FROM SY R IA TO YEMEN

from syria to yemen

Now I want to tell about our relations with some other Arab countries, not just Egypt. Such relations improved after 1956, when Soviet intervention stopped the military assault on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel. In the Arab world our authority rose immediately, with widespread approval

This section of the memoirs was tape-recorded in 1970. [SK]

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of our peace-loving policy in defense of underdeveloped countries and nations that were freeing themselves from colonial oppression and taking the road of independence. In particular very, very good relations were established between Syria and us. The Syrian government was pursuing an independent policy and understood us correctly. It moved willingly in the direction of rapprochement with the USSR. Representatives of Syria arrived frequently in the Soviet Union and our delegations went to Syria. Several agreements were signed for the provision of Soviet aid to Syria.

Then it became known to us, from reliable reports coming through our intelligence services, that the United States was about to organize an invasion of Syria, making use of Turkey, as well as Iraq and Iran, for that purpose. We were unable to find out exactly what forces would be drawn from the latter two countries, but John Foster Dulles had obtained their agreement to participate in the aggression, in the event that Turkish forces proved to be insufficient. A detailed plan came into our hands, a plan not only for the invasion itself but for the buildup to it, and we had no doubt about the accuracy of the information we received. We even knew the date when the invasion was to begin. We knew what forces Turkey intended to use, where and how they were concentrated, and how many tank and infantry divisions and how much artillery would take part in this action.1

The plan was designed to deal a lightning blow, with the aim of reaching Damascus2 in one swift thrust, as quickly as possible, to occupy the city and put an end to the independent Syrian government. Was the purpose of this invasion to incorporate Syria into Turkey? Hardly. The idea was to overthrow the progressive form of government in Syria, so as to force that country to follow along in the wake of NATO policy. We worked out a counter plan, together with Syria. It was designed to put pressure on our neighbors, Iran and Turkey, so as to restrain them from aggression. An announcement was made in the USSR that we would hold military maneuvers on our border with Iran, in Turkmenistan. Then we also made a demonstration of our military power on our border with Turkey, in the Caucasus. After that, in agreement with Bulgaria, we organized a similar demonstration of military might along Bulgaria’s border with Turkey, with the Bulgarians announcing that they would conduct maneuvers with the participation of the Soviet Air Force. For each step that Turkey took to prepare for war on Syria, once it became known to us, we took steps in response, publicizing our actions widely through the press. And when the time came (the “x hour”) for the invasion of Syria, we sent some of our “fighting marshals” [with combat records well known from World War II] to the areas where the military exercises were conducted.

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Marshal of the Soviet Union Meretskov headed off to our border with Iran, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko went to our border with Turkey, while Soviet Air Marshal Skripko was already in Bulgaria.3

The x hour was drawing near. We knew in advance all the stages of Turkey’s preparations for the invasion, and we designated corresponding stages in the preparation of our troops for combat—or more exactly, for a demonstrative display as though they were preparing for combat. Turkey continued to build up its invasion force, and we took steps in response, publicizing reports of this in our press. A peculiar kind of contest was going on. According to the plan worked out by the Pentagon, only a few steps remained. We were very well informed about what was happening in Turkey. With great accuracy our people kept Moscow updated. On the eve of the appointed hour (the “x hour”) we announced that we would come to the aid of Syria militarily. At that point the United States suggested to Turkey that it cease preparations for war, and subsequently the plans for the invasion were canceled altogether. We were overjoyed at this turn of events, because we didn’t want a war then, not at all, not even a local war. We had demonstratively made our preparations only for the sake of stopping the aggression. We remained on alert for some time longer, not being sure that the invasion had definitely been called off. After waiting for a while, we learned that indeed Turkish troops had been withdrawn from the border with Syria.

The Soviet leadership celebrated because we had succeeded in staying the hand of the imperialists without firing a shot. They had raised their sword over the Syrian republic, but bloodshed had been prevented. Besides, this testified to our growing military might, which now had to be taken into account even by such inveterate promoters of imperialist policy as John Foster Dulles.

In general in those days Mr. Dulles constantly sought to worsen relations between the capitalist world and the USSR, putting great effort into the attempt to isolate all the socialist countries from the rest of the world, preventing trade and cultural exchange, and doing us harm in all sorts of ways. The policy of keeping the socialist camp encircled and maintaining a blockade to prevent any contacts played a major role in his foreign policy conception. Not even tourists were allowed to visit us. On one occasion a group of our chess players was denied entry into the United States. And a delegation from our food industry was supposed to attend an international chefs’ congress in the United States, but it too was refused admittance. In short, Dulles was sealing all the openings that might allow for communication and interaction between people in our country and those in other countries. He tried to achieve the same result in the Middle East but was unable to. We broke though his blockade in 1956,

