- •Часть I
- •Часть I
- •§ 1. Инфинитив I. Инфинитив в различных функциях
- •3. Инфинитив в функции обстоятельства результата илиследствия и сопутствующего обстоятельства.
- •4. Инфинитив в функции подлежащего, предикативного члена, именной части составного сказуемого и обстоятельства цели
- •1. Субъектно-предикативный инфинитивный оборот (конструкция «именительный с инфинитивом»).
- •2. Объектно-предикативный инфинитивный оборот (конструкция «винительный с инфинитивом»).
- •§ 2. Герундии I. Герундий в различных функциях
- •§3. Причастие I. Причастие в различных функциях
- •III. Причастия в функции союзов и предлогов
- •IV. Форма на -ing
- •§ 4. Страдательный залог
- •§ 5. Сослагательное наклонение
- •§ 6. Модальные и вспомогательные глаголы
- •I. Should
- •II. Can, may, must
- •III. To be
- •IV. To have
- •V. To do
- •§ 7. Артикль
- •I. Определенный артикль
- •§ 8. Четырехчленная каузативная конструкция
- •II. One
- •III. That
- •§ 10. Многозначные и трудные для перевода слова
- •II. Служебные слова
- •§ 11. Сложноподчиненные предложения
- •§ 12. Эллиптические конструкции
- •§ 13. Препозитивные атрибутивные словосочетания
- •§ 14. Неологизмы
- •III. Образование неологизмов.
- •§ 15. Интернациональная
- •Часть III
- •2. The Olympic Sham
- •4. The Second Stage
- •6. Jobless Youth
- •9. Living without it
- •2. What Happened to That «Global Architecture?
- •3. A Dangerous Gun Show
- •5. The end of privacy The Surveillance Society
- •6. «Call to Arms»
- •8. When the snarling's over
- •§ 1. Инфинитив
- •§ 2. Герундий I. Герундий в различных функциях
- •II. Герундиальный комплекс
- •§ 3. Причастие
- •§ 4. Страдательный залог
- •§ 5. Сослагательное наклонение
- •§ 6. Модальные и вспомогательные глаголы
- •§ 7. Артикль
- •§ 8. Четырехчленная каузативная конструкция
- •§ 9. Различные функции слов It, One, That It
- •§ 10. Многозначные и трудные для перевода слова
- •§ 12. Эллиптические конструкции
- •§ 13. Препозитивные атрибутивные словосочетания
- •§ 14. Неологизмы
- •§ 15. Интернациональная
3. A Dangerous Gun Show
As we listen to the post-Littleton debate on gun control, it's impossible not to notice the enormous gap between the problem gun-control advocates describe and what their proposals can be expected to deliver. Childproof gun locks, requiring instant checks of buyers from licensed dealers at gun shows, holding adults liable for letting children get guns — none of these would have stopped the Littleton murderers, who planned their crime and assembled their arsenal for a year and violated several existing laws in the process. These proposed new laws would make only a marginal difference. The gun controllers' rhetoric, decrying the large number of guns in the United States and pointing out that gun deaths are much lower in countries that ban guns, makes much more sense as an argument for eliminating gun ownership altogether — which many gun controllers would like to do.
This misfit between problem and solution is typical of reformers,
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mostly liberal but some conservative. Gun-control advocates are not the only reformers whose solutions are tiny next to the problem they address and who ignore the practical difficulties of their unspoken agendas — while remaining uncurious about possible unanticipated consequences.
Consider advocates of the latest campaign finance bill, who decry the importance of money in politics and then propose new laws that will surely be evaded as previous laws have been. The problem is basic: In a big-government democracy, people will want to influence elections, out of idealism as well as self-interest, and they will spend money to do so. And they will be acting on a claim of right: the First Amendment. To which some campaign finance reformers respond: Get rid of the First Amendment. In March 1997, 38 senators voted to amend the First Amendment to allow campaign spending limits. Or as House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt put it: « What we have here is two important values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for healthy campaigns in a healthy democracy. You can't have both.» The Framers disagreed.
There is little evidence that gun-control advocates have given much thought to the practical difficulties of a serious gun ban. For the fact is that while the media lavish attention on marginal changes in federal gun-control laws, the great source of successful reforms in the 1990s is the states, which have been passing laws allowing law-abiding citizens, after a background check, to carry concealed weapons. Today 31 states, with 50 per cent of the nation's population, have such laws. None of the negative consequences predicted by gun controllers has come to pass. Instead, according to the most complete statistical study by University of Chicago economist John Lott, concealed-weapons laws have reduced crime. Citizens stop crimes 2 million times a year by brandishing guns, Lott writes, and criminals are deterred from attacking everybody because they know that a small number of intended victims will be armed. Lott's book, More Guns, Less Crime, presents a strong argument that more gun control would produce more crime.
