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egypt

Iwant to tell about Egypt: about how our relations developed with the Egyptian government and its new leadership after the revolution [of July 1952] carried out by young army officers headed by [Gamal Abdel] Nasser and [Abdel Hakim] Amer.1 Even the former king of Egypt, Farouk2 [who was overthrown by the 1952 revolution], had asked Stalin to sell him arms, which he wanted in order to fight against the British colonial troops stationed in Egypt. Stalin refused. I don’t remember what answer was given [to the Egyptians], but in our inner circle Stalin said: “No, it’s not worth it for us to stick our nose in those affairs. Egypt’s in Britain’s sphere of influence.” When a suitable occasion arose (possibly a birthday?), Stalin ordered that a sable cloak be

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sent as a gift to the queen of England.3 I’m telling about this to show what our attitude toward Egypt was at that time. It doesn’t mean we didn’t want to help them. On the contrary, by all means we wanted the Egyptian people to free themselves as soon as possible from colonial dependence, because that was in the interests not only of the Egyptian people but also of the Soviet people and of all progressive humanity in general. It’s just that Stalin didn’t think the right time had yet arrived, although we could have supplied Egypt with arms. I think Farouk had in mind that he wanted to receive them secretly. But what kind of secret could there be if you were delivering arms to a country where British troops were stationed? A secret like that would become known to the British immediately.

After the first coup d’état that the army officers carried out in Egypt, Nasser and Amer did not take the leading position. Some general headed the government, a man whose views were not progressive, as we saw it, and who apparently favored driving the British out but maintaining the capitalist foundations in Egypt. I don’t remember now how long the transitional period lasted. But then [in mid-1954] the young officers removed this general [Naguib] as head of state. Nasser became the leader of Egypt.4 At first, in the policies he pursued, he also gave no hint that he would change the social and political structure in Egypt. Thus, during the initial period after the coup and the coming of Colonel Nasser to power, we could not determine what direction his government would take in foreign and domestic policy. We leaned toward the idea that evidently what had occurred was just one more military coup of the kind to which everyone had grown accustomed. As a result we didn’t expect anything special. In fact we had no other choice but to wait and see what direction the new leadership of Egypt would take.

Some time had elapsed after the second coup, and the Egyptians again asked us to provide them aid in the form of arms. They intended to take serious measures. Their intention was to force the British troops out of Egypt, and for this they needed a strong army. We decided to give the necessary aid. It was provided on a commercial basis but at favorable prices. That is, we sold them weapons, mainly infantry weapons and artillery. The Egyptians were conducting their policy in a worthy way, putting stronger and stronger pressure on the British, and demanding their withdrawal. The British understood that they had no choice, that they would have to treat the national demands of the Egyptians with understanding, and they agreed to withdraw their troops. And the British troops did leave. This reassured us, and we began to pay more attention to the requests of the Egyptian government. We also began to show some respect for that government. We saw that it was not just one more government

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coming to power as the result of a purely military coup, but one that was defending the national interests of its people. That meant it deserved support in the fight against the colonialists.

Nevertheless, it was still very difficult to determine the policy of this government. What social and political aims was it pursuing? On what basis was it thinking to develop and strengthen the Egyptian state? The banks and large holdings of capital had not been touched in the revolution [of 1952–54]. Apparently it was a pro-capitalist government that had come to power. But it was in our interests to support even that kind of leadership, because its policy was aimed against colonial domination and it was weakening the British in the Middle East. That coincided with the interests of the USSR, and we supported the line taken by Nasser. Tito had established the very best relations with Egypt. As I recall, when Tito traveled to India, he took a ship through the Suez Canal and stayed for a visit in Egypt.5

The Yugoslavs were writing a lot about Egypt’s new policies and about the Egyptian leadership. They took note of its progressive character and said that it deserved aid. At that time we had not yet reestablished good relations with Yugoslavia, although they were already improving. When I met with Tito during a visit of his to the Soviet Union [in June 1956], we had an exchange of views on international questions. We also touched on Egypt. Tito spoke in a very flattering way about Nasser’s policies.

I replied to Tito: “I don’t understand his speeches. It’s hard to figure out what he wants. He speaks in favor of establishing a progressive system. But how? He doesn’t touch the capitalists or the banks. It’s difficult for us, as of now, to evaluate what kind of policy and what aims the country of Egypt wants to undertake.”

Tito, on the other hand, argued as follows: “Nasser is still a very young man and politically inexperienced. Besides that, he’s a military man. He has good intentions, but so far he hasn’t found a firm ground of support. In some areas he needs to be supported and in other areas discouraged. He wants good things for his people. It’s possible to come to an agreement with him. It’s possible to exert an influence on him that would be beneficial for the world Communist movement and for the people of Egypt as well.” That is, Tito was expressing the desire to influence Nasser, not out of selfish motives, but with the aim of binding together closely the interests of those who wanted to influence Nasser and the interests of the people. Here the interests were mutually beneficial. The question of socialism is not a question facing just one people or nation. Socialism can bring desired results to all nations. Here it is not a question of a conspiracy by one side against another, but of the

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desire of one side to share its experience and exert influence on another so that it can borrow from that experience and apply it in its own interest.

In autumn 1956 war broke out in the Middle East.6 The World Bank had refused loans to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Yet those loans had been promised earlier. At that point Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. In response the Suez Canal Company withdrew all its specialists and other technical personnel. Nasser requested that the USSR provide aid in the form of technical specialists. We sent our harbor pilots and navigators and other specialists who were needed to maintain the normal functioning of the Suez Canal.

The capitalist world, especially France and Britain, thought that Nasser would not be able to cope [with the challenge of operating the Suez Canal], and that as a result they would have a chance to influence the Egyptian government. But they quickly realized that Nasser was no longer following the lead of the capitalist world in foreign policy, that he was aspiring to independence in the realm of economic development for the Egyptian people.

Our relations with Nasser at that time were fairly complex. We gave aid to the Egyptians as a people who were fighting for their independence, for liberation from the colonialists. We sold them arms, and we helped them in every possible way to move forward. But we also had big disagreements on political and ideological matters. Nasser stood for a special Egyptian road of development. Here I think Comrade Tito had considerable influence, because he too proclaimed a special road of development for socialism in Yugoslavia. As for the Egyptian formulation, it was completely incomprehensible to us. But one thing we understood clearly was that any Communists discovered by Nasser were put in jail. The Egyptian Communist Party7 was outlawed and was operating underground. From the point of view of our Communist ideology, Nasser was pursuing an anti-Communist, reactionary policy. It cannot be said that we saw in Nasser a person who, from our point of view, the Egyptian people needed. Our thinking was that [despite these shortcomings] there was no other, more progressive figure on the horizon at the time. He was capable of leading the fight against the colonialists. He was a national hero from the Egyptian military. He had not yet arrived at a clear understanding, had not yet worked out what path of development Egypt would take, what goal would be set for its future. Scientific socialism was out of the question. Certain phrases were dropped about some sort of national socialism. I am telling about this because at that time there was no mutual understanding between Nasser and us in regard to political and ideological matters. However, we calculated that it would be useful for us if Egypt consolidated

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itself as an independent state that would no longer follow in the wake of the imperialist powers Britain and France. Tension was mounting quickly [between Egypt on the one hand and Britain and France on the other]. In late summer 1956 the British began deploying their aircraft on Cyprus and other islands in the Mediterranean. It was obvious they were preparing for war. Still, we didn’t think Britain and France would go so far as to openly declare war on Egypt. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what happened.

Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt. I don’t remember now exactly what day that happened. It was in the last days of October [October 29, 1956]. The thunder and lightning of war erupted. Egypt stubbornly defended itself, but it was an unequal contest, in terms of both economics and armaments. Britain and France had vast wealth and experience, and they had military cadres who had gone through the school of the world war against Nazi Germany. The experience of the Egyptian army was limited to cavalry skirmishes on camelback. Their main weapons were the rifle, the submachine gun, and the machine gun.

We were very concerned. We were afraid Egypt would be defeated, and that would strengthen the position of the reactionaries in the Middle East.

At that time Iraq was ruled by a reactionary pro-British monarchy. The position taken by Syria was different, but it was also a long way from us. We didn’t yet have any special contacts with Syria, although an improvement in our relations was noticeable. We understood that everything would depend on how events developed in Egypt, the strongest and largest of the Arab republics.

We held a meeting of the Central Committee Presidium to discuss what position we should take in this conflict. In spring 1956 [April 18–27], when Bulganin and I were in Britain holding talks with Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Minister [Selwyn] Lloyd,8 we constantly sought to convey to them that the Middle East, and in particular Egypt, were of vital concern to us and that if a war broke out there, it would be difficult for us to refrain from taking part in the conflict. We insisted it would be a good thing if we came to an agreement on ensuring peace in the Middle East.

We feared most of all an invasion of Egypt by foreign troops from Britain and France. Their interests were particularly affected by the political developments in the country [of Egypt] led by Nasser, who was pursuing an independent foreign policy, a policy serving the interests of Egypt and not the interests of the former colonialists. I am not saying anything about Israel at this point. But now the war against Egypt was developing full force.

As soon as we eliminated the uprising in Hungary [on November 4, 1956], we were confronted with the task of providing aid to the Egyptian government,

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to President Nasser. By that time huge difficulties had developed for the Egyptian government. We wanted to stop the war as quickly as possible. I called up Molotov.

I said: “Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, I think we should now send a message to U.S. President Eisenhower and propose joint action against the aggressor forces that have attacked Egypt.”

Molotov objected: “Do you really think Eisenhower would make an agreement with us against Britain, France, and Israel?”

I agreed with him: “There’s no doubt he would refuse such an agreement. But when he did, we would have removed the mask from the face of the United States government and President Eisenhower. In statements to the press they are condemning the attack by Britain, France, and Israel on Egypt. But as the saying goes, ‘Vaska listens but goes on eating.’9 The war is still going on, and undoubtedly there is an unspoken behind-the-scenes coordination [that is, between the United States on the one hand and Britain, France, and Israel on the other]. One side is fighting with arms in hand to eliminate the progressive government of President Nasser, while on the other hand the American government in the person of its president is supposedly speaking out with condemnation of this aggressive action. If their condemnation was serious, if the United States really protested at the top of its voice, and Britain, France, and Israel came to believe that the voice from America really did sound serious, that the warnings might develop into a threat of action, then of course the aggressor governments would take that into account. That’s how simply the roles have been assigned in this stage play in which the liquidation of the revolutionary Egyptian government is being performed. We would place the U.S. president in an awkward position if we made a proposal [for joint action to stop the aggression].”

Molotov then agreed: “Yes, you’re right. Let’s have a discussion about it. It would be a positive action.”

After consulting with Molotov I brought the question to the Central Committee Presidium. I immediately called up all the members and proposed that we gather at the Kremlin to discuss the urgent question of our action against the war in Egypt.

We gathered. The appropriate document was prepared. In our message to the U.S. president we proposed to unite our efforts against aggression under the flag of the United Nations. I call attention to the fact that we specified under the flag of the United Nations. We had been informed that when the U.S. president received our message he even said to the journalists: “This is unbe-

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lievable. The Russians are proposing that we, the United States, together with them, take action against Britain, France, and Israel. That’s inconceivable.”

We ourselves thought that for the United States it would be inconceivable. They could not possibly take action together with us against the aggressors who were their own allies. We simply wanted to remove the mask of the peacemaker, the fighter for justice, the fighter against aggression [that the U.S. government had assumed]. They were such a fighter only in words and not in deeds. It was precisely in that kind of role that President Eisenhower was acting. We were demonstrating who was opposed to the aggression in reality, not just in words. A little while after our message had been delivered to the president, we published the text in our press. At the same time we drafted letters to Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Britain, Prime Minister Guy Mollet of France, and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of Israel.10 We warned them that in attacking Egypt, the aggressors had calculated that Egypt was much weaker than they were, that it did not have the kind of army or weaponry that they had. We said, however, that there were countries that could come to Egypt’s defense and provide aid to Egypt, even without sending troops. In short, we were hinting at long-range missiles. We proposed therefore that the war of aggression against Egypt be stopped immediately.