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establishing good relations with Egypt. The imperialists wanted to punish Syria harshly, to indirectly teach Egypt and Lebanon a lesson. I’m not even talking about Iraq, where an extremely reactionary government was performing its functions during those same months [of 1957]. It was headed by a man who had been installed by the British imperialists, Nuri Said, a man of doglike loyalty to his colonialist masters.4

We celebrated a bloodless victory. When we were convinced that the threat against Syria had passed, we immediately declared through our press that our military maneuvers had ended and that the commanding officers who had assumed duties in the border area had returned to the performance of their regular duties. What was it that was so special about that operation? Well, we restrained the aggressors at the same time that we were lending a helping hand to Syria, preventing the destruction of the Syrian republic, and we accomplished it without a war. This marked the opening of a new stage in Soviet foreign policy, in which we could attain the objectives we desired by means other than those we had used previously. I was then very much involved in world affairs, and it gladdened my heart that Dulles, who had formulated and implemented U.S. foreign policy based on “positions of strength,” had retreated. He wanted to pursue a policy of “balancing on the brink of war,” but when he had reached that brink [the limit beyond which war was likely] and sensed the real possibility of a counterblow he decided against crossing that line. By no means does it follow from this that in the future we should draw an incorrect conclusion and adopt the same sort of policy ourselves. After all, it’s possible that one of the two sides might not stop at the brink. Neither side, by itself, can determine exactly where that line is drawn. It’s easy to slip over the brink and fall into bloodshed. Nevertheless, at the same time that we held those “war games,” we showed our ability to keep our forces under control. While making evident a threat [of the use of force], we didn’t overdo it.

The events that had unfolded frightened the Syrian capitalists and landowners, and they rushed into Egypt’s embrace, proposing the formation of the United Arab Republic [which took place in February 1958], so that they could rely on the reactionary forces in Egypt to prevent the possibility that the progressive forces grouped around the Syrian Communist Party5 might carry the democratization process further. I’ve already related how all that ended up, when I told about our relations with Egypt and President Nasser.

The next clash with the United States in the Middle East occurred when the government of Iraq was overthrown in 1958 [on July 14]. We welcomed this event because it eliminated the extremely reactionary government of the

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imperialist bootlicker Nuri Said, who was universally hated in the Arab world, so much so that [when he was overthrown] the new leader of Iraq, General Kassem,6 was able to use only one army division to deal with all the forces on which Nuri Said relied. It was reported that Nuri Said put on women’s robes, including a chador, in an attempt to conceal himself, but a soldier noticed the military boots sticking out from under the long, loose garment and shot Nuri Said.7

After May 1958, when a revolt of the Lebanese began against the reactionary regime in their country, the Americans made a landing of their troops in Lebanon in July. In reply we again organized counter measures, no longer just of a military nature, but public demonstrations. We organized protests in every country of the world where we could do so. We brought the question before the United Nations, succeeded in having an appropriate resolution passed, and finally forced the Americans to evacuate their troops from Lebanon. Thus one more demonstrative campaign for peace on earth and in favor of the liberation movement was victorious. Through the joint efforts of democratic forces around the world we succeeded in restraining the colonialists. The Iraq revolution was also victorious. Our energetic political line raised the authority of the USSR higher than ever, not only in the Arab world but also among all people fighting for national independence.

Then the cutting edge of events shifted to Yemen. Earlier the heir apparent to the throne of Yemen, Prince Al-Badr,8 had come to our country. He was asking for arms for the struggle against the British, and we helped him. This happened in 1955 before the official visit to Britain by our Soviet delegation [in April 1956].

I met with Al-Badr. What was he like? What impression did he make? We first became acquainted in Moscow. The man who walked into my office was huge, well-built and well-proportioned, a handsome man with broad shoulders. A good impression was left by the conversation I had with him. He had the appearance of a sensible man who understood his country’s interests. Our conversation mainly centered on the question of how we could provide aid in the form of arms for driving out the British and freeing the Kingdom of Yemen from the colonialists. Al-Badr told me that he had suppressed an uprising organized by internal forces opposed to his father.9 A coup had been carried out in Al-Badr’s absence. The insurgents were unable to capture the capital city of Sanaa,10 but they besieged it. Al-Badr returned and with the assistance of neighboring rulers crushed the insurgents and restored the previously existing order. It was hard for me to decide what attitude to take toward what he had done. And I didn’t have to decide. After all, as they say among the

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people, the horseradish is no sweeter than the radish. [In other words, the insurgents may have been no better than the ruling Al-Badr family.] The social and political order that his father represented as imam, religious leader of Yemen’s Muslims, and as king, or head of the secular government, was a stronghold of extreme reaction. But I had the impression that the son was already taking a different view of how to rule the country. I didn’t discuss any of these subjects with him; I only listened to him.

