MEETING WITH ADENAUER

meeting with adenauer (september 1955)

Iwill now express a few thoughts about the reception in the USSR of a delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The delegation was headed by Adenauer.1 The only meeting I had with Adenauer was that one—in Moscow in September 1955. We were very pleased by the

This part of the memoirs was tape-recorded in 1969.

[ ]

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST : THE COLD WAR

initiative taken by Adenauer when he proposed that there be a meeting in the Soviet Union. Both sides wanted such a meeting, and it was beneficial for both. The situation in Germany had remained abnormal (it still is today [in 1969]). That’s why there naturally arose a desire to normalize it.

After Stalin’s death, Adenauer and his party [the Christian Democratic Union, or CDU] thought it would be possible for them to achieve their maximum goal of absorbing the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), thus creating a unified German capitalist state. Adenauer and his supporters—our former allies—felt that West Germany had already built up enough economic strength. Now it was able to offer credits to other countries. The USSR needed credits to buy modern equipment on the Western market. Credits would allow us to obtain equipment that we needed but were not yet able to produce in our country, nor could we obtain it in the other socialist countries.

As far as I remember, the government of the FRG (the initials used for West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany) said at that time that it was ready to offer us credits by way of compensation for postwar reparations that had not been paid—reparations due to us under the Potsdam Agreement.2 The FRG had not paid them on time. I don’t remember the amount. A figure something like 500 million West German marks keeps running through my head. The West German mark had a high value on Western markets. Adenauer had imagined incorrectly the position we might take in regard to the GDR (East Germany). First, we could not at all agree to the question being posed: whether East Germany was to be or not to be. After all, that was a question for the [East] Germans themselves to decide— that is, those who had established this new republic. We had an interest, not in eliminating, but in strengthening East Germany. It’s hard to imagine how this idea could have occurred to Adenauer—that we might agree to the elimination of East Germany. Our ideological, political, and economic contacts with East Germany were mutual, not unilateral.

We insisted on the preservation of an independent German state of the workers and peasants that would be our ally. Besides, our military-strategic interests also lay in the direction of strengthening East Germany. As for West Germany, as I have said, it was seeking to achieve a unified German state on capitalist foundations. If that had happened, we would have been forced to retreat immediately to the borders of Poland. Thus, if we had given in to threats or persuasion like that, it would have meant a political and strategic retreat, a renunciation of East Germany and of its socialist path of development. That would have inspired aggressive forces in West Germany to apply

[ ]

MEETING WITH ADENAUER

even more pressure, to try ultimately to move the Polish border farther east—a goal the West Germans had been trying to achieve even before that, and they’re still trying to [at the time this was taped, in 1969], despite the fact that borders have already been firmly established. If that happened [that is, if the Polish border were moved], it could set off a chain reaction. There was no way we could agree to that. We could not even imagine that, or think such a thought.

But strong desires sometimes have a blinding effect on sound thinking, and ideas arise that make it seem possible for the unattainable to be realized. Apparently such ideas inspired Adenauer and his circle to make the decision to come visit us, so that through personal contacts, in the course of discussion, they could tempt us with the offer of credits, that is, to create for themselves conditions in which they could achieve the desired goal without war. The people who accompanied Adenauer then were as follows: Kiesinger (who later became chancellor),3 [Karl] Arnold (the head of the trade unions, who later died),4 Schmidt,5 and one other Social Democrat. These are the names that have stayed in my memory. I don’t remember whether Hallstein was there.6 It seems that he was. In those years the Hallstein doctrine was making a big splash.7 Today it no longer has such prominence, but at any rate it has not been abandoned. In their debates and in practice the West Germans still adhere to the Hallstein doctrine.

The main question was the signing of a peace treaty [that is, between the Soviet Union and Germany]. Adenauer had been expressing himself in favor of that. However, in our view, such a peace treaty could be arrived at only if an agreement was signed between the two German states, with West Berlin set apart as an autonomous “free city.” The West Germans, however, were proposing a united Germany with its capital in Berlin, which did not coincide with our interests at all. We had no moral right to try to influence the GDR in that direction. For the GDR, such a solution would have meant renouncing its independence and dissolving itself into capitalist West Germany. On the other hand, what we wanted to focus on in our negotiations was officially putting an end to the technical state of war that still existed—that is, not so much to sign a peace treaty as to sign an agreement officially stating that the USSR and Germany were no longer in a state of war. Such an agreement would make it possible to establish diplomatic relations, which would facilitate economic, cultural, and social contacts between our two countries.

