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quantities given by their intensity and duration. Nothing so philosophical as an “equal right to happiness” is required contra Herbert Spencer (cf. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. 5: par. 36, footnote).

(4)The ui’s are, as stated, numbers that measure the net balance of happiness for each individual I over the relevant stretch of time (during which the institution or action in question has effects). We can imagine this stretch of time divided into unit intervals so each ui = uij, j = 1, . . ., q. But this is just frills, so no more of this kind of thing. You can see how it goes.

(5)The fundamental point is that the ui’s represent only one kind of information: namely the net balance of utility computed, or estimated, solely from the intensity and duration of the agreeable or disagreeable consciousness of pleasure and pain, regardless of any of the objective relations of individuals to one another that are conditions of these experiences, or the aims of the desires the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of which brings about pleasure or pain. In themselves, the pleasures of vindictive cruelty count equally with those of generosity and affection. As Bentham said: at the margin, push-pin is as good as poetry (a unit of one = a unit of the other).

§3. Some Comments about Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility (IP-Comparisons)

(1)In order to speak of maximizing a linear sum of utilities, we must assume that it makes sense to add the pleasures and pains of each individual and that the units in which these are estimated are the same for different individuals. The classical doctrine assumes full comparability of interpersonal comparisons: (a) that levels of happiness are comparable, and (b) in the same units. The Bentham-Edgeworth-Sidgwick line also assumes a natural zero, a point of indifference between pleasures and pains. On these matters, see Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 2.9

(2)The classical doctrine assumes that each individual can estimate and compare their own levels of happiness on the basis of introspection and memory: pleasures and pains are aspects directly known in experiences judged to be agreeable or disagreeable.

9. [See Sidgwick Lecture III of this volume for an extensive discussion of interpersonal comparisons of utility. —Ed.]

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(3) Assuming the same natural zero for all individuals, and (following Edgeworth) the same just-noticeable difference in levels of happiness as the common unit for all individuals, as well as supposing that all individuals can rank consistently the differences between levels of happiness, it follows that the interpersonal comparisons required are forthcoming, and without relying on choices involving chance and risk. (These assumptions are extremely strong and seem implausible; but more on this later.)

§4. Some Features of the Principle of Utility as the First Principle of a Rational Method of Ethics

(1)We are especially concerned with those features of classical utilitarianism that lead Sidgwick to think it overcomes the defects of intuitionism, as shown in his discussion of justice (discussed in the previous lecture). With this in mind, notice first that utilitarianism is a single-principle conception: a conflict of first principles is impossible since there is only one such principle. This is a gain over intuitionism.

(2)Moreover, Sidgwick believes the principle of utility is the consequence of three self-evident (or seemingly self-evident) principles: (a) the principle of equity (or fairness) (ME, pp. 379f ), which Sidgwick finds already formulated in essentials by Clarke (pp. 384f ) and Kant (pp. 385f );

(b)the Principle of Rational Self-Love (zero time preference) (p. 381); and

(c)the Principle of Rational Benevolence (pp. 382f ). These three principles, however, do not conflict but together yield the single principle of utility; and so the criterion of self-evidence is satisfied without giving up the criterion of having a guide in practice. (On this see Lecture I on Sidgwick at B: 5.)

(3)Sidgwick contends that the principle of utility is fully rational in that it is not limited or restricted by arbitrary exceptions or qualifications; it applies with full generality to all cases of practical reasoning; and the use of secondary rules or “middle axioms” (ME, p. 350) is explained by the principle itself, thus meeting the criterion discussed in Lecture I, B: 5.

(4)Finally, the utilitarian principle harmonizes and systematizes com- mon-sense judgments and adjusts them in a coherent and consistent way. (See, for example, the discussion of ideal values in Bk. III, Ch. 14, and the conclusion (pp. 406f ) that no principle but that of utility can organize these

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judgments.) At the same time, this principle corrects our pre-reflective judgments and so criterion B: (5): (c): viii is also satisfied. Sidgwick assumes that our pre-reflective judgments (or some of them) have some prima facie validity, and so bringing order into them is further confirmation of the principle of utility. (See Bk. IV, Ch. 2, pp. 419–422.)

§5. Sidgwick’s Critique of Natural Freedom as an Illustration

(1)In §4 of Bk. III, Ch. 5, Sidgwick argues that the Principle of Free- dom—the principle that the whole of what people owe to one another, apart from contracts (including the enforcement of these), is freedom from interference—cannot be the first principle of a rational method of ethics. For one thing, (a) it contains arbitrary restrictions: for it does not itself account for why it doesn’t apply to children and the mentally deficient and the like, but must tacitly invoke another principle, e.g. the utilitarian principle (ME, p. 275).

(2)Again, (b) it is ambiguous as between freedom of action allowing for all kinds of annoyances but barring constraint, or as including as well freedom from certain annoyances at least, although not presumably from all. But to find the mean between these two unacceptable extremes, some further principle is required, again, e.g. the utilitarian principle (pp. 275f ).

(3)If a social order is to be possible using this principle, the Principle of Freedom must allow the right to limit one’s freedom by contract. But this right itself must be limited since it hardly allows the right to sell oneself into slavery; yet to derive an appropriate limited right to limit one’s freedom by contract from the Principle of Freedom alone seems impossible. We need some additional principle, which may then be superior in validity, etc. (p. 276).

(4)Turning to the question of the appropriation of material things and especially land (and here Sidgwick seems to have Locke in mind; in 1–3 above he has perhaps Spencer in mind), he argues that the principle of freedom would be best realized without any appropriation. If, in a society where all land is appropriated and some inherit no landed property, the argument is that everyone in society is nevertheless better off with appropriation than without, then the view is that interference with freedom can be compensated for. But this is, in effect, to appeal to another principle, and so

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the realization of freedom cannot be “the one ultimate end of distributive justice” (pp. 276ff ).

§6. Further Points Concerning Definition of the Principle of Utility

(1)The phrase “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” seems to occur first in Hutcheson’s Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil (1725): see III, §8. This phrase has led some to regard the principle as nonsense, since it presents two aims (happiness and numbers) to maximize. But this is a misunderstanding: the principle is to maximize total happiness, and this means that the distribution of happiness among existing people, or over generations, as well as the number of people (so far as social policy affects this), are all to be decided by what maximizes total (not average) utility. Sidgwick is clear on these points: see ME, pp. 415f (see also A Theory of Justice, pp. 161ff ).

(2)Note that the principle of utility puts no weight at all on equality (in the sense of an equal distribution of utility): the only thing that counts is total utility. This is implied by the additive nature of the principle (to maximize a linear sum of the ui’s). Observe that if the principle were said to multiply utilities, there would be a push in favor of equality. Thus the mathematical form already incorporates an ethical notion: namely, distribution is not significant.

(3)In practice, regarding, e.g., legislation, utilitarians often assume people have similar capacities for pleasure and pain, and that the principle of diminished marginal utility holds: all this implies equality, ceteris paribus, in distributing the means of happiness.

l e c t u re i i i

Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism (Fall 1975)

§1. Introduction to Utilitarianism

(1) As I have said before, utilitarianism is the longest (oldest) continuous tradition in English moral philosophy. By English I mean: written in the

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English language; many of the important utilitarian writers are Scottish— Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith—and in this century it has had strong representatives in the United States. It is no exaggeration to say, I think, that beginning with the second quarter of the 18th century utilitarianism has more or less succeeded in dominating English moral philosophy. By dominating, I mean:

(a)It counts among its representatives an extraordinary sequence of writers—Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Bentham, the two Mills, Sidgwick, and Edgeworth—who in numbers and intellectual power surpass that of any other line of moral philosophy, including social contract theory, idealism, intuitionism, and perfectionism. (Keep in mind that I am talking about English moral philosophy, and not that of the continent: Germany, France, etc.)

(b)Again, utilitarianism has tended to control the course of philosophical debate insofar as other traditions have labored to construct an alternative to it, often unsuccessfully. While intuitionism or idealism may succeed in establishing various weaknesses in utilitarianism, they fare less well in formulating an equally systematic doctrine that can match that of the best utilitarian writers. Primary among the intuitionists I have in mind are Butler, Price, Reid, and Whewell, while the main 19th-century British Idealists are Hamilton, Bradley, and Green.