Of course it was more to our advantage if Yemen existed independent of British rule. That’s why we provided aid. This involved not only the provision of arms. The prince also asked us for economic assistance—to build a port facility. “We don’t have a real port,” he explained. “When the British took the port city of Aden from us11 we were left with no major maritime docking facilities. Now when ships approach Yemen they have to stop some distance from the shore, and all cargo, including passengers, is unloaded from the ship in small boats. Once the cargo reaches shore, it’s carried off on people’s backs.” The USSR built a port in Yemen at Hodeida on the Red Sea.12

Al-Badr seemed to be a man with a sense of humor and a fairly cheerful disposition; and he was apparently not very religious. He had not come alone to our country, he said, but was accompanied by a man his father specially trusted, who was sent along to keep an eye on the king’s son and keep him from doing anything inappropriate. This informer kept the prince under observation and reported everything to the king. Al-Badr made a joke of it. “What kind of a spy is he, this mullah? He and I live together at the Hotel Moskva.13 Our rooms are side by side. One day a waiter brought wine to my room. I looked at him with surprise and said: ‘Excuse me, there must be some mistake.’ The waiter left. Then I thought to myself that possibly my watchman had ordered wine for himself. Muslims aren’t supposed to drink wine—and that’s especially true in his case, because he’s a representative of our faith. I decided to drop in on him. I walked into his room without knocking, and what did I find? He had a bottle tipped back and was drinking wine from its mouth. Was he ever shaken up when he saw me standing there! He didn’t say anything but just stood there with a distraught look on his face. I asked him: ‘What are you doing? It’s forbidden by Allah. You’re violating the Prophet’s commandments.’ The mullah argued back:‘The Prophet didn’t make any direct prohibition against wine.’14 ‘Well, even if the Prophet said nothing directly against wine, you should at least pour the wine into a glass and drink like ordinary people, but there you are sucking it straight out of the bottle. How indecent can you get!’”

The prince laughed as he told this story, as if to say: “See what I’ve got for a mentor.”

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The prince seemed to me a man who, it might be hoped, would change the social system for the better once he came to power. According to information from our ambassador, Al-Badr’s father was quite ill. He [the king of Yemen] was a dangerous person, a religious fanatic and a petty tyrant capable of anything.

He was a cruel and very reactionary man. Medieval conditions of life persisted in parts of Yemen. Even slavery existed.15 We sensed that Al-Badr was also waiting for his father to die, so that he could succeed to the royal throne [and make changes]. He openly ridiculed the backward conditions in his country, thus indicating to me that he wanted to introduce a new order of things, although we had no discussions directly on this subject. Al-Badr began treating us with special confidence, and we continued to supply aid to Yemen. When Imam Ahmed, the king of Yemen, died the prince ascended to the throne [in September 1962]. Sometimes it’s typical of princes to advocate liberal policies while they are heirs apparent, but later, after gaining the throne, they continue the policies they had earlier opposed when their predecessors were still on thethrone.

As it turned out, Al-Badr’s rule lasted an extremely short time. Colonel As-Salal, chief of the king’s palace guard, overthrew him.16 Only by accident did Al-Badr escape with his life. For a long time it was thought he had perished, buried under the ruins of the palace. But it turned out he had disguised himself in women’s robes and, hiding his face behind a veil, managed to flee the country. With the help of Saudi Arabia he organized a prolonged war against the new government.

At first we didn’t know anything about the coup against Al-Badr. Only after the coup had been made did Egypt’s President Nasser intervene, deciding to aid those who had risen up against the reactionary regime.17 Nasser wanted to transfer a number of military units from the UAR [Egypt] to Yemen, but he didn’t have airplanes for that purpose. We sold the UAR several Antonov military transports [AN-12s], very good planes, which remain valuable to this day [1970].18 But it turned out there were no suitable pilots in Egypt. Nasser asked us to provide aid in that form as well. We responded positively to his request and quickly staffed the planes with our crews. Thus Egypt was able to support Yemen and transfer its military units, which served as a reliable base for the new government formed after the coup. Those troops remained in Yemen a long time, right up until the next war with Israel [that is, the SixDay War in 1967].

But it became clear that Nasser lacked the type of military aircraft necessary for operations against the monarchist forces recruited in neighboring countries, where the Arab monarchs, fearing for their own well-being, wanted to restore the king of Yemen to his throne. We sold Nasser our excellent TU-16 bombers.19

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Again, he didn’t have pilots for them and asked us to assign and send pilots. They were volunteers. They went to Egypt without any fanfare in our press and were transferred from there to Yemen. They went into action to stop the forces that were on the offensive against the troops of the new government. The attackers were crushed.

