- •Public Administration And Public Policy
- •Contents
- •Acknowledgments
- •About The Authors
- •Comments On Purpose and Methods
- •Contents
- •1.1 Introduction
- •1.2 Culture
- •1.3 Colonial Legacies
- •1.3.1 British Colonial Legacy
- •1.3.2 Latin Legacy
- •1.3.3 American Legacy
- •1.4 Decentralization
- •1.5 Ethics
- •1.5.1 Types of Corruption
- •1.5.2 Ethics Management
- •1.6 Performance Management
- •1.6.2 Structural Changes
- •1.6.3 New Public Management
- •1.7 Civil Service
- •1.7.1 Size
- •1.7.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •1.7.3 Pay and Performance
- •1.7.4 Training
- •1.8 Conclusion
- •Contents
- •2.1 Introduction
- •2.2 Historical Developments and Legacies
- •2.2.1.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of King as Leader
- •2.2.1.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.1.3 Third Legacy: Traditions of Hierarchy and Clientelism
- •2.2.1.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition of Reconciliation
- •2.2.2.1 First Legacy: The Tradition of Bureaucratic Elites as a Privileged Group
- •2.2.2.2 Second Legacy: A Tradition of Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.2.3 Third Legacy: The Practice of Staging Military Coups
- •2.2.2.4 Fourth Legacy: A Tradition for Military Elites to be Loyal to the King
- •2.2.3.1 First Legacy: Elected Politicians as the New Political Boss
- •2.2.3.2 Second Legacy: Frequent and Unpredictable Changes of Political Bosses
- •2.2.3.3 Third Legacy: Politicians from the Provinces Becoming Bosses
- •2.2.3.4 Fourth Legacy: The Problem with the Credibility of Politicians
- •2.2.4.1 First Emerging Legacy: Big Businessmen in Power
- •2.2.4.2 Second Emerging Legacy: Super CEO Authoritarian Rule, Centralization, and Big Government
- •2.2.4.3 Third Emerging Legacy: Government must Serve Big Business Interests
- •2.2.5.1 Emerging Legacy: The Clash between Governance Values and Thai Realities
- •2.2.5.2 Traits of Governmental Culture Produced by the Five Masters
- •2.3 Uniqueness of the Thai Political Context
- •2.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •3.1 Thailand Administrative Structure
- •3.2 History of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.2.1 Thailand as a Centralized State
- •3.2.2 Towards Decentralization
- •3.3 The Politics of Decentralization in Thailand
- •3.3.2 Shrinking Political Power of the Military and Bureaucracy
- •3.4 Drafting the TAO Law 199421
- •3.5 Impacts of the Decentralization Reform on Local Government in Thailand: Ongoing Challenges
- •3.5.1 Strong Executive System
- •3.5.2 Thai Local Political System
- •3.5.3 Fiscal Decentralization
- •3.5.4 Transferred Responsibilities
- •3.5.5 Limited Spending on Personnel
- •3.5.6 New Local Government Personnel System
- •3.6 Local Governments Reaching Out to Local Community
- •3.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •4.1 Introduction
- •4.2 Corruption: General Situation in Thailand
- •4.2.1 Transparency International and its Corruption Perception Index
- •4.2.2 Types of Corruption
- •4.3 A Deeper Look at Corruption in Thailand
- •4.3.1 Vanishing Moral Lessons
- •4.3.4 High Premium on Political Stability
- •4.4 Existing State Mechanisms to Fight Corruption
- •4.4.2 Constraints and Limitations of Public Agencies
- •4.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •5.1 Introduction
- •5.2 History of Performance Management
- •5.2.1 National Economic and Social Development Plans
- •5.2.2 Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform
- •5.3 Performance Management Reform: A Move Toward High Performance Organizations
- •5.3.1 Organization Restructuring to Increase Autonomy
- •5.3.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.3 Knowledge Management Toward Learning Organizations
- •5.3.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.3.5 Challenges and Lessons Learned
- •5.3.5.1 Organizational Restructuring
- •5.3.5.2 Process Improvement through Information Technology
- •5.3.5.3 Knowledge Management
- •5.3.5.4 Performance Agreement
- •5.4.4 Outcome of Budgeting Reform: The Budget Process in Thailand
- •5.4.5 Conclusion
- •5.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •6.1.1 Civil Service Personnel
- •6.1.2 Development of the Civil Service Human Resource System
- •6.1.3 Problems of Civil Service Human Resource
- •6.2 Recruitment and Selection
- •6.2.1 Main Feature
- •6.2.2 Challenges of Recruitment and Selection
- •6.3.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.1 Main Feature
- •6.4.2 Salary Management
- •6.4.2.2 Performance Management and Salary Increase
- •6.4.3 Position Allowance
- •6.4.5 National Compensation Committee
- •6.4.6 Retirement and Pension
- •6.4.7 Challenges in Compensation
- •6.5 Training and Development
- •6.5.1 Main Feature
- •6.5.2 Challenges of Training and Development in the Civil Service
- •6.6 Discipline and Merit Protection
- •6.6.1 Main Feature
- •6.6.2 Challenges of Discipline