(c)Further, utilitarianism has had very close ties with social theory, and its leading representatives have also been major political theorists and economists. Consider this striking fact: of all the great classical political economists, every single one—with the exception of Ricardo—has an equally important place in utilitarianism as a tradition of moral philosophy! One has only to list the names: thus,

18th century: Hume, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham.

19th century: James and J. S. Mill, Edgeworth, and Sidgwick (the latter two more in economics and philosophy, respectively, but they had both interests). Sidgwick’s third book, The Principles of Political Economy (1884; 3rd ed. 1901), is a short treatise in utilitarian welfare economics, in a sense the first.

In the 20th century, utilitarianism has had far more influence in economics than any other moral philosophy, where it was represented by Marshall and Pigou; only with the 1930s did the hold of the classical doctrine fail. But still today many economists hold what they call a very general form of utilitarianism. More on this later.

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It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to give utilitarianism careful attention. A tradition of this force cannot be without great merit.

(2)Now, a few brief comments about the beginnings of utilitarianism in modern times. Like so much else of modern English moral philosophy and social theory, it is convenient to say: it starts with Hobbes and the reaction to Hobbes. We must keep in mind that Hobbes is an overwhelming figure—a marvelous writer with a vigorous style, and seemingly a perfect form of expression of his peculiarly deep, and somewhat terrifying, vision of political life. Hobbes aroused a violent intellectual reaction: to be regarded as a Hobbist was somewhat dangerous, and the reasons are easy to see: Hobbes was the chief representative of modern infidelity.

Consider and compare with Hobbes an orthodox Christian moralist like Cudworth, who espoused roughly the philosophical views shown in the left column of Figure 9.

Compare this with how he [Cudworth] interpreted Hobbes (as did much of the age (right column).10 To see what Hobbes meant to his age, what violence he did to the Christian moral and philosophical tradition, there is no better source than Cudworth’s True Intellectual System (1671) (imprimatur), (1678) (date of publication).

(3)However, the reaction of the leading utilitarians to Hobbes was, of course, very different from Cudworth’s. (Here I leave aside the theological utilitarians—Gay, Paley, and Austin—as special cases; and some were theologians or theists, such as Hutcheson and Smith.) For the most part, what bothered them about Hobbes was not his atheism, if atheist he was, or his materialism, determinism, and individualism. In some reasonable sense, Hume, Bentham, the two Mills, and Sidgwick also held these views. What they rejected in Hobbes rather (or in what Hobbes was taken to mean or represent) was:

(i)The doctrine of psychological egoism and ethical egoism.

(ii)The idea that political authority is legitimated by superior power (though this is doubtfully Hobbes’s view), or by agreements made in the face of superior power, or indeed that it rests on a social contract at all, or on any kind of contract (in the usual sense).

(iii)The thesis of ethical relativism.

10. John Passmore, Ralph Cudworth (1951), pp. 11f.

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Thus, it is useful to think of classical utilitarianism (the line of writers from Hutcheson-Hume to Sidgwick-Edgeworth) roughly in this way, namely, as the attempt to formulate in reaction to Hobbes:

(a)a moral and political conception that gave an account of the grounds of political authority, not as based on power but on moral principles; and one that was not relativistic, nor based on psychological egoism, nor ethical egoism.

At the same time, classical utilitarianism accepted as conditions of the state of modern culture that a moral and political conception must be secular, that is:

(b)classical utilitarianism does not base moral first principles in the divine will, and it is fully compatible with the denial of theism (in the traditional sense). It is compatible also with: materialism, determinism, and individualism, and so with what are thought to be the conclusions of social theory and natural sciences.

In sum: classical utilitarianism was the first tradition to develop a systematic moral conception under the assumption of a secular society under modern conditions. Much of the effort of utilitarian writers is devoted to opposing the orthodox moral tradition and to establishing a moral basis for political institutions entirely free from any theological background; and designed to be compatible with secular assumptions and the trends of the modern world.

You will observe that the notion of a truly based well-ordered society as a reasonable political criterion rests on the same idea. So we may accept this objective: we can do this without implying that the orthodox [theological] assumptions are false. It suffices to develop a moral doctrine that does

Figure 9.

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