As the negotiations proceeded each side tried by every possible means but without results to achieve its goals and intentions. When nothing was being achieved a break in the negotiations ensued. I don’t remember the

[ ]

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST : THE COLD WAR

nuances now. But in the final stages the West Germans categorically rejected the proposals we were making; we likewise stated our lack of agreement with Adenauer’s proposals. Suddenly he declared that since they could not sign a suitable document, they would be leaving the next day. I said to them: “I express my sympathy and regrets. Such a step would do harm to the relations between our countries and above all to the Federal Republic of Germany itself. But that is your affair. Go ahead and leave, but you will suffer losses, both politically and economically, because economic ties with the Soviet Union would be very profitable for you.”

We were ready for them to make a demonstrative departure the next day without any final document being signed and without any ceremonial sendoff. But that very same day we found out they wanted to meet with us again. The threat of leaving our country demonstratively turned out to be just a way of applying pressure, an attempt to extort an agreement from us, a test to see whether we would stand our ground firmly. Adenauer wanted to frighten us with the thought that the state of war would continue. But we were not especially troubled by that prospect, although there was no question that we would have regretted such an outcome. Apparently, though, the capitalist big shots in West Germany put pressure on their government because they especially felt it was necessary to “open a window” onto Russia. In earlier times Germany had extracted great profits from trade with the old, prerevolutionary Russia and with the USSR. Before Hitler came to power we had good trade relations with the Weimar Republic. Our relations were stable and “big deals” were concluded between us and the German capitalists.

I remember after the civil war a German company was given a concession in the Donbas to sink a new shaft that would be Mine No. “17-bis.” It would be right next to Mine No. 30, which was currently in operation, but the new shaft would be deeper. Our head miner felt offended and dismayed that in effect we had given this job to the Germans, as though to say that we ourselves didn’t know how to sink such a shaft. He went to see Abakumov, who was the mine manager, and offered his services: “Trust me, Yegor Trofimovich [Abakumov], I can sink a new shaft at the mine, a test shaft or prospecting shaft, no worse than the Germans. Just give me the necessary equipment.” But that was precisely the problem—equipment! In spite of everything, we dug up what reserves we could, and, as an experiment in competition, we allowed our head miner to “take on” the Germans. He managed to sink a test shaft, and so we didn’t end up being hopelessly outclassed.

As I recall, the Germans also restored a coke byproducts processing plant at Mine No. 30. A rally was held to celebrate the completion of this work. At

[ ]

MEETING WITH ADENAUER

that time I was in charge of the organizational department of the party’s Yuzovka district committee. I was invited to this rally as an old-timer who had worked at the mines when they had been owned by a French company. I had worked there as a machinist (slesar) [in a machine shop for the maintenance and repair of mining machinery]. That’s why the workers there knew me backward and forward, and I knew all of them just as well. This was where I had spent my childhood and youth. I took a German Communist with me to the rally. He was studying in Moscow, taking some courses, and had come to Yuzovka for the spring break. I wanted to have a German Communist who would speak for our side. I remember the beginning of the rally very well. First a representative of the German company spoke, a heavy-set man, some sort of engineer or technician. He spoke in German, and he wasn’t sure whether we had a translator. The workers stood there and listened to him. They were gawking at him, as the saying goes. On the surface it wasn’t a very attractive scene. All the people were from the villages, many were wearing bast shoes, and their clothing was old and worn, if not completely tattered. In short, the people looked pretty drab back then. Of course that’s entirely understandable. After a world war, then a civil war with sabotage, which was what the revolution ran into, it was slow going, trying to restore the economy. The accumulation of resources was also going slowly, and the people’s standard of living was not rising. We understood this, but I’m talking about the outward impression given at the time.

The workers listened to the foreign capitalist speaker, but you didn’t hear one person clap. Then I announced that a representative of the Comintern [the Communist International] would now speak, comrade so-and-so, also a German. He was immediately greeted with applause. And when he finished his speech, which was a short one, the kind you give at a rally, a stormy ovation was worked up in his behalf. I don’t think the listeners entirely understood the essence of the speech by the Comintern representative, whose mastery of Russian was poor. But it was enough to say that he was a representative of the Comintern for them to award him in a truly fraternal way with a warm greeting and give him a big ovation. That was how high our regard was, back then, for the banner and authority of the international Communist organization, the Third International.

The Western industrialists extracted all they could from the commercial ties established with us after the end of the Russian civil war.