- •6.7 Conclusion
- •References
- •English References
- •Contents
- •7.1 Introduction
- •7.2 Setting and Context
- •7.3 Malayan Union and the Birth of the United Malays National Organization
- •7.4 Post Independence, New Economic Policy, and Malay Dominance
- •7.5 Centralization of Executive Powers under Mahathir
- •7.6 Administrative Values
- •7.6.1 Close Ties with the Political Party
- •7.6.2 Laws that Promote Secrecy, Continuing Concerns with Corruption
- •7.6.3 Politics over Performance
- •7.6.4 Increasing Islamization of the Civil Service
- •7.7 Ethnic Politics and Reforms
- •7.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •8.1 Introduction
- •8.2 System of Government in Malaysia
- •8.5 Community Relations and Emerging Recentralization
- •8.6 Process Toward Recentralization and Weakening Decentralization
- •8.7 Reinforcing Centralization
- •8.8 Restructuring and Impact on Decentralization
- •8.9 Where to Decentralization?
- •8.10 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •9.1 Introduction
- •9.2 Ethics and Corruption in Malaysia: General Observations
- •9.2.1 Factors of Corruption
- •9.3 Recent Corruption Scandals
- •9.3.1 Cases Involving Bureaucrats and Executives
- •9.3.2 Procurement Issues
- •9.4 Efforts to Address Corruption and Instill Ethics
- •9.4.1.1 Educational Strategy
- •9.4.1.2 Preventive Strategy
- •9.4.1.3 Punitive Strategy
- •9.4.2 Public Accounts Committee and Public Complaints Bureau
- •9.5 Other Efforts
- •9.6 Assessment and Recommendations
- •9.7 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •10.1 History of Performance Management in the Administrative System
- •10.1.1 Policy Frameworks
- •10.1.2 Organizational Structures
- •10.1.2.1 Values and Work Ethic
- •10.1.2.2 Administrative Devices
- •10.1.2.3 Performance, Financial, and Budgetary Reporting
- •10.2 Performance Management Reforms in the Past Ten Years
- •10.2.1 Electronic Government
- •10.2.2 Public Service Delivery System
- •10.2.3 Other Management Reforms
- •10.3 Assessment of Performance Management Reforms
- •10.4 Analysis and Recommendations
- •10.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •11.1 Introduction
- •11.2 Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.2.1 Public Service Department
- •11.2.2 Public Service Commission
- •11.2.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •11.2.4 Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
- •11.2.5 Administrative and Diplomatic Service
- •11.4 Civil Service Pension Scheme
- •11.5 Civil Service Neutrality
- •11.6 Civil Service Culture
- •11.7 Reform in the Malaysian Civil Service
- •11.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •12.1 Introduction
- •12.2.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.2.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.3.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.3.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.4.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.4.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.5.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.5.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.6.1 Context and Driving Force of Development
- •12.6.2 Major Institutional Development
- •12.7 Public Administration and Society
- •12.7.1 Public Accountability and Participation
- •12.7.2 Administrative Values
- •12.8 Societal and Political Challenge over Bureaucratic Dominance
- •12.9 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •13.1 Introduction
- •13.3 Constitutional Framework of the Basic Law
- •13.4 Changing Relations between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •13.4.1 Constitutional Dimension
- •13.4.1.1 Contending Interpretations over the Basic Law
- •13.4.1.3 New Constitutional Order in the Making
- •13.4.2 Political Dimension
- •13.4.2.3 Contention over Political Reform
- •13.4.3 The Economic Dimension
- •13.4.3.1 Expanding Intergovernmental Links
- •13.4.3.2 Fostering Closer Economic Partnership and Financial Relations
- •13.4.3.3 Seeking Cooperation and Coordination in Regional and National Development
- •13.4.4 External Dimension
- •13.5 Challenges and Prospects in the Relations between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
- •References
- •Contents
- •14.1 Honesty, Integrity, and Adherence to the Law
- •14.2 Accountability, Openness, and Political Neutrality
- •14.2.1 Accountability
- •14.2.2 Openness
- •14.2.3 Political Neutrality
- •14.3 Impartiality and Service to the Community
- •14.4 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •15.1 Introduction
- •15.2 Brief Overview of Performance Management in Hong Kong
- •15.3.1 Measuring and Assessing Performance
- •15.3.2 Adoption of Performance Pledges
- •15.3.3 Linking Budget to Performance
- •15.3.4 Relating Rewards to Performance
- •15.4 Assessment of Outcomes of Performance Management Reforms
- •15.4.1 Are Departments Properly Measuring their Performance?