Our fraternal aid to the insurgent people of Yemen raised the authority of the Soviet Union higher than ever; it was already high in the Arab world. Other nations could see from these examples that the USSR stood for progress not just in words, but in deeds, and when a need for help arose that help was given quickly and decisively. On the other hand, the same events demonstrated that imperialism was growing weaker. It was no longer allpowerful. Its desires exceeded its capabilities. From now on the political balance of forces was tilting more and more in favor of the socialist countries and their spiritual allies throughout the world. Imperialism was compelled to avoid any hasty or thoughtless measures that might draw it into an all-encompassing war. As for us, we by no means sought to initiate conflicts; we were only trying to paralyze the reactionary aggressive forces.

After Dulles died [in 1959] I used to say, among my close friends or when meeting with friends from other countries: “What is said publicly about Dulles is correct. He deserved his reputation as an aggressive person who literally breathed hatred of communism and progress. But we may yet regret the death of Dulles. Yes, he was our enemy and did everything he could against us. But we may yet praise him for being sufficiently sober-minded. He showed good sense about the ‘brink of war,’ which he mentioned in many of his speeches. He never wanted to go over the brink.”20 During the events in Yemen Dulles was no longer alive, but in that case too the United States refrained from going over the brink.

We established good relations with the Yemen Arab Republic, which had replaced the Kingdom of Yemen, and the UAR even made an alliance with the new republic. As for the imperialists, they take protests seriously only when they see concretely that social and political pressure might develop into military action, when they are confronted with a specific choice between war and peace. That was the means by which we were able to make the aggressive forces retreat and preserved the independence of the countries mentioned above. While pursuing that policy, to the extent that we could, we tried to influence the Arab leaders to take a more understanding attitude toward their neighbor Israel and not try to change the existing borders by means of war. In this connection I remember a conversation I had with Nasser in [May] 1964. He agreed with me then and expressed understanding for our point of view, but

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he explained: “We have a complicated situation in the Arab world now. The wounds that the Arabs suffered when the state of Israel was founded are still too fresh. The [Palestinian] Arabs were driven from their land, and now these exiled people find themselves in a very hard situation economically and morally. I have to give them moral support and to speak out sharply from time to time against the policies being pursued by Israel.”

I understood Nasser. This was an absolutely correct policy on his part. But today I can’t understand what happened back then. I don’t understand why in summer 1967 Egypt demanded the withdrawal of UN troops from the border between Egypt and Israel. After all, those forces acted as a restraint against aggressive actions by Israel. That’s why the UN forces had been deployed there—to neutralize the aggressor and prevent border clashes, thereby creating conditions favorable to the elimination of military conflicts. It’s not clear to me what aims Egypt was pursuing when it demanded that U Thant withdraw the UN troops. And why did Egypt close off the Red Sea commercial shipping channel being used by Israel [the Gulf of Aqaba]? It was these measures that Israel seized upon as pretexts for its military action against Egypt. If Egypt was getting ready for such a war—and the steps it took can only be understood in that way—why then didn’t it mobilize its forces and place its army on combat alert? After all, in a matter of just six days all the forces of the Arab states who took part in military action were smashed—that is, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. It’s impossible to make head or tail of this based on the information in our press. And now for Egypt the conditions that have taken shape are much more difficult than they were before.

I regret this very much, but what can I do? All I can do is express my regrets. I am sick at heart, and I don’t understand how this was allowed to happen. I compare the way the USSR conducted itself in 1956, when we were several times weaker than we were in 1967. Why were we able to give effective aid to Egypt then, to repel the British, French, and Israeli forces and compel them to withdraw to the previously existing borders? Why couldn’t we manage to do the same thing in 1967, when our military strength had increased to an incredible degree? Today, after so many years have gone by, it’s hardly worth expecting Israel to take any sensible measures without pressure being applied. Israel would like the existing situation to continue forever. For propaganda purposes it sets specific conditions, saying that if it can negotiate directly with Egypt, the means for reaching an agreement will be found. That would mean a split in the Arab world.21 It’s exasperating for me to see what appears to be our impotence in this situation when I recall the success the USSR had [previously] in defending Egypt, Syria, and Yemen against the imperialists.

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rel ations with afric an countries

People sometimes ask me about Soviet relations with the African countries, what they were based on and how they were structured during the time when I held a high post in the party and government. That’s not an easy question to answer. I don’t know how successful my discussion of this question can be, but I’m happy to record my recollections about it. For all practical purposes, it was a question of our attitude toward the national liberation movement. Our attitude flowed logically from the teachings of Lenin, who not only outlined the theory and tactics of the working-class struggle against capitalism but also put those into practice in the October revolution, which raised the banner of struggle for the liberation of all the oppressed, not just the working class but entire nations. The process of liberation from colonial

oppression had begun, and the colonial system was collapsing.

After World War II, Britain was forced to grant independence to India and Pakistan. Later on, France came to realize that it was necessary to offer an option to its colonies to express their preference—whether they wanted to remain part of the French Community or vote for independence. The first French colony to obtain its independence through such voting was Guinea [on October 2, 1958].1 Of course the fate of Guinea was not decided only by the good will of French President de Gaulle. An active liberation struggle had been organized in Guinea, but when de Gaulle came to power [in 1958] he put forward the proposition that if any African country voted to leave the French Community, France would honor that decision.

Guinea was the first to take that road. De Gaulle’s reaction is well known to people who follow the press. He withdrew not only all government officials but also all technical specialists. By doing this, the French wanted to destabilize Guinea economically, calculating that Guinea would not be able to deal with the situation. They may even have hoped Guinea would rejoin the French Community. [Ahmed] Sékou Touré,2 a true son of his people, became the leader of Guinea. Knowing that Guinea would need aid during the first phase of its independence, we considered it our duty to help, and we extended our hand to aid Guinea as soon as its leadership asked us for help. We sent our specialists and provided material aid. The specialists we sent there even helped them begin printing their new currency [in 1960].3 The Guineans didn’t have the necessary experience and didn’t know how this was done. Thus we came to the aid of the first African country after World

This section of the memoirs was tape-recorded by Khrushchev in 1970. [SK]

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War II to gain its independence as the result of many years of struggle against the colonial rulers.4

Then Sékou Touré came to our country and we became personal acquaintances. We began to call him “comrade.” Maurice Thorez [head of the French Communist Party] gave a very good character reference for Sékou Touré. He had known Touré in trade-union work. Touré had been one of the leaders of the trade-union movement, and Thorez had had connections with the African trade unions.5 Touré impressed us as a well-educated man who understood the essence of the class struggle and the struggle for national independence. In these areas complete mutual understanding arose between us. But we were put on our guard, and I include myself personally (it was I who conducted negotiations with him on behalf of the Soviet government) by some uncomplimentary remarks he made about the French Communist Party and about Maurice Thorez personally as the leader of that party.

Our attitude toward Thorez was one of great respect. Even today I maintain that attitude toward this remarkable Frenchman, my colleague in the sense that we both worked in the coal industry; he too had been a mineworker. Touré’s attitude toward Thorez not only put me on my guard, but I felt offended by it. After all, how could you speak in such a free and easy manner about the French Communist Party and its leader when they had done literally everything to help the struggle of the Guinean people for independence? Anyhow, that’s the way it was. Later on, our first impressions were supplemented by others that were even more bitter and painful.

The Guineans again asked us for help when they wanted to build an airport (or complete construction of an airport) that could accommodate very heavy airplanes. Again we willingly sent them our technical specialists and provided materials. Nevertheless, when the Caribbean crisis erupted, which could have brought us into armed conflict with the United States [in October 1962], the Sékou Touré government denied us the possibility of using Guinea as a stopover on our way to Cuba, refusing permission for our planes to land in their country at all. And yet our planes needed at least one stop to refuel before crossing the ocean. If we had been able to refuel in Guinea, that would have been a saving grace for us. But we were refused permission. We were told that there were “technical conditions” preventing Soviet planes from landing at the new airport. One wonders who would know better the technical conditions at the airport—the government of Guinea or our technical specialists who had built the airport? Naturally we placed no confidence in those explanations, and we regarded that as an action against the USSR and in favor of the United States. Yet the Soviet Union had stood and still stands with all its

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heart in support of those struggling for independence, including the people of Guinea.

I met with Touré two or three times. In his conversations with me, he took, as I have said, an incomprehensible position, as we saw it, toward the French Communist Party, and later he displayed the same kind of attitude toward the USSR. As for us, we thought that Guinea ought to take a position in unity with the socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism. But that didn’t happen. There were additional distressing events. Our embassy reported that the Guinean leaders were busy enriching themselves personally and that Sékou Touré’s brother had set himself up as the owner of private properties on a huge scale.

In short, the events in Guinea were not a source of satisfaction for us. They provided no grounds for assurance that this country would take the road of building socialism and would become our ally in the battle against imperialism. Well, what can you do? The social and political direction of changes in any country depends on the people themselves. The people choose their own path. But when the leaders are busy enriching themselves, that cannot in any way be explained as an expression of the will of the people. On the contrary, if that happens, it’s at the expense of the people. Some individuals want to arrange for their own personal prosperity above all else, and they set themselves up with private property, which later becomes a heavy weight around their necks, dragging them down and determining their social outlook.

