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ground, made them so important for Hume. Much if not most that Butler says doesn’t depend on this background at all.
§3. Role of Compassion: As Part of Our Social Nature
(1) Its definition—from Sermon V: 1 we can say: Compassion is an affection for the good of our fellow creatures and delight from the affections being gratified, and an uneasiness from things going contrary to it.
Thus by definition compassion is related to others’ good (as distinct from resentment which concerns a wrong, an injury). It is a general affection somewhat indeterminate in the range of persons it includes; but to some degree it often includes all human persons—and so is fellow-feeling, as Butler often says. In this respect it is distinct from attachments—affec- tions for particular persons—and from self-love, a kind of general affection for oneself.
Butler’s initial characterization of compassion is not quite right, and it’s important to correct it for the purpose of understanding his view. He says (Sermon V): When we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and compassionate their distresses, we, as it were, substitute them for ourselves, their interest for our own; and have the same kind of pleasure in their prosperity, and sorrow in their distress, as we have from reflection upon our own (92–93). But it seems obvious that when others are in distress and we feel compassion for them we do not have the same kind of distress as they; nor do we feel as we would feel if we were to imagine (as far as we can) that we were in their situation. Very roughly, when you are ill and I feel compassion for you, I don’t feel ill; but my compassion prompts me to help or to comfort you in some way. Moreover, my compassion doesn’t make me dwell on how I would feel if I were ill in the way you are. I might start dwelling on that, but the point is: that’s not what makes my feeling of compassion. What does this is my thinking what I can do to help and to comfort, accompanied by feelings of distress on my part, and so on. Of course, Butler knows this perfectly well, and says it correctly later in Sermon V: 5: “Whereas men in distress want [need] assistance; and compassion leads us directly to assist them . . . The object [of compassion] is the present misery of another
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[which needs] a particular affection for its relief. . . . [Compassion] does not rest in itself, but carries us on to assist the distressed” (97). Here Butler is contrasting compassion with rejoicing in the felicitation of another.
l e c t u re iv
Butler’s Argument against Egoism
§1. Introduction
Today I shall discuss Butler’s argument against egoism as found in Sermon II, the first of two sermons on the love of our neighbor. By egoism in this connection we should understand Hobbes’s psychological egoism and the various forms in which this was a fashionable view in Butler’s day (in Mandeville, for example); or so Butler plainly believes. Keep in mind that Butler is engaged in apologetics, in the defense of the common-sense moral doctrines and virtues and in these as a part of Christian faith and belief. He is concerned to argue that a way of life informed by these common-sense virtues is not a way of folly unmindful of the proper good of our own person, but to the contrary, it is completely consistent with this good when correctly understood. Next time I shall discuss the supposed conflict between conscience and self-love and suggest how I think Butler resolves this conflict. In this connection Sermons XII–XIII are important.
In Sermon XI (“Upon the Love of our Neighbor”) Butler examines four questions which appear in this order in the text:
(1)Whether private interest is likely to be promoted to the degree in which self-love engrosses us and prevails over other principles. It is in connection with this question that Butler introduces the so-called Paradox of Egoism (or paradox of hedonism): the idea that preoccupation with one’s own concerns can be in various ways destructive of one’s own happiness. This question is discussed in the long par. 7: 190ff.
(2)The second question is whether there is any peculiar incompatibility between the pursuit of public vs. private interest. By a peculiar incompatibility between public and private interest Butler means an incompatibility
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which is other and greater than the incompatibility between any two affections, whether particular or general. Thus he observes (in par. 18) that the more time and thought we give to the good of others, the less time and thought we can give to the good of ourselves, and so on. His question is whether there is a peculiar or distinctive kind of incompatibility between private and public interest. He wishes to hold that there is not. The question is first discussed in pars. 10–11, pp. 194ff.
(3)The third question examines the nature, the object, and the end of self-love, as distinguished from other principles and affections of the mind. Butler believes that the answer to this third question must be taken up first; the answer to the other questions depends upon it, although as the discussion proceeds he says things that are relevant to it. The first discussion of this question is given in pars. 5–8, pp. 189–192ff.
(4)Once the first three questions are answered in the order (3) → (1) → (2), Butler takes up a 4th question which can be seen as a generalization of the 1st question. It asks whether a way of life, a devotion to benevolence and virtue and to public good, is likely to prove incompatible with a proper concern for our private good. He holds that it does not any more than any other particular affection or passion may prove incompatible. Indeed, he goes further, and enumerates several distinctive features of a way of life characterized by a devotion to benevolence and virtue that tend to reduce this incompatibility. This question is discussed in pars. 12–15, pp. 197–200. He considers an objection to his answer in pars. 17–19; and in pars. 20–21, pp. 204–206, there is a well-known passage on the alleged conflict between conscience and self-love which appears to concede the supremacy of selflove, in ostensible contradiction to Butler’s earlier thesis of the supremacy of conscience: He says: “Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, ’till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it” (206). This passage and others related to it I take up next time. The question we have to ask is whether Butler is simply inconsistent; or whether, taking the troublesome passages in context and keeping in mind his overall view, we can work out a coherent doctrine. Of course we may have to supply some of the details and correct a few slips, but we should assume—as usual with any text we are prepared to read—that a coherent interpretation can be found.
