THE SIX DAY WAR IN THE MIDD LE EAST

the six day war in the middle east

Today is August 1, 1967. I had to “busy myself” a great deal with the Arab countries, especially after 1956, when we saved Egypt during the Suez crisis.

It’s a very important part of the world. We paid a great deal of attention to it because many leaders of the Arab countries were young and inexperienced; they hadn’t gone through a serious schooling of political struggle. That’s why they often make many crude errors; they get into unpleasant situations and don’t know how to extricate themselves. At least one example of this would be the unification of Egypt and Syria—that is, the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) [in February 1958].1 This unification was an obvious mistake. When Nasser came to visit us [on July 8, 1958] I discussed this question with him for an entire day. We had been speaking out against this unification, and he flew to Moscow to have a talk with me [on the subject].

I told him bluntly: “We’re against it.”

He said: “But Syria itself has expressed an interest in doing this.”

I added: “This will end badly for you.” But there was no way that he could understand why I was saying this.

What was it that I said to him? “You must understand that the Syrian Arabs have been trained in the school of French culture.2 Their system is more democratic [than in Egypt], and they are more prosperous: their standard of living is incomparably higher than Egypt’s. The Syrians have become accustomed to democratic conditions. They have many different political parties. The Communist Party is legal there, and so is the Socialist Party. It’s really a classical bourgeois country with a normal parliament. Parliament votes its confidence or votes ‘no confidence’ in the government, which can be changed accordingly. Bourgeois traditions have taken root in that country. None of that exists in Egypt. For now, Egypt is still a poor country, with low living standards among the people. You don’t, in fact, have a variety of political parties, and you aren’t thinking of introducing any such thing. Right now the Syrian bourgeoisie has shown an interest in unifying with you, but why? The Syrian capitalists have been frightened by the Communist Party, by the strength it has shown, and they want to make use of you to suppress democracy. But that is a temporary phenomenon. When you have lived together for a while and the Syrians feel what it’s like to be under your rule, they will rebel against you. They won’t be able to reconcile themselves with Egypt’s political system.”

This section of the memoirs was tape-recorded partly in 1967 and partly in 1971. [SK]

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He started to say: “Well now, you know . . .”

But I went on: “I’m only warning you that Syria will either back out of its unification with you or will throw off your system of rule.”

And that’s how things turned out. They lived together for a few years [from 1958 to 1961]. Then Amer was placed under house arrest and, later, was sent packing from Syria.3 The Egyptian ambassador to the USSR, [Murat] Ghaleb, was an intelligent man.4 He was a witness to my conversation with Nasser. When the collapse came he himself told me: “I took notes on the whole conversation. Everything turned out exactly as you had warned.”

In [May] 1964 I was Nasser’s guest.5 I was there for an important stage in the construction of the Aswan High Dam.6 Between President Nasser and myself the very best, most trusting relations had been established. I candidly expressed my views to him.

I asked: “What are you doing? Do you want a war? Do you want to destroy the state of Israel? That’s not right. It’s totally wrong. Besides, Israel is a very tough nut for you to try and crack. Bear in mind that although Israel is numerically smaller than Egypt, it has a higher cultural level. Well-trained personnel are serving in the Israeli army who know modern weapons better than your people do. Besides, you’re putting yourself in a position where you’ll lose sympathy from other countries, and you’re putting the USSR in an awkward position. In the UN we voted for the founding of the state of Israel. Of course we voted with some reservation, because our party never sympathized with Zionism. It fought against the Zionists in our country both before and after the revolution. We don’t sympathize with this reactionary bourgeois party. But that’s not the point. The point is that the state of Israel exists, and you can’t fail to take that into account.

“There’s no need to become embroiled in a war. And you shouldn’t pursue a policy aimed at the destruction of Israel. It exists, and it has a right to exist. It’s recognized by the United Nations, and therefore it’s not sensible or intelligent for you to adopt the aim of destroying it.

“You should use different methods in seeking to win recognition for the rights of the Arabs living in the state of Israel. They should have equal rights.” Nasser then expressed his agreement with me. He said: “I don’t want a war.

I understand the full seriousness of the situation. If I give speeches like that [calling for the destruction of Israel], I do it because I’m compelled to. I’m paying tribute to popular sentiment.”

