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about Sermons XIII–XIV. This may encourage us to overlook their importance for his view. Indeed, they are the culmination of his account of the various notions of benevolence, self-love, and happiness, and so the principles of his moral psychology.
§3. Some Principles of Butler’s Moral Psychology
(1)Let’s start with the principle we discussed last time: “All particular affections whatever, resentment, benevolence, love of arts, equally lead to a course of action for their own gratification, i.e. the gratification of ourselves; and the gratification of each gives delight: so far, then, it is manifest they have all the same respect to private interest” (XI: par. 14, p. 197).
But: “This gratification is not the object of the affections; the deliberate pursuit of pleasure as such presupposes the affections, which do not have pleasures as their object.” Note that in XIII: par. 13 (pp. 239–240) Butler says that the question: Whether we ought to love God for God’s own sake or for our own is a mere mistake in language. He makes the same point here as earlier contra Hobbes and others regarding egoism. We are to love God as the highest and proper object of our perfected real benevolence (as informed and directed by our reason), but of course the delight we find in this love constitutes the full gratification of our nature and therefore answers to our reasonable self-love which looks after our real happiness. Butler is using the distinctions we discussed earlier to say that there is no conflict between the perfected love of God and our proper good.
(2)There are several important psychological principles which apply to benevolence as an affection for virtue and public good which distinguish it from the affections generally:
(a)One is hinted at in par. 16 of XI (p. 201): “Love of our neighbor . . .
as a virtuous principle, is gratified by a consciousness of endeavoring to promote the good of others; but considered as a natural affection, its gratification consists in the actual accomplishment of this endeavor.”
But what is the explanation of this fact? Here Butler simply asserts it. Is it a basic principle or a corollary of such a principle? We get an answer perhaps in XII: par. 23 (see also XIII: pars. 7–10). For Butler says here: “Human nature is so constituted, that every good affection implies the love of itself; i.e. becomes the object of a new affection in the same person. Thus, to be
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righteous, implies in it the love of righteousness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to be good, the love of goodness; whether this righteousness, benevolence, or goodness, be viewed as in our own mind, or in another’s: and the love of God as a being perfectly good, is the love of perfect goodness contemplated in a being or person” (p. 228).
This is restated in XIII: 3 (p. 230); XIII: and par. 6 (pp. 234f ), where Butler says: “To be a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, goodness, righteousness, when these principles are the objects of contemplation. Now if a man approves of, or hath an affection to, any principle in and for itself; incidental things allowed for, it will be the same whether he views it in his own mind, or in another; in himself, or in his neighbour. This is the account of our approbation of, our moral love and affection to good characters; which cannot but be in those who have any degrees of real goodness in themselves, and who discern and take notice of the same principle in others.” Call this a basic principle of reflective affection: a good affection—an affection to virtue—gener- ates an affection to itself.6 It also explains why we can’t violate conscience without self-condemnation: we must dislike vice in ourselves.
(b)Next there are two principles which generate love: First, the Principle of Superior Excellence, XIII: pars. 7–8 (pp. 234–235). Second, the Principle of Reciprocity: good intentions and actions for our benefit and good generate a natural gratitude and returning love (XIII: 9–11, pp. 236–238).
(c)Next there is a basic presumption: namely, these principles won’t work—particularly Principle (a) of reflective love—unless we have some degree of moral goodness: i.e., an affection to goodness in our mind and character: XIII: 9, p. 236.
(d)Principle of Proper Aspiration: XIV: 3, p. 244, which Butler connects with Resignation = fear-hope-love:
“Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety: it includes in it all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet and composure of mind. There is the general principle of submission in our nature.”
(e)Principle of Continuity: XIII: 12, pp. 178f.7
6.See the statement in par. 16 of XI (p. 168) quoted above. See the selection immediately under section 2a above.
7.[It is not clear what this principle is. The lectures end here abruptly, without further elaboration or a summary. —Ed.]
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a p p e n d i x
a p p e n d i x : a d d i t i o n a l n o t e s o n bu t l e r
Important Points in Butler
(Hobbes and Butler, the two great sources of modern moral philosophy: Hobbes as posing the problem—the writer to refute. Butler supplied a deep answer to Hobbes.)
(1)Authority vs. Strength
(2)Dissertation notion of RE = starts here8
(3)On Method—Last par. Dissertation on personal identity
(4)Egoism contra Hobbes: Butler holds moral projects as much a part of the self as other parts of the self: our natural desires, etc. Kant deepens this by connecting ML (Moral Law) with the self as R+R (Rational and Reasonable).
(5)In Dissertation Butler attacks Hutcheson’s explanation of the moral
sense.
(6)Butler’s general method is to appeal to experience; but there are different kinds of experience, moral vs. non-moral, memory vs. non-memory (as in Ref. in 3).
(7)Hume responds to Butler in two ways:
(a)Hume tries to allow for Butler’s distinction of Authority vs. Strength by the distinction between the calm vs. violent passions.
(b)Hume tries to reply to Butler’s critique of utilitarianism (Hutcheson) re justice by the distinction between the natural and the artificial virtues. (Hume concedes Butler is right in saying that justice is not always beneficial.)
(8)Butler does not want to explain everything; or to go beneath or to systematize the data of our moral experience. Systematic theory isn’t his aim. We know enough for our salvation, and that knowledge we should be clear about and hold firm.
Sturgeon: on Butler Phil. Review (Schneewind thinks wrong) Whewell’s chapter on Butler in his History of Ethics: “Butler got the
data right; our task is to work out the theory” (or something like that).
(9)Connect this up with Kant; including his notion of reasonable faith.
8. [“RE” seems to refer to reflective equilibrium, and “Dissertation notion of RE” refers either to Butler’s “Dissertation: Of Personal Identity” or to Rawls’s own dissertation and his initial account of reflective equilibrium worked out there, which was published in “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951), in Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), Ch. 1. —Ed.]
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(10) Butler proposes a new basis for the authority of morals—not revelation or divine will; but moral experience (as available to common sense and conscience).
Conscience and the Authority of Conscience: Preface: 24–30, esp. 26–28; Sermon I: 8–9; II: entire Social Nature of Man:
Sermon I: 9–13; cf. esp. 10, 12
There is no self-hatred in man, or the desire to hurt others for their own sake, or of injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, etc. (also Kant).
Preface: 26–28: to violate conscience is to be self-condemned, we cannot so act without “real self-dislike.”
Conflict [of] Conscience vs. Self-Love: Preface: 16–30; esp. 24; III: 9; XI: 20
Analogy: 87 and 87n
religious and temporal interest of self-love cf. 70f Conscience in Analogy:
(1)Cannot depart from with[out] self-condemnation: 111
(2)Its dictates are the laws of God, laws as including sanctions: 111 Conflict [of] Conscience and Self-Love: (Passages)
Preface:
Conflict with one’s own interest, happiness left without a remedy by Shaftesbury: 26; 27–30 also relevant
Conflict resolved by epistemic certainty [of] conscience: 26 Sermon I:
Paragraph 15: appears to put conscience and self-love on a par Sermon II: (avoids comparing conscience and self-love)
Conscience principle in the heart, and supreme: 8, 15 Sermon III: discussion 6–9:
Narrow self-interest impossible for us: 6–7
Self-Interest (present and temporal) as maximizing satisfactions generally
Coincides with virtue and its course of life: 8 And will do so in the final distribution of things: 8
Conscience and self-love properly understood co-equal, but we are to follow conscience always: 9
Sermon XI: 20–21
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Butler’s Aim: To Show Us to Ourselves: II: 1 On Conscience:
Its role in Constitution of Human Nature:
The parts of Human Nature set out (Const = Econ): P:14 Supremacy of conscience defs constitution of human nature: P:14 All parts governed by conscience, gives idea of constitution or sys-
tem of human nature: P:14; This system adapted to virtue: P:14 That our constitution is at times disordered doesn’t make it not a
constitution: P:14
In virtue of conscience and our constitution we are moral agents and accountable: P:14
Nothing more contrary to our nature than vice and injustice: P:15 Constitution of our nature requires us to govern ourselves by con-
science: P:25
Our constitution makes us a law to ourselves and liable to punishment, even when we doubt the sanction: P:29
Its Authority: P:16–30
Conscience as approbation of some principles or actions, etc.: P:19 Conscience and its authority is what distinguishes man from animals:
P:18–24
Conscience claims absolute direction of our constitution: P:24 This claim made independent of strength of influence: P:24 Shaftesbury’s error: to have a scheme where strength decides: P:26
Why conscience overrides: epistemic argument from certainty and authority: P:26
We cannot violate our conscience without self-condemnation and self-dislike: P:28
Conflict of conscience and self-love: 16–30
Does not depend on Religion but issues from our own mind: Analogy I: 7:11
Conscience necessary for governing and regulating other elements of human nature: II: 8
Argument from disproportion II: 40 Method and Intuitionism
Relation to Clarke, etc. P:12
Appeal to moral facts as Butler’s own method: P:12, 27; II: 1 Appeal to moral experience as sui generis: P:16
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Appeal to moral sense of each person’s heart and natural conscience: II: 1
(Compares to appeal to the sense re knowledge of things) Appeal to moral emotions and their role: e.g. shame: II: 1
They cannot be wholly mistaken: II: 1
Why is our nature social?
(1)Shown by appetites and affections, etc. (On resentment, on compassion, Sermons XI–XII)
(2)By general principle of benevolence
(3)By context of conscience
(4)By fact that reasonable self-love would lead us to be social
Is the Constitution of Human Nature Actual or Merely Ideal?
(1)The parts are actual, including conscience.
(2)It is ideal in that it can be disordered; and conscience is not generally followed.
(3)It is manifest in the actual deliverances of conscience of impartial and fair-minded persons, given a cool hour.
(4)The const. is then what we would be like in our actions if we generally followed conscience.
(5)This const. and supremacy of conscience makes us a law unto ourselves; it makes us responsible and accountable moral and reasonable agents.
(6)Butler would say: All this is based on facts of our moral experience. Is Butler an intuitionist? e.g. like Clarke?
Preface
Butler’s acceptance of intuitionism à la Clarke: Pref: 12 Butler’s own method: Pref: 12f
appeal to moral experiences as matters of fact: 12, 27 Const. (or econ) of human nature: Pref: 12f; 14
the various parts: 14
relations of parts and supremacy of conscience: 14 purpose: adopted to virtue: 14
as watch to tell time: 14 Irrelevance of disorders: 14
Constitution of agents accountable for disorders in the const.: 14
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Nothing more contrary with human nature than vice, injustice: 15 Poverty and pain not and why: 15; III: 2
Principle of self-love: 35
Particular passions and appetites: 35
Variety of human motives, as taking turns: P:21 Notion of Authority of Conscience: 14, 16, 19
Difference of kind of moral experience re Harding: 16 Has authority over other parts of our const.: 24
This authority distinguished from strength: 24 This authority implied by reflect approbation: 25
Critique Shaftesbury: who omits this authority: 26–30
Conflict of conscience vs. rational self-love: 26, 41; III: 5–9; XI: 20–21 Why conscience always overrides (epistemic explanation): 26 Appeal to interest and self-love: 28
Transgression conscience leads to self-condemnation, self-dislike: 28 Man a law to himself: 29
Why punishment still just of unbelievers: 29
Accepts Shaftesbury’s thesis: virtue tends to happiness, vice to misery: 26, 30
How obligations proved; what our nature and condition require: 33 Moral experience sui generis: 16, 24
Sermon I
Virtue the NL we are born under: 2 Our whole const. adapted to virtue: 2
Social nature of man: complementarity of parts of our const.: 4f; 10 we were born for society and our own good: 9
Principle of Benevolence: 6
Principle of self-love: 6; (cool self-love) 14; II: 10–11 Analogy: I: 3–7 Coincidence Benevolence and Self-love: 6; III: 9: cf III: 5–9 Superior to Passions: II: 10–11
Particular Affections and Passions: 7
How distinct from principles of benevolence and self-love: 7 Why they are viewed as instruments of God: 7
Principle of Reflection, or Conscience: 8 Shown by appeal to moral experience: 8
No such thing in human nature as: Self-hatred: 12
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Ill-will: 12
Love of injustice: 12
Cause of evil and wrong-doing: 12; Broad: 56 Nature of man judged by bulk of mankind: 13
Authority of Conscience vs. Influence: II: 1–8, 12–14; III: 2 Sense in which natural: II: 8
Office of Conscience: II: 8; III: 2 (to manage and preside) Makes us law to ourselves: II: 4, 8, 9; III: 3
Prerogative, natural supremacy of conscience: 8, 9; III: 2 Example to illustrate unnatural conduct: II: 10
God placed conscience in our const. to be our proper governor: II: 15; III: 3, 5
Right and Wrong can be discerned by the fair-minded without benefit of principles and rules (of philosophy): III: 4
We have the rule of right within: III: 4
Conscience carries its own authority: obligation to obey rests on its being the law of our nature: III: 5
Conscience as voice of God: III: 5 (Bernard’s interpretation), see Analogy I: 3:15–16; I: 7:11; II: 1:25; I: 3:13
Virtue as suitable to our nature: III: 9 Appeal to experience: II: 1; 17 Butler’s Aim: II: 1
Equal rank of conscience and self-love: III: 9
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c o u r s e o u t l i n e
Philosophy 171:
Political and Social Philosophy—Spring 1983
This class will consider several social contract and utilitarian views which have been important in the development of liberalism as a philosophical doctrine. Attention will be given to Marx as a critic of liberalism; and time permitting, the class will end with some discussion of TJ [A Theory of Justice] and other contemporary views. The focus of the class is narrow in the hope of achieving some depth of understanding.
A.Introduction
B.Two Social Contract Doctrines: (3 weeks)
1.Hobbes:
a.Human Nature and the Instability of the State of Nature
b.Hobbes’s Thesis and the Articles of Peace
c.Role and Powers of the Sovereign
2.Locke:
a.Doctrine of the FLN
b.Social Contract and the Limits of Political Authority
c.The Legitimate Constitution and Problem of Inequality
C.Two Utilitarian Doctrines: (3 weeks)
1.Hume:
a.Critique of the Social Contract Doctrine
b.Justice, Property, and the Principle of Utility
2.J. S. Mill:
a.The Principle of Utility Revised
b.The Principle of Liberty and Natural Rights
c.Subjection of Women and Principles of the Modern World
d.Private Property, Competitive Markets, and Socialism
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Course Outline
D.Marx: (2½ weeks)
a.The Role of Conceptions of Justice
b.Theory of Ideological Consciousness
c.Theory of Alienation and Exploitation
d.Conception of a Rational Human Society
E.Conclusion: Some Contemporary Views
a.Sketch of the Main Ideas of TJ
b.Their Relation to Some Other Views
Texts
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Macpherson (Pelican Classics)
Locke, Treatise of Government, ed. Laslett (New American Library) Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Liberal Arts)
J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism and On Liberty (Hackett); Subjection of Women (MIT) Marx, Selected Writings, ed. McLellan (Oxford)
Readings
Leviathan, Pt. I, esp. Chs. 5–16, Pt. II entire; Second Treatise, entire; Enquiry, entire, and Of the Original Contract (Xerox); Utilitarianism, entire, On Liberty, esp. Chs. 1–3; Subjection of Women, entire; in McLellan, ed., On the Jewish Question, #6; Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, #8; On James Mill, #10;
Theses on Feuerbach, #13; German Ideology, #14; Wage-Labor and Capital, #19; Selections from Grundrisse, #29; and Capital; and Critique of the Gotha Program, #40.
Lectures are on Monday and Friday. There will be a final examination and a term paper of approximately 3,000 words.
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