Naturally, the representatives of the big corporations of West Germany, knowing the history of their previous relations and the opportunities they had had earlier, continued to calculate what they might extract from us if

[ ]

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST : THE COLD WAR

our relations were normalized and they were again able to do business with the USSR. Adenauer felt the pressure from these businessmen, and he himself had an interest in accomplishing the same thing. And so the Germans didn’t leave after all. We continued our discussions and began to work on a document that we could both sign. On one particular question our counterparts put up especially stubborn resistance. We were surprised, and then they leaked the information that the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Charles Bohlen,8 was putting pressure on Adenauer.

At first when Bohlen became ambassador we had good relations with him. Our sympathy for him was based on our high regard for Roosevelt. Bohlen had been Roosevelt’s personal interpreter both at Tehran and in the Crimea [at the Yalta conference], and not only in the Crimea. In short, we had the impression that he was a Roosevelt man and would therefore stick to Roosevelt’s foreign policy. However, it turned out later that Bohlen was a rabid reactionary. He supported the hateful policy pursued by the circles in the United States that were hostile to us. He was ambassador for a long time, and he did whatever nasty things he could against us. He worsened relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Not only did he do nothing toward improving those relations but he also put the freeze on any initiatives in that direction. I don’t know if he received some instructions from Washington on this particular question or if this was a case of his taking personal initiative. I think he did it of his own accord, because he didn’t want any improvement in our relations. So the information we got from the Germans was something that we believed.

I also remember a man by the name of Arnold, who was a representative of one of the German provinces [North Rhine–Westphalia].9 Later he headed the trade unions in the Adenauer era. During the course of the negotiations I had the opportunity to talk with him at some of the official receptions. Arnold showed more interest than the others in signing an agreement, reducing tensions, and normalizing our relations. The Social Democrat Schmidt held a special position. As for Kiesinger, I didn’t form any particular impression at that time. I think he was Adenauer’s right-hand man and had no disagreements with him in his views on the possibility of signing an agreement, especially on not making “concessions to the Soviets,” as they used to say.

At the end of the negotiations Adenauer bragged that, in spite of the pressure put on him by Bohlen, he had nevertheless carried the talks through to a successful conclusion, so that in the end we agreed upon a text.10 The Germans let us know that they wanted to have the text signed in

[ ]

MEETING WITH ADENAUER

a hurry before Bohlen could see the final version. We agreed with their approach. If it was acceptable to us and not acceptable to Bohlen, of course we would be on Adenauer’s side in such a case. Thus the document was signed. Later I was informed that Bohlen was extremely angry at Adenauer’s position, but the document had already been signed.

One particular impression has remained with me about Adenauer himself. He was a man capable of resorting to what I would call crude flattery, if he thought it necessary. During our conversations he “singled me out,” saying things like, “Only as a result of your influence has such and such happened.” It was unpleasant for me to listen to this from a political leader. It impinged on his dignity. When I saw this unpleasant type of behavior I thought to myself,“What a petty way of thinking about other people.” Probably he himself was a petty person. For example, when we had an exchange of views during dinner he whispered in my ear, right then, through his interpreter, with some sort of flattering remarks. But as far as the policies he was pursuing are concerned, in his understanding of his own interests, he was a solid representative of the German capitalists and their great defender.

The negotiations ended, the documents were signed, and the West German delegation left. We saw them off, and that was the first and last contact we had. There were no more meetings between Adenauer and myself and no more exchanges of governmental delegations. It’s true that economic relations between our two countries began to develop. I often received representatives of Krupp11 and of other West German firms with whom we were bound by common economic interests. We placed orders with them, and they supplied us with good machinery and equipment. The Germans know how to work and how to trade.

What else can I say about Adenauer? He of course has gone down in the history of his country as a representative of big capital. But as a person he was, so to speak, quite skillful. How many years was it that he managed to stay in power in West Germany! And he had the support of the voters. I remember the following episode. During one dinner Schmidt turned to me and, in accordance with the custom in the Socialist and Communist parties, called me “Genosse Khrushchev” [Genosse being the German word for “comrade”]. In reply I called him “Genosse Schmidt.” When Adenauer heard this an ironical expression appeared on his face, and he mockingly repeated the phrase, “Genosse Khrushchev.” Then he addressed me as “Mister Khrushchev” and said, “Do you think that the workers in our country vote for these Social Democrats? No, the majority of the workers in Germany vote for me!” And he immediately rattled off how many votes the Social

[ ]