- •15.4.2 Are Budget Decisions Based on Performance Results?
- •15.4.5 Overall Evaluation
- •15.5 Measurability of Performance
- •15.6 Ownership of, and Responsibility for, Performance
- •15.7 The Politics of Performance
- •15.8 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •16.1 Introduction
- •16.2 Structure of the Public Sector
- •16.2.1 Core Government
- •16.2.2 Hybrid Agencies
- •16.2.4 Private Businesses that Deliver Public Services
- •16.3 Administrative Values
- •16.4 Politicians and Bureaucrats
- •16.5 Management Tools and their Reform
- •16.5.1 Selection
- •16.5.2 Performance Management
- •16.5.3 Compensation
- •16.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •17.1 Introduction
- •17.2 The Philippines: A Brief Background
- •17.4 Philippine Bureaucracy during the Spanish Colonial Regime
- •17.6 American Colonial Regime and the Philippine Commonwealth
- •17.8 Independence Period and the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration
- •17.9 Administrative Values in the Philippines
- •17.11 Conclusions
- •References
- •Contents
- •18.1 Introduction
- •18.2 Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
- •18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
- •18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
- •18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
- •18.2.4 Local Government Finance
- •18.2.5 Local Government Bureaucracy and Personnel
- •18.3 Review of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its Implementation
- •18.3.1 Gains and Successes of Decentralization
- •18.3.2 Assessing the Impact of Decentralization
- •18.3.2.1 Overall Policy Design
- •18.3.2.2 Administrative and Political Issues
- •18.3.2.2.1 Central and Sub-National Role in Devolution
- •18.3.2.2.3 High Budget for Personnel at the Local Level
- •18.3.2.2.4 Political Capture by the Elite
- •18.3.2.3 Fiscal Decentralization Issues
- •18.3.2.3.1 Macroeconomic Stability
- •18.3.2.3.2 Policy Design Issues of the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.3.2.3.4 Disruptive Effect of the Creation of New Local Government Units
- •18.3.2.3.5 Disparate Planning, Unhealthy Competition, and Corruption
- •18.4 Local Governance Reforms, Capacity Building, and Research Agenda
- •18.4.1 Financial Resources and Reforming the Internal Revenue Allotment
- •18.4.3 Government Functions and Powers
- •18.4.6 Local Government Performance Measurement
- •18.4.7 Capacity Building
- •18.4.8 People Participation
- •18.4.9 Political Concerns
- •18.4.10 Federalism
- •18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •19.1 Introduction
- •19.2 Control
- •19.2.1 Laws that Break Up the Alignment of Forces to Minimize State Capture
- •19.2.2 Executive Measures that Optimize Deterrence
- •19.2.3 Initiatives that Close Regulatory Gaps
- •19.2.4 Collateral Measures on Electoral Reform
- •19.3 Guidance
- •19.3.1 Leadership that Casts a Wide Net over Corrupt Acts
- •19.3.2 Limiting Monopoly and Discretion to Constrain Abuse of Power
- •19.3.3 Participatory Appraisal that Increases Agency Resistance against Misconduct
- •19.3.4 Steps that Encourage Public Vigilance and the Growth of Civil Society Watchdogs
- •19.3.5 Decentralized Guidance that eases Log Jams in Centralized Decision Making
- •19.4 Management
- •19.5 Creating Virtuous Circles in Public Ethics and Accountability
- •19.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •20.1 Introduction
- •20.2 Problems and Challenges Facing Bureaucracy in the Philippines Today
- •20.3 Past Reform Initiatives of the Philippine Public Administrative System
- •20.4.1 Rebuilding Institutions and Improving Performance
- •20.4.1.1 Size and Effectiveness of the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.1.2 Privatization
- •20.4.1.3 Addressing Corruption
- •20.4.1.5 Improving Work Processes
- •20.4.2 Performance Management Initiatives for the New Millennium
- •20.4.2.1 Financial Management
- •20.4.2.2 New Government Accounting System
- •20.4.2.3 Public Expenditure Management
- •20.4.2.4 Procurement Reforms
- •20.4.3 Human Resource Management
- •20.4.3.1 Organizing for Performance