Thus a fissure appeared in relations between Guinea and us, and later we nearly suffered a break in relations over something that was, strictly speaking, a foolish minor incident. One of our college-level instructors, a woman who was working in Guinea, refused to return to the Soviet Union. Apparently the agencies of the Soviet government that were concerned with this problem displayed excessive bureaucratic zeal with the intention of somehow forcing her to return to our country. When I found out about that, it made me angry and I explained to them: “What difference does it make? If this woman wants to stay in Guinea let her stay. Maybe she’s found a worthy mate for herself. Please, let her stay.” Nevertheless, a heated diplomatic exchange flared up over this question. The Guineans, with Touré at their head, regarded the actions of the Soviet government agencies as an insult. In their minds they associated our attitude with colonialism, when whites had opposed marriage with blacks.

Well, why did we have to make such a fuss over this instructor who wanted to remain in an African country? Truly this was stupidity! I don’t know how that incident ended, but I thought then and I still think now that she had fallen in love with someone, and that’s why she made the decision to stay

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there. This is a private matter, and generally speaking, we ought to treat such questions in a more liberated way. For us the question of whether a person is white, black, or yellow is not important. The main thing is a person’s soul, their class position, which camp they belong to—that is the main basis for evaluating people, not the color of their skin. Of course when conflicts of this kind arose we tried to play them down and keep them quiet somehow. We assumed that sooner or later the leaders of Guinea would come to realize that they had understood the actions of some individuals incorrectly or perhaps even mistakes that we had committed. We hoped that in the end we would converge on a position held in common of fighting against the colonialists.

The liberation struggle of the Algerian people was something we regarded with great attention and sympathy. The Arabs of Algeria, like those of Egypt, had been conducting a heroic struggle for a number of years against the French colonialists.6 We aided them by all means available to us. We sent weapons to them, although this was difficult to accomplish. The French imperialists at that time were doing everything they could to prevent weapons from reaching the Algerians. It was necessary to send them by way of Morocco or other countries. As the result of many years of revolutionary armed struggle, the Algerian people finally did win their independence.7 The government of an independent Algerian republic was formed. Later Ben Bella, a worthy son of the Algerian people, became president. I met with him more than once in the Soviet Union, and our last meeting took place in Egypt, when I was there on an official state visit [in May 1964].8

Ben Bella made the very best of impressions on me. Other African leaders, even those who came out of the grassroots people’s movement, did not take a firm position on the basis of scientific socialism. It could not be said that they didn’t know what socialism was. Most of them were educated people. But they wavered. The president of Algeria, on the other hand, immediately said that his country would begin to develop and would organize its life on the basis of scientific socialism. It would not be based on some surrogate or artificial concept such as “Arab socialism.” There were other types of “socialism” of a similar kind that were being bruited about. But no, Ben Bella adopted the formula precisely of scientific socialism, although of course he took into account the particular features that must be recognized in undertaking the building of a new life for society in Algeria.

Unfortunately, a little while later [in 1965] a coup d’état was carried out in Algeria, headed by Minister of Defense Houari Boumédienne, who later became the head of the government.9 Some members of the revolutionary government took part in the coup. The fate of Ben Bella is unknown to me, but he

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was a remarkable individual. We liked him because of his correct understanding of the cause and his correct leadership of the people in their struggle to build a new society. A report has just appeared in our press [in 1970] saying that his mother met with him, that he was alive and well, but condemned to political inactivity.10 Yet he was a young man and could have done a great deal. He was a major political figure, distinguished by sober-mindedness and the ability to see things over the long term, a man who took a firm position on the ground of scientific socialism.

At one point one of the leaders of the Algerian Communist Party11 told me about a conversation he had with Ben Bella with regard to the situation the Communist Party found itself in after the victory of independence. The Communist Party remained illegal, as it had been before. The explanation for this is that when the National Liberation Front, the Algerian FLN [Front de la Libération Nationale] was preparing for an armed uprising, the Communists expressed their opposition to that idea. They didn’t believe in the possibility of victory. The secretary of the Algerian Communist Party did at first speak in favor of the armed uprising, and he himself joined the ranks of the FLN, but later at a certain stage of the events, the Algerian Communist Party decided that the armed struggle would not be successful and that the necessary conditions for it had not yet matured. In addition to all that, the Algerian national bourgeoisie of course was opposed to Marxist-Leninist theory and the Communists. For one reason or another, the Communist Party remained illegal.

However, Ben Bella said to the Communists, as I was told: “You should enter and get involved in government organizations that exist in Algeria—also in the trade unions and other social organizations. Don’t do this as members of your party but as individuals worthy and capable of occupying such posts.” As for us [in the Soviet leadership], we also advised the Algerian Communists to take advantage of all opportunities of this kind. We wanted their party to join the ranks of the FLN and rise to leading positions in that organization. When Ben Bella and his close comrades in arms declared that they stood on the grounds of scientific socialism, there were no longer any ideological disagreements between them and the Communist Party, although some particular questions remained in dispute.