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST : THE COLD WAR

Democrats had won, how many workers belonged to their trade unions, and how many votes his party had received. It turned out that the majority of workers had voted for Adenauer’s party. Unfortunately, that was the truth. If the majority had voted for the Social Democrats, of course, Adenauer would not have been the head of the West German government. Even after Adenauer’s death the situation didn’t [immediately] change.12

Adenauer laid the foundations for the present-day policy of the German Christian Democratic Party. It’s still very strong today and has great influence in that country. You have to give Adenauer credit. He was a man you had to take into account. But he remained an irreconcilable enemy of Communist ideas and therefore was our intransigent ideological opponent. That held us back, and for his part, he did not seek any close contacts with us through government channels. That’s what I wanted to add to the generally known fact that Adenauer was a representative of the reactionary circles in West Germany. That was what he had always been and what he remained till the day he died.

However our meeting was useful. We put an end to the official state of war between Germany and the USSR13 and exchanged ambassadors. Through the Soviet embassy in that country our influence on public opinion was strengthened, and we had the opportunity to make contacts with business circles and with people who were sympathetic toward us. Such contacts always have good results. We broke through the isolation in which we had found ourselves, and that was not to the liking of the United States. Their people did literally everything they could to prevent the agreement between West Germany and the USSR, not wanting us to break the ring of isolation in which they had encircled the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. But we broke out of that encirclement. That was beneficial not only for us but also for the other socialist countries, although they did not yet have embassies in Bonn, because the Hallstein doctrine was still an obstacle to such relations. Even today only Romania and Yugoslavia, it seems to me, have embassies in West Germany.

When Yugoslavia was temporarily on bad terms with the other socialist countries it concluded a treaty establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany. Later, when relations between Yugoslavia and other socialist countries were normalized, Yugoslavia recognized the German Democratic Republic. Diplomatic relations with West Germany thereby ended automatically [because of the Hallstein doctrine]. That was in 1957, but in 1963 relations were reestablished between West Germany and Yugoslavia.14 Comrade Tito should be given credit. He preferred to have relations with

[ ]

MEETING WITH ADENAUER

East Germany and resisted the pressure from the West Germans. Thus the Hallstein doctrine did not withstand the test of time, and that’s why at a certain point West Germany did normalize its relations with Yugoslavia.

I consider it necessary to emphasize further why Charles Bohlen undertook everything he could, for his part, to try to prevent the agreement between West Germany and the USSR He kept sticking spokes in the wheel as much as he could, but Adenauer didn’t listen to him, and after we had come to agreement on the main questions, Adenauer proposed that we make the agreement official by placing our signatures on it as quickly as possible, because he was afraid that pressure from the United States would be intensified, with direct pressure coming from Washington through the U.S. ambassador in Bonn. But what were the considerations Adenauer was guided by in this situation? Was he expressing any particular sympathies for the Soviet Union? Why did he want to restore diplomatic relations? It was purely commercial interests that were at work here, the big money interests in West Germany. In contrast, it was to the advantage of the United States that West Germany should remain officially in a state of war with the Soviet Union and not have its own diplomatic representatives in Moscow, while we too would not have our diplomatic representatives in Bonn.

Then commercial contacts would not have developed between our two countries, and that would have served the interests of the United States. They wanted to invest their capital in West Germany and to influence the development of its economy. West Germany, on the contrary, wanted to free itself from the embrace of the United States. West German capital, having regained its strength, was seeking markets for the sale of its goods and seeking customers who would order its products. That’s why Adenauer wanted to open a window onto the Soviet Union. That was his primary motive, not any special sympathy or any noble feelings possessing his mind. The idea of profit was what predominated. In this case the interests of the United States came into conflict with the interests of West Germany. When people’s pocketbooks are involved, and the interests of the banks are affected, the requirements of one’s ally may be left out of account. The German capitalists were quite resourceful. They knew very well what opportunities our market offered, and they resorted to whatever cunning devices they needed to.

Now that I am retired I sometimes remember Adenauer. He gave me a gift as a souvenir—a good pair of binoculars made by the German company Zeiss. When I go for walks I use these binoculars, so that “with Adenauer’s assistance” I enlarge my range of vision. I have a chance to get a closer view of the broad fields, the woods, and the other delights of nature outside

[ ]

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST : THE COLD WAR

Moscow. If people I meet take an interest in my binoculars, I say: “A gift from Adenauer.” That immediately makes them more interesting. Of course we [in the Soviet Union] also make binoculars, probably no worse then the German ones. I have other binoculars, too. But I use this pair because they’re more convenient. And there you have one of the memories that has stayed with me from my personal meeting with Adenauer.

[ ]