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§2. Butler’s Argument contra Hedonistic Egoism
While Butler’s argument contra hedonistic egoism (in pars. 4–7, with supplementary observations elsewhere)4 is not altogether successful, he does make several essential points which pave the way for a useful refutation. These points are picked up by later writers (e.g., Hume, Enquiry, App. II of
An Enquiry into the Principles of Morals, and Bradley in Ethical Studies, Essay VII, esp. pp. 251–276).5 Bradley’s argument is quite decisive, I think. Thus, rather than set out and comment upon Butler’s argument as he presents it, I shall sketch in brief form what I take to be a version of Bradley’s argument and then point out what Butler contributed to it. This will help us to see at the same time where Butler’s formulations may need correction.
(1)Let’s begin by noting certain features of the actions of reasonable and rational agents. We assume that agents can select between various alternative actions, depending on their circumstances and the various constraints to which they are subject. The class of alternatives is within their powers: they are able to do and not to do any of these actions. Which available action an agent will do depends upon the agent’s beliefs, desires, and assessment of the consequences of the possible action, as understood by the agent. Here “desires” is a stand-in for Butler’s appetites, affections, and passions both general and particular, and in these we have to include what in the passage just quoted Butler called the “affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such.” Note that Butler calls this an affection.
(2)Next, think of the object of desire as that state of affairs the bringing about of which is the aim of the desire. When this object is brought about, we say the desire is fulfilled; it has achieved its aim by realizing its object. Let’s say that a desire is gratified when the agent knows, or reasonably believes or experiences, that the desire is fulfilled.
The language here has to be rephrased a bit to accommodate desires to participate in or to engage in various activities, or to do various things, for their own sake. Sometimes it is awkward to think of activities as states of affairs, even if by certain locutions we can do this. We should also introduce the notion of a final desire as, for example, the desire to engage in an
4.Cf. especially the statement of one basic psychological principle in par. 13.
5.F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927).
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activity, or to bring about a certain state of affairs, for its own sake. A chain of reasons—I want to do X to bring about Y, and Y to bring about Z, etc.— must stop, say, at Z, which I want to bring about for its own sake. A chain of reasons must not only be finite, but is usually reasonably short. As Butler notes, if this isn’t the case, we are not moved by desire but by uneasiness— an aimless inclination to activity without apparent reason. This uneasiness is the emptiness of desire with[out] the possibility of any gratification except motion.
(3)Now very roughly we can characterize the intention of an action as those consequences of an action which are foreseen by the agent and recognized as part of the causal chain of events and processes essential or necessary for bringing about the state of affairs which specifies the object of desire. Other consequences may also be foreseen, e.g. those which are subsequent in time to the realization of the object of desire, and for the sake of which the action is done. Of course, even if we don’t count these consequences as part of the agent’s intention, we may still hold the agent accountable or responsible for them, provided they were, or should have been, foreseen. Different ways of drawing these lines may equally serve the same philosophical purposes.
Next we say that the motive of an action is the desired and presumptively foreseen consequences for the sake of which the action is done. So described, we should distinguish motive from the psychological element that moves the agent to act. This element can be described in various ways depending on the circumstances, ranging from an impulse to a deliberate plan the formulation in thought of which directs and moves the agent. Part of the context of this deliberate thought will be the thought of the desired and foreseen consequences, or what I have just referred to as the motive.
(4)The preceding is admittedly rather tedious. But going over these distinctions puts us into a position to make a simple and indeed obvious point which can break the hold of egoism over our thought. This point is the following: the gratification of desire is always pleasant, or enjoyable, or satisfying, (etc.)—whichever description is appropriate. But it does not follow that the object of desire is always to obtain (or to realize) the experience of pleasantness, or enjoyment, or satisfaction. That the gratification of desire is always pleasant, enjoyable, or satisfying does not imply that the motive is always pleasure, enjoyment, or satisfaction, nor that the thought of plea-
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sure, enjoyment, or satisfaction is the psychological element that prompts our actions.
This enables us to see the fallacy in the following argument:
(1)Every deliberative and intentional action of ours is undertaken in order to bring about, or to try to bring about, some object of one or more of our desires, which desires belong to our person and prompt us to act.
(2)When a desire is fulfilled—when the object of desire is achieved and we know, or reasonably believe, or experience this fact—our desire is gratified.
