable that the Americans would institute a similar system in their newly acquired colony in 1900. This was an opportunity to discover whether the system they adopted for themselves would work in a different culture.
The American colonial regime thus introduced a civil service system based on merit and fitness in the Philippines, characterized by professionalism and careerism, ensured security of tenure, and with appointments determined by open competitive examinations. Another important feature of the system was the adoption of political neutrality for career members of the civil service, which secured them against involvement in partisan politics. It may be relevant to mention here that it was this latter issue that defined the field of Public Administration in America, commonly referred as the politics-administration dichotomy. The neutrality of apolitical and career bureaucrats was contained in the provisions of the Pendleton Act of 1883 in the United States, which established a professional civil service in America.
From here, the young academic Woodrow Wilson would draw inspiration in his celebrated 1887 essay, The Study of Administration, calling for a “science of administration.” Frank Goodnow’s (1900) Politics and Administration would strengthen the proposition with similar ideas of insulating the administrative system from the currents of political activities. But, this would be rejected by scholars of the discipline in the United States.
The law that established the civil service in the Philippines was one of the early pieces of legislation enacted by the Philippine Commission. Passed on September 19, 1900, Act No. 5 also known as the Philippine Civil Service Act, with the formal title of “An Act for the Establishment and Maintenance of an Efficient and Honest Civil Service in the Philippines,” set the tone for the establishment of a professional bureaucracy in the Philippines based on merit and fitness. The Americans deemed this as the response to the graft-ridden bureaucracy of the Spanish period and made sure that the merit system would be upheld, regardless of religious beliefs or political affiliations. Corpuz explains further:
The colonial government was laudably obsessed with the desire to make the service a strictly merit system, and to this end there were strict proscriptions and injunctions against inquiry into the political or religious opinions or affiliations of examinees or employees whether for appointment or promotion. Likewise, direct or indirect solicitation, collection, or receipt of political contributions by or from employees were sternly prohibited. (Corpuz, 1957: 167)
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344 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
Another significant feature of the administrative system established by the American colonial regime was that it was open and made available to Filipinos. Unlike the Spanish system, which restricted Filipinos to almost inconsequential positions, the administrative system established by the Americans fostered broader Filipino participation in the civil service even if executive and policy-determining posts remained in the hands of the Americans.
In fact, Section 6 of the Civil Service Act gave priority of appointment to Filipinos “where other qualifications were equal…” (Corpuz, 1957: 176). This policy was also influenced by the fact that American officials recruited to man the bureaucracy were not disposed to take up residence in the islands for extended periods. The potential lost career opportunities in the home country made it difficult to recruit Americans. This was also compounded by the uncertainty of the length of time of the United States’ tenure in the Philippines.
In time, the Americans adopted a policy of Filipinization of the bureaucracy, owing to the instability of recruitment in the American segment of the civil service. It was, to use President Theodore Roosevelt’s words, to be “a bureaucracy of Filipinos, assisted by Americans.” Thus, by 1919, Filipinization of the bureaucracy was practically accomplished with Americans comprising less than 6% of the total (Corpuz, 1957: 180, 201).
Therefore, it was not surprising that when the Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1935, the Filipinos strengthened the civil service and further expanded its coverage and powers. The establishment of the commonwealth was provided under the Tydings-McDuffie law, which stipulated that independence will be granted to the Philippines after a transition period of 10 years during which the Filipinos will exercise self-rule.
In 1934, a Constitutional Convention was convened that subsequently promulgated the 1935 constitution. Under this charter, a full-blown article on the civil service, Article XI, again provided and restated the policy on merit and fitness in appointments to be determined by competitive examinations and insulated from partisan political activities. Accordingly, a law was subsequently passed, Commonwealth Act 177, which elevated the status of the then Bureau of the Civil Service from a second-class bureau to a first-class agency to be headed by a commissioner with the rank of undersecretary. Aside from these, the agency was also given special powers in formal investigations and other pertinent and supporting provisions, which led one American observer to call it “the civil service reformers dream come true” (Corpuz, 1957: 217). The policies that were thus adopted then upheld and supported the values of merit and fitness in the civil service.