Some time later, well-informed people told us about the process by which Guy Mollet and Eden coordinated their actions.11 How accurate this report is I leave to those who informed me. They said that during the time of the Suez crisis, Guy Mollet did not leave the building of the French government to spend the night at home. When he received our message he ran to the phone, without any trousers on, just in the underwear he was sleeping in, to call up Eden.

Whether he was wearing trousers or just underpants when he picked up the phone doesn’t change the essence of the matter. The main point is that within twenty-two hours after the receipt of our warning the aggression was ended [on November 7, 1956]. Our warning had been a serious one—not like China’s warnings, which numbered in the thousands.

Thus, the aggressors were thwarted. Their aim had been to break Egypt’s resistance and eliminate a government that was pursuing an independent policy in the interests of Egypt and the other Arab peoples, who were fighting against colonial enslavement. This was a big victory for the Soviet Union, a victory for its authority [in world affairs] and its military might. These two great powers, Great Britain and France, were forced to take us into account. Here I leave Israel aside.

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The information was passed on to us that at the moment when our messages were received a critical situation had developed in the Egyptian government. At that time in Egypt substantial forces desiring the overthrow of Nasser still existed. They opposed the radical policies that Nasser was then following.

Voices critical of us could be heard at that time in the Arab press, saying that the Soviet Union was taking no steps, not raising its hand to help the Arab people when they were under attack. Eisenhower’s authority rose sharply, especially after he made a public statement condemning the aggression and demanding an end to it.

The difference is that after Eisenhower made his statement the aggression continued. The British and French governments understood that this was a ruse on Eisenhower’s part for tactical purposes and that it would have no consequences. When we made our statement, on the other hand, it was no longer a matter of grandstanding for the public, but a serious statement. The aggressor governments drew the correct conclusion. This was a great victory for the progressive forces in all countries of the world. The authority of the Soviet Union rose very high not only among the Egyptian people but also in other countries that were freeing themselves from colonial dependence or waging a struggle for their liberation.

I would like to make an additional point. When a critical situation developed in Poland and Hungary [in October 1956], with anti-Soviet elements denouncing our party and the Soviet people, that naturally created difficulties for us. Some British and French diplomats, though not of the first rank, when they met with members of our embassy staffs in the British and French capitals over a cup of coffee or a glass of wine, expressed thoughts like this: “Well, you know, we take an understanding attitude toward the difficulties that you are facing in Poland and Hungary. We, on the other hand, are having difficulties with Egypt. Let’s make a tacit agreement that you will overcome your difficulties by your methods, but you won’t interfere with us.”

You can see how the imperialists wanted to make use of our difficulties and deprive us of the possibility of raising our voice in defense of the struggle of the Egyptian people against the colonialists, who wanted to reestablish their domination in their former colonies.

However, we quickly coped with our difficulties. I have already told about how we did that. In Poland the new leadership headed by Comrades Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz12 played a major role, and we coped with the difficulties in Hungary. In this way we were able to untie our hands and immediately raise our voice to help the Egyptian people. This voice proved to be so powerful that it forced the aggression to cease.

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We were very happy that Eden and Guy Mollet had enough courage to stop the war.

The war by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt in 1956 became a historical landmark for the Soviet Union.

We were not pursuing selfish or mercenary goals. We did not want to replace Britain in Egypt or in the other Arab countries. No! We wanted to help the former colonial peoples to free themselves from slavery and dependence. This was the policy of Lenin, and it had taken firm and realistic root in the practice of our diplomacy. After this Egypt drew even closer to the Soviet Union. It was filled with even more trust and respect for our policies and for our Soviet socialist system.

We had won much respect even before that, before our intervention in favor of Egypt when it was attacked by Britain, France, and Israel, which raised the authority of the USSR in the Arab world very high, especially among the Egyptian people. Nasser said many flattering things then in regard to the policies of the Soviet government. We had helped them sincerely, without setting any conditions, providing aid on the basis of ideological considerations, with the aim that all colonial peoples could win their independence. Our action was based on humane considerations and was not in pursuit of any mercenary interests.

The USSR itself had no needs that it was seeking to meet in this situation. It had no need for the riches of the United Arab Republic (UAR) [Egypt’s official name, adopted in 1958, upon unification with Syria]. In our country we already have nearly everything produced in Egypt or extracted from the ground there. Generally speaking, we are a wealthier country than Egypt. If we are lacking in some goods, if there are some items we seek to obtain from other countries, we do it not through war or machinations of some sort, but on the basis of trade and commerce, as is the practice among civilized people. What did Nasser mean when he declared that the war of aggression by the three powers was stopped as a result of aid from the Soviet Union? I repeat, first of all, our appeal to Eisenhower with the proposal that the military efforts of the USSR and USA be united under the UN flag to take action against the aggressors who had attacked Egypt. That was a political move. We understood that Eisenhower would not want to combine with us against his own NATO allies, but we wanted to strip him of the mantle of the peacemaker in which he had draped himself. We wanted to reveal the true face of a politician who in fact held the same position as the aggressors.

There’s another question. Why did Israel withdraw from the territories it had occupied after the war had ended and the situation had returned to

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normal? Together with the French and British, Israel had seized extensive territories. When the British and French withdrew their troops, Israel withdrew its troops as well. Apparently there was an agreement among these three powers. But there was another circumstance as well. We had raised the question in the United Nations and had achieved a condemnation of the aggression [by the UN]. Also we made a public declaration on our own that Soviet volunteers were being recruited to join the Egyptian army: “including tank crews, pilots, artillery men, and other military specialists.”

Yes, we wanted to provide real support to Egypt by sending people there who were fully trained and capable of handling the latest and most modern weapons. This pushed Israel toward the realization that it had to withdraw its troops and liberate the territories it had seized in the three-power attack on Egypt. I think that this fact [the public statement about Soviet volunteers for the Egyptian army] turned out to be extremely important for our policy as a whole, and we made correct use of it, having set certain limiting conditions on Israel—that is, if it did not abide by the recommendations of the United Nations, it would be confronted by an Egyptian military force in which our volunteer troops might also be present. This too was very highly appreciated by the Egyptian people and by Nasser. That’s what he talked about in his speeches. But after the situation was normalized, a different understanding became evident in regard to the basis for restructuring the Egyptian state. We saw that Nasser was inconsistent. Tito said, for his part, that Nasser simply didn’t understand certain things, but that we should continue to help him as before.

Nasser began to mention in his speeches the possibility of building socialism in Egypt. I think that this was the result of Tito’s influence. Nasser had his own peculiar conception of socialism. Here again we couldn’t understand him and thought that either he didn’t know his way around on theoretical questions or he was deliberately muddling things up. After all, under certain circumstances the word “socialism” can be used for concepts quite divergent from ours. Even Hitler called his party National Socialist. But the whole world knows what kind of “socialism” he had. That’s why we took a cautious attitude toward people who took up the word “socialism” but didn’t explain concretely what they meant by it, how they intended to use it, and by what means they wanted to achieve it. We thought it was possible that Nasser would lead his people astray by beginning to promote a special road for Egypt, the road of Arab socialism. As a result of these disagreements a certain coolingoff occurred in our relations, but fortunately it was only temporary.

Let me now say something about Egypt’s victory. Before our disagreement [over socialism], Nasser had explained the victory as the result of our intervention,

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but after the strain became noticeable in our relations, he began to say that Egypt won because it was helped by Allah. When friendly relations between us were reestablished, I would sometimes refer to this. I would ask him: “Now, who was it that helped you? Was it us or Allah?” And he would smile. After all, anything and everything can be attributed to Allah—aid and assistance, victory and defeat. Just as Russians blame everything on their God, so the Egyptians attribute everything to Allah.

For a certain time even after the victory of 1956, a cautious attitude toward Nasser was displayed in the USSR, but at the same time we supported him and offered him military aid in fairly substantial amounts. We sold Egypt ships for its navy [destroyers], torpedo boats, and airplanes. And we sold all sorts of weapons in the quantities that Nasser needed—rifles, artillery, and tanks, in addition to aircraft and naval vessels.

By this time we had already established good relations with the government of Syria. But we also supported the Communist Party in Syria, which was the strongest such party in the Arab countries. It was headed by a very experienced leader, [Khalid] Bagdash.13 At that time the whole democratic movement in Syria was fairly confident of its strength.14 It was putting pressure on the government, seeking to extract social and political concessions for the people. The Syrian bourgeoisie were in a state of great alarm, seeing that the Syrian Communist Party was growing stronger and influencing public opinion in Syria.15 Right-wing circles began to seek ways of freeing themselves from Communist influence and keeping the country within the capitalist framework. Suddenly (for us it was sudden) the question was raised of uniting Egypt and Syria as one country.16

The press in both countries began to develop propaganda in favor of such a merger. Both in Egypt and Syria fairly substantial forces were active in favor of unification. As for us, we didn’t see that this represented progress. Syria was a bourgeois democratic country where the Communist Party was legal, and a parliamentary system of the French type had been established there. Conditions were more favorable for progressives there than in Egypt. There was no democracy in Egypt, which was ruled by a group of colonels headed by Nasser. Only bourgeois and Islamic parties of a reactionary nature were allowed to function.17 Therefore we didn’t support the idea of a merger and the establishment of the United Arab Republic. It is possible that Nasser was copying the idea of the Soviet Union, having in mind the possibility that any Arab country could join the United Arab Republic on an equal basis. Is that possible? I don’t know.

Was the idea behind the United Arab Republic that any Arab country could join it, so that eventually a large, powerful, and united greater Arab state

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would emerge? Nasser had in mind that Egypt would be the leading force in the unified country. It would seem that in the future a united Arabic republic could become a progressive phenomenon. But at that time, when the Egyptian Communist Party didn’t exist and individual Communists were either underground or in jail and the people had no democratic rights, at a time when a military dictatorship had been firmly established, such a system promised nothing good for Syria. The Soviet leadership did not speak out in the press against Nasser’s policies, not wishing to estrange him or drive him away, but it also did not support his policies. On the other hand, we did support Bagdash, and Bagdash was waging a struggle, exerting all the influence the Syrian Communist Party had—a struggle against unification with Egypt.

When a military coup took place in Baghdad [on July 14, 1958], and General [Abdel Karim] Kassem18 came to power, we welcomed this revolution because an extremely reactionary and terroristic regime had existed in Iraq previously. The end of that regime was long overdue. Kassem achieved a fairly easy victory. He commanded a division, and when he marched through Baghdad he overthrew the government of the dictator Nuri Said.19 Nuri Said had been an agent of British imperialism. The Iraqi king [King Faisal, who had been installed by the British colonial rulers] was killed. A revolution was victorious. It would be more correct to call it a coup d’état [rather than a revolution]. At first Kassem moved in a progressive direction. The Iraqi Communist Party was legalized20 along with other progressive tendencies. We supported Kassem by all possible means and officially recognized that a revolutionary break with the former social structure had begun in Iraq.

At the moment when the revolution occurred in Baghdad, Nasser was on vacation in Yugoslavia. A telegram came to us from Tito in Belgrade with the request that Nasser be received incognito [that is, without publicity] in the USSR. We responded in the affirmative.

By that time the formation of the UAR had been accomplished. Syria fell under Nasser’s leadership, and democratic conditions in that country were abolished. The Syrian Communist Party found itself in a difficult situation. Syria began to be trimmed down, having its hair cut to conform to the Egyptian social and political model. We, of course, did not support this and spoke out against it. Our position offended Nasser; he became unfavorably disposed toward us. That’s fully understandable. He understood correctly that we were supporting the Communists of Syria, who were fighting against Egypt and against Nasser.

