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Church of England was required by law for the tenure of fellowship.4 He was promptly given a special position that did not require subscription to the Articles; and he was re-appointed Fellow when the law requiring subscription was repealed. Sidgwick became Knightbridge Professor (following Birks, successor to F. D. Maurice) in 1883, at the age of 45. He never taught elsewhere. William James wanted him to come to Harvard for the year 1900, but Sidgwick seemed not interested in pursuing the opportunity.

In 1876 at age 39 Sidgwick married Eleanor Balfour, who was the sister of Arthur Balfour, subsequently the Prime Minister. She founded Newnham College, the first place of higher education for women in Cambridge.

Of G. E. Moore, his student, Sidgwick said: “His acumen—which is remarkable in degree—is in excess of his insight.”5

§2. The Structure and Argument of The Methods of Ethics

(1) Perhaps the first thing to notice about The Methods of Ethics is that is does not set out to advocate or to justify some particular moral and philosophical, or theological, doctrine. In this way, it is different from most of the works that precede it: e.g. by Hobbes and Locke, Bentham and J. S. Mill. Of course, this is part of what I meant by saying that The Methods of Ethics treats moral philosophy as any other branch of knowledge.

But more than this, note Sidgwick’s remark in the Preface to the first

4.[The following remarks were among Rawls’s notes on Sidgwick, on the thoughts that led him to resign his fellowship. The remarks appear to follow J. B. Schneewind’s discussion in Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 48–52. —Ed.] “Sidgwick on ‘The Ethics of Conformity and Subscription’ (1870): What is the duty of progressive members of a religious community to that community, with regards to expressing dissenting views? Sidgwick thinks one must choose between two evils: loss of veracity and absolute unchangeability. One must accept some insincerity, the evil of which can be lessened only if: (1) there is some maximum thereof [of insincerity]; (2) we encourage open avowal of dissent. Three main features [of Sidgwick’s essay]:

(1)It is a realistic appraisal [of actual practice], not ideal [society]; (2) There are no clear common-sense rules to guide us in deciding how to act when two duties conflict [e.g. the duty of veracity and duty of fidelity to one’s chosen church]; (3) Difficulties and conflicts are to be resolved by some form of appeal to the utilitarian principle.”

5.See J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, pp. 15–17. For those who wish to consult a secondary work on Sidgwick’s ethics, Schneewind’s book is highly recommended. It provides a comprehensive discussion of Sidgwick’s doctrine and locates it within the history of English moral philosophy.

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edition (Methods of Ethics, p. vii; hereafter ME) that he aims to examine (and I would add compare and contrast) all “the different methods of obtaining reasoned [moral] convictions as to what ought to be done which are to be found—either explicit or implicit—in the moral consciousness of mankind generally.” These methods “have been developed, either singly or in combination, by individual thinkers, and worked up into the systems now historical” (p. vii). Sidgwick wishes to describe and criticize (assess) these methods “from a neutral position, and as impartially as possible” (p. viii). Part of our task here is to see what this neutral and impartial position is.

What is a “Method of Ethics”? Sidgwick defines it as any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings ought to do; or determine what is right for them to do; or to seek to realize by (free) voluntary action (ME, p. 1). The phrase “individual human beings” distinguishes ethics from politics, which Sidgwick says studies what is right or good legislation,6 but this distinction is not important for us, since the principle of utility applies to both and Sidgwick’s discussion of justice really belongs to politics.

Note that Sidgwick assumes that, under any given circumstances, there is something (some definite alternate institution or custom, etc.) that it is right or reasonable to do, or to bring about (if this is possible); and that this may be known in principle. (See ME, Preface, 1st edition, p. vii.) In addition, Sidgwick assumes that a rational method is one that can be applied to all rational (and reasonable) human beings to get the same result, when the method is correctly followed (cf. ME, 27, 33). In sum: There is always one right or best answer, and this answer is the same for all rational minds. For Sidgwick this assumption is characteristic of science and the search for truth; he believes it holds for moral philosophy and ethical beliefs. Sidgwick says: it is implied in “. . . the very notion of Truth that it is essentially the same for all minds, [and so] the denial by another of a proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence in its validity” (ME, p. 341).

This is said in explaining why a mark of self-evidence is general agreement in judgment. Thus Sidgwick holds the thesis of moral objectivity.

(2) Now the methods of ethics Sidgwick has in mind are those proce-

6. “Politics . . . seeks to determine the proper constitution and the right public conduct of governed societies.” ME, p. 1.

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dures embedded in the historical doctrines: the various forms of rational intuitionism and moral sense views; perfectionism and utilitarianism; and social contract doctrines insofar as they incorporate parts of such doctrines. Sidgwick also includes rational egoism as a method of ethics.

Note that Sidgwick wishes to concentrate on the methods themselves and their differences as methods, and not on their practical results. He wants to put aside the desire to edify which he thinks is a barrier to advance in ethics, and to study the methods from disinterested curiosity. He wants to forget about even “finding and adopting the true method of determining what we ought to do; and to consider simply what conclusions will be rationally reached if we start with certain ethical premises, and with what degree of certainty and precision” (ME, Preface, 1st edition, p. viii).

This statement does not quite describe Sidgwick’s view accurately, since he is prepared to say that a rational method of ethics must answer to certain criteria; and these criteria serve, as we shall see, as the neutral standpoint from which the different methods can be assessed. Nevertheless, the desire to set out and to compare the various methods of ethics, from an impartial point of view, is an important feature of Methods of Ethics.