17.7 Japanese Interregnum, 1942–1945
Unfortunately, World War II intervened and the Philippines was swept into the war in the Pacific with the Japanese army invading the country in 1942. As a result, the commonwealth government and its leaders were forced into exile.
The Japanese occupation of the Philippines disrupted and dislocated the political, economic, and social life of the country. On gaining control of the islands, the Japanese Imperial government established a puppet government and conscripted political leaders and bureaucrats alike who stayed in the country to render service to the new Japanese-sponsored government.
The 3 years of Japanese occupation had a severe impact on the bureaucracy in the Philippines. The civil servant who manned the government during the truncated commonwealth period were forced to serve under pain of reprisals. The civil servants were coerced to serve and were forcibly drafted into the service, which by and large, resulted in a demoralized and demotivated administrative system.
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Development of Public Administration in the Philippines 345
For these civil servants and for the rest of the populace, the government and its administrative machinery “was the instrument of a hated regime,” and acts of sabotage to undermine the Japanesesponsored republic were regarded as a patriotic act (Corpuz, 1957: 220). Thus, such “acts of administrative delay and obstruction,” and “countless ways of less-than-full compliance with administrative orders, came to be habitually indulged in, and were condoned as moral and patriotic” (Corpuz, 1957: 221). Those who chose to perform their duties efficiently were considered as “collaborators” and “traitors,” which made it more convenient for the politically astute to go through the motions and rituals of administrative activity while secretly committing covert acts of sabotage.
The war years exacted severe repercussions on the country’s institutions and left the country in ruins. Manila emerged as the most devastated capital city in the world, next to Warsaw in Poland, according to the assessment of Senator Millard Tydings of the U.S. Congress. By the end of the war, as discussed earlier, the Philippines was a ravaged nation, and the people experienced widespread poverty. Its hospitals, ports, banks, libraries, buildings, and other structures and facilities were in shambles, particularly those located in the urban areas (Reyes, 2003a: 51; Shalom, 1986: 33; Steinberg et al., 1971: 373, as cited in Abueva, 1988: 47).
The end of the war brought about unemployment, food shortages, inflation, and internal conflict and strife, as the country was enmeshed in a campaign to seek out and punish collaborators and supporters of the hated Japanese-sponsored government. Unrest in the countryside grew, especially in the Northern provinces, as a growing Communist movement, remnants of the resistance to the Japanese, began to gather strength, taking advantage of the confusion and upheaval besetting Philippine society.
The bureaucracy, like the society that enveloped it, was severely traumatized by the war, and the work ethic that was supposed to have been implanted during the American regime was soon eroded. While the American regime promoted and instilled professionalism, responsibility, and commitment to public service in the bureaucracy, the war truncated the full flowering and internalization of these values.
It seemed that the habits and practices of negative bureaucratic behavior that were shaped during the Japanese interregnum continued and rendered an administrative system almost incapable of addressing the multiple and complex problems brought about by the war.
Following the war, faced with low income that did not measure up to living standards, it was not difficult for civil servants to commit misfeasance and other corrupt acts. Moreover, exposes of big-time graft and corruption cases among unscrupulous political leaders, including presidents, practically dominated the newspaper headlines. It was therefore understandable that civil servants would be prone to follow the example of their leaders, who would on occasions, enlist or involve the bureaucracy in the commission of corrupt dealings.
17.8Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
When the Philippines was granted independence by the United States on July 4, 1946, the prospects of nationhood and self-rule were not exactly convivial. It was a welcome development, but the events were not exactly festive. The economy was in shambles, political and social institutions were traumatized, society was in disarray, and unrest and upheaval loomed in the offing as rebel and Communist groups began to rearm in the countryside. It was evident, as the noted writer Hernando Abaya maintains, that democracy was “in distress” and “the national economy was on the verge of collapse” (Abaya, 1967: 56; also cited in Reyes, 2003a: 53).
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The bureaucracy, the administrative mechanism that was supposed to deliver basic services and implement policies designed to address the problems confronting the newly independent nation, was likewise a damaged institution. Stigmatized as it was during the dark years of the Japanese regime, the administrative system was not by any means equal to the complex and multiple challenges facing it. Not only was the system ill-equipped to respond to the demands of the new republic, it was also inept, incompetent, and corrupt, with the war-time habits of complacency and indifference overpowering the spirit of patriotic zeal.