Nasser flew to Moscow.21 Before Nasser’s arrival, our leadership had an exchange of views on all questions that might be touched on, and we decided our attitude on those questions. I was assigned to meet with Nasser, one

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on one. Of course some people from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interpreters and stenographers, were also present. This was my first meeting with Nasser in person. He made a good impression on me. He was a young man; he bore himself well, was obviously intelligent, and had a winning smile. I liked him, if we are to speak from a purely personal point of view. Our meeting took place outside the city at Novo-Ogaryovo.22 Nasser was accompanied by [Murad] Ghaleb, his future ambassador to Moscow, a very interesting man deserving of respect.23 He knew Russian well and served as Nasser’s interpreter. I had my own interpreter, so that full and free communication was established. We began to exchange views. I started talking about the unification of Syria and Egypt, criticizing it. Nasser began arguing that the merger was beneficial. The arguments on our side emphasized the point that unification would give nothing good to Syria and that consequently there would be no positive results for Egypt either, that the unification was artificial by nature. Nasser conducted himself in a self-assured manner during the conversation and at times I would say even displayed aggressiveness. He asked: “Why in the world are you supporting Bagdash? Do you want Bagdash to be our leader? That we will not tolerate. That is simply impossible.”

For Nasser the problem came down to the fact that Bagdash opposed the unification, we supported Bagdash, and that was a mistake. He said we didn’t know our way around on Arab questions and were taking the wrong road, that we were looking at the unification not through our own eyes but through the eyes of Bagdash, who was basing himself on a narrowly political point of view. Then Nasser gave us to understand that this was only the beginning. The unification would spread. In reply I said that we were not worried about the existence of a strong Egypt. On the contrary, we were pleased. We would do everything in our power then and in the future so that Egypt could become stronger, and the same for the entire Arab world. In principle, we had a favorable view of the idea of a united Arab state. We were not afraid of the emergence of such a state. That was not the problem. I said: “We want to be friends with you and to unite our efforts in the struggle against the reactionary forces. Why would we be opposed to unification of the Arab countries? If today, under certain specific conditions, we do not support such a unification, we are proceeding from our own view of the matter. We think you made a mistake when you undertook this. And you’re mistaken now if you think that you’ll extract any particular advantage for Egypt out of this. The opposite is true. This unification will weaken your position.”

Nasser didn’t agree with my arguments and didn’t understand me. I gave him the following example: “Mr. President, in your country the Communists

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are in the underground, and their leaders are in jail, but in Syria the Communists are at liberty. In your country you have no true parliamentary system, but the Syrians are accustomed to such a system. They have political parties in Syria and a parliament, and people publicly state their different positions, and there is voting on that basis. A bourgeois democracy exists there. Among the Arab countries Syria is the most democratic. Now, in fact you have deprived Syria of its parliament. If nominally a parliament remains, in reality you have taken upon yourself the power to decide all questions. Do you really think such actions will strengthen your union with Syria? No, it is a temporary situation. A struggle will begin, and in that struggle you will be defeated. In addition to that, the living standards in Syria are much higher than in Egypt. Now your countries have united, and your material resources have also been merged. Who wins? Who benefits from that? Egypt benefits, and Syria loses. It used to export grain, but now it will not export it. After all, Egypt consumes more grain than it produces. Consequently all surpluses will go to Egypt. Syria will be deprived of foreign currency, which it needs for the development of its economy. Again Syria will suffer. You were too hasty, and later on you will regret your decision. This will turn out badly for you.”

“No,” he objected, “I don’t agree. You don’t understand. You don’t know your way around on Arab matters.” Then he advanced a new argument. He said: “If we are to speak honestly, it wasn’t I who wanted unification but the Syrians who urged us to do this. They encouraged the unification at a forced pace, and we agreed to it.” On this I agreed. I said: “That’s right. We understood that the main force pushing for unification was the Syrian bourgeoisie, and that perhaps it had even taken the imitative on this question. But why did it do so? Because a revolution was building up in Syria. The democratic forces were growing stronger. The Communists were winning more and more influence in public opinion. Therefore the right-wing circles began to tremble in the face of this prospect and became so frightened that the only salvation they saw for themselves and for their capital was unification with Egypt. They want to use your hands to suppress the progressive forces in Syria, and in the process they have agreed to accept some damage for themselves personally. Their thinking was that fundamentally they would win by maintaining their property, their banks, their accumulations of capital, and the capitalist system in general, which in their opinion was being threatened. They didn’t feel they could cope with the progressive forces inside Syria by themselves. That’s what they had in mind. As for us, we think the position taken by Bagdash is progressive. Naturally we are on his side. Later on the time will come when you will regret the merger. The UAR will fall apart.”

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We sat and discussed the entire day, having lunch in the open air by the Moscow River. The conditions there are very pleasant. The weather was marvelous. It was a splendid suburban Moscow summer day. Despite the polemics we displayed no passion that might cause tension in our personal relations. Each of us remained within certain bounds, so as not to disrupt the friendly nature of our conversation. It was not a dispute but an analysis of the state of affairs in the Middle East. We probed and tested each other’s assertions in an attempt to reach a correct analysis of events and determine a political line for the future. Each of us remained convinced of his own opinion. Nothing else was possible at that time. On the personal plane, the visit to our country by the president of the UAR made a good impression on me and on other comrades with whom he met. But there were no official receptions because his visit was unpublicized.

Later Nasser began to express concern. He said: “I need to return to my country. Major events are taking place in Iraq! Right now I’m going to fly back to Yugoslavia and then return to Alexandria by ship.” I expressed my concerns: “Mr. President, I don’t advise you to return by way of the Mediterranean. The revolution in Iraq has upset the situation in the region. The United States and Britain have put their army and naval units on a combat footing, and a tense situation has arisen.24 You don’t enjoy the sympathy of the Western countries, and it would be no trouble for them to sink your ship in the middle of the Mediterranean [on the way from Yugoslavia to Egypt]. If the yacht on which the president of the UAR was sailing suddenly sank, it would be impossible to prove the cause. And how could there be any proof? You would be sailing on an unarmed yacht, and even if it was armed, that wouldn’t change the situation. They’re always sending submarines through that area, and there are planes flying over all the time. No more convenient occasion could be expected for getting rid of the president of the UAR, if such was their desire. I advise you to take a plane by way of Baku [in the Azerbaijan SSR], Iran, and Iraq to Syria.” He agreed.

Our relations with Iran at that time were not bad. Therefore we were able to make use of Iranian airspace, but special agreement had to be made in that regard. I told Nasser: “I don’t think the shah of Iran will refuse. When he was in our country, we felt that he was showing an interest in improving our relations. We have always stood in favor of good relations with Iran, as with all other neighbors.” When Nasser agreed to depart by air in one of our planes, we asked Tehran for permission for a Soviet plane to pass through their airspace, though of course we didn’t say the president of Egypt would be on the plane. We quickly received permission for the

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flight. Nasser departed, and we soon received the report that he had arrived safely in Syria.25

Meanwhile, from the conversation with him I understood that the revolution in Iraq was a surprise for him. For us it had been completely unexpected. We had some information about Kassem. It was even said that he had made some contacts with the Communists, but they had been only momentary, not permanent contacts. For us he remained an unknown figure. These events concerned Egypt very much. It’s possible that Nasser was hoping he might establish closer ties with the new government in Baghdad and that Iraq would follow Egypt’s lead. This desire is entirely understandable, but these expectations were not borne out, and neither were our expectations concerning Iraq. We had hoped that progressive forces would win out in Iraq also, that Kassem would demonstrate social wisdom in choosing a progressive path for his people. But he proved to be a man of uncertain political direction, an inconsistent type of person. But that’s a different subject, and I will not stop to go into it.

Our relations with Egypt steadily improved despite isolated strains and tensions, especially over the question of the unification with Syria, as the result of which the Syrian Communist Party was driven underground. When that party criticized Nasser, he transferred his anger [over that] to us, and of course there were grounds for that. We didn’t take any decisive steps in favor of the Syrian Communist Party, but ideologically we were on its side and supported it through our press. This annoyed Nasser, and he reacted accordingly in speeches [countering what was in our press and countering the positions of the Syrian Communist Party].

It was an age-old dream of the Egyptian people to make fuller use of the Nile River, to use its hydrological resources for agriculture and at the same time to make the Nile provide power to drive turbines and produce electric power.26 When Nasser took power, discussion of this question began to be whipped up intensively. An agreement was reached with Western banks,27 and Egypt was promised credits for building a dam on the Nile. The Egyptians flattered themselves that with aid from the United States they could realize a hope they had been cherishing for centuries. Later, the fact that Egypt stopped following the lead of U.S. and British policy was considered a blow to the imperialists, and one day [July 19, 1956] the announcement was made that the banks were refusing to give Egypt the credits they had promised. That made Nasser explode, so to speak, and he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal [on July 26, 1956]. The political temperature leaped skyward, and the situation led to extreme international tension. The West withdrew

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its personnel from the Suez Canal—harbor pilots, engineers, and the like. Egypt was left without trained personnel. The West thought Egypt would discredit itself, would not be able to cope with the difficulties, and that the Suez Canal would cease to operate. That would create further financial and political difficulties for Egypt.

The Suez Canal was then being operated under an international arrangement [by the Suez Canal Company]. The Egyptian government appealed to us for help. We immediately sent our harbor pilots, engineers, and other specialists so that the Egyptians could master the task of operating the canal as painlessly as possible. Everything worked out fine. But political passions had risen to an incredibly intense heat. It was precisely the reckless policy of the United States, the “positions of strength” policy, John Foster Dulles’s line of constantly keeping the pressure on,28 that helped us make a rapprochement with Egypt and made it easier for Egypt to sort out who was its friend and who was its enemy. Although our press sometimes published critical commentaries, at moments of difficulty for Egypt the USSR invariably stood on its side and supported the just struggle against the colonialists and the strengthening of Egypt’s independence. Egyptian delegations began to come to our country. Military men from Egypt also came, headed by the commander-in-chief, Amer. Again we provided them with the assistance they needed. With our weapons Egypt’s strength was fairly thoroughly consolidated.

Then the Egyptians began asking us for help in building the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River.29 At first we refused. I think it was Tito who advised them to ask the USSR for assistance. And not simply to make such a request but to make the request insistently while friendly pressure was applied. Why do I think that? Once when I met with Tito we were talking about Egypt. He supported Nasser 100 percent and always argued that we should help Nasser. In this he was absolutely correct. Life and history have confirmed the correctness of his arguments. Even today [in 1970] we have the very best relations with Egypt, and this serves the interests of both Egypt and the Soviet Union— and all progressive forces. At first the negotiations about the Aswan Dam were conducted by members of our embassy staff in Egypt. Later Nasser and Amer came to visit us. The latter ended his life tragically (and I still suffer over this). He committed suicide after the disaster the Egyptian army experienced in 1967 [in the Six-Day War with Israel].30 As commander-in-chief he bore the main responsibility for that disaster. To what extent he was personally responsible for the catastrophic defeat it’s hard for me to judge. Amer made an impression on me as a decent man, devoted to Egypt’s cause, and one who understood the necessity for fraternal relations between the Egyptian

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people and the peoples of the USSR. The effect of this was that it won me over. My attitude toward him was one of trust. His approach toward friendship between our countries was not a thing of the moment. He sincerely believed that friendship with the USSR was in the interests of the Egyptian people and of raising the level of its economy, culture, and well-being.

Whenever Amer came to the USSR he always asked to meet with me. With permission from our party’s Central Committee I met with him, listened to what he had to say, and expressed my thoughts. On one occasion he insis- tently—and he knew how to express stubborn insistence, although without any arrogance—began trying to convince me that it would be very much to the advantage of the USSR for a powerful Egypt to emerge. Then he came to his main point. He said: “Today we have a weak economy. We can’t raise our economic level without the Aswan Dam. Our energy resources are weak. The Aswan Dam will also give us the possibility of increasing the amount of irrigated land in our country by one third.” I replied that I agreed, but this would require large capital investments, and for the time being that was beyond our capabilities. Later we had an exchange of views in the Soviet leadership. What should we do? We assigned our economists to go over the question and study the existing proposals. Our people studied the matter for a very long time and then reported how much it would cost and how long it would take for us to build the Aswan Dam. They demonstrated that such an arrangement could be beneficial for us not only politically but also economically. But it must be understood that there was a certain conditional quality about the economic benefits. The conditional nature of the situation was that we would be strengthening the economy of a friend and we would be consolidating friendly relations between our countries. This is where economics passes over into politics. In addition, the money spent would not be thrown away. The value would be returned in the form of goods supplied to us. The Egyptians could supply long-staple cotton, rice, and other products. Thus the money we spent would not be a gift, but a loan that would actually be repaid. We would receive additional repayment in the form of increased trust in us by all the Arabs and other peoples of underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa. It would be evident that they could rely on the USSR, that ours was not a self-seeking country, that the USSR had an understanding attitude toward the needs of nations freeing themselves from colonial dependence. Of course the economic component was not the main one for us; the political component was.

Time and again it happens that political interests are more important than economic ones. The strengthening of the Arab countries would weaken the

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camp that was hostile to us. If we didn’t make an effort to strengthen our ties with the countries winning liberation, imperialism would begin searching for every opening so that it could creep in and arrange matters to serve its own interests. In that case much broader forces and territories would be arrayed against us. That would force us to spend even more to maintain our army and navy. That’s how things come around full circle. At first it may seem as though we’re losing economically, but if you study the matter more deeply, you see that not only do we not lose, but we bring in some winnings. That’s why, after we had discussed the situation from all angles and weighed the options available to us, we decided that we could build the Aswan Dam and agreed to the Egyptian proposal.

We signed a contract with Egypt to build the Aswan Dam. While the negotiations were going on, Egypt insisted that we take on the job of contractor for the construction work, that we should calculate how much the work would cost and the deadlines for completion of various stages of the project, and then Egypt would start repaying us for the capital investments and compensating us for our expenses. We refused to sign an agreement in that form on the grounds that if we assumed the role of contractor, we would have to start hiring Egyptian labor. We would be taking on a management role. Conflicts could arise (and they always do arise) between the contractor and the hired work force. Thus instead of appearing as a friend of the Egyptian people, we would be seen as exploiters. The fact that we were using our resources to build the dam for them was one aspect of the matter. But we would be dealing with the people who worked for us in a different capacity altogether: not as a country that was providing credits, but as an institution functioning as a contractor and hiring wage labor. There would be actual conflicts with the Egyptian population. We didn’t want that, and wherever we granted credits we refused to take on this kind of role. That was true in India when we contracted to build a metallurgical plant in Bhilai and other production facilities. That’s the kind of policy we followed even earlier. As far as I know, that policy is still being followed. It’s the only correct and sensible line to take.

So then, we said to the Egyptians: “Undertake the work of construction yourselves, but we will take full responsibility for providing technical direction. The equipment will be ours and the plans and designs will be worked out by our specialists. The plans will be reported to your government. You yourselves will look them over and approve them.” Thus, step by step, our relations with Egypt improved and began to develop on a friendly basis. The agreement to build the Aswan Dam changed everything. The Egyptian leadership began to understand correctly that our policy was friendly toward all

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countries that were taking the road of fighting for their liberation or that had already liberated themselves from the colonialists and were reorganizing their economies on a new foundation. Here I have in mind both the socialist path of development and the nonsocialist path. We were confident that sooner or later, all people would grasp the usefulness and progressive character of the socialist path. But we knew that we had to show patience and not impose our ideas for building a socialist society. People had to be given the opportunity to make their own choice, so that they would see that they themselves had chosen and that they had made a correct choice. Then they would fight for the establishment of a new system, and for its consolidation and development.

Our engineers produced a draft plan for the dam. And our specialists were the most experienced in the world in hydroelectric power plant construction. The explanation for this is that immense hydroelectric power plants having turbines with huge capacity had been built over a short period in the USSR by our engineers and scientists, and thus a great deal of experience had been accumulated. On the basis of this practical experience our engineers and scientists knew how to arrive at the most progressive technical decisions. When our Soviet engineers took up the existing plans for construction of the Aswan Dam and studied them, they saw that more sensible decisions could be made with a more economical method for construction and that the hydroelectric power facility could be built in a more rational way that would be economically more effective.

The Egyptian government raised the question of a Soviet delegation coming to Egypt to familiarize itself with construction conditions on the spot and establishing close relations between the engineers and the work force. The leaders of delegations arriving from Egypt kept saying that I personally should head the Soviet delegation. In this way they sought to bind our two countries together more tightly, with the aim of securing economic aid and winning support for the policies being pursued by the Egyptian government. I will not conceal the fact that I had a very great desire to visit Egypt and to see this fabled land of ancient culture with my own eyes. I was invited to come at the time when the foundations were being laid for the construction of the Aswan Dam, but that wasn’t possible for me then, although I thanked them for the invitation and for their consideration. Every time they made such an invitation again, I would reply jokingly: “How can you be inviting me when in your country you have Communists sitting in prison? In Egypt the Communists don’t have the legal right to exist. But we know the leaders, and we know that many of the members and other representatives of progressive movements are in prison. I don’t want to be exposed to the same danger. I don’t want to

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keep them company—even though they would be good companions. We respect you, but we also respect the Communists you are keeping in jail. And as a Communist I don’t want to increase the prison population of Egypt.” In reply Amer would smile: “No, your information is not quite correct.” He and other Egyptian leaders argued that the Communists in their country were not like the ones in the Soviet Union. That was why they were obliged to jail them in the interests of the Egyptian people and the Egyptian state. I had heard such arguments before not only from Egyptian leaders. And I answered: “No, we have heard our fill of such fairy tales.”

The leaders of all countries where Communists are in prison, or where they are forced to operate deep underground, always assert that the Communists in their countries are not like the ones in the USSR. I remember during the civil war I was talking once with some members of the intelligentsia after we had done what was called “putting the squeeze on the bourgeoisie” in 1920 in Yekaterinodar under the leadership of Comrade Fúrmanov.31 At that time he was the head of a Red Army political department and was in charge of carrying out the campaign I’ve mentioned. In the house where I lived, the owners were very nice people, but they had an incorrect understanding of socialism, of the revolution, and of the Communists. They didn’t approve of what was happening in the Kuban region [in the North Caucasus]. One of the miners from that area said: “We’re in favor of the Moscow Communists, because they’re not like these Yekaterinodar Communists.” We had a heated argument with them. So the arguments that the Egyptian leaders were making were not new to me.

Time went by. The work developed. The Aswan Dam was built successfully, as were new factories. We provided credits for the construction of production facilities for medications, a metallurgical works, and some other factories. It was not we who did the building. Egypt did that, but we provided credits for the construction as well as technical leadership. Our engineers actually served as the directors of this construction. This increasingly strengthened the confidence the leaders of Egypt had in our country. The Egyptian leadership was made up of officers. The officers in that country did not come from the working class, but rather from the middle layers of the bourgeoisie. They were property owners, whose wealth and status allowed them to obtain both a general education and a military education. Of course there were people of various social backgrounds and of varying degrees of material prosperity among them, for within their ranks there was no monolithic social homogeneity. The members of the Egyptian leadership took various attitudes toward us. And that’s the way it was everywhere, in all countries of the world. When a

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revolutionary process is under way, it usually takes a painful course [resulting in different attitudes toward the revolution among different social layers].

And what about now? In Nigeria for the last two and a half years there has been a civil war, which has just ended [in 1970].32 It originated as a result of the fact that Nigeria won its freedom from colonial dependence, but the leadership was not monolithic in its composition. Its members came under various kinds of pressure and pursued different and varying interests. In the first stages of the Egyptian revolution the leadership was of a similar mixed variety. Today it has become more solidly cemented because a lot of time has gone by, some disparate elements have been blown away by the wind, others have been chopped off, and new forces have grown up to replace them.

At first they spoke of Arab socialism in Egypt, and later some began talking about scientific socialism. But the building of the Aswan Dam drew us closer together not only with the leadership but with the Egyptian people as well. Our engineers and workers in the most important trades came into direct contact with Egyptian engineers, technicians, and workers. The Egyptian workers had formerly been peasants. Our people trained them and worked together with them on the same machines. They all worked under equal conditions, and that brought them closer together, disposed them more favorably toward one another, and trust and confidence arose among all these people.

The first phase of construction of the Aswan Dam was approaching completion—that is, the time for changing the course of the river.33 This is a basic phase of construction. Later [in the dry riverbed] the high dam would be built, containing the turbines. At this point the Egyptians began to display stubborn insistence that at last I should come to their country for the celebration marking this occasion. After all, the Aswan Dam was something special for them, a sacred dream of their people. However, I again refused, citing the incorrect policy being pursued in Egypt in regard to progressive forces in that country. When I spoke with Ghaleb, the Egyptian ambassador, who had come to me with the invitation, I repeated my arguments, and he—being a wise man—understood me.

The formation of the United Arab Republic had already taken place [in 1958]. I asked Ghaleb: “How did your unification with Syria go?”

He said: “Well, it went as you predicted. Powerful forces soon arose and fought for the withdrawal of Syria from the UAR.” Marshal Amer was in Syria [when the September 1961 uprising against unification with Egypt occurred], and he was detained or placed under house arrest. Later they released him.

The collapse of the Syrian-Egyptian unification raised our authority even higher in the eyes of the Egyptian leaders. Things had happened exactly as

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we had warned. A letter exists that we sent to Nasser [in 1958]. The same letter was sent to other countries as well, to inform those who needed to know about our understanding of the question. But all this was laid out for the first time in the conversation I had with Nasser, at which Ghaleb took notes. In the letter we simply restated what we had said in that conversation. We sent the text to Nasser and read it orally to the president of Iraq. We made it known to other Arab leaders as well. We were sincerely on their side and were doing everything in our power to strengthen the regime that had been established in Egypt. We took a patient attitude toward the fact that there were things we disagreed with in their internal policies. We felt that such problems would only be temporary, that the Egyptians would come to realize their mistakes and become convinced, on their own, that the problems needed to be corrected. Therefore at the same time that we criticized them we also gave them credits and aided them in all sorts of ways.

The time came for the celebration in connection with the [temporary] damming of the Nile River [to change its course]. The Egyptians invited me not just to celebrate this occasion but to have a vacation in their country and get to know Egypt. And of course useful discussions could be held. They asserted that there were literally only a few Communists still in jail and that the president promised they would be freed by the time we arrived. We agreed to make the trip. This happened in May 1964.34 I was accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Deputy Defense Minister Grechko,35 and other comrades. Grechko went in the expectation that military questions would be raised. Gromyko was necessary in connection with decisions about general problems of world politics. The welcome provided for us corresponded to our rank and the level of relations between our two countries. The talks held during our stay were friendly. We became acquainted with the cities of Egypt and with the facilities that had been built with our assistance and that were already in operation, producing goods and services. This raised our authority very high. We had built a pharmaceuticals plant that produced medications. Previously the Egyptians had had to pay enormous sums for medications that they bought from Britain. Now they were producing their own. Being cheaper, they were more accessible to ordinary people. The inhabitants of Egypt were very poor; their incomes very low, and the prices [for medications] made a hard hit on their pocketbooks. Now the needs of the sick were being met more cheaply. We visited other factories as well. Everywhere the people met us with great sympathy and expressed their joy. After all, it was we who had provided assistance in building these factories. And thousands of people had obtained employment as a result. Then came the day of the [temporary]

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damming [to change the course] of the Nile [on May 14, 1964]. Nasser and I went to the dam site. The trip made a strong impression on me. Nasser was a genuine leader, whose authority was colossal. He was greeted everywhere with enthusiastic chants of “Nasser! Nasser! Nasser!” Of course I knew how such things are arranged. Sometimes the necessary crowds are rounded up artificially. Apparently they did things that way in Egypt, too. But I also witnessed unfeigned enthusiasm on the part of the people for their leaders, primarily toward Nasser. At the same time that we reached the Aswan Dam, some others also arrived: Ben Bella,36 president of the Algerian republic; also the prime minister of Yemen [Abdel As-Salal]37; and President Aref38 of the Republic of Iraq.

Bad relations had developed between Aref and us. We did not consider him a progressive-leaning person, and as an individual he was unpleasant. It was hard to have a conversation with him. Nasser gave a ceremonial dinner for his guests. Just prior to that, news arrived that Aref had carried out reprisals against the progressive forces in Iraq. I remarked to Nasser: “This is very distasteful. According to our information, Aref has arrested or killed a lot of people. It’s distasteful even to sit next to such a person.” The seating arrangement at President Nasser’s table was such that I was supposed to sit right next to Aref. Nasser took exception to my remarks: “I think your information is incorrect. I don’t think Aref has done this, especially while he’s in Egypt as my guest and would be meeting with you. He has very much wanted to meet you and wants closer ties with the USSR.”

I said to him: “I doubt it. Nothing like that has been evident in his speeches or his political line.”

“I will find out right now,” said Nasser, and hurried away.

After a little while [Nasser came back and] said: “Aref swears to God that he hasn’t done any such thing, that these are fabrications of the capitalist press. Nothing of the sort has happened. They are lying. I [that is, Nasser] believe him because he’s a devout religious person. He spends all his time on his knees, bowing toward Mecca and praying to Allah, asking Allah to answer his prayers about every possible problem. Aref is such a religious man that he’s incapable of lying, I assure you.”

The dinner proceeded with full ceremony, and afterward I had a talk with Aref, who brought up the subject on his own initiative. “The information you have received is inaccurate. It is apparently being circulated by persons who don’t want improved relations between Iraq and the USSR. I have done no such thing, and I never would.”

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I replied: “I’m very glad that you are making such a declaration and that this has not happened. However, we did receive such information. Still, I grant that it is possible that the information is inaccurate.”

Ben Bella made the very best impression on me. He was a cultured and educated man, well informed on questions of socialist construction and of Marxism. He took a position in favor of scientific socialism, and he himself stated that there was no true socialism other than scientific socialism, that is, Marxist socialism. I also liked his domestic policies very much. The Algerian Communist Party, it was true, remained illegal, but that was mostly just a formality, because it was able to operate freely, and the Central Committee of the Algerian Communist Party functioned openly. All prominent members of the Algerian CP were well known to the people. The Algerian Communist Party members themselves had told me that Ben Bella had invited influential figures from their party to meet with him and had told them: “Do whatever you need to. Take posts in the trade unions and get involved in educational, cultural, and economic work. Everywhere where people with some cultural background are needed and where you can be useful—there you should jump right in. There are no obstacles to your entering government service or social organizations. The government will not take any measures against you.”39

A huge number of people gathered for the [temporary] damming of the Nile [and its diversion from its usual channel], and everything there was arranged on a colossal scale. The government minister who had direct responsibility for construction of the Aswan Dam gave a speech.40 Then the official start-up of the new system took place. Nasser said to me: “Since the dam is ours but you helped build it, I request that you and I together press the button that will explode a dike and allow water to flow into the new [temporary] channel through a tunnel.” This was an honor for me. I thanked him for it and agreed with pleasure to his proposal. Together we pressed the button, the explosion went off, and the water went pouring down the new channel. Later we were told that two people had stayed too long in the tunnel and had been swept away. The assertion was also made that they had been saved. But who knows if that is true. Proper precautions had not been taken. It’s also possible that it was the work of provocateurs. But it didn’t cast a pall on the celebration. You had to have been there to see how people’s faces were glowing with triumph, how the eyes of the Arabs sparkled as they watched the mighty flow of the waters of the Nile (I can’t convey it with words alone). We had laid the basis for completion of the dam [that is, for the building of a permanent dam in the former riverbed] and installation of electric power-generating

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facilities [in the new dam] that would help create a new order in Egypt for the Egyptian people.

I was warned that the climate in the Aswan region was especially dry. Rain falls only once every several years there, it was said. Therefore Aswan has special qualities as a health resort.41 I was told that I should prepare for these special conditions. But what kind of preparations can you make? When we arrived in Aswan, it was as though we had just walked into an oven. There was no escaping the burning sun. However, the building where I was housed had air conditioning. I decided to take a cold shower, but the term “cold” can only be used conditionally. The water had been warmed by the sun, and even if you filled the tub with water and immersed yourself in it, you didn’t feel that your body had been cooled at all. Yet I wanted to restore myself somewhat before the evening when a large public rally was scheduled. A gathering of our Soviet specialists and workers was held before the rally.42 Our people had a small cultural center, and they invited me to give a speech there. I gladly agreed to that, met with them, and told them about the state of affairs in the USSR. And on the whole things in our country were good, and the mood of our people was also very good.

In the evening when the sun went down, a large public meeting was held.43 During the day it would have been impossible for people to sit out in the open and listen to speeches. Nasser gave a speech. He spoke about the socialism that he was building and would continue to build. Nasser departed from the standard theme he had usually repeated many times earlier. Instead of speaking about Arab socialism, he now spoke about scientific socialism, although he didn’t mention Marx or Lenin. Strictly speaking of course, it’s the same thing. But I think at that time it was still not easy for him to change his way of thinking all at once, not only because of his own conception of socialism but also because apparently he had to take into account the sentiments of some of his opponents and, most important, of his allies who had not yet reached his level of understanding. At any rate his speech was a step forward, and it was pleasant for me to hear it.

I also had a short prepared speech and I gave it. The audience received me warmly. Then Ben Bella spoke, and he gave a very good speech. Aref spoke after him. I could not agree with the contents of Aref’s speech. Politically it was all confused. Aref spoke only about “Arab socialism,” and he spoke a great deal about Allah. His speech was noticeably different from the speeches of Nasser and Ben Bella. On the other hand, the speech by the president of Yemen, As-Salal, did not stand out in any way; it was constructed along the lines of a newspaper editorial. It aroused no enthusiasm from the audience, but

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contained nothing you could object to. Considering who As-Salal was (he was not a Communist, but a military man, a colonel) there was no reason to expect anything special from him. He was a public figure without any great aspirations, but he showed that he sincerely wanted to establish friendly relations with the USSR. In response we gave him support and provided military and technical assistance to Yemen. The Yemenis at that time were building a seaport with docking facilities for ocean-going vessels [at Hodeida]. Their republic had no major facilities other than such docks. For the authorities the internal situation remained unstable, so that their president was not primarily concerned with maritime construction. He was engaged in a war against Al-Badr.44 Al-Badr was an interesting personality, quite an original individual. I met him a number of times when he was still the crown prince of Yemen.45

At the large public rally [at the stadium in Aswan] I sat next to Ben Bella. While Aref was speaking, Ben Bella kept turning toward me and laughing, demonstrating that he didn’t agree with some of the statements by the speaker. Toward the end of the speech, when its content became completely clear, Ben Bella began trying to persuade me to speak again.

I said to him: “It wouldn’t seem right. I’ve already spoken. I was given the floor and I made use of the opportunity provided to me to say everything that needed to be said. Now I don’t have a prepared text, and it would be taken poorly if I suddenly asked for the floor a second time, to say more than is customarily expected of a guest.”

“No, what are you saying?” He kept trying to persuade me. “Believe me, if you speak again, it will be taken well, and it’s not such a terrible thing that you don’t have a prepared text. I’m sure you’ll find words for what you have to say. And you can say something useful both to Aref and to the audience.” When I refused, I was trying to be considerate of Nasser, thinking it would be unpleasant for him. So I answered: “What’s the point of getting into an argument now and starting a debate with Aref? That wouldn’t be proper at a public rally on the part of guests of the president of the United Arab Republic.” At that point, Nasser, who had overheard my remarks, intervened: “I would advise you to speak. Engage in a polemic without naming Aref personally, but express your views. It will be useful for others who are listening. Otherwise the impression will be formed that possibly we agree with him on everything.” I responded favorably: “All right, I’ll express my point of view, which you yourself know. So don’t make any complaints against me afterward, since it

is you who are now insisting that I speak.”

I was given the floor again. I began talking about scientific socialism. Aref’s speech had followed approximately the following lines: we are Arabs and

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therefore are taking the Arab way to socialism. I had fought against this point of view even earlier when I had had a discussion with Nasser. For Nasser this was now a stage that he had already passed through, but Aref was repeating the same old thing—that is, “We are true to the Arab people. We do not divide it into classes; we view the Arab people as a single whole.”

I took up this topic in my speech. I said: “Some people here have spoken about the Arab nation as a whole. In this connection I would like to make the following point: like all peoples of the world, the Arab people does not consist of a single monolithic whole; it has a complex structure. There are Arabs who are capitalists, there are Arabs who are large landowners, and there are Arabs who are peasants, and Arabs who are wage workers. People who speak along the lines of one undifferentiated Arab people—whose interests are they fighting for? Arabs who are peasants want to obtain the land of the owners of large landed estates, but the landowners don’t want to give up this land. They want the peasant to work for them and to work on land that they own. Arabs who are workers labor on behalf of Arabs who are capitalists, and the capitalist Arabs want the worker Arabs to work as hard as they can; the capitalists want to have as long a workday as possible and to pay their workers as little as possible, so that the capitalists will obtain as much profit as possible. Arabs who are workers want what’s good for them—a shorter workday and higher pay. So, after all this, which Arabs are they speaking for—those who speak about the Arab people as a whole? Are they speaking for the workers and peasants? Or for the large landowners and capitalists?” I presented other similar arguments that are elementary for Marxists. All such arguments are understandable to ordinary people. They are accessible to anyone. And anyone who wanted to could plainly understand that I was polemicizing against Aref.

Of course I had some doubts about how the blue-collar and white-collar workers at the rally would take my remarks. The absolute majority of workers at the dam were illiterate and had been indoctrinated with the concept of Arab socialism, precisely as Aref conceived it. For them that concept was progress. They all understood that the Arab peoples had to defend themselves. After all, Egypt had been under the heel of the British colonialists for many years, and then the Arab peoples had to fight against Israel, which had seized their lands. That’s why this understanding of the situation had developed among them. When Arab interests were discussed, the sharp edge was directed against the foreign enemy. Internal questions of class struggle were glossed over or sometimes concealed entirely. The Communist parties in the Arab countries for the most part were weak or were operating underground. If

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the class composition of Arab society was to be laid bare, how would the workers take it? As it turned out, the Egyptians listened to me very closely, and our interpreter conveyed my remarks quite well, so that they were received with stormy applause. When I finished the audience very passionately displayed its positive attitude toward my speech. Ben Bella was pleased. He said: “It came off very well.” Nasser also praised the speech.

I think that in this case Nasser was displaying politeness. He praised me the way a host will praise a guest. But Ben Bella really did understand everything correctly. After all, he had initiated the whole action, encouraging me to make the speech, and I had no doubt he would tell me exactly what he thought. The meeting soon ended. And what about Aref? He also understood everything. I considered him a limited person. But you didn’t have to be a genius—to have a huge forehead, bulging with wisdom—to guess that my speech was meant as a polemic against Aref’s. Yet he was the president of Iraq, and both Nasser and Ben Bella were favorably inclined toward him. When I pointed out his shortcomings to them, they agreed. Ben Bella spoke rather frankly: “Comrade Khrushchev, Aref is going along with us; he’s not going his own separate way. He’ll stay with us to the end. We ought to support him even if he doesn’t understand everything now. The time will come when he will understand. There’s no one better than him right now in Iraq. He’s in favor of Arab unity as he understands it. But at any rate he favors unity with us, and we shouldn’t drive him away. We should support him. Without him other people will come to power in Iraq who would begin to carry out a different policy.”

My answer was this: “Yes, it really is better to be patient. There’s nothing else to be done for now.” In the fairy tale about the little humpbacked horse, there are these lines: “If you were born stupid, your father was always cursing at you.” (Koli glupym ty rodilsa,/ zavsegda otets branilsa.) With people like Aref you have to deal with them as they are. [You can’t always be cursing at them, like the father in the fairy tale.46] At that point, the three of us agreed to treat Aref more tolerantly. I reassured Nasser and Ben Bella by saying that I agreed with them, that there was no need to poke fun at Aref, which might irritate him or cause a cooling-off in our relations. I agreed that we should support him.

