Lecture nine: The Decline of Detente and the'Second' Cold War, 1973-85

So last week we looked at the moves towards détente in Europe and between the United States and the Soviet Union. During that period we saw three important treaties being signed (two multilateral and one bilateral) regarding limitations of arms and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. We also saw how the Sino-Soviet split and Nixon’s opening in China altered considerably the international scene. Finally we looked at moves towards détente in Europe with France and Romania forging increasingly independent paths in West and East and moves by West Germany towards détente with East Germany under the W. German chancellor Willy Brandt. This week we’re going to see how fragile détente was between the Soviet and the United States in the years 1972-80 as mistrust was ripe between the two powers and showed that in some respects nothing was really solved by SALT I. The move away from détente was led by the United States who didn’t trust the Soviets moves in less developed countries and SALT became a rather dirty word in some quarters. In Europe however détente did rather better business as the postive effects of peaceful coexistence were experienced on both sides of the Iron curtain. Détente between the US and Soviets did however end in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan bringing a second cold war – epitomised by the Policies of Ronald Reagan and his Star Wars project. We will end the lecture in 1985 just before the coming to power of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.

Ok so let’s have a look at the rundown of the lecture. First of all we’re going to look at one of the earliest signs that détente was deeply flawed with the Soviet-US disagreement over the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 when both sides once more took the opposite side. That said the 1970s did see some positive co-operation between both sides and we will have a look at them in the next section. We will then look at issues in the middle of the 1970s in the third world which shook US-Soviet attempts at détente as both sides supported various in conflicts in the developing world – including Chiles, Angola and Vietnam. We will then look at American issues with détente in the mid to late 1970s as they gradually turned their back on the policy, this will include a look at the slightly confused foreign policy of the new American President from 1976 onwards, Jimmy Carter (and his relations with Brezhnev). We will then look at definitive moves away from détente which was symbolised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which led to first Carter and then in dramatic style Reagan to restart the Cold War. We will look at Reagan’s policies and other issues which destabilised the world between 1981-1985. I will then offer some conclusions.

Ok so let’s have a look at one of the earliest instances where détente was called into question, remember that at Moscow the two sides had agreed to the basic principles which, amongst other things had stated peaceful coexistence, mutual equality, restraint during crises, avoiding confrontation, no use of force. People at the time had been worried about their practical application. Crisis in the middle east in late October 1973 illustrated these issues. We didn’t go into it too much but in 1967 as part of the six day war had successfully defeated a host of arab powers (including Egypt, Syria and Jordan) who refused to recognise its existence (in this war remember the US had supported Israel and the Soviets had supported the Arab countries). As part of the war the Israelis had occupied West Bank, Gaza strip, Golan Heights and other nearby areas (parts of Jordan, Egypt and Syria). The new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sought to put the Middle East situation back on the map again and cement Egypt’s position as the head of the Arab states. Thus he, along with Syrian support decided to attack Israel – this situation brought about a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. One of the worst challenges since 1962, it challenged the idea of détente and the basic principles. What was the basic chronology of the 1973 war? (sometimes called the Yom Kippur war as it occurred at the time of the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur). The war lasted for three weeks.

During the war (like in that of 1967) the Soviets supported the Arab powers and the US supported Israel. Sadat had signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971 and the Soviets were supplying Egypt with arms. Despite more independent policies by Sadat in 1972 and the Soviets lack of support for the Yom Kippur war, the Soviets still remained on the side of the Arab powers. The US continued to be staunchly behind the Israeli cause.

Firstly Egpyt and Syria attacked Israel on the 6^th of October, initially the attack by the Arab powers was very successful. The attack straight away brought up and unpleasant situation between the Soviets and the Americans. The US was annoyed that the Soviets had not warned them about Sadat’s desire to attack Israel (Young suggests however that the Soviets only knew about the attack several days before). Despite professions of innocence bad taste left in the mouth of the Americans.

The worst confrontation between East and West was at the end of the war. By the second week of the war the Israelis had turned the tide against the Arab powers (via the help of regular US airlifts), and both Soviets and Americans were alarmed by the violence in the region. The Soviets and the Americans worked together to bring about a ceasefire, which Kissinger was able to officially bring about by the 23 of October. According to the Soviets however the fighting had not come to an end, with the Israelis not keeping to the terms of the ceasefire. As a result of this Brezhnev and the Soviets threatened to intervene militarily in order to bring about the end of the war. The US was not happy with the Soviets threat to use force in the area – leading to a tense standoff between the two great powers on the 25-6 of October. In the end the Soviets did not employ their troops, in fact they were surprised at the anxious response of the Americans to the Soviet threat.

The Soviet threat to use force and their lack of warning of the attack not appreciated by the US, also the Soviets arming of the Arabs not appreciated

Challenge to the idea of détente – 12 principles.

The aftermath of the war further undermined Soviet-US relations. As the US moved to achieve peace in the region without the Soviets. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy – moves between Middle Eastern capitals –seeking to achieve a peace deal. Kissinger reestablishes links with Egypt and able to reopen the Suez canal in 1975. The Soviets responded to being excluded from the peace deal by further supporting the arab states and even recognising the Palestine Liberation Authority.

Serious threat to détente but the Soviets had shown restraint – détente not dead yet – but challenged.

There was however examples of détente in the 1970s – it wasn’t all about tension between the two powers and challenges to the twelve principles. There were also encouraging continuation of détente in Europe (when added to the moves by Brandt at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s)

A number of signs of the continuation of Moscow. First of all in July 1975 the Soviet Union and the USA ran their promised space mission (as part of the Moscow summit). This was important as it marked the end of the space race between the two powers which had developed since the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957.

Secondly the Soviet Union and the US took part in annual summits between 1973-5, where they discussed issues relating to world security, again showing the two powers were willing to negotiate and continue détente.

As part of the détