From appeasement to war

The Nazis made no secret of their territorial ambi­tions; Mein Kampf spelt out Hitler's racial views and expansionist plans quite explicitly. Why, therefore, did the governments of Britain and France not do more to prevent Hitler from realizing these plans? Why was Hitler allowed to remilitarize the Rhine-land, annex Austria, and invade Czechoslovakia before the Allies confronted him over his incursion into Poland in September 1939? Why, in short, was Hitler appeased for so long?

The policy of appeasement pursued by the West­ern powers throughout much of the 1930s has received considerable scholarly attention, and remains a potent source of historical analogies for politicians. The first generation of post-war histor­ians was extremely (if understandably) harsh to its verdict on the appeasers: Chamberlain and his French counterparts were the 'Guilty Men of Munich'. By cravenly appeasing Hitler, the leaders of France and Britain simply fed his appetite, and emboldened the Fuhrer to believe that he could suc­cessfully carry off ever more audacious violations of the Treaty of Versailles.

A number of subsequent historians have been somewhat kinder to the 'appeasers'. Certainly we should not underestimate the magnitude of the domestic and international crises confronting West European policy-makers and diplomats in the 1930s. Japan's violations of Chinese sovereignty were a source of concern in the Far East. Events in Asia thus provided a convenient cover for Hitler to leave the Geneva disarmament conference and the League in 1933, and to begin the process of German rearmament. Germany also profited from Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, and was a far from reliable ally to Mussolini during the ensuing war there. Although Mussolini announced the formation of a 'Rome-Berlin Axis' between Germany and Italy in Novem­ber 1936, in fact, Hitler had sent some arms to Haile Selassie's beleagured forces in Abyssinia—precisely to protract the war, enabling Germany to tear more gaping holes in the fabric of the Versailles settle­ment, while British and French attention was still focused on north-east Africa. As the League grappled with the issue of whether or not to apply sanctions to Italy over Abyssinia, civil war broke out in Spain. The ideological fissures in Europe were now unmistakable.

British and French politicians accordingly faced the daunting scenario of war on three fronts: in the Pacific (against Japan); the Mediterranean (against Italy), and Central Europe (against Germany). Nei­ther Britain nor France was prepared militarily for such an eventuality. Nor, for much of the 1930s, did a majority of British and French citizens appear to favour going to war to prevent or reverse acts of aggression. There were after all pressing domestic issues to be attended to: the Depression had created chronic unemployment and poverty. Moreover, the memory of World War I was still vivid, and this made politicians, mindful of the publics they served, cautious about embarking on military solu­tions to International problems. Appeasement, some historians would thus argue, was in certain respects a justifiable attempt to 'buy time'. It enabled British and French rearmament to proceed, and public opinion to be mobilized, so that if Ger­many did have to be challenged militarily, and Hit­ler's pose as a 'man of peace' was proved a sham, then at least a serious military effort could be mounted against him.

However, this more charitable interpretation of appeasement might be criticized on the grounds that it credits the appeasers with considerable foresight— with seeking a breathing-space which would enable them, ultimately, to wage more effective war against Hitler, whereas in fact they tended to believe that by giving in to his demands, the Fuhrer would cease to make them. Chamberlain not only accepted that Germany did have some legitimate grievances but additionally regarded Hitler in the same light as other statesmen. The British premier therefore assumed that differences between European states­men could be ironed out through negotiation and compromise, as all essentially wanted peace. This underestimation of Nazi intentions consequently enabled Hitler to launch a spectacular series of assaults on the Versailles settlement with impunity. He reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936, with surpris­ingly little response from France. He encouraged Nazi movements in Austria, and pressurized the Aus­trian chancellor Schuschnigg to include Nazis in his government. Then in March 1938 he dispatched German troops over the border to secure the 'unifica­tion' of Austria with Germany (Anschluss). Czecho­slovakia was next. Here, Hitler again deployed as legitimation the fact that Germany had been wronged in 1919, when three and a half million Germans of the Sudetenland had been incorporated within the new Czech state. German troop move­ments against Czechoslovakia began in May 1938. While British and French leaders were clearly alarmed by this development, they nevertheless con­tinued to appease Hitler, and indeed the high-point of the policy was the now notorious Munich con­ference of September 1938. At Munich, the British and French premiers agreed to German occupation of the Sudetenland, but offered a guarantee (with Italy and Germany) of the borders of the remaining Czech state. Hitler also promised Chamberlain that their two countries would 'never go to war with one another again'—the famous piece of paper which Chamberlain claimed would secure 'peace for our time'.

As we know, it did not. In Match 1939, Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and Brit­ain and France ignored their pledges made at Munich, with Chamberlain having decided some months earlier that Czechoslovakia was indefens­ible. However, in the wake of Germany's effective occupation of all Central Europe, the Western powers showered guarantees on the remaining free states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Why this sudden diplomatic revolution? The answer seems to be that appeasement no longer appeared morally defensible once Hitler's ambitions had clearly out­stripped revision of German grievances outstanding from 1919. By sending German troops into Prague, Hitler revealed that his territorial greed was not just

Box 3.7. The origins of World War Two in Europe: a chronology
30 Oct. 1922	Mussolini becomes Prime Minister of Italy.
30 Jan. 1933	Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany
14 Oct. 1933	Germany leaves the Geneva disarmament conference and walks out of the League of Nations.
14/15 June 1934	Hitler and Mussolini meet in Venice.
25 July 1934	Murder of Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, by Austrian Nazis.
16 March 1935	Germany reintroduces conscription.
3 Oct. 1935	Italy invades Abyssinia/Ethiopia.
11 Oct. 1935	League decides to impose sanctions against Italy.
7 March 1936	Germany reoccupies the Rhineland (which the Treaty of Versailles had established as a demilitarized zone).
9 May 1936	Italy annexes Abyssinia.
17 July 1936	Civil war breaks out in Spain between Franco's fascist forces and the communist/socialist/syndicalist Popular Front.
1 Nov. 1936	Mussolini announces the existence of the Rome-Berlin Axis.
11 Dec. 1937	Italy leaves the League of Nations.
13 March 1938	Austria united with Germany (Anschluss).
20 May 1938	Rumours of German troop movements against Czechoslovakia.
15 Sept. 1938	British PM Chamberlain meets Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
22 Sept. 1938	Chamberlain and Hitler meet at Godesburg.
29/30 Sept. 1938	Munich Conference.
28 March 1939	End of Spanish Civil War.
31 March 1939	Britain and France extend a guarantee to Poland that they will defend Poland's territorial integrity from German attack, after Germany occupies the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
17 April 1939	USSR proposes alliance to Britain and France.
22 May 1939	Pact of Steel signed between Italy and Germany.
12 Aug. 1939	Britain and France begin military talks with USSR.
23 Aug.1939	Stalin signs Nazi-Soviet Pact.
25 Aug.1939	Britain signs treaty with Poland.
1 Sept. 1939	Germany invades Poland; Italy remains neutral.
3 Sept. 1939	Britain and France declare war on Germany.
17 Sept. 1939	USSR invades Poland.
30 Nov. 1939	USSR invades Finland.
9 April 1940	Germany invades Denmark and Norway.
10 June 1940	Italy enters the war.
22 June 1940	France signs armistice with Germany.
22 June 1941	Germany invades USSR.
8 Dec. 1941	US enters the war.

for 'Germanic' lands. Why assume that he would be satisfied with Czechoslovakia? Poland, the Low Countries, and France all now appeared in immi­nent danger of German expansionism. Fearing for their own territorial integrity, the leaders of Britain and France thus determined to go to war with Hitler over Poland in September 1939. The Czechs might have been sacrificed on the altar of appeasement, but the Poles would not suffer the same fate without a fight.