When I returned to Moscow we also decided, after an exchange of views, to follow Ben Bella’s advice. It was conveyed to our press and the fraternal Communist parties that such a tactic should be chosen. It would encourage Aref to move in the proper direction and at the same time would take account of his present views. This didn’t mean that we were conceding on any matters of principle; on the contrary, this was an attempt to mobilize our forces. After

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the big public rally at the Aswan Dam, our people who knew Arabic told me: “The Arabs listened very carefully and gave an exceptionally good reception to your speech. One of our specialists was in a car whose driver was an Arab. While sitting in his car, the driver listened to all the speeches, including both of mine, and he said: ‘That’s the first time in my life I’ve come across that interpretation of Arab unity. It was stated openly and was very correct. It’s true that we Arabs have differing interests within our society.’” The class differentiation that I spoke about rather bluntly in that speech is elementary for us, like the ABCs, but for the Arabs it’s something new. No one among them, especially among the leaders, had raised this question. No doubt the members of Arab Communist parties did talk about such questions, but they were underground. Marxist ideas had not yet been disseminated among the people. I was satisfied that I was able to sow the seeds of a correct understanding of the structure of society, that this is a class society and different classes have interests that contradict one another.

According to the plan for our stay as guests of President Nasser, a trip to the Red Sea was scheduled.47 Some ships on which we would spend several days [actually, May 15–16] were waiting for us there. Nasser said that those who liked to fish could do so, that there were plenty of fish in the Red Sea, and at the same time we could discuss among ourselves and have joint discussions with the representatives of the other Arab countries. Let me repeat that representatives of Yemen, Algeria, and Iraq were there. After its break with Egypt, Syria did not wish to be present.

We went out on the Red Sea. On shipboard the air was somewhat fresher than it had been in the sands around Aswan. At any rate, it was easier to breathe the sea air. Those among us who wanted to fish engaged in that pursuit, and the government representatives spent the time holding talks. These conversations were useful. They made our various points of view clearer and more precise.

During our exchange of views, we found more points of agreement and more mutual understanding than we did questions that required further processing or matters that had to ripen longer. These questions were of an international nature, as well as questions of internal structure and questions of unity among countries that favor a struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism and that are for peaceful coexistence. The main problem of an internal nature was the question of development: which path to take, capitalist or socialist? Nasser spoke in favor of the path of scientific socialism. As for Aref, if he still spoke about Arab socialism, that was not because he counterposed his point of view to that of Nasser. No, Nasser was an absolute authority

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for Aref. It’s simply that what had become clear for Nasser had not yet ripened in the mind of Aref.

I am not talking about Ben Bella, who stood closer to all of them than us, the Marxists. Although he did not speak out openly in favor of MarxismLeninism, he was in fact guided by that doctrine in his actions. However, he knew that somehow he had to give his people time to mature, to arrive at a correct understanding of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. You can’t distance yourself from your own people. If you lose touch with them, that allows your class enemies to take advantage of the ignorance of the illiterate. I don’t know what situation Ben Bella is in now.48 It was only from the newspapers that I learned he had been overthrown. I thought it was a great loss for the socialist countries and the world Communist movement. My assumption was that he was potentially a Communist [leader]. The policy he followed did not contradict Communist policy in strategic respects. On the tactical level, he conducted his policies intelligently.

The Red Sea is warm,49 but I didn’t go swimming. Others among our comrades went swimming and did some fishing. From its outward appearance along the shore the Red Sea is similar to the Caspian. It is surrounded in the same way by bare stretches of sand.50 The view both from the shore and from the sea is rather depressing—nothing but desert and sand dunes. The time came for us to leave the sea and fly back to Aswan. From there we continued our trip through Egypt. We visited one of the ancient capitals of the Egyptian kingdom, Luxor—very rich in historical monuments, which had to be saved before being flooded by the giant new lake created by the Aswan Dam.51 Our stay there was brief but crowded. Here’s what the Nile looks like from an airplane window: the river stretches along a narrow strip of green, rather a sad sight, because there’s greenery and vegetation visible for only a little distance to the left and to the right from the Nile River. All the rest is lifeless desert. Of course we know this from geography lessons in school, but it’s a rather different feeling to see it firsthand from the air. There it is. You can reach out and touch it, a strip of green, the boundary of life, and beyond it the barren expanses without any water and without any life.

When we were talking with President Nasser and Vice President Amer, they told me about military training in Egypt. It turns out that they were training special units that could survive in the desert by living off the land, eating whatever they could get hold of. They would eat lizards, snakes, and such things. It turned out that a person could survive for a rather long time out in the desert if he knew it well enough.

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Our trip to Egypt ended where it had begun, with a visit to Alexandria [beginning on May 22, 1964].52 Some organizations were located there that were working out projects for bringing new land under cultivation as a result of the Aswan Dam and the irrigation it would provide. It was a huge amount of land. Egypt’s cultivable land was increased by fully one third. That was a very weighty quantity for Egypt! It must be remembered, after all, that in this part of the world irrigated land is of the highest value. Harvests are brought in at least twice a year and in the case of some crops three times a year.

And when you get right down to it, what really is a year? In their country periods of warmth alternate with cold that is not freezing. In general there really is no cold there.53 Cultivable land is of such value there that the Aswan Dam took on unparalleled importance for the Egyptian people. The area that could be sown with crops was increased greatly, and better conditions were created for providing the country with food and industrial crops such as cotton.

We were riding in the same car with Nasser, looking over the surroundings of Alexandria, when suddenly he felt bad; his eyes rolled into the back of his head, and he fell back against the seat of the car. The car was stopped. This caused me much alarm. When his condition improved a little, he said that he wasn’t feeling well; he was dizzy and couldn’t continue the trip. He excused himself, got into another car, and went back to Alexandria, but he suggested that we continue along our former route accompanied by Amer.

We visited one of the new agricultural districts. There we were met by the planners and architects, who were developing plans for the settlements in the new regions. The principle they were following was to keep going along the same old road. That is, the land that they would obtain as the result of the Aswan Dam would be cut up into small plots for smallholder peasants who would conduct their work using the same technology that existed then and had existed for thousands of years. A water buffalo plodded in a circle, and a driver followed behind it. The animal would be turning a wheel that brought up water and poured it into troughs that went to the rice fields. These weren’t really fields but little scraps of land. We encountered some farms that were on such a miniature scale that one person could irrigate them by hand. And the buildings on those tiny plots were of a corresponding size. It was a dreadful spectacle. People were literally living in burrows like prairie dogs. Because of the impoverished situation in the villages, Nasser suggested that we not even travel into some inhabited areas to inspect the economic conditions there. Basically we stayed on the road, and they pointed out to me that people were living over there. Everywhere we encountered a mass of miserable, impoverished people. The principle that was laid at the very basis of the new land that

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was being brought into cultivation was not progressive. But I didn’t state the impressions I was forming. I listened and watched. However, even when you listen and watch you can’t help comparing.

And in my mind I was comparing this situation with the situation in our Central Asian republics. There was obviously a great similarity in agricultural conditions. Agriculture based on irrigation is carried on in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan,54 just as it is along the Nile. In those Central Asian republics people rely mainly on irrigated land, just as in Egypt. Without irrigation nothing can be obtained. I am talking about their main crops: cotton, rice, and fruit. If the irrigation were removed, everything would turn into desert again. In those republics we had carried out, along a broad front, a process of mechanizing the work, leveling out the cultivated areas, and putting in irrigation canals. None of this was available in Egypt; in fact it was totally unknown, leaving aside the much larger scale on which our irrigated agriculture was conducted in Central Asia. When I saw the approach they were taking toward the new land that would come under cultivation, I began to take a critical attitude toward their plans. For a long time I wavered. Was it worth expressing my doubts to Nasser? I didn’t want to give him any reason to think that I was trying to push him into taking radical measures such as collectivization or other large-scale forms of agriculture.

We returned to Alexandria, where we lived for several days. We had our meals in a palace that had been assigned to me, in luxurious chambers. One evening Nasser invited me to his home, which in our country we would call a dacha.55 It was fairly decent and large. The main room of the dacha could have accommodated a dozen people easily. That’s where we gathered but without Amer. At this point I couldn’t restrain myself. There’s a saying in Russian: “The skilled workman has no patience [with unskilled work].” An inner need was gnawing at me to express my views, to explain to him that my remarks were not in any sense a recommendation and didn’t oblige him to do anything. When he and I were alone together, I used to call him “comrade” [although officially he was “mister”]. Now I said to him: “Comrade Nasser, some thoughts have occurred to me, but I am hesitant. I don’t know whether to talk to you about them or not.”

He looked at me questioningly with his large, clear eyes and a warm, winning expression on his face. I liked him very much, and to this day I feel great sympathy for him. He asked: “What were you thinking about?”

I said to him: “About the land that is being prepared for cultivation in your country. I wanted to ask how you intended to proceed.”

He said: “We’ll divide up the land. We have a lot of landless people. Their need is colossal.”

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That was not new to me. I knew very well that they had more hands to do work than would fit in the sky, let alone on the newly cultivated land. The peasants needed their tiny plots to be enlarged. Many were looking forward to receiving land as a result of the building of the Aswan Dam.

I replied to him: “Of course this is a big event. The wealth of your country is growing. But would you allow me to express my thoughts? And I would ask you in advance to understand me correctly and not be offended, not to think that your guest is behaving inappropriately or telling you what to do. What I am going to say does not oblige you to do anything. It is your business; it’s up to you what attitude you may take in the future to what I am going to say.”

“Please, I am listening to you.”

“If I were in your place, I wouldn’t divide the land into tiny plots, but I would establish state-run farms similar to the ones that in Soviet conditions we call state farms,56 that is, government-operated agricultural enterprises. We have an enormous amount of experience. In Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan we have established such farms because it’s possible for us to determine exactly how profitable they are, what the return is from the resources we invest in them.” At this point, going by memory, I quoted some figures, rounded off to the nearest large quantity.

“Let me tell you how things are done in our country. Right now we are doing a great deal of work in a region called the Golodnaya Steppe [in Uzbekistan].57 The question of bringing the land there under cultivation depends solely on the amount of capital investment and the quantity of water available. We rejected the idea of establishing collective farms58 on that land; instead we immediately created state farms, and we are building urban-type settlements with all municipal conveniences and services, such as schools, child-care centers, and kindergartens. In short, we are putting in everything needed by the people living and working there. Of course this requires large capital investments. But the experience we have accumulated shows that three good harvests are enough to recoup our expenses. And good harvests on irrigated land depend entirely on the quality of cultivation of that land, on people’s knowledge and ability at cultivating the land. It’s possible to obtain, at the minimum, 30 centners of cotton per hectare or even more. Our best farms obtain more. If the value of the harvest is estimated not in terms of raw cotton but in products made from cotton, our economists report that the capital investments can be repaid literally with one and a half to two and a half harvests on the new land. Let’s say that in your case it might take four harvests. Nevertheless, after four harvests you will have repaid your capital investments and will begin to

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receive enormous accumulations of capital. If you established governmentoperated farms, you would be obtaining literally a printing press that would stamp out money for you. Besides, you would be creating jobs for a large section of the population, employing them as labor at the government-operated farms. Their cultural level and their skills would be increased. Their pay would also be at a suitable level. The work would begin to skim along not the way it is now when a donkey [or ox] is turning a wheel in order to irrigate the fields. Please don’t be offended. I saw such scenes in a textbook about the Egypt of olden times. The pictures in that volume showed that method of irrigation.”

