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conscience (of its judgments) is directed against Hutcheson (on the latter, see the Dissertation of Virtue).

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The Nature and Authority of Conscience

§1. Introduction

Last time I discussed the moral constitution of human nature, its parts or elements, the relations between these parts—how they are organized into a moral constitution by the supremacy and authoritative role of con- science—and finally, the end of this constitution which Butler describes as the adaptation of our nature to virtue. I glossed the adaptation of our nature to virtue as: Our nature is adapted to virtue, and virtue in turn is those principles and forms of action and conduct which adapt us to our life in society; that is, which make us fit to conduct ourselves as members of society concerned as we must be with our own interests and those of people we care for, but able to give due whether to the interests and concerns of others. Our moral constitution makes us fit for society by enabling us to act in accord with the due claims of the good of the community and of our private good. This emphasis on the moral constitution of human nature as making us fit for society, and Butler’s emphasis on this moral constitution, is the centerpiece of Butler’s reply to Hobbes.

(1) Today I shall make some observations on Butler’s view concerning the nature and the authority of the principle of reflection, or conscience. It also proves useful here to note what he regards as the content of conscience. By this I mean the kinds of actions and forms of conduct, and the kind of temper and character in our nature, which conscience approves of. For example, in the Dissertation on Virtue II (an appendix in the Analogy), Butler argues against Hutcheson that the content of our conscience is not utilitarian. This means that the deliverances of our conscience are not in accordance with principles of utility; or as Butler puts it, “benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered” is not the “whole of virtue and vice” (par. 12). It is not the case that (slightly adapted) “we . . . approve of benevolence

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to some persons rather than to others, or disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and misery by the second” (par. 12).

What is of interest here is not simply that Butler rejects utilitarianism as an account of the content of conscience (as a correct conception of right and virtue) but the kind of argument he uses to support his rejection, and the interpretation he gives of the conclusion he draws.

(2) Thus two preliminary comments: first, Butler’s argument rests simply on an appeal to our common-sense moral judgments, which he assumes everyone, or most everyone, agrees upon. The judgments he has in mind are those of any fair-minded person who is impartial and considers the matter in a cool hour. Here I have used Butler’s phrases: “fair-minded,” “impartial,” “cool hour.” Of course, he takes for granted various other conditions which I need not spell out here. Let’s call such judgments “considered judgments.” Butler takes these as more or less given, that is, as commonly recognized facts of our moral experience. His moral doctrine rests on this appeal to moral experience, as opposed to revelation or to rationalist philosophical views. While he appears to agree with a rationalist such as Clarke, his argument takes another form. This feature of Butler’s method is a distinctive shift. Moreover, he regards this moral experience as sui generis; he does not suppose that moral notions can be resolved into non-moral notions (assuming some such line between notions can be drawn independently in some useful way). Here he contrasts with Hobbes and possibly with Hume (this remains to be seen); and in this respect he does agree with Clarke and the rational intuitionists.

The second preliminary comment on Butler’s rejection of utilitarianism (pars. 12–16) is that for him a moral doctrine is an account of the moral constitution of our human nature. Butler is prepared to entertain the view, as a speculative possibility, that God acts solely from the Principle of Benevolence. But for him this is, I think, simply a speculative possibility; it is not our business to speculate about such matters so far beyond our comprehension. Our conscience is to be our guide, given the station and place in the world God has called us to; and our conscience is not utilitarian. That we know, and that’s all we need to know. Butler insists that the happiness of the world is God’s happiness, not ours: “. . . nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways,

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but those which He [God] has directed; that is indeed in all ways, not contrary to veracity and justice . . . it is our business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow creature” (par. 16).

For us the principle of benevolence is approved within the bounds and limits specified by justice and veracity and the other relevant virtues. Observe, further, here that a great shift will later come with Bentham, who will emphatically say that happiness of the world is our business (Hume does not say this, as we shall see). Ask yourself why this shift occurs and what lies behind it.

§2. Features of Our Moral Faculty

(1)It is this faculty of conscience and our moral nature that makes us capable of moral government. Here by our “moral nature” (as opposed to our moral faculty or conscience), Butler means our moral emotions: compassion, resentment, indignation, and so on; or our natural sense of gratitude, etc. We distinguish between harm and injury, as it were, spontaneously (“unavoidably,” Butler says) (Dissertation II: par. 1).

(2)Nor are the deliverances of conscience on general matters, with respect to the particulars, doubtful. There is an acknowledged universal standard; it is that which in all ages and countries has been professed in public in the fundamental laws of all civil constitutions; namely, justice, veracity, and regard to the common good. There is no problem of lack of universality (par. 1).

(3)It is manifest that we have such a faculty of conscience. Some features of it are:

(a) Its object—what it judges and approves of—is those actions and active practical principles which, when fixed and habitual in us, specify our character (par. 2).

(b) Thus its object is actions—as distinct from events—where the notion of an action involves the notion of a person doing something from will and design, including under design the intention of bringing about such- and-such consequences (par. 2).

(c) Presuming also that such actions as are objects of this faculty are within our power, either in what we do or what we fail to do (par. 2).

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(d) Such action and conduct is the natural object of the moral faculty, as speculative truth and falsity is the natural object of speculative reason (par. 2).