- •20.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
- •20.4.3.3 Rationalizing the Bureaucracy
- •20.4.3.4 Public Sector Compensation
- •20.4.3.5 Quality Management Systems
- •20.4.3.6 Local Government Initiatives
- •20.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •21.1 Introduction
- •21.2 Country Development Context
- •21.3 Evolution and Current State of the Philippine Civil Service System
- •21.3.1 Beginnings of a Modern Civil Service
- •21.3.2 Inventory of Government Personnel
- •21.3.3 Recruitment and Selection
- •21.3.6 Training and Development
- •21.3.7 Incentive Structure in the Bureaucracy
- •21.3.8 Filipino Culture
- •21.3.9 Bureaucratic Values and Performance Culture
- •21.3.10 Grievance and Redress System
- •21.4 Development Performance of the Philippine Civil Service
- •21.5 Key Development Challenges
- •21.5.1 Corruption
- •21.6 Conclusion
- •References
- •Annexes
- •Contents
- •22.1 Introduction
- •22.2 History
- •22.3 Major Reform Measures since the Handover
- •22.4 Analysis of the Reform Roadmap
- •22.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •23.1 Decentralization, Autonomy, and Democracy
- •23.3.1 From Recession to Take Off
- •23.3.2 Politics of Growth
- •23.3.3 Government Inertia
- •23.4 Autonomy as Collective Identity
- •23.4.3 Social Group Dynamics
- •23.5 Conclusion
- •References
- •Contents
- •24.1 Introduction
- •24.2 Functions and Performance of the Commission Against Corruption of Macao
- •24.2.1 Functions
- •24.2.2 Guidelines on the Professional Ethics and Conduct of Public Servants
- •24.2.3 Performance
- •24.2.4 Structure
- •24.2.5 Personnel Establishment
- •24.3 New Challenges
- •24.3.1 The Case of Ao Man Long
- •24.3.2 Dilemma of Sunshine Law
- •24.4 Conclusion
- •References
- •Appendix A
- •Contents
- •25.1 Introduction
- •25.2 Theoretical Basis of the Reform
- •25.3 Historical Background
- •25.4 Problems in the Civil Service Culture
- •25.5 Systemic Problems
- •25.6 Performance Management Reform
- •25.6.1 Performance Pledges
- •25.6.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.7 Results and Problems
- •25.7.1 Performance Pledge
- •25.7.2 Employee Performance Assessment
- •25.8 Conclusion and Future Development
- •References
- •Contents
- •26.1 Introduction
- •26.2 Civil Service System
- •26.2.1 Types of Civil Servants
- •26.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure
- •26.2.4 Personnel Management
- •26.4 Civil Service Reform
- •26.5 Conclusion
- •References
356 Public Administration in Southeast Asia |
|
18.4.9 Political Concerns................................................................................................ |
373 |
18.4.10 Federalism......................................................................................................... |
373 |
18.5 Conclusions and the Way Forward.................................................................................. |
374 |
References ................................................................................................................................ |
375 |
Annexes................................................................................................................................... |
377 |
18.1 Introduction
The imperative to transfer powers, functions, responsibilities, and accountabilities to local governments through a process of decentralization has been central to the value to encourage citizen participation and deepen the democratization process. It is within this context that many countries in the region have adopted decentralization as a strategy to deepen democracy and empower local governments.
In the Philippines, Republic Act 7160, commonly known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), was enacted. The code has been considered as a landmark, far reaching, and the most radical piece of legislation in the history of the Philippine politico-administrative system. It devolved significant functions, powers, and responsibilities to the thousands of local governments in the country that have long been operating under a highly centralized regime (Brillantes 2003, 2002, 1998).