The relations between Nasser and us were good, and I allowed myself to take the liberty, assuming that he would understand everything correctly and would not take offense. I continued: “This was the method of irrigation that existed in Egypt under Ramses I,59 and now there’s the same thing under Nasser I. Entire millennia have gone by. And what has changed? Nothing. Because farming on a very small scale with an absence of technology lies at the basis of it all. On a tiny plot of land a person can’t install a pump or use a cotton-harvesting machine or a planting machine. You can’t drive a machine onto such a small plot of land, and there’s nowhere to turn around. Everything would be crushed [under the wheels]. That’s why I think that [with your present plans] you are not establishing the conditions for a progressive form of agriculture. If you divide up and parcel out all the new land, the peasant will of course praise you to the skies for your good works, but you won’t be able to make use of modern technology. You’ll be laying the foundations for something that will literally turn you into a slave of the land, where everything is based on manual labor. You would be depriving yourself of revenue. You won’t have at your disposal the higher income earned by state farm workers. You will have to impose a system of taxation [on smallholder peasants]. The productivity of labor will be low. As a result revenue for the government will be small, and consequently the income for the people as a whole will also be small. If you were to agree with my point of view, all you have to do is organize an authoritative government delegation to come visit us in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and take a look at our new state farms there, inspect our plans, our technology, our water-distribution mechanisms, and so forth. Everything there has been done on the most up-to-date level. All the farms are functioning efficiently wherever intelligent directors have been installed. You may now wish to act as though you haven’t heard me, as though I had never said anything, and you’re not obligated to anyone or anything.”

He had been listening to me closely, and now he said: “This would not be suitable for us. First, we don’t have the trained personnel. Second, there is so

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much corruption it would be impossible to establish a system of control [that is, a reliable accounting system]. The farms would lose money.”

I said: “It’s your business. I have just expressed my thoughts and it’s up to you to decide. You know your own country and your people best. It’s of no concern to me what you decide, and I won’t be offended by your decision. You know best what is useful here and what is harmful. But as for your comment that there are no trained cadres and your comment about corruption, we also have thieves in our country, and thieving will go on in your country. But even with thieves present, which is inevitable, once you have the possibility of selling goods and earning additional income from their sale, you’ll be able to extract greater benefit for your people and for your budget. I repeat a veritable mint, a money-minting machine will result. You’ll be making millions and millions.

“As for personnel, take them from the army. Send a group of officers to the Soviet Union, let them work there for a year or two, and meanwhile you’ll be preparing to put the vast waters from the Aswan Dam to use, and by then you’ll have trained personnel available. They will acquire theoretical knowledge of agronomy and go through a school of practical work. Tractor drivers can also be trained. They’d not only learn to drive a tractor but also to operate a planting machine and a combine harvester. We can make one of our testing fields available, so that you can train your people there. It’s a gradual and cumulative process. Not everything works out right away, obviously. But what can you do? The experience of the pre-Soviet era really doesn’t differ in any basic way from the experience of the Egyptian peasants, the fellahin, who irrigate the land with a water wheel powered by a water buffalo. The Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen used the same methods. When we set about the formation of large state farms, a different method of organizing the work appeared along with fields of a different [much larger] size and different methods of irrigation.

“Previously we used to level out the land, to make a flat and even surface and to make dirt trenches for irrigation canals. This resulted in a serious loss of water [through seepage into the soil]. The farming turned out to be unprofitable. A huge amount of work was required to keep the irrigation system in good repair. The irrigation canals had to be repaired every season, and the banks of the earth trenches had to be rebuilt. But when I was in France [in 1960] and flew to the south of France near the border with Spain, I saw an irrigation system that fascinated me. They used reinforced concrete troughs to carry the water.60 With reinforced concrete troughs there was no loss of water as the result of its seeping into the soil. And there was no need to rebuild the banks of the irrigation canals, which is very labor intensive. The

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leveling of the land so that the water would be distributed properly was also simplified. [As mentioned above,] the troughs rest on raised structures, or supports. All that remains to be done is to [adjust the height of the supports and thus] give the proper amount of incline to the troughs, sloping them properly, and then to calculate how much water to add, at what location, and at what time. All those factors can be calculated. The production of these troughs has been mechanized, and the system for installing them has been organized. We sent our engineers to France, and thanks to the courtesy of the French we were allowed to learn from the French experience. Today we have applied this method in our country. I think it is a very efficient system and could easily be introduced under the conditions that exist in Egypt.

“You Egyptians will be able to see a lot of other good things if you come to our country. The accounting books will be open to you, and everything will be at your service. You can verify everything by inspecting the fields themselves, and then you can weigh and evaluate whether it would be to your advantage or not. If it will be beneficial for you, then do it. If not, dismiss it. But if something were not beneficial for us, I would never have the audacity to advise someone else to use it. It was Lenin who proposed a plan for cooperative agriculture, and that was subsequently confirmed by life itself. Where peasant cooperatives were formed and state farms were established intelligently on a businesslike basis, with a selection of well-trained personnel, they justified themselves. And yet how much thieving has gone on in our country? How many money-losing state farms do we have? How many collective farms in a state of ruin? How many people were destroyed because of the senseless way that collectivization was carried out? But those are different questions altogether, historical questions, questions for analysis of the mistakes made and the distortions that occurred during collectivization. That has nothing to do with you. What you should do now is take the best of the experience accumulated by the Soviet people.”

At this point Nasser began to listen more closely and ask more questions. He said: “At a certain time [later the same day] I will come for you and we will go to my place. The entire Egyptian leadership will gather there and we’ll have a talk.”

“I said: “Please, by all means, I’ll have something to eat and wait for you.” The visit to Egypt was pleasant for me because of the fact that Muslims do not drink alcohol, although not all believers in Islam adhere to the recommendations of the prophet. At meals and at ceremonial events and in family situations in Egypt, we drank only juice, which, by the way, was remarkable, from a wide variety of different kinds of fruit. It was very pleasant and it

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took away your thirst. Given the intense heat in that country. that’s the only means of salvation. I want to express my gratitude to the Prophet [Muhammad], who advised his people not to drink alcohol.61

For many years I was accustomed to a regimen under which twenty minutes for a meal was sufficient for me. When I ate alone I never drank alcohol, even as a young man. As soon as I had eaten I was ready to go back to work. I waited for the appointed hour and Nasser arrived with Amer. Nasser had said to me once, person to person: “Comrade Khrushchev, Amer and I are like one person. Anything you can say to me you can say to Amer. Or anything you say to Amer you can say to me. We are very close friends.” I could see that with my own eyes. They even lived next to each other. Their families too were like one family. The children were all friends together. I was happy that two such friends were the leading figures in the new project to reorganize the Egyptian economy and Egyptian politics.

When we got in the car, Nasser smiled and said: “Comrade Khrushchev, I’ve been thinking about our conversation and I told Amer. We had an exchange of views and I want to say that you have made a very tempting and enticing offer for us.”

Amer at that point joined in the conversation: “I think that this is precisely the way we ought to organize the economy. It’s the only progressive path.”

I said to him: “If you consider my proposal progressive and if it will be useful to Egypt, I will be glad. I will feel moral satisfaction that to some degree the expenses of our trip to your country have been justified. A good thing will have been developed as a result of our advice. This would be a historic event! If you were now to introduce small-scale, private irrigated agriculture, Egypt would not be able to make a revolution in agriculture. Your peasants on their small holdings engage in agriculture that is technologically primitive. Reorganize agriculture, create large farms, and amalgamate them together.

“I certainly know what it costs to carry out collectivization. Unbelievable efforts are required. On the other hand, if you establish government-operated farms on the new land and they begin to serve as a good example, then at a certain stage it will be possible to undertake the reorganization of small-scale private farming. I’m not proposing the latter type of action, because collectivization is bound up with incredible difficulties. It would be even more complicated and difficult for you than for us. Therefore it’s more correct to establish on the new land a system that you yourself consider rational. If, on the other hand, that which took shape historically is simply repeated, then you’ll just be punishing yourself. You’ll be depriving yourself of the possibility of having reserves of capital in the interest of your country, to develop agriculture,

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heavy industry, the means of production, and the means of consumption.” Both my listeners acknowledged the justice of what I had said.

In Alexandria Nasser informed those who had gathered about our conversation and began arguing that if my ideas were put into practice, it would be of great benefit and assistance to Egypt and the development of agriculture would move in the correct direction. The possibility of organizing production on a high level with the use of modern technology and mineral fertilizers would be created. Meanwhile I saw that he was not repeating my words literally but was speaking out of personal conviction about the fact that this was the only correct path and that they should make use of it. Several more years would be required before the completion of the Aswan Dam construction, but those years could be used to do the preparatory work for bringing the new land into use. Everything would coincide.

They immediately began discussing specific questions: who should they send as head of the delegation to Uzbekistan in order to study our experience there on the spot, experience that they would need to transfer to the newly irrigated lands? Prime Minister Ali Sabry62 was named as the head of the delegation. He was a very close friend of Nasser; they had known each other even before the revolution. The decision was made to send, together with Ali Sabry, agronomists, accountants, and others who would look into the potential economic effectiveness of government-operated farms. We agreed to weigh and calculate everything so that a decision would be made not on the basis of intuition but after a profound process of technical and economic elaboration. I noticed no skepticism. It may be that someone had doubts in the depths of their soul, but no such statements were made openly.

Why do I suppose that there might have been skepticism? Well, after all, this was such a huge break with the economic system that had existed for millennia! It should also be kept in mind that the ordinary people had placed great hopes in the possibility of obtaining land after the dam was completed. Water there is the source of people’s existence. A lot of propaganda had been conducted. A republic-wide organization had been formed that was specifically engaged in working out the details of the Aswan Dam project, and a huge mass of people was involved in this organization, including architects, agronomists, and economists and some of the most active people [in the country]. It’s not such an easy thing to suddenly make a 180-degree turn from dividing the land up in tiny plots for individual owners toward the socialization of the land. Of course what would have happened there would not have been socialization, because the land would immediately become state property [without having been privately owned, because previously it

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was desert owned by no one.] Nevertheless, it was a huge break from the past, and to a certain extent it represented the adoption of a socialist system in agriculture. Not all the people in the Egyptian leadership were prepared for such a step, so that doubts would have been logical. But one must show patience and explain the economic benefits to people. Above all, it is precisely the economic benefits that must be explained, but these benefits bring with them a big political change.

After I was retired on a pension [in October 1964], I learned from the newspapers that an Egyptian delegation had come to the Soviet Union headed by its prime minister. It was pleasant for me to read and to see that my advice was still in effect even after I had ceased to occupy a high position. This testified to the fact that Nasser personally had been convinced of the correctness of my advice. How agriculture will develop further on the new lands in Egypt I cannot say. I cannot decipher anything in this respect from our newspapers. In general it’s impossible to figure out much of anything from our press. The only thing I’ve read is a confirmation of the fact that as a result of the completion of the Aswan Dam the cultivable land in Egypt has been increased by one third so that the figure I had heard earlier about the amount of new land that would be brought under cultivation has been confirmed, but the organizational forms to be utilized on this land remain unknown to me.

When we were discussing the economic problems of agriculture in Egypt, the thought occurred to us to establish a model farm there on a certain number of hectares, to furnish it with modern technology and put competent technicians and agronomists in charge. Such a farm would serve as a concrete example of a socialist way of conducting agriculture under Egyptian conditions. I don’t remember the size of the area we recommended for the establishment of such a farm,63 but this was a form of economic aid that was within the means of the USSR. We drafted up our proposals and sent them from Egypt to Moscow, explaining what had prompted them and saying that our people [that is, the Soviet leadership in Moscow] ought to discuss this question and prepare to make a decision. We had organized similar model farms at our own expense in China and India. These farms had played an especially big role in India in promoting our technology and the socialist mode of production. Large-scale agriculture did arise and develop in India. The Indians themselves gradually increased the size of their agricultural operations and began to train their personnel on a new basis. Of course, in a capitalist framework, all such operations remained capitalist enterprises, because the basic means of production were still in private hands. But at any rate, we had demonstrated a progressive trend in working the land. Both in India and in Egypt they work

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the land with a wooden plow, and the peasant scrabbles around in the dirt. You can see the same kind of thing in our country, only now you can only see it in pictures from the past. For people of the older generation, there really is something to compare between the old way and the new.

