l o c k e

iar to us than, say, thinking through conceptions in mathematics, physics, or economics. But perhaps it can be done. Why not? We can only find out by trying.

4. So much for preliminary comments on the problem of the class state in Locke. I first sketch some main points about his account of property, calling your attention to a few important points in the Two Treatises, stressing some sections in Chapter 4 of the first, and Chapter 5 of the second. With this done, I indicate how a constitutional class state might be thought to come about in the course of ideal history. The purpose in doing this is to show that such a state is consistent with Locke’s basic ideas.

The thought here is not to criticize Locke, who was a great man—one who, while cautious, and some say even timid, nevertheless ran enormous risks to his life for many years to defend the cause of constitutional government against royal absolutism. He put his head where his mouth was. It would be indecent to take a lofty critical tone towards him because his view is not as democratic as we now would like.

Our aim, then, is one of clarification: if Locke’s formulation of the social contract doctrine is not satisfactory—because, say, it is compatible with the class state—how then should it be revised? We examine how such a state could arise in ideal history in order to highlight certain basic features of Locke’s view, hoping that getting a clear idea about them may show us how best to revise it.

§2. Background of the Question

1. The question of the franchise is not raised explicitly in the Second Treatise. Although there was controversy about redistricting during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679–81, the franchise as such was not the central issue. The basis for thinking that Locke accepts the class state is what he says in the Second Treatise, ¶¶140f, where he seems to accept as justified that the franchise be limited to those who met the 40 shilling freehold rule in existence at the time (in land terms, that is roughly 4.5 acres of arable land). Although not a large sum, various estimates indicate that it excluded a large part of the male population, possibly as large as 4/5 at the time of the Exclusion Crisis, though others think it was considerably less and closer to 3/5

[ 140 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Property and the Class State

or less.4 These variations do not matter for our purpose of examining legitimacy of the class state in Locke’s doctrine.

Locke’s complaint against the Crown is that it resists redistricting to bring representation in Parliament in line with the appropriate principle. He says in ¶158: “If . . . the Executive, who has the power of Convoking the Legislative, observing rather the true proportion, than fashion of Representation, regulates, not by old custom, but true reason, the number of Members, in all places, that have a right to be distinctly represented, which no part of the People however incorporated can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance, which it [that part of the people however incorporated] affords to the public, it [the executive] cannot be judged, to have set up a new Legislative, but . . . to have rectified the disorders, which succession of time had

. . . inevitably introduced.”

Now this passage, read together with the whole of ¶¶157–158 and 140, seems to mean by those “that have a right to be distinctly represented” (as opposed to those who have a right to be, say, virtually represented), those who have the right to vote. However, we should not read the passage as accepting property as the sole basis of redistricting. Rather, we should read

4. There are various estimates. J. H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675–1725 (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 27ff, gives the estimate of 200,000 as conservative for the size of the electorate at the time of William II. This was perhaps as few as 1/30 of the nation including women, children, and the laboring poor, whom no one considered worthy of political rights (pp. 28f ). J. R. Jones in Country and Court (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979) gives the size of the electorate in Queen Anne’s reign as about 250,000 (p. 43). Richard Ashcraft in his Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) has an account of the electorate pointing out that it tended to increase for two reasons: one was the steady inflation of the time, which lowered the real value of the property qualification; the other was the tendency of Parliament to enlarge the franchise as a way of defending itself against the Crown (pp. 147f ). The Whigs under Shaftesbury looked to an electorate of tradesmen, artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants, and most freeholders who prospered at the expense of middle-size landowners and the small gentry (p. 146). Also, the electorate varied from one part of the country to another; in London, for example, Ashcraft thinks there was virtually manhood suffrage in elections of parliamentary representatives and city officials (p. 148). Ashcraft cites Derek Hirst as thinking that in 1641 the electorate may have been as large as 2/5 of the male population (pp. 151f ). In his Authority and Conflict: England, 1603–1658 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), Hirst says that after Ireton’s proposals of 1647–1649, representation was fairer than it was to be again until the later 19th century (p. 330).

[ 141 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

l o c k e

¶¶157–158 together as saying that “fair and equal” representation (¶158) is based on both “wealth and inhabitants” (¶157), each given a weight in a manner Locke leaves unspecified.5

I assume, then, that Locke accepts the class state as consistent with his view. Our task, as I have said, is to find an explanation of how he could do so, and to reject MacPherson’s explanation.

§3. Locke’s Reply to Filmer: I: Chapter 4

1. I now turn to the First Treatise and to Locke’s rejection there of property as a basis of political authority. I begin with a summary of Filmer’s views, following Laslett, who in his introduction to his edition of Filmer’s writings sums them up as follows:6

There is no legitimate government but monarchy only. There is no legitimate monarchy but paternal only.

There is no paternal monarchy but absolute, that is, arbitrary. There is no such thing as legitimate aristocracy or democracy. No legitimate government can be a tyranny.

We are not free by nature but always born subject to obligation.

For our purposes here, perhaps the last statement is most important. And in First Treatise, ¶6, Locke would seem to agree. There he says that Filmer’s “. . . great Position is, that Men are not naturally free. This is the Foundation on which his absolute Monarchy stands. . . . But if this Foundation fails, all his Fabric falls with it, and Governments must be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance, and the consent of Men . . .

making use of their Reason to unite together in Society.” Thus Locke states a basic foundational difference between himself and Filmer; and he claims that his view returns to an older social contract tradition.

2. Before discussing Locke’s views on property, a comment about the idea of property. Property consists, it is often said, in a bundle of rights, with certain conditions imposed as to how those rights can be exercised.

5.On this point, see John Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke.

6.See the Introduction by Peter Laslett to his edition of Patriarcha and Other Political Writings of Sir Robert Filmer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1949), p. 20.

[ 142 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Property and the Class State

Different conceptions of property, private or otherwise, specify the bundle of rights in different ways.

For Locke, property—or “propriety in” (as he often says)—is a right to do something, or a right to use something, under certain conditions, a right that cannot be taken from us without our consent.7 We should distinguish the right itself and its grounds, from the kind of action or thing we have a right to do or to use. Even when the right is the right to use and to have appropriate control over land and natural resources, property does not mean land or resources, even if Locke sometimes seems to talk that way. There is one meaning of property as a bundle of rights: the right (as a bundle) cannot be taken away without our consent. Different rights connect with the different kinds of actions and things we can have property in.

Also we should distinguish at least two uses—not meanings—of “property” according to the kinds of things connected with the bundle of rights in question.

(a)One is Locke’s broad use, in which the rights involve lives, liberties, and estates, as found in ¶¶87, 123, 138, 173.

(b)The other is his narrow use, in which the rights involve such things as: fruits of the earth, ¶¶28–32; or land, ¶¶32–39, 47–50; or estates, ¶¶87, 123, 131, 138, 173; or fortunes, ¶¶135, 221.

(c)And then there are indeterminate uses: we cannot tell whether some of these are broad or narrow, for example, ¶94, where Locke declares that: “. . . Government has no other end but the preservation of Property.” This is a very strong assertion of the purpose of government, but seems to cover both uses of “property.” Others are quite clearly linked to other broad or narrow uses, given the larger context.

3. To proceed: recall that the aim of Locke’s argument from cases is to show, against Filmer, that the right of property cannot be the basis of political authority. He does this by making two points.

(a)In the First Treatise, Chapter 4, he holds that property in land and resources alone cannot give rise to political authority: my having greater property than those without property gives me no political jurisdiction over them.

(b)In the Second Treatise, Chapter 5, he argues that property in land and

7. See James Tully, A Discourse on Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 112–116, with definition on p. 116.

[ 143 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

l o c k e

resources can, and did, arise before government; and indeed that one reason for establishing government is for the protection of already existing property.

Thus, for Locke, property neither establishes nor requires political authority, in contrast with Filmer’s and the feudal view.

I begin with the first point. The clearest statement of it is in the First Treatise: Chapter 4, ¶¶39, 41–43. Filmer had claimed that God gave the world to Adam as Adam’s property. Much in these chapters is, like much of the rest of the First Treatise, extremely tedious, but some passages are fundamental to Locke’s view. After a long discussion Locke says in I: ¶39: “. . . for however, in respect of one another, Men may be allowed to have propriety in their distinct Portions of the Creatures; yet in respect of God the Maker of Heaven and Earth, who is the sole Lord and Proprietor of the whole World, Man’s Propriety in Creatures is nothing but that Liberty to use them, which God has permitted, and so Man’s property may be altered and enlarged, as we see it was here, after the Flood, when other uses of them are allowed, which before were not. From all [of] which I suppose, it is clear, that neither Adam nor Noah, had any Private Dominion, any Property in the Creatures, exclusive of his Posterity, as they should successively grow up into need of them, and come to be able to make use of them.” This passage, along with the passage in I: ¶41, contains several central features of Locke’s conception of property.

For one thing, property in something (here, “propriety in creatures”) is a liberty to use that something for the satisfaction of our needs and requirements. God is always the lord and proprietor of the world itself, of living things and natural resources. But given the fundamental law of nature, which wills the preservation of mankind, and so far as possible, every member of it (including our own person), we have two natural duties: one, to preserve ourselves, the other, to preserve mankind.

4. In view of these two duties, we have two natural rights. These are enabling rights: that is, rights we have so that we can fulfill certain duties that are prior in the order of grounds. And from those duties, we also have a third natural right. This Locke describes here as a “liberty to use” inferior things and natural resources as essential means to preserve mankind and ourselves as members of it. From I: ¶41: “. . . it is more reasonable to think, that God who bid Mankind increase and multiply, should rather himself give them all a Right, to make use of the Food and Rayment, and other

[ 144 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Property and the Class State

Conveniences of Life, the Materials whereof he had so plentifully provided for them; than to make them depend upon the Will of a Man for their Subsistence, who should have Power [right] to destroy them all when he pleased.”

Another feature of Locke’s view of property is that this liberty of use is not an exclusive right: that is, it is not a right to which that we can appeal to restrict the liberty of use of those who succeed us, when they need to use, or to have access to, the bounty of nature for their legitimate interests. In short, no one can be excluded from the use of, or from the access to, the necessary means of life provided by the great common of the world, except from that which we have made our property subject to the two provisos. This third natural right to the means of preservation is our right, along with every one else, in the use of, or the access to, that great common.

These remarks prepare us for I: ¶¶41–42, in which Locke rejects altogether the idea that property can be the basis of political authority. This seems already clear from the passage in I: ¶41 quoted above. But Locke goes on to say that God has not left us to the mercy of others; nor given any one such property that excludes others, who are in need, from also having a right to the surplus of others’ goods: “And therefore no Man could ever have a just Power over the Life of another, by Right of property in Land or Possessions; since it would always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of his Plenty. As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him from extreme want. . . . [A] Man can no more justly make use of another’s necessity, to force him to become his Vassal, by withholding that Relief . . . than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer him Death or Slavery” (I: ¶42).

This is a strong statement, and I: ¶43 makes the same point. It may seem at first that ¶43 says that even in such extreme situations consent is what establishes political authority. Locke says: “Should anyone make so perverse [a] use of God’s Blessings poured on him with a liberal Hand; should any one be Cruel and Uncharitable to that extremity, yet all this would not prove that Propriety in Land, even in this Case, gave any Authority over the Persons of Men, but only that Compact might; since the Au-

[ 145 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

l o c k e

thority of the Rich Proprietor, and the Subjection of the Needy Beggar began not from the Possession of the Lord [ownership of property], but the Consent of the poor Man, who preferred being his Subject to starving.”

That Locke describes the man of property as making a perverse use of his blessings, and as cruel and uncharitable, means, I think, that he denies the binding force of consent in such a case. Rather, he is saying that whatever political authority there might be (and there may be none) arises from compact: from the consent the poor man gives. As to how much authority there is, Locke goes on to say that if we count such consent as valid, we might as well say that when our stores of grain are full at a time of scarcity and with money in our pocket, when others are starving; or our being on a vessel at sea and able to swim when others are drowning and need our help; in all these and other such cases we could likewise properly demand others’ consent to our political authority over them. But Locke believes no such thing; and concludes that no matter what private dominion God gave to Adam (and he says he has proved that God gave Adam no such private dominion), it could never give rise to sovereignty. Only free consent under certain conditions, violated in the cases described, can do that.

5. From the preceding, we may infer three further constraints on ideal history:

(a)Practices and custom, however primitive they may be, must allow for, or secure to, all persons a title to the product of their honest labor. This is a principle of justice. (So we have a precept of justice: to each according to the product of their honest labor.)

(b)Barring catastrophes, practices and custom must permit no one to

fall into extreme want, or to become incompetent and unable to exercise their natural rights and to fulfill their duties in an intelligent manner. This is

a principle of charity.

(c) The third natural right is to be respected: all have the liberty of use, or of access to, the great common of the world, so that in return for their honest industry they can earn the means of life. This is a principle of reasonable opportunity. Here we can’t say equal, or fair, opportunity; these terms appear too strong for what Locke has in mind. Nevertheless, this reasonable opportunity is of great significance.

It would seem to follow from these constraints that, in ideal history, it simply cannot happen that the larger part of the adult male population (the fraction without the vote) can be so brutish and so callous as to be incom-

[ 146 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College