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section two provides a historical brief of local autonomy and decentralization in the Philippines. Section three highlights the LGC: its key features and the current state of local governments, the gains and the emergent challenges of the policy design and its implementation over the past 17 years. It also discusses some critical reviews of decentralization. Section four discusses local governance reforms and capacity building directions toward a more desirable design and implementation of decentralization. Section five provides the conclusions and way forward.
18.2Toward a Genuine Local Autonomy and Decentralization in the Philippines
18.2.1 Evolution of Local Autonomy
The development of local autonomy in the Philippines can been traced as far back as the pre-His- panic societies when the chieftain of native settlements exercised executive, judicial, and legislative powers assisted by a Council of Elders. The monarchial chieftain, called the datu, panginoo, or pangulo, headed an autonomous territorial and political unit.
The colonial governments of the Spanish colonizers consolidated autonomous villages into pueblos (towns), cabildos (cities), and provincias (provinces). They enacted the Maura Law 1893, which established tribunals, municipals, and juntas provincials, but the government remained centralized.
In 1898, the Malolos Constitution introduced “decentralization” and “administrative autonomy” by instituting localized law-making bodies through the municipal and provincial assemblies. Local officials were then elected on a popular basis.
During the American occupation (1902–1935), a number of policies were promulgated promoting local autonomy; however, because of security considerations, local affairs had to be under the control of the Americans. The Commonwealth placed local governments under the general supervision of the president, who could, in effect, create or abolish them.
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Decentralization and Local Governance in the Philippines 357
In 1959, the first local autonomy act (RA 2264) entitled “An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments” was enacted. This act vested in city and municipal governments greater fiscal, planning, and regulatory powers. It broadened the taxing powers of the cities and municipalities within the framework of national taxing laws.
In the same year, the Barrio Charter Act (RA 2370) sought to transform the barrios, the smallest political unit of the local government system, into quasi-municipal corporations by vesting in them some taxing powers. An elective barrio council governed the Barrios.
The “Decentralization Act of 1967” (RA 5185) further increased the financial resources of local governments and broadened their decision-making powers over administrative (mostly fiscal and personnel) matters.
The imposition of martial law in 1972, which abolished local elections and vested in the dictator the powers to appoint local officials who were beholden to him, was a great setback for the local autonomy movement. The 1973 Constitution rhetorically committed itself to a policy of “local autonomy.” The Local Government Code of 1983 (Batas Pambansa Bilang 337) reiterated the policy of the state of local autonomy.
After the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution was promulgated. It included specific provisions guaranteeing autonomy to local governments. The LGC was enacted in 1991.1 It was only then that a genuine local autonomy started to take root after a number of patchy policy statements and given the country’s past of a highly centralized politico-administrative system.
18.2.2 Government Structure and the Local Government System
The 1987 Philippine Constitution enshrined a new politico-institutional system that hoped not to repeat an authoritarian regime experienced under former President Ferdinand Marcos. Some of its key features include checks and balances, term limits for elective positions, people empowerment, and the promulgation for a genuine local autonomy in the Philippines. It provided the enabling policy framework for decentralization under the new LGC.2
The Philippines is a presidential-unitary state headed by a president with co-equal branches of government—the executive, the bi-cameral legislature (Senate and the House of Representatives), and the Supreme Court (SC). Its president is elected for a 6-year term and cannot seek re-election. The Senate comprises 24 nationally elected senators, while there are more than 220 lower house seats for congressional district representatives and a few more for sectoral-party list representatives.
It has a three-tier local government system—province, city/municipality, and barangays (village or the lowest political unit). The 1987 Constitution provided for the creation of autonomous regions or metropolitan political regions. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created as a political region—an institutional response to the peace conflict in Muslim Mindanao—to be headed by an elected governor. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), formerly Metro Manila Council, was designated as a special development authority with functions to coordinate metro-wide services, plan for regional development, and respond to externalities that have trans-border effects. An appointed chairman heads the MDDA, who is under the direct supervision of the Office of the President. Figure 18.1 shows the structure of local government system in the Philippines.
1 This summary draws from Brillantes and Moscare (2002).
2 This section also appears as a sub-section of the MA thesis of Tiu Sonco (2009).
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
358 Public Administration in Southeast Asia
National Autonomous government
region
Provinces
(80)
Municipalities |
Component |
Independent/ |
121 cities (both highly |
(1,493) |
cities |
Highly urbanized |
urbanized and |
|
|
cities |
component) |
Barangays |
Barangays |
Barangays |
41,994 (all barangays) |
Figure 18.1 Structure of local government system in the Philippines. Source: Based on LGC of 1991; Department of the Interior and Local Government for the figures.