As discussed earlier, the milieu of the post-war period made it attractive for civil servants to engage in rent-seeking behavior, which brought about inefficiency. Moreover, a new generation of civil servants, most of whom were exposed to inhospitable and cruel living conditions, took over and abandoned the values that had been implanted during the American colonial era.
Widespread unemployment also characterized the period, and in this, politicians saw the opportunity to put their constituents in government posts by way of circumventing civil service rules and regulations.
The civil service, although designed to function on the basis of merit and fitness, did not exactly behave that way, as spoils and patronage resurfaced. The dedication and professionalism that had been ingrained during the American and commonwealth periods had somehow virtually eroded, as members of the bureaucracy became preoccupied with their own personal struggles to survive.
The agenda of reconstruction and rehabilitation became the foremost concern for both the Philippines and the United States. A United States Economic Survey Mission, headed by Daniel Bell, was promptly dispatched to the Philippines “to consider the economic and financial problems of that country and to recommend measures that will enable the Philippines to become and remain self-supporting” (Bell Report, 1950; also, as cited in Reyes, 2003a: 53).
Out of the package of recommendations submitted by the Bell Mission in 1950 were programs designed to rehabilitate agriculture, industry, internal and external finances, domestic and foreign trade, and public administration. On the latter aspect, the Bell Mission recommended a host of measures that would restore competence and integrity in the bureaucracy.
The efforts toward professionalizing the conduct of public affairs in the Philippines had started even before this when a joint US-Philippine Commission was constituted in 1947 on the initiative of Washington to study and improve the financial condition of the country through such measures as tax reform, the establishment of a central bank, and the imposition of import controls, among others (Reyes, 2003a: 52; Shalom, 1986: 71).
Thus, the Bell Mission recommendations on public administration in the Philippines read as follows:
that public administration be improved and reorganized so as to insure honesty and efficiency in the Government; that the civil service be placed on a merit basis and civil service salaries raised to provide a decent standard of living; that the Philippine Government remove barriers to the employment of foreign technicians and take steps to improve training facilities for technicians in the Philippines; and that in accordance with the request of the Philippine Government, the United States send a Technical Mission to assist the Philippine Government in carrying out its agricultural and industrial development, fiscal controls, public administration, and labor and social welfare programs. (Bell et al., 1950: 6, also cited in Reyes, 2003a: 53)
In 1952, as part of the proposals of the Bell Report, an Institute of Public Administration (IPA), based at the University of the Philippines, was established to administer a training
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program that would professionalize the Philippine civil service and restore its competence and confidence.
Eventually, the institutionalization of the study of Public Administration in the Philippines was formalized following a technical assistance agreement concluded between the University of the Philippines and the University of Michigan. That same year, two distinguished academic officials from the University of Michigan, James K. Pollock, chairman of the political science department, and John W. Lederle, director of the IPA arrived in the Philippines to organize the IPA (Reyes, 2003a: 55).
Working under a two and a half year contract, which would be extended until 1956, the American academics, with the assistance of Filipino scholars, set in motion the establishment of a Public Administration library, which would contain a collection of books, journals, documents, and other materials on Public Administration. Simultaneously, a two-pronged program was introduced: an in-service training program for government workers; and an academic program designed to offer undergraduate and graduate degree programs in Public Administration. A program for the conduct of research and publication was also established (Reyes, 2003a: 54-55).
These interventions contributed considerably to the reconstruction of Philippine society and its government, even as it struggled to overcome the many complex problems that it faced. The 1935 Charter was restored as the fundamental law of the country. Gradually, the economy recovered and political and social institutions were re-established. The presidential system of government was retained, a bicameral Congress was reconvened, and the judicial system resumed its functions of adjudication and dispensing justice.
Elections were held even if, more often than not, charges and allegations of vote buying, terrorism, cheating, disenfranchisement, and other anomalies were raised. In time, the Philippines was restored to a vibrant democracy under a two-party system, where civil liberties and basic freedoms were upheld.
