Core-States—Hegemonic Leadership and Military Force

Core states have two vital functions in the maintenance of the structure of the modern world system First, some core states have played a hegemonic leadership role within the interstate system Second, and more generally, core states are invariably the dominant military powers within that sys­tem and use that power in order to discipline those who refuse to accept the 'rules of the game'.

According to Wallerstein, 'the cyclical rise and fall of hegemonic powers... has provided the cru­cial degree of equilibrium' necessary to allow 'process of capital accumulation to proceed with­out serious hindrance' (1996: 102). A hegemonic power is a state which, because of its productive effi­ciency, enjoys a position of economic and military superiority over all its rivals. According to Wallerstein, three states have attained hegemonic status within the life of the modern world-system, Holland in the mid-seventeenth century, followed by Britain in the mid-nineteenth, and the United States in the mid-twentieth centuries.

The importance of these periods arises from the fact that the hegemonic powers play a leadership role within the world-system. Their supremacy allows them to impose or underwrite certain prac­tices or institutions which dominate all interna­tional transactions. Whilst these are doubtless intended to serve the ends of the hegemonic powers themselves, the net effect is to generate a relatively predictable environment in which capi­tal accumulation can proceed successfully through­out the system. So, for example, the Bretton Woods system of global economic regulation established under American hegemony at the end of the Second World War, provided the underpinning for the long post-war boom.

Thus we see that the importance of what Wallerstein calls 'hegemonic cycles' lies in the fact that they establish a certain order throughout the world-system—an order which tends to survive even when the power of the hegemon begins to wane until it is eventually reshaped by another emerging hegemonic power. In a sense, an inter­state system dominated by successive hegemonic powers provides a kind of half-way house avoiding the equally damaging extremes of a world empire which would, as we have seen, stifle capitalism, and a totally anarchical situation in which capitalism would not have the stability necessary to function effectively.

Military supremacy is an important element in the attainment of hegemonic status by a particular core state. Nevertheless, even if one state in the core has a preponderance of military force over the others, when viewed in terms of the world-system as a whole, it must be recognized that the core states more generally have far greater military capability than the states of the semi-periphery and periphery. These core states have proven more than willing to use their military might in order to uphold their dominant position within the world-economy. They have intervened repeatedly to ensure that they retain access to raw materials and to important markets. In addition, they have also utilized milit­ary force to undermine states in the periphery and semi-periphery which are regarded as threatening the stability of the capitalist world order.

Examples of such interventions are legion. The Gulf War of 1992 is a case in point. The coalition forces justified the launching of Operation Desert Storm in terms of reinstating Kuwaiti sovereignty and ensuring respect for the norms of behaviour essential for the functioning of international soci­ety. However, others would argue that it was Kuwait's, and in particular Saudi Arabia's, pivotal position in the global petroleum market which was the main factor in the calculations of American President Bush and his allies. Further examples of the use of military force by core states to defend the stability of the world-system can be found in the repeated American attempts to overthrow left-wing governments in Latin America; even when those governments were democratically elected, as in the case of Guatemala (1954), Chile (1973), Nicaragua (1979-90). See Box 7.5.