Even if sweeping gun control did not have that unintended consequence, it would be fiendishly difficult to enforce. There are some 240 million guns in America, most of them owned by people with a claim of right. And not a frivolous claim. The intellectually serious debate is over how far the Second Amendment right extends: Congress can surely ban the possession of nuclear weapons and surely cannot ban all handguns and rifles; the Second Amendment blocks the road somewhere in between. Earlier this month, former members of Congress Abner Mikva and Mickey Edwards, heads of a bipartisan committee, urged caution in proposing constitutional amendments, and they are surely right in urging avoidance of triviality. What do they have to say to the reformers who would repeal the heart of the First Amendment and ignore the Second?
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4. Down with the Death Penalty
The warrior and the executioner do similar jobs. Both kill the enemies of the state. But there the similarity ends. From time immemorial the warrior has been feted and honoured. The public executioner, by contrast, has always had to lurk in the shadows, working anonymously or for a pittance. There is no glory in what he does.
That sense of discomfort and shame is why a growing number of countries have washed their hands off judicial execution. Today nearly all western democracies, as well as dozens of other countries, have abandoned capital punishment. Most of the countries, which still use it with much frequency, such as China or Iran, are authoritarian states without independent legal systems.
The single most defiant — and most notable — exception to this trend is the United States. To the irritation of many of its allies, the American government regularly defends the death penalty in international forums, reflecting widespread support for capital punishment at home. Too often, death-penalty opponents have reacted to America's stubborn exception-alism on this issue with knee-jerk condemnation, or despair. Instead they should relish the chance to convert the world's most vigorous democracy to a saner policy. For they have a better case.
Three basic arguments are made for the death penalty: that it deters others, saves innocent lives by ensuring that murderers can never kill again, and inflicts on them the punishment they deserve. The first two, utilitarian arguments, do not stand up to scrutiny, while the moral claim for retribution, although naturally more difficult to refute, can be answered.
Despite voluminous academic studies of American executions and crime rates, there is no solid evidence that the death penalty is any more effective at deterring murder than long terms of imprisonment. This seems counter-intuitive. Surely death must deter someone. But the kinds of people who kill are rarely equipped, or in a proper emotional state, to make fine calculations about the consequences. Moreover, even for those who are, decades of imprisonment may be as great a deterrent as the remote prospect of execution. Although European countries have abolished the death penalty, their rates of violent crime have risen more slowly than crime overall. Indeed, their murder rates remain far below America's.
It is indisputable that executing a murderer guarantees that he cannot kill again, and this argument once carried considerable weight in societies that could not afford to imprison offenders for long periods. But today most countries, and especially America, can afford this. Opinion polls
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show that support for the death penalty among Americans drops sharply when life imprisonment without parole is the alternative. Executions are not needed to protect the public.
Against the dubious benefits of capital punishment must be weighed its undoubted drawbacks. It is a dangerous power to give any government, and has been grossly abused by many to kill political opponents and other inconvenient people under the colour of law. Even America, with all its legal guarantees and complex system of appeals, has not been able to apply it fairly or consistently. Worst of all, it is irrevocable. Mistakes can never be rectified. America, like all countries, which use the death penalty, has executed innocents. This is too high a price to pay for an unnecessary punishment.
Where does this leave retribution? Some crimes are so heinous that a societal cost-benefit analysis hardly appears relevant. Death alone seems sufficient. And yet, as many relatives of murder victims have discovered, real retribution can never be achieved. For example, the only way to repay fully those who have committed multiple murder, or killed in a ghastly way, would be to torture them physically in turn, or to strive to make them endure repeatedly the torments of death. Modern societies have rightly turned away from such practices as barbaric, tempering their demands for retribution in recognition that tit-for-tat vengeance is beyond the reach of human justice. That is where the death penalty, too, belongs.
In 1976, after short lull, the court allowed executions to proceed again under redrafted state statutes. Since then it has frequently changed the rules, most recently restricting appeal avenues so as to shorten the time between conviction and execution, now averaging almost ten years. Even so, researchers still find inequities in how the death penalty is applied. Avoiding a death sentence depends a lot on having a good lawyer. Not surprisingly, rich, well-educated murderers rarely get a capital sentence. And the risk of executing the innocent remains very real. Since 1973, 78 people have been released from death row after evidence of their innocence emerged.
The attempt to apply the death penalty fairly has exhausted even some of its staunchest supporters on the bench. After retiring from the Supreme Court, Lewis Powell, the author of a landmark 1987 decision upholding Georgia's death penalty even in the face of an undisputed statistical study showing racial bias in its application, said that he regretted the decision and backed abolition.
America's stubborn retention of the death penalty is usually seen as the abolitionist movement's greatest defeat. And yet in the long term it may prove to be one of its greatest assets. If even America, with its com-
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plex legal guarantees and elaborate court system, cannot apply the death penalty fairly or avoid condemning the innocent, then do executions have a place in any society which values justice?