The implication of this feature is that we should not view Methods of Ethics as aiming to justify classical utilitarianism. It is plainly the doctrine Sidgwick prefers and the one to which he is most strongly drawn. But at the end of ME he thinks he is forced to recognize that while utilitarianism, from a neutral point of view, passes the criteria of a rational method of ethics far better than any form of intuitionism, and so is superior to intuitionism, nevertheless classical utilitarianism and rational egoism both seem to pass these standards equally well. Sidgwick comes to the unwelcome conclusion that there seems to be a conflict of reason within itself in the practical sphere.

(3) The structure of ME is roughly as follows (I go over this so that you can put Ch. 5 on Justice and Sidgwick’s argument as a whole in its proper context):

(a) ME falls into 4 Books.

Book I: discusses preliminary matters: definitions of ethics and of moral judgment, ethical principles and methods; definition of free will and its relation to ethics; definitions of desire and of pleasure; of intuitionism vs. egoism and self-love, etc.

Book II—Egoism: since Sidgwick decides that there are essentially only

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three fundamentally distinct methods of ethics, rational egoism, intuitionism, and utilitarianism, he sets out to give a systematic comparison and description of these. Book II is devoted to rational egoism.

Book III—Intuitionism: covers the various kinds of intuitionism (together with Chapter 8 of Book I), and at the same time points out the weakness of intuitionism as a method and hints at the argument to come, that classical utilitarianism is superior. See especially Book III, Chapter 11, on the review of common-sense morality, then Chapter 13 on Philosophical Intuitionism, and Chapter 14 on Ultimate Good.

Book IV—Utilitarianism: begins with the definition of the principle of utility in its classical form. Chapter 1 presents part of the neutral and impartial point of view, or argument whereby methods of ethics can be assessed. Chapter 2 discusses the proof of the principle of utility; Chapter 3 surveys the relation between common sense and utilitarianism and argues that common sense is, as it were, unconsciously utilitarian. Chapters 4–5 lay out the method of utilitarianism; and Chapter 6 discusses the relations between the three methods of ethics and closes with the dilemma of the “dualism of practical reason.”

(b) Strictly speaking, the argument of Methods of Ethics does not justify the classical utilitarian doctrine, although it is clearly the view to which Sidgwick is strongly inclined. The reason is that while utilitarianism wins out over intuitionism in Bks. III–IV, a tie exists between utilitarianism and rational egoism: that is, both satisfy equally well the objective criteria of a rational method of ethics. This offhand surprising conclusion is reached in the last chapter of Bk. IV; so we have, Sidgwick says, the dualism of practical reason and no objective resolution is in sight.

Thus, from this structure and outline it is clear that Sidgwick fails in his objective: While he is satisfied, for the moment, that he has described and compared the main methods of ethics correctly, it turns out that at least two of them—rational egoism and utilitarianism—pass equally, so far as he can tell, the rational and neutral tests of any such method. Therefore his initial assumption of objectivity—the thesis that there is always one right an- swer—is put in question. He suggests a way out via a theological assumption, but this we have not time to examine (I believe it well worth looking at, however convinced one may be that it cannot be correct).

(4) I should mention here (it will be relevant later), first, that Sidgwick reduces the main methods of ethics to three only—not, to be sure, without

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examining the others of historical importance: rational egoism (Bk. II); intuitionism (Bk. III); and utilitarianism (Bk. IV). Thus perfectionism reduces to intuitionism; and Kant’s doctrine reduces to a formal principle of equity or fairness in Sidgwick’s terminology (cf. ME, p. 379). This is, in my opinion, too small a range of comparisons: it is defective, I think, in not seeing that Kant’s doctrine, or a view similar to it, is a distinctive method of ethics; and Theory of Justice is such a view. Also, I think he wrongly assimilates perfectionism to intuitionism. This gap in Sidgwick’s range of comparisons is one weakness of his overall view.

Secondly, I believe Sidgwick fails to include in his description of methods of ethics certain important aspects of a moral conception, but I shan’t go into this at this point.

(5) The General Criteria of any Rational Method of Ethics:7

I call your attention to the footnote, p. 293 (of Ch. 5) where Sidgwick says that by “arbitrary” (as applied to definitions) he means definitions that include limitations (exceptions and qualifications) “as destroy the self-evi- dence of the principle; and, when closely examined, lead us to regard it as subordinate.” Now in the background here is Sidgwick’s view of the criteria for the 1st principles of a Rational Method of Ethics, which are:8

(a)First, Sidgwick holds that the 1st principles of a method of ethics must satisfy these conditions: (i) they must be at least as certain as any other moral principles, and (ii) of superior validity to other principles; (iii) they must be really self-evident and derive their validity, or evidence, from no other principles, moreover:

(b)Any such principles (iv) must be fully rational in the sense that they contain no limitations, or exceptions, or restrictions, unless these are selfimposed; that is, follow from the principle itself, and are not simply appended as unexplained provisos (cf. Methods of Ethics: 293n., the definition of “arbitrary”). In addition:

(c)(v) 1st principles must control, regulate, and systematize subordinate principles and standards (and lower-level moral precepts and beliefs) so as to organize them into a complete and harmonious scheme free of arbitrary elements. This requirement is connected to another: namely that (vi) 1st principles must define a method of ethics that determines (ascertains) ac-

7.Here I interpret Sidgwick’s procedure and arguments, but see especially Book IV: 2.

8.Here you should see Methods, III, Ch. 11 and IV, Ch. 2; and Schneewind, Chs. 9–10.

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