I understood him. Israel was of course pursuing a reactionary and aggressive policy toward Egypt. It was necessary to arm oneself so as to be able to repel the aggressor if an attack came, but it didn’t make sense to initiate war

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THE SIX DAY WAR IN THE MIDD LE EAST

oneself, to get tangled up and drawn into a war. Nevertheless, the Six-Day War [of 1967] happened. That was an error, and a very crude one besides! For a long time the Arabs had wanted to destroy Israel. That was understandable to some degree, because they had been driven from their land [by the Israelis]. Such actions always arouse intense hatred between ethnic groups. But I don’t want to dwell on the moral side of the question. If you are going to fight, prepare properly and take effective action. But to make such a mess of things, to sh—— all over yourself—it’s incomprehensible!

Nowadays the Arabs are crying out everywhere about their peace-loving nature, that they are a peaceful people who have been the victims of aggression. I have no access to information other than the radio and the newspapers [and television], but even from them it’s obvious how events actually developed.

A military delegation from Egypt arrived in Moscow. “Whisper, whisper, whisper” [secret talks were held]. An agreement was reached. They left. Then our military delegation left for Egypt. Again: “Whisper, whisper, this and that, that and this.” Then they came back. Then a Syrian government and military delegation came to our country. They had a discussion and proposed toasts. Then they too left. What subjects were they discussing? It’s quite clear. But now they blame Israel: “Those no good so-and-sos, sons of bitches.” But how is it that Israel is blamed for what it did? Egypt demanded that the UN withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the area between the Israeli and Egyptian troops. Who demanded that? Nasser. U Thant7 complied with his request. Why would neutral troops be removed [from a disputed region]? So they wouldn’t interfere with the start of a war. Again, who demanded it? Nasser. So then, who wanted to start a war? Nasser. He closed the Gulf of Aqaba,8 which was being used by Israeli ships [as a commercial shipping channel]. Why did Nasser do that? In preparation for armed conflict! In other words, it seemed as though, for Nasser, everything was in readiness.

Later on, they began making up stories, saying their officers had gone off to be with women, and therefore their army was caught off guard while its officers were away, consorting with women. This happens in every country of the world. Officers go off to consort with women. So the problem can’t just be dismissed with that. That wasn’t the problem! That’s a fairy story to tell gullible people—although such a story is a thousand years old. Yes, of course, military men are away from home, separated from their women, and no matter what you do, they’re still going to chase after “a little something on the side.” As Stalin said at one point during the war [of 1941–45]: “We need to mobilize young women, organize officers’ clubs, and so on.” And that wasn’t just an accidental remark. The Americans are making practically the same

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kind of arrangements for themselves in South Vietnam, although it takes a different form. None of that is important anyway. It’s a trifling detail, and I don’t want to get diverted onto that subject. These are questions of daily life, of relations between men and women, not between countries.

The point is that our instructors went there [to Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries] and trained their people. Arab officers also trained at military academies in our country. But then they give this explanation: “They had all gone on leave.” This is an explanation for fools. How so? Well, if I had demanded the removal of UN troops, closed the gulf, and waged a press campaign preparing for war, would I then have sent my officers, pilots, and tank crews off on leave? Not even an idiot would do that. So why was it really that they were defeated? Because they made a mess of things, they sh—— all over themselves (prosrali) and for no other reason! Now they’re trying to shift the blame, to say that some officer was away on leave, or else had an upset stomach.

The main reason for Israel’s victory was that it had a higher cultural level and better discipline in its army, and its officers had combat experience and excellent training. After all, very good specialists from many different countries had come together in Israel. For example, I have a very high regard for their top general, [Moshe] Dayan,9 as a military man. He’s a fine fellow! I said as a joke that if I was premier and he was in the Soviet Union, I would immediately appoint him our minister of defense. He is worthy of that. The Jews are a people who have been dispersed all over the world. That’s why it turned out that their officers were better trained, and so were their soldiers, their tank crews, and airplane pilots. What about the factor of fanaticism? Well, that’s not primary. There are all sorts of fanatics. But if you pull down a fanatic’s pants and whip him a few times, that fanatic will run off without looking back, so as not to get another whipping. The thing is that the Israelis were simply better organized, had a better mastery of their weapons, and made more intelligent use of them.