Each local government unit (LGU) has executive and legislative functions. Each level is headed by an elected local chief executive (LCE) who serves a 3-year term, i.e., a governor for the province, a mayor for the city or municipality, and barangay captain for barangays. An elected governor or a mayor may seek re-election for two more consecutive terms, giving a maximum of 9 years in office if elected. Each level has its own local legislative council with elected local legislators and is presided over by a vice-governor for a province or a vice-mayor for a city/municipality.
The LGC prescribed the criteria for the creation of LGUs as well as their powers and functions, including the authority and magnitude to levy taxes at each level. On the other hand, an Organic Act for ARMM expands the powers and degree of authority over the local governments within the jurisdiction of the autonomous region; however, it follows the LGU structure provided by the LGC. Since the implementation of the LGC, LGUs have been growing in number. Table 18.1 indicates the changing number of political subdivisions before and after the implementation of the LGC. Additional provinces, municipalities, municipality to city conversions, and barangays have been created over time. A major incentive for the creation of a new LGU is greater fiscal resource transfers from the central government. Individual municipalities are converted into cities to enjoy a greater internal revenue allotment (IRA)3 share and local taxing powers.
The provinces have grown from 76 to 81 in 2008; two and three provinces were created under President Fidel Ramos (1992–1998) and President Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–present), respectively. The number of cities has more than doubled from 60 to 137 in 1979 and 2008, respectively. It is interesting to note that a total of 5 provinces and 71 cities have been created since the implementation of the code. In 2008, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration recorded the most number of municipality to city conversions with 41, followed by Ramos with 18 and Estrada with 12.
3IRA is the main form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers of the central government to the LGUs. It follows a predetermined formula between the central government and LGU based on certain percentages distributing a pool of resources by LGU level, and across each level of LGUs on certain percentages of the population, land area, and equity sharing.
©2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Decentralization and Local Governance in the Philippines 359
Table 18.1 Number of Local Government Units, Various Years
LGU |
1979 |
1981 |
1991 |
1998* |
2001 |
2003 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Provinces |
75 |
75 |
76 |
78 |
78 |
79 |
81 |
80 |
80 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cities |
60 |
60 |
66 |
84 |
96 |
115 |
137 |
121 |
138 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Municipalities |
1484 |
1497 |
1,540 |
1,540 |
1,513 |
1,497 |
1,493 |
1,509 |
1,496 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Barangays |
n.a. |
n.a. |
41,820 |
41,820 |
41,943 |
41,971 |
41,994 |
41,994 |
42,025 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board; DILG.
*Unofficial data source. Computed by the author based on various reports.
Figures in 2009 indicate a major change in the number of cities and municipalities, and a decrease in provinces. In December 2009, the Supreme Court declared the laws the created the 16 cities as constitutional. Another city and two barangays were created in March 2010.
18.2.3 Devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991
The LGC devolved powers and functions including the delivery of basic services; responsibility to enforce regulatory powers; power to increase financial resources by broadening their taxing powers, shares from internal revenues, and the exploitation of national wealth; legitimization of participation for civil society in local governance; and authority to engage in entrepreneurial and development activities. Table 18.2 presents its key features and the powers, authorities, and functions devolved to local governments. Annex 18.1 indicates the devolved services by LGU level, which include agriculture, environment, health, social welfare, education, public works, tourism promotion, and the administration of justice.
In hindsight, the proponents of the LGC hoped to “bring development to the countryside, by allowing local governments develop at their own pace.” As such, the LGC provided for the
Table 18.2 Devolved Functions and Key Features of the 1991 LGC
Devolved functions |
Features |
|
|
|
|
1. Delivery of basic |
• Health (field health and hospital services and other tertiary |
|
services |
services) and social services (social welfare services) |
|
|
• Environment (community-based forestry projects) and agriculture |
|
|
(agricultural extension and on-site research) projects and public |
|
|
works undertakings (locally funded) |
|
|
• Education projects (school building program) |
|
|
• Tourism activities (facilities, promotion, and development) |
|
|
• Telecommunications services and housing projects (for provinces |
|
|
and cities); and other services like investment support |
|
|
|
|
2. Responsibility to |
• Reclassify agricultural lands |
|
enforce certain |
• Enforce environmental laws |
|
regulatory powers |
||
|
||
|
|
|
|
(contiuned) |
© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC