mill iii

The Principle of Liberty

§1. The Problem of On Liberty (1859)

1.I begin with stating the problem of On Liberty as Mill formulates it in Chapter I. This problem is not the philosophical problem of freedom of the will, but that of civil or social liberty. It is the problem concerning “the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.” This is an ancient problem but one which, Mill believes, in the state of society of the England of his day, assumes a different form under new conditions. It requires, therefore, a different and, in Mill’s view, more fundamental treatment (I: ¶1). What Mill has in mind is that the problem of liberty, as he anticipates it, will arise in the new organic age in which society will be democratic, secular, and industrial.

The problem is not that of protecting society from the tyranny of monarchs, or rulers generally, for this problem has been settled by the establishment of various constitutional checks on government power and by political immunities and rights. The problem concerns the abuses of democratic government itself, in particular the abuse by majorities of their power over minorities. Mill says: “The will of the people . . . practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people—the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power” (I: ¶4). Thus Mill’s concern is the so-called “tyranny of the majority,” to which Tocqueville had previously drawn attention.1

2.Note, however, that Mill is equally concerned with “the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, . . . the tendency of society to impose,

1. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1st ed., 1835).

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by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development . . . of any individuality not in harmony with its ways . . . There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism” (I: ¶5). Moreover, Mill foresees that this problem will occur under the new conditions of the imminent democratic society in which the newly enfranchised laboring class—the most numerous class—will have the vote.

The problem, then, is to determine what, under these new circumstances, is the “fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control” (I: ¶6). Some rules of conduct, legal and moral, are plainly necessary. No two ages resolve this question in the same way, and yet each age thinks its own way is “self-evident and self-justifying” (I: ¶6).

3.At this point Mill stresses a number of characteristic faults of prevailing moral opinion. Thus, this opinion is usually unreflective, the effect of custom and tradition. People are likely to think that no reasons at all are required to support their moral convictions. And indeed some philosophers (perhaps Mill refers to the conservative intuitionists here) encourage us to think that our feelings are “better than reasons and render reasons unnecessary” (I: ¶6). Then Mill states one of the main principles he wants to attack: “The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act” (I: ¶6). Of course, no one “acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking”; but Mill maintains that it is true nonetheless, because: “an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person’s preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people’s liking instead of one” (I: ¶6). But to most people, their own preferences supported by the preferences of others are perfectly satisfactory reasons, and in fact, the only reasons they usually have for their moral convictions. [See also IV: ¶12.]

4.The prevailing moral opinion in society tends, Mill believes, to be a grouping of unreasoned and unreflective, mutually supporting shared preferences; yet these opinions are influenced by many kinds of causes:

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(a)For instance, where there is an ascendant social class, a large portion of the morality of a country reflects the interests of that class and its feelings of class superiority.

(b)But also, the general and obvious interests of society have a share, and a large one, in influencing moral opinion; so the role of utility (in Hume’s loose sense of an appeal to these interests) is not unimportant. These general interests, however, have their effect less from being recognized by reason than as a consequence of the sympathies and dislikes that grow out of them.

Thus, to sum up Mill’s argument, the unreasoned likings and dislikings of society, or of some dominant portion of society, are the main elements which have, up to now, determined the rules for general observance, which have been enforced by the sanctions of law and prevailing opinion. And “wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed” (I: ¶7).

5. I have gone into these details since they help us recognize how Mill views the problem of liberty and what he sees the Principle of Liberty— first stated in I: ¶9—as doing. Mill wants to change not only the adjustment between social rules and individual independence, as actually determined up to now, but also how the public—the educated opinion he wants to ad- dress—reasons about those adjustments. He is presenting his Principle of Liberty as a principle of public reason in the coming democratic age: he views it as a principle to guide the public’s political decisions on those questions. For he fears that the sway of prevailing and unreasoned opinion could be far worse in the new democratic society to come than it has been in the past.

Note that Mill thinks that the time for making changes is “now” but the situation is not hopeless. [Cf. III: ¶19 esp.] “The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of government [as] their power, or its opinions their opinions” (I: ¶8). When those in the majority, including the new laboring class, come to feel this way, individual liberty will be as exposed to invasion from government as it has long been from public opinion.

On the other hand, Mill thinks there is much latent resistance to such invasions. But the situation, as he sees it, is in a state of flux and can go perhaps one way or the other. “There is . . . no recognized principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People decide according to their personal preferences” (I: ¶8).

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They rarely decide in accordance with any principle, “to which they consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done by government.” It is because of this lack of principle (in this state of flux) that when government does intervene, it is as likely to be wrong as right (I: ¶8).

6. Putting this together with I: ¶15, where Mill speaks of the present tendency to increase the power of society while reducing the power of the individual, we can say that he hoped to do the following:

(a)He aimed to state a principle of liberty appropriate for the new democratic age to come. This principle would govern the public political discussion of the adjustment of social rules and individual independence. And:

(b)By convincing arguments, Mill wanted to build up support of this principle “. . . a strong barrier of moral conviction” (I: ¶15). The disposition of people to impose their own opinions can only be restrained by an opposing power; in this case Mill thinks it must be at least in part the power of moral conviction. And:

(c)These arguments are to be based on reason, because only in this case do they appeal to genuinely moral convictions as opposed to widely shared and mutually supporting preferences. Here it becomes plain that by reasoned arguments Mill means arguments founded on the Principle of Liberty (as he explains it in Chapter I, ¶¶9–13), and as it is connected with his conception of Utility (I: ¶11). This principle meets, he thinks, all the requirements of a reasoned principle, whereas no other principle does so.

The Principle of Liberty is presented, then, as a public political principle framed to regulate free public discussion concerning the appropriate adjustment between individual independence and social control (I: ¶6). As such, it will be instrumental in shaping national character to have the aims, aspirations, and ideals required in the age to come.

I comment here that Mill’s chosen vocation is evident: he sees himself as an educator of influential opinion. That is his aim. He thinks the situation is not hopeless: the future is still open. It is not unreasonable, or merely visionary, to try to forestall the possible tyranny of democratic majorities in the coming age. Plainly Mill attributes significant efficacy to moral convictions and to intellectual discussion about political and social matters. (Here he would seem to differ from Marx. But there is a question how to put this more exactly: for Marx too asserts that his Das Kapital has a social role.) Attempts to convince by reason and argument can have an im-

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