It was hard for the Egyptians to contend with them, and they paid dearly, poor fellows. To put it crudely, they could ride camels and knew how to handle rifles, but they had now been seated in tanks. In our country too [in the 1930s], the cavalry was switched over to tanks. But serious training is required to carry that out. The level of military culture and the degree of tempering of military cadres are factors of no small importance. The Egyptians failed to make use of their weapons as they should have. If cadres had existed in their army capable of handling the weapons we had supplied them, they could have contended with the Israelis more effectively and perhaps could have stood their ground against them.

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All in all, they should have been advised not to take such a risk, not knowing whether they could stand up to the Israelis or not.

I simply can’t understand how such a thing happened. How could we have permitted it? I repeat, the Soviet Union bears a major share of the responsibility for what happened. With the possibilities we had of exerting influence we could have restrained Nasser from going to war. We had the possibility of giving President Nasser good advice, not to make a display of ardent militancy in demanding that UN peacekeeping troops be withdrawn. Also, it was not necessary to close the gulf that Israel used for commercial shipping.

In short, he shouldn’t have heated up the atmosphere. But as things happened, an atmosphere of imminent war was created. That’s how I understood the situation at the time. It’s true that Israel started the war. It launched a surprise attack, but it launched that attack preemptively, to forestall its opponent, because both sides had already mobilized and were on a war footing. Israel struck first and easily achieved a thorough routing of Egypt’s troops.

This was a miscalculation by our military. Our military evaluated the situation incorrectly. An uncritical approach was taken toward determining Egypt’s ability to win a victory. At any rate it is my opinion that it was not necessary to go to war at all.

The defeat occurred as the result of an incorrect evaluation of the disposition of forces, an incorrect policy, an underestimation of Israel’s strength. Here, in such a case, everything is decided by the cadres concerned with military matters as well as by the diplomats. But it is primarily the military men who are responsible, because it is not the diplomats but the military who have the last word.

Despite the weapons the Arabs had in 1967, eleven years after the attack by Britain, France, and Israel in 1956, they were defeated. Back then [in 1956] I would say we brilliantly—and I repeat, brilliantly; I’m not ashamed to say that; I won’t play at false modesty—we coped brilliantly with the situation, lent Egypt a helping hand, and forced the aggressors to stop the war.10 Yet eleven years later, when our military power had increased so greatly, when there was no comparison with what it had been eleven years earlier, we ended up in such an embarrassing situation. Our country conducted itself incorrectly from the very beginning; it was incorrect to allow this war to happen. The Arabs were allowed to provoke Israel, to bet everything on one card, and start a war. That ended with a victory for Israel. Then in the peace process we also conducted ourselves incorrectly. We didn’t make use of our military might after the cease-fire; we didn’t demand an immediate withdrawal of [Israeli] troops from the occupied territories.

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But in the end I think the war will rebound against Israel. I have no doubt of that. After all, the Swedes defeated Tsar Peter I at the battle of Narva, but what was the final upshot of that situation?11 Thus in similar fashion Israel will be defeated, although I don’t know when. Again, I have no doubt of it. Is there an understanding of this in Israel itself? No, there isn’t. They’re drunk on their victory; their military broadcasts are aggressive and provocative. After defeating the Arabs, the best and most intelligent thing for the Israelis to do would be to immediately pull their troops back to their starting positions. That would surprise the whole world and win I don’t know how much sympathy for Israel.

Here I am, a man who is harshly critical of Stalin. But I will say that Stalin was a very smart man. We started a war with the Finns in 1939. Officially it’s written that the Finns attacked us, but the Finns never dreamed of doing any such thing! We attacked them. I know that for certain. We wanted Finland to become Soviet. But when the Finns bloodied our nose good and hard, Stalin made peace. As soon as we took the Karelian isthmus12 he signed a peace treaty. The Finns fought hard and retained their independence, and Stalin, on his side, decided not to be stubborn. Then during the war with Germany, in which the Finns fought against us alongside the Germans, Stalin nevertheless made peace with the Finns again, signing a peace treaty with them [in September 1944], even though the situation was such that we could have fought a little more and conquered all of Finland. But he decided not to do that. Why? I think that this is where Stalin showed his intelligence. By this action [of not continuing war against Finland] he wanted to pave the way for the disintegration of the German coalition. If the Russians didn’t want to conquer Finland, that meant they also didn’t want to conquer Hungary, Romania, and other countries allied with Hitler. That encouraged Hitler’s allies to make peace with us. And that’s how things turned out. Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary pulled out of the war.