When we met in Egypt, Ben Bella, as before, took a position that was most acceptable in our eyes. He spoke unconditionally in favor of scientific socialism and, most important, understood the doctrine well. Other representatives of the Arab peoples wavered on this question and failed to speak out clearly. That is to say, everyone except Nasser. At the big public rally in Aswan, Nasser

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also declared that in his domestic policy he would base himself on scientific socialism. As for their foreign policy, the Arabs had already taken a clear position. They stood firmly against a new world war, for peaceful coexistence, and for good relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

I see from materials in the press nowadays that the Algerian leader Boumédienne, who carried out the coup [in 1965], is conducting the same kind of policy in principle that his predecessor carried out. Friendly relations with the Soviet Union are being maintained and developing further, as well as with the other socialist countries. Algeria holds the same position on international questions as it did before. I don’t know Boumédienne personally. I never met with him, although I read that he is by no means an accidental figure in the leadership, that he was prominent among those who fought against the French occupation. Thus he is a worthy individual from the standpoint of his participation in the revolutionary struggle. It’s true that, even before the coup he carried out, some members of the Algerian government told us they thought he was a reactionary figure capable of carrying out a coup. Boumédienne came to visit our country several times, but he met mainly with our military people.

I will now speak about the president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah.12 I met with him several times. He was a very interesting person, a winning conversationalist, intelligent and well-educated, but he spoke with restraint on the question of the social and political tendency of development in Ghana. Gradually he became more and more imbued with confidence in the Soviet Union and its leadership. From personal conversations it was possible to conclude that in the future he would have undertaken to declare that Ghana was choosing the socialist path—if and when internal conditions in Ghana became ripe for such a declaration. But officially he made no public statements about scientific socialism.

We were troubled by the fact that Nkrumah had been educated in Britain and had gone to a university in England. After Ghana gained its independence [becoming an “independent” member of the British Commonwealth in 1957] all the officers in its army remained British. What kind of independence is that if the former colonial rulers still control the command staff of your army? In a cautious manner we pointed out to Nkrumah that this situation in his country was holding him back. Later on [in 1966], reactionary officers of the Ghanaian army did play a role in ousting the progressive regime in Ghana.

I had several conversations with Nkrumah on this subject, trying to convince him that there was a constant danger present in the form of the commanders of his army who were British officers. Ultimately the threat was from the

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Western capitalist powers.13 In the final period [of his presidency] Nkrumah did ask us to assign some of our officers as consultants, so that he could make them part of his personal bodyguard as president. It seems to me we did succeed in sending such people to Ghana, but I don’t remember how many. Of course, a mere handful of people are not able to ensure the stability of a government. The Ghanaian army remained under the influence of the same British officers I have mentioned. This created favorable conditions for the antidemocratic capitalist forces. And they achieved their aims. They changed the situation in the country, and a new military government began to eliminate the democratic institutions created under the leadership of Nkrumah. Ghana then took its stand firmly on the capitalist road of development.

I remember Nkrumah’s arrival in the Soviet Union. At that time Mikoyan and I were on vacation in the Crimea. Nkrumah came to visit us with his wife, an Arab woman from Egypt.14 We had pleasant conversations with him. The coup in Ghana took place also during a trip he was taking, but this time he was on his way to China.15 He was flying in one of our planes, and when he found out about the events in his country, he was forced to turn back, but he didn’t return to Ghana. He couldn’t. He was forbidden to [by the new military rulers of Ghana]. From the USSR he flew to Guinea. The president of Guinea must be given credit. Sékou Touré welcomed Nkrumah fraternally and even proclaimed him to be the vice president of Guinea, creating this high position in society specifically for him.16 As for Ghana, the government there continues to pursue a pro-Western policy line to this day. Some attempts to return to the former course [followed by Nkrumah] have been unsuccessful.

Now I will talk about Mali. After Mali won its independence17 some progressive forces came into the leadership. Modibo Keita became the president of Mali.18 Modibo Keita was also a very interesting man and an intelligent politician. Physically he was enormous. I remember that after he spoke at a big public meeting in Moscow, he and I embraced. I felt as though I was being hugged by a bear. Later I saw a photograph of that moment and it always made me laugh. In his height and size and weight Keita was simply a giant. When he was visiting our country he stated rather loudly (and later he did the same in his own country) that Mali would develop on the road of scientific socialism and that it was the only correct road for his country.