The Communist rebellion, which emerged from a splinter group of the Filipino resistance against the Japanese, known as the Hukbalahap,9 was contained so as not to threaten the stability of society, even if insurgents continued to operate underground and repeatedly undertook lightning strikes and attacks on government troops and installations. Thus, Abueva recounts:
From 1946 to about 1968, the legitimacy, stability, and responsiveness of the Philippine political system appeared to have passed a series of tests. Except for the Communist HUKBALAHAP rebellion, there was little serious challenge to the authority of the national government. Political and governmental processes operated within constitutional bounds, restrained by the press, civic organizations, and the Supreme Court… The bureaucracy and the military were subordinate and responsible to Congress and [to] an increasingly powerful President…. Although criticisms of the malfunctioning of Filipino democracy were common, various opinion polls showed its general approval by the people. (Abueva, 1988: 50–51)
With the democratic system restored and political institutions somewhat stabilized, the civil service was also reinvigorated. The principle of merit and fitness, with its attendant and complementary canons of open competitive examinations, political neutrality, professional career,
9Hukbalahap is the shortened name for the Filipino Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, translated roughly as the People’s Army Against the Japanese. This would later be further shortened to Huk.
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and security of tenure were reinstituted. The bureaucracy experienced several reorganizations beginning in 1954.
In 1959, the civil service law was revised under Republic Act No. 2260, which provided for the civil service to embrace all branches, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
But the evils and venalities of spoils and patronage continued to plague the civil service. For example, de Guzman, in a case study, identified one of the schemes as the “50-50 Agreement.” This scheme involved the filling of new positions in the bureaucracy to be split and divided “5050” between appointees recommended by the executive and by members of Congress, specifically, the House of Representatives or the lower house. The arrangement was made in order to secure the smooth approval by the House of the budget proposed by the executive branch (de Guzman, 1963, 1993). However, the practice was checked, if not eradicated, when the upper chamber, the Philippine Senate, got wind of the arrangement and proceeded to establish oversight bodies to monitor appointments.
It is not correct, however, to say that the civil service system abandoned the merit and fitness principles that are well enshrined not only in the law but also in the constitution. Merit and fitness continue to be the established norms in the recruitment, selection, and appointment processes in the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, these principles were compromised when politicians intervened, and they do intervene whenever constituents, qualified or not, approach them. This did not mean that politicians would have their way at all times, for well-meaning leaders, even from their ranks would support resistance against civil service violations committed with impunity.
In this milieu, the confluence of competence and partisan politics interspersed. A combination of the legacies of the Spanish era and that of the American regime adapted to Filipino culture and temperament evolved.
In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos placed the country under martial law, closed Congress, suspended civil liberties, arrested critics and opponents, and governed by decree. Elected in 1965 as president and re-elected in 1969, Marcos was barred under the 1935 constitution from seeking a third term. The declaration of martial law was a quick solution to stay in power and Marcos took advantage of the worsening insurgency in Central Luzon and a growing secessionist movement in Mindanao to justify his decision to put the country under martial law.
Upon declaration of martial law, Marcos at once directed the reorganization of the bureaucracy under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, a proposal that languished in Congress for many years. Under these conditions, the civil service became both willing and unwilling collaborators of the regime. Marcos also initiated the professionalization of the public service and took steps to purge the civil service of unqualified personnel. A Career Executive Service was organized and a new civil service law was codified. But, by summarily dismissing a number of civil servants, Marcos also compromised security of tenure. Protégées and accomplices of the regime soon replaced those dismissed.
Marcos ruled for another 14 years until 1986 when he agreed to call a “snap election” in 1985 to prove that he still enjoyed the confidence of the people. Marcos was challenged by Corazon Aquino, the widow of his arch enemy, Senator Benigno Aquino, who was assassinated three years earlier on his return to the country from exile in the United States. As in previous elections, charges of cheating and manipulation of election results were made against Marcos, which eventually led to his ouster in the celebrated and bloodless people power revolution.
Upon Marcos’ ouster, Aquino became president and democracy was restored with a new constitution promulgated and ratified in 1987. Under this constitution, the independence of the Philippine civil service based on merit and fitness was restored and upheld. Like Marcos, the newly
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