This is the kind of thing Israel doesn’t understand. You may be standing on the banks of the Suez Canal today, but tomorrow you’re going to lose Tel Aviv. That’s what it all comes down to! Today the United Nations has passed a resolution that Israel must withdraw from the territories it has seized. But Israel won’t let go; it’s dragging its feet. Well now, what are the Arabs supposed to do? The Arabs have to prepare for war again. If I headed an Arab country and received the necessary weapons, then in perhaps three days I would break Israel into bits. It’s entirely possible to do that. After all, if a good runner were to set out from the border that existed before the Six-Day War, starting in the morning, he could have lunch in Tel Aviv. This is a country

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that’s completely within firing range, from one end to the other. It’s not the Soviet Union, you know. The Germans had to march and march before they marched as far as Stalingrad, but even from there they would still have had to march so many thousands of kilometers [to completely occupy the Soviet Union]. But what about Israel? A man on a bicycle can leave one border in the morning and reach the other by evening.

People sometimes ask: “Would we [the Soviet Union] assist the Arabs if they wanted to destroy Israel?” Well, the Arabs have now gone through the school of war. [That is, they might be capable of effectively fighting Israel.] Let me recall the following conversation [about being schooled in warfare]. Molotov related it to me once, and Churchill subsequently referred to it. During World War II, when Molotov flew to London for the first time, he was received by Churchill.13

Now Churchill was a clever man and a very brazen one. This is what he said: “Mr. Molotov, there in the place where you are sitting Boris Savinkov used to sit when he came to my office back in 1918. I had discussions with him about our landing at Arkhangelsk.14 On the whole you ought to say ‘Thank you’ to me for doing that. I taught you how to fight. We organized our intervention, and you learned to fight fairly well. You drove us out. And now [in World War II] you’re fighting very well. That was my school that you learned from.”

Well, now the Arabs have gone through a similar “schooling.” And it cannot be forgotten, after all, that Israel lives surrounded by the Muslim world, which fully sympathizes with the Arabs. The Jews are just a handful in that part of the world. That’s why I don’t think it has realistic long-term prospects for holding onto the territories it has conquered. But it is trying to hold onto them.

Israel has firmly fastened onto the Sinai peninsula. Apparently that peninsula is very valuable property. It has both gas and oil and thus will become even more valuable. Previously it was a desert, representing nothing of value. Nothing grew there. But now its mineral deposits have proved to be far more valuable than any plant life.15 Despite the value of Sinai’s minerals, the policies Israel is now following are unwise. Its victory has gone to its head, so that Israel is no longer able to make a sober evaluation of its place in the world. It’s in a very dangerous situation. Today the most intelligent thing for it to do would be to withdraw its troops in exchange for Arab recognition of the state of Israel.16 Israel’s stubbornness will boomerang against it. It’s no longer proceeding on an intelligent basis, but acting out of stupidity.

Given this situation, what should the Arabs do? Gather up their strength, as Tsar Peter I did in his day, and win a battle of Poltava.17 People will say that the Arabs aren’t Russians. But back then, the Russians weren’t Swedes either.

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The Swedish army was the best in Europe at that time. Yet Peter smashed it even though there was no better army than that of the Swedes. In spite of everything that army was defeated by a bunch of peasants in bast shoes.18

It must also be kept in mind that behind the Arabs stands the Soviet Union. That means our technology, our advisers, and our schools are available to them. And after all, the Arabs are no “dumber” than the Jews. All people have equal potential. It’s only necessary to make skillful use of it. Today the Jews are more advanced, but it’s only a matter of time [before the Arabs catch up with them]. Take for example the first years of the revolution in our country. Jews made up a very high percentage of party activists. And that was completely understandable, because they were more literate. That situation doesn’t exist now. Why? Because the Russians caught up. Nothing under the sun lasts forever.

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