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3. Переведите приведенную ниже информацию на русский язык. Выразите свое мнение по поводу обсуждаемой проблемы в письменной форме. Используйте выражения из статьи:

Economist, Aug 9th 2011 | London

David Goodhart believes that immigration is endangering European society. These are his remarks:

The open societies of modern Europe—combining individual rights, social market economies and welfare states—are the closest the world has yet come to the good society. Mass immigration into these societies, without the appropriate integration of newcomers, is endangering that unique combination of individual liberty and social solidarity.

It is doing so by changing the face of many towns and cities too rapidly, eroding the belief that existing citizens come first and weakening a sense of mutual obligation expressed through the tax and benefit system.

There is nothing mystical about the nation-state. Anyone can join (if invited) so long as they learn the language and respect the traditions of the country. And a commitment to the nation-state is compatible with internationalism, and support for bodies like NATO and the EU to which countries have ceded some of their sovereignty.

But after a long and often bloody pre-history the modern nation-state is the only institution that can currently deliver what liberals, of both right and left, want: democratic legitimacy for the exercise of power; cross-class and cross-generational solidarity and even, in Europe's post-religious age, a sense of collective identification that is bigger than families and neighbourhoods but more tangible than the whole world. It is possible in the future that more global institutions might be able to deliver democracy and welfare, but there is little sign of it yet.

And for the nation-state to work it must entail borders and boundaries and it must "belong" to existing citizens—on important matters they must have special rights over non-citizens. That means immigration must be managed with the interests of existing citizens in mind. The question is what are those interests?

Immigration does not in itself endanger the European nation, but when it happens very quickly and on a very large scale and when many immigrants choose to live in cultural enclaves it does do so.

That, alas, is what has been happening in Europe. The unintended consequences of liberal immigration policies and multicultural politics (with the exception of France)—which said that you can come here and remain the same—have alienated voters across the continent and given rise to populist parties in once tolerant places like the Netherlands.

In several European countries the immigrant and ethnic minority population is rising to 15% or 20% (one leading demographer has said that on current trends Britain will be "majority minority" by 2066). Many large towns are already around 40% minority: Birmingham, Malmo, Marseilles. This sudden and largely unplanned demographic shift has damaged trust between citizens and generated segregation, fear and, in some countries, extremism.

The "rights revolution" from the 1970s onwards, partly designed to atone for the racism of the first period of immigration, has if anything exacerbated the "parallel lives" problem. Other factors have played a role: the sheer size of some minority communities which has made it easier to live apart in "little Pakistan", and so on; the rising influence of a conservative Islam; the growth of trans-national "commuting" diasporas with a purely instrumental attitude to the European home. And unlike America, where hard work acts as an integrating force, Europe's generous welfare states have created too many immigrant dependants (especially in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany), triggering resentment among mainstream taxpayers.

There is, of course, good immigration too. Supporters point to the creativity and dynamism of many young migrants, their willingness to do dirty or under-rewarded jobs (like caring) that few natives want, their slowing of Europe's ageing process. But these benefits would have to be very large, and demonstrable, to compensate for the cultural and social disruption caused by over-rapid immigration.

And they are not. Almost all the economic analyses of mass immigration in recent years have found that the effect on employment, wages and per head growth is marginal. Similarly, on the question of fiscal benefit, productive immigrants like Poles probably pay in more than they take out, but less productive ones like Somalis (in Britain, only 25% of them work) do the opposite.

Moreover, costs and benefits are unevenly distributed: employers and richer people benefit, as do many consumers and, of course, immigrants themselves. But low-skilled workers (often recent migrants) face lower wages, and while immigrants create as well as take jobs, the creating takes longer than the taking. Because it is concentrated at the top and bottom, mass immigration reinforces inequality and reduces social mobility (one-third of professional jobs in London are taken by people born outside Britain). It adds to urban congestion, increases pressure on public services and housing, and discourages employers from training, especially hard-to-reach youngsters such as those who have been busy looting in recent days in London.

No sensible person wants a complete halt to immigration, but Europe needs a slowdown to absorb the large inflows of recent decades (like America's "pause" from 1920 to 1965) and Denmark's experience shows it is possible. There will be some economic costs of a slowdown, but if democratic politics fails to deal with this existential issue on which there is such a settled popular will the resulting backlash will threaten many of the achievements of the past 30 years.

One such achievement, in Britain at least, is the sharp decline in overt racism. Young people now have very liberal views on race and gender but they have become much less generous on welfare, poverty and redistribution. That is not just because of the mishandling of mass immigration—affluence and individualism play a role too. But that makes it even more important to rein in mass immigration before Europe loses its unique balance between individual rights and mutual obligation and increasingly comes to resemble the United States.