Unfortunately, he didn’t succeed in establishing a solid position for himself inside his own country, and he was unable to render harmless the antisocialist forces. A military coup was carried out there as well [in November 1968]. Keita was removed from power. I don’t know where he is now or whether he is still alive.19 He was our very good friend. At the present time I don’t know what

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social position the government of Mali takes. All I can see or tell is that it’s antisocialist, which means it’s also anti-Soviet. If it held a different position, there would have been no reason to remove such a progressive president as Modibo Keita.

Despite the fact that the democratic forces were defeated both in Ghana and in Mali and their progressive leaders were ousted, I as a Communist remain profoundly convinced that justice will triumph in those countries in spite of everything, that new forces will grow up who will follow the correct path, making use of Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the socialist countries, where that theory is applied in practice.

After the peoples of Somalia gained their independence,20 we also established good relations with that country. Government delegations came to our country from Somalia, and we decided to aid their country, as we had others, providing all possible assistance. When the Somalis asked us for weapons we provided them on favorable terms. To the north of Somalia was Eritrea, formerly an Italian colony, which had come under British control.21 When the time came for it to gain its independence the appetite of the Somalis was whetted. The Somali republic wanted Eritrea to become part of its country, since Somalis also live there—people of the same nationality, who had been divided up by the colonialists.22 On the other hand, Ethiopia also wanted to absorb Eritrea and presented evidence of its historical rights to that territory.23

When we provided arms to the government of Somalia, that upset Ethiopia. Its emperor, Haile Selassie,24 asked us not to supply arms to Somalia and to take an understanding attitude toward the evidence proving that historically Eritrea had belonged to Ethiopia. We found ourselves in a rather delicate position. On the one hand, we sympathized with the new government of Somalia, but on the other, we had good relations with Ethiopia, and historically we had been friendly with that country. We didn’t want these two former colonial countries to clash, and we were obliged to display a great deal of diplomatic flexibility. I see from material in the press that another military coup recently [in October 1969] took place in Somalia,25 and a fairly progressive new leadership has come to power there. It has declared that it will base its policies on scientific socialism and chart a course toward friendship with the USSR. Meanwhile, how do things stand with Ethiopia? What this means of course is that new complications have arisen.26

During the time when I was part of the Soviet leadership we established good relations with Morocco. I met with the crown prince, who later became King Hassan II,27 during my visit to the United Nations General Assembly [in 1960]. At that time I headed the Soviet delegation, and Prince Hassan

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came there too as a representative of the Moroccan government. We had a brief conversation with him, which subsequently had good results. An official Soviet delegation was invited to Morocco, and it was headed by the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, [Leonid] Brezhnev.28 At that time he was received by King Mohammed V, who is now deceased.29

These contacts contributed to the strengthening of good relations between our countries. Our attitude toward the young country [that is, the newly independent government] of Morocco was one of sympathy. It should be noted that after Algeria won its independence Morocco made claims on some border areas of Algeria. The impression was created that an armed conflict could break out between them. Our sympathies were more on the side of Algeria, but their dispute caused fresh difficulties for us. To the gratification of all , no serious armed conflict developed, and the disputed questions were resolved by diplomatic means.

Under King Hassan II Morocco began to pursue a special policy. The country retained monarchical political institutions and took the capitalist road of development while remaining a genuinely independent country, free from colonial rule. Although it took this special position, in the struggle of the Arab peoples against Israel Morocco sympathized with the line of pan-Arabism. Although it didn’t take part directly in that struggle, its policies apparently reflected the personal sympathies of the king. We need to develop friendly relations with Morocco. Rulers do not live forever, but their countries remain. Of course we would like it if the socialist system was victorious in Morocco, but in the meantime let the king rule the country. What will come next history alone can show.

We adhere to a policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and a confirmation of that may be seen in the good relations we have with all countries that have gained their freedom from colonial rule but who adhere to a capitalist orientation. We have good relations with several neighbors that are monarchies, for example, Afghanistan. The basis for these relations was laid in the first years when an independent Afghan state was established. That was back in Lenin’s time. He recognized the Afghan state and established diplomatic relations with it. Under Stalin relations were in a rather frozen or stagnant condition. It was only after Stalin’s death that we managed to change the situation, and our relations have become the warmest and friendliest possible. I am very pleased that during the time when I was part of the leadership we achieved this fundamental change in the situation.

The October revolution, the defeat of Nazi Germany, and especially the successes of the Soviet Union after World War II, our progress in the development

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of industry, science, and the space program—all this has caused more and more people to pay attention to scientific socialism and to the socialist path of development. The people who have freed themselves from colonial oppression are becoming more and more convinced that the only correct choice is to put an end to the capitalist system and turn onto a new road, the road of socialism. In the realm of theory, socialism was founded by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and it has been put into practice by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It seems evident that sooner or later all the peoples of the world will take this path, because it is the only right path for working people— for the working class, the working peasantry, and the working intelligentsia.

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