(4)The remainder of the Dissertation is an appeal to moral experience to show aspects of the content of conscience. (Here see the statement at the end of par. 1, p. 53: “And as to these inward feelings themselves; that they are real, that man has in his nature passions and affections, can be no more questioned, than that he has external senses.” See also Sermon II, end par. 1.) For example:

(a) Our moral faculty associates with moral good or evil actions of good or ill desert; this association is natural (part of our constitution) and is not artificial or accidental (par. 3).

(b) Our moral faculty approves of prudence as a virtue and disapproves of folly as a vice (cf. pars. 6–7).

(c) Our moral faculty does not approve benevolence as the whole of virtue. Here Butler sets forth a critique of Hutcheson (pars. 8–10).

(5)Recall that in the Preface and Sermon I the role of the Principle of Reflection or conscience is supreme and regulative. Its office is to administer and to govern. In Sermon I, Butler’s account is brief and found in pars. 8–9. In par. 8 he defines conscience and is concerned to prove its existence by describing two actions such that it would be absurd to deny that we approve of one and disapprove of the other when we coolly reflect.

§3. Outline of Butler’s Arguments for Conscience’s Authority: Sermon II

(References: Preface: pars. 24–30, esp. 26–28; Sermon I: pars. 8–9).

(1)Our constitution as a creature and its adaptation to certain ends is a reason to believe that the Author of our nature intended it for these ends. Note Butler’s deistic-shared premises: see also par 3: lines 9–11 (par. 1).

(2)The objection to be resisted: granted there is such a faculty as the moral faculty, why is it authoritative? Why not say: let each follow their nature, so conscience directs only when it is strongest? What sign is there that the Author of our nature intends otherwise? (par. 5).

(3)The objection assumes there is no distinction between violating justice for the sake of present pleasure and acting justly when there is no

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temptation to the contrary. Both are equally following our nature. But if this were true:

(a)The idea of deviating from our nature would be absurd;

(b)Then what Paul says re our being a law unto ourselves would be erroneous;

(c)Since following nature as an injunction would have no point.

Thus the objection rejects what Paul says, though seeming to allow it. Language shows that following nature is not acting as we please (par. 6).

(4)We need to explain what is meant by saying: every man is naturally a law unto himself, and may find within himself the value of right and obligation to follow it (par. 6).

(5)Two senses of nature are not relevant (pars. 7–9).

(6)The third sense is that of St. Paul and explains the sense in which a man is a law to himself. The argument is this (all from pars. 10–11):

(i) Our passions and affections to public and to private good conflict. (ii) These passions and affections are in themselves natural and good,

but there is no way of seeing how deeply each kind belongs to us by nature. (iii) None of these passions and affections can be a law to us.

(iv) But there is a superior principle of conscience which asserts itself and approves or disapproves.

(v) This faculty makes us a law to ourselves.

(vi) It is not a principle of the heart to regulate us by its degree of influence but is a faculty different in kind and supreme over all the other elements of our nature and bears its own authority.

(vii) Still, it is a principle that does influence us and prompts us to comply with its dictates.

(7)The illustrative example Butler uses (an animal caught by bait) would be in the case of man an action disproportionate to our nature, and hence unnatural (par. 13). This action is unnatural not because it involves going against self-love merely as natural, since the same is true of repressing passion for the sake of self-love (merely, as natural) (par. 15).

(8)There must be another distinction: namely, the principle of selflove is superior to passions. To act from our nature, self-love must govern. This gives an example of a superior principle without invoking conscience (par. 16).

(9)Similarly, conscience is superior to the passions which directly seek objects without distinction of means necessary to obtain them. When these means injure others, conscience disapproves and is to be obeyed. Here self-

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love is left out of consideration. Conscience is supreme without considerations of influence (par. 17).

(10)Thus we get the distinction between power and authority, here applied not to civil law and the constitution of society, but to principles of human nature. From its nature and role, conscience is manifestly superior; it involves judgment, direction, and superintending. And conscience has this authority and role, regardless of how often we rebel against it (pars. 18–19).

(11)Butler gives a second argument (pars. 20–22). Suppose the contrary. The bounds or limits of our conduct are then defined by our natural power on one side, or our not seeking harm for its own sake for ourselves or for others. This results from supposing that only their relative strength is the difference between principles of human nature. But the limits above make us morally indifferent between, e.g., patricide and filial duty. But this is absurd.

The Principles of this argument are:

(1)The way our nature works and is regulated indicates God’s intention for how we should govern ourselves.

(2)For this knowledge of our nature, the appeal is to moral experience; e.g. how our feelings of shame affect us, etc.; and re faculty of conscience.

(3)Butler assumes rough agreement of judgments of conscience. What is Butler’s Argument for Conscience’s Authority and Supremacy?

(A)One Form:

(1)God fashioned us as reasonable and rational beings capable of being a law unto ourselves.

(2)Such beings need a governing principle or faculty if, as we do, they have numerous passions, affections, and appetites, and competing more general affections such as benevolence and self-love.

(3)None of these other principles and passions, etc. can provide such a governing principle.

(4)Conscience claims superiority and authority as such a principle or faculty:

(a)First, via its approvals and disapprovals, and the agreement in common content thereof between persons.

(b)Second, by the fact that we experience ourselves as self-con- demned if we violate conscience.

(c)No other principle or passion has these features: no other condemns us if we violate it.

(5)The use of language supports the claims of conscience.

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