We quickly received an answer from Moscow and reported to the Egyptian leadership about our gift. A broad smile spread across Nasser’s face, and his eyes sparkled with pleasure. Soon after that I was no longer connected with these matters, and I was no longer in a position to observe how my idea was carried out. Rumors reached me that some people to this day fail to understand the importance of our example of helping countries who are considering socialist methods of agriculture. Providing aid does not mean only to introduce socialist principles, although that also is of great importance. It’s also a question of helping our friends concretely, so that they can see the socialist countries don’t just talk about giving aid but in fact do so for the underdeveloped countries, so that they can more quickly raise their economic level and standard of living. Sometimes people say that Khrushchev went off to other countries, handed out presents to everyone, and squandered our country’s resources. I think such arguments come from people who themselves took part in those decisions, because I never unilaterally did anything, nor could I have done anything, without permission and the decision of the government and the party’s Central Committee. A foul-smelling rumor is being circulated for purposes of immediate advantage.64 Either such foul rumors are being deliberately circulated or a failure to understand important political measures is being displayed. But people whose political development is limited may get caught on this hook, and therefore I would like to express my views on this matter.

Aid to other countries given freely as a gift has important consequences— not only political consequences, when such aid wins us friends, but also material consequences. I remember when we first visited Afghanistan at the invitation of its king and government [in 1955]. Bulganin was heading our delegation. From our conversations we sensed that the king was concerned about the backwardness of his country in cultural and economic respects. The Afghans were casting about, seeking a solution. We saw that the Americans were courting Afghanistan. The United States is a wealthy country and has the capacity to invest its resources in economic sectors and the construction of particular plants or facilities that are highly visible and effective. They are effective not only economically but also politically.

At that time the United States had surrounded us with military bases and had created a military organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

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(SEATO),65 which Pakistan had joined. India had not joined, and therefore the Yankees were also courting India, where there existed fairly powerful conservative elements who were opposed to the Soviet Union. But the government of India was headed by a progressive politician, who has now passed away, [Jawaharlal] Nehru,66 who took a firm position of nonalignment with any military blocs. In Afghanistan the Yankees undertook some road construction at their own expense. What intention was concealed behind that? Of course their aims were not charitable. It was not a question of sympathy or concern for people in need, not a desire to help the poor. That kind of thing hardly ever happens. Taking advantage of the country’s difficult economic situation and providing it effective aid, the United States wanted to impose its political conditions. They didn’t even hide behind a fig leaf but made their intentions clear: they wanted to put in a missile base. Just imagine if the United States had succeeded in imposing its conditions for economic aid on Afghanistan and in return for that aid had won permission for the construction of a military base.

For our part, we also offered aid to Afghanistan at the same time the United States did. We set aside for this purpose a certain amount of foreign currency. We didn’t have that much ourselves, but we wanted to show that we were favorably disposed toward Afghanistan. It was important that Afghanistan take our interests into account and not allow the United States to use its territory to build military bases. But the Afghans politely thanked us and refused. We were surprised and chagrined. They were our neighbors. Why had they refused? The king said nothing to us by way of explanation. But what I think is that he didn’t want to accept aid free of charge, so that he would not then feel that his hands were tied. He may have thought the Soviet Union wanted to penetrate Afghanistan, using its aid as an opening wedge, at first sending its people as specialists; then later the propagandists would arrive. A coup d’état could then be expected or some actions directed against the existing government. [Such suspicions apparently prompted the Afghan king to reject the proffered Soviet aid.] We swallowed that bitter pill. That was a specific example of aid offered free of charge, which would have had not only economic but also political significance. However we did try to make it clear to the leaders of Afghanistan that we were not pursuing any political aims.

Time went by. Our policies were tested and verified by specific actions and events as time went on. Our specialists went to Afghanistan, occupied themselves directly and only with the work to which they had been assigned—tech- nical and economic matters. Trust in us was established and grew stronger. Once the Afghans saw that our representatives were not engaging in propaganda, they themselves began to show interest and make requests of us. We built an

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airport for them, an educational institution, and a factory that produced bread, and we undertook to build a road from our border to Kabul. The road had great political and strategic importance, being located in close proximity to the Soviet-Afghan border. We continued to aid Afghanistan as much as we were able to, and of course this entailed material expenditures.

The capital that we gave away to Afghanistan was not some surplus that we had to spare. We would have found use for it in our own country. Therefore some people might say that it was not a wise thing to do. But it was unwise only from the point of view of unwise people. If Afghanistan had not become our friend and if the Americans had been able to penetrate that country, how would things have turned out? They would have put in their missile base! How much capital investment then would it have required of us to build bases in Central Asia to counter that? What we spent in aid given free of charge to Afghanistan was a drop in the ocean by comparison with those kinds of expenses [building bases in Central Asia]. That’s how we should view the question of giving material aid free of charge! That is the purpose of the resources taken away from our own needs and given to our neighbors so as to win them over and strengthen friendly relations.

Thus, as Kozma Prutkov used to say, you have to look at the root.67 If you proceed on the basis of purely superficial impressions, you could accuse the government of squandering our national resources. But if you look at the root of the matter, it turns out that in the end we were economizing on our national resources. No expenditures would be too great to win the friendship of our neighboring countries. The most valuable thing is if one neighbor has a trusting attitude toward another and does not allow the enemies of its neighbor to set up military bases on its territory. That’s how the problem should be understood.

To a lesser degree we were ready to spend similar amounts in the case of Iran. But we received information that Iran had given in to U.S. persuasion. We sensed that the Iranians were wavering. The shah came to visit us.68 He impressed me as an intelligent man, one who was willful and authoritative but who knew what he wanted. We had some border disputes, and there was no firm border between Iran and the USSR established by treaty. Neither side was satisfied with the existing line of demarcation. We quickly settled these questions during the shah’s visit. Also at that time we raised the question of building a dam on the [Aras] river that formed the border between the USSR and Iran on the south side of the Azerbaijan SSR, with both sides sharing the expenses. Such a dam would be useful both for Iran and for the Soviet Union.69 After my retirement on a pension, I learned that in the end such an

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agreement was reached. Iran finally understood that there was mutual economic and political advantage in the project. We did not want Iran to become a beachhead for the United States against the USSR. That was something we were very much opposed to, and therefore during the negotiations and in correspondence with the shah we criticized him for making military bases available for the aircraft of the United States. Although the shah assured us that they had no such agreement with the United States, we didn’t believe his words. And our lack of confidence in the shah in turn led to large expenditures to strengthen our border with Iran.

And what if Egypt had become a staging point against us used by the United States? They had had a military base there at one time. The Americans also had bases in Libya and Tunisia. After the revolutionary upheavals [of 1952–54], the Egyptians demanded that all foreign bases be eliminated [from their country].

The Egyptian leadership understood that a policy [of allowing foreign military bases] went against the interests of the Egyptian people. They refused to follow along in the wake of the imperialist countries. They wanted to pursue an independent policy of nonalignment with any military blocs. The term “nonalignment” was thought up by the Yugoslavs, and it does make sense. I would prefer to have more countries in the world that are not aligned with any military blocs. I would rather have that than countries belonging to military blocs directed against the USSR. Today we have friendly relations with the Arab countries, not just with Egypt. This is very much to our advantage. The material expenses for the gift we gave to Egypt are a drop in the ocean compared with the material resources the USSR spends for defense. The more friends we have on our borders, the better. If they follow a policy of peaceful coexistence and don’t allow imperialist countries to set up military bases on their territory aimed against the socialist countries, in such a case even a fool could understand that our expenditures are repaid a hundredfold, both materially and politically.

In the event of a military conflict foolish, short-sighted economizing can turn out to cost much blood. If a military disaster were to occur, it’s precisely with blood that we would pay for our former short-sightedness. These were the considerations I was guided by when I proposed that we offer this gift to the friendly Egyptian people consisting of equipment for use in agricultural production. The Russian people had a good tradition. I remember it from childhood. If a housewife was going to visit another village, she never went empty-handed. Invariably she would wrap up some flat cakes or a pie or some boiled eggs in a small bundle. In Kursk province mostly they baked a pie. This

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was a very good tradition. The same applies here [on the question of foreign aid]. It was not a matter of squandering the country’s resources, but on the contrary of economizing our resources. Of course everything has to be done intelligently and in moderation. Otherwise when you give away your country’s resources, you can earn the reputation of being a soft touch. I think that our policy was intelligent and paid for itself in full.

During our stay in Egypt we also discussed military problems. I personally didn’t discuss with the military men. Grechko visited military academies and installations. I didn’t visit any military bases, so as not to give any bad impression. Why make waves or ruffle anyone’s feathers.70 The Egyptians asked for military aid. They wanted us to give them the latest, most up-to-date weapons in large quantities on favorable terms. There was no discussion of our providing such weapons free of charge, although such desires could have been justified in our eyes. In principle agreement was reached about our providing weapons on favorable terms. During those negotiations I acted like a skinflint, responding unfavorably to some of their requests. Nasser reproached me: “After all, we’re preparing for war against an aggressor. And it’s in your interests to defend Egypt and protect the kind of Egypt that now exists.” Yes, that was a sensible argument.

The 1956 war, imposed on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel, was aimed at replacing the Egyptian leadership, installing pro-British and pro-French leaders, and thereby ensuring economic and political advantage for those countries in that geographical zone. Everyone understands the exceptional importance of this region—the Middle East, the Suez Canal, and so on. The Six-Day War in 1967 was actually waged for the very same reason. America spares no expense. The United States provides arms to Israel using money given by the American monopolists. Actually that is a gift [from the United States to Israel]. It is a gift aimed against Egypt and against the socialist countries.

[After the 1956 war] we gave Egypt modern torpedo boats and missile boats. We also agreed to sell them MIG-21s, which we had not sold earlier.71 Agreements were made on other weapons, all the most modern and up-to-date. Of course they were up-to-date at that time, but military technology dates rapidly. The most advanced item today will turn out to be obsolete tomorrow. After all, the thinking of designers and scientists goes on uninterruptedly. The means for the destruction of other human beings is constantly being renewed and improved. People on both sides are doing everything they can to perfect the means of self-destruction. And it really is self-destruction. We stand four-square against NATO and NATO stands against us. The socialist countries are forced to lay out resources for defense that bring no dividends

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for the economy. As long as two antagonistic social systems, the capitalist and socialist, exist, this apparently is inevitable.

During the negotiations about military questions, I was again suffering from the heat. We are a relatively northerly people, and when we end up in the kind of climate they have in Egypt it’s hard even to sleep when you’re not accustomed to it. But that kind of climate was the original source of great riches. In my childhood when I studied the Bible at a church school, it talked about Paradise. Based on the pictures in the book and the stories told by the priest, I ended up with the impression that in places like Egypt or Indonesia you had paradise on earth. I formed this impression because of the richness of nature in those countries: the great variety of the vegetation and the unusual birds. All around you everything is like a fairy tale and it’s extraordinarily beautiful.

Another thing we liked in Egypt was the spectacle that opened before our eyes from a tower that gave you a view overlooking Cairo. At the top of the tower is a platform with a revolving restaurant. You can sit there and drink coffee and look over the surrounding areas. That was the first time I had visited this kind of technological innovation. Later [in 1968] I visited the Ostankino tower and feasted my eyes on Moscow and its surrounding areas from that high television tower [which also has a revolving restaurant near the top]. It is also a very impressive spectacle.72

I want to make one more comment—in passing, so to speak. We sailed to Egypt on a passenger ship named the Armenia. We went through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, then past the Greek islands. When we sailed by Istanbul and other Turkish cities, I remembered how Lenin had established good relations with Turkey, which were then spoiled by Stalin after World War II.73 Stalin pursued a policy toward Turkey that was not well thought out. Through the Georgian press he made territorial claims against Turkey. Turkey “shied away from us” and fell into the arms of the United States, making Turkish territory available for U.S. military bases. That cost us dearly, and it still costs us quite a bit. It’s another consequence of Stalin’s rule and the lack of wisdom in the way he ruled. Only now are we beginning to reestablish friendly relations with Turkey. I can see that mistrust is diminishing and friendship is growing stronger. That is useful both for Turkey and for the Soviet Union.

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