(3)The gratification of desire is always pleasant, or enjoyable or satisfying; the frustration of desires is always unpleasant, etc. Therefore:
(4)The object of all our desires is really the pleasures (pleasant experiences) or the enjoyments which ensue upon the recognized fulfillment of our desires.
This conclusion does not follow, since the argument depends on a confusion between the object of desire and the gratification of desire. Desires have indefinitely many different kinds of objects, and their objects specify their content. The fallacy lies in supposing that the content of all desire is the pleasant and/or the enjoyable experience because the gratification of desire is pleasant and enjoyable.
It is this fallacy which Butler is after in his discussion of the third question in pars. 4–7. He is also after a second fallacy latent in the above argument; namely, the fallacy of supposing that because all of our actions are moved by one or more of our desires—Butler, Hume, and Kant all agree on this—and gratification of our desires is pleasant or enjoyable to us and not to someone else, then we must have been moved to act by these pleasant or enjoyable experiences as objects of our desire. Here the idea that the desires that move us to act are our desires, and the pleasantness and enjoyment of gratified desires are our experiences, somehow tempts us to suppose that our desires must take these experiences of ours as their objects. Against these errors Butler says: “Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour, is as really our own affection [an affection of ours], as self-love; and the pleasure arising from its gratification is as much my own pleasure [a pleasure I experience and not someone else], as the pleasure self-love
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would have.” There is an odd clause deleted here, the meaning of which I am uncertain. Butler goes on: “And if, because every particular affection is a man’s own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification his own pleasure,
. . . such particular affection must be called self-love; according to this way of speaking, no creature whatever can possibly act but merely from selflove; and every action and every affection whatever is to be resolved up into this one principle.”
He adds: “But then this is not the language of mankind: or if it were, we should want words to express the difference, between the principle of an action, proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my own advantage; and an action, suppose of revenge, or of friendship, by which a man runs upon certain ruin, to do evil or good to another. It is manifest the principles of these actions are totally different, and so want different words to be distinguished by: all that they agree in is, that they both proceed from, and are done to gratify an inclination in a man’s self ” (188).
In these important paragraphs 4–7 we can see how Butler is making the distinctions we earlier rehearsed. One way to put his point is that psychological egoism overlooks essential distinctions. Either it is a truism that we always act from our own desires, which desires, when these action are successful, are gratified; and these gratifications of our desires are our gratifications. (How could it be otherwise?) Or: psychological egoism is false. Looking at the plain facts of experience, our desires—appetites, affections, and passions—have many different objects, an extremely varied content which comprises much more than pleasure.
(5) Butler also wishes to make another psychological point which is important; namely, that it is impossible, given our psychological constitution, for pleasure or enjoyment to be the object of desire. Put another way: something else other than pleasure must be desired; and indeed, focusing on pleasures and enjoyments as a certain kind of self-love does presuppose desires—appetites, affections, and passions—which have by our constitution certain objects; and these desires could not be gratified unless there was a “prior suitableness” between these desires and their objects (par. 3).
Some further points:
(1) Regarding this last point: Butler calls these objects external things. He would have done better to say desires are desires to do things involving
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or using external things. Take the example of eating; or helping another. This doesn’t affect Butler’s main point.
(2) It would have also clarified Butler’s argument had he distinguished more explicitly various kinds of desires; for example:
(a) Desires in a self vs. desires of a self ’s, and among the former:
(i)Self-centered desires: those for my own honor, power, glory; health and nourishment.
(ii)Self-related desires: for the honor and power of persons and groups related to me—my family, my friends, my nation, etc.
Selfishness is specified by relation to such desires.
(b) Affections for others are neither self-centered nor self-related desires: they include desires for the other’s good. Proper self-love is an affection for our good and is altogether different from selfishness, as I hope to discuss next time.
(3)Also I think Butler conflates two rather different notions of self-love and two different notions of happiness, which go with these.
(a) The first has hedonistic overtones, as when Butler says the object of self-love is “somewhat internal, our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction
. . . [it] never seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good” (par. 3, p. 187).
(b) A planning or rational plan notion of self-love: ordering, scheduling, and arrangement of the fulfillment of desires aimed at securing our own good. See for example the second sentence of par. 16: “Happiness consists in the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with objects which are by their nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed set us to work to gratify these; but happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such gratification alone. Love of our neighbour is one of those affections.”
The trouble with the hedonistic notion is that it tends to absorb everything. The planning notion does not do this, but applies to ordering those affections and desires that more directly concern us so that they work for our proper good.
(4)Also Butler might have invoked a distinction mentioned by Bradley between the thought of pleasure and a pleasant thought. The latter has no hedonistic implications: it does not show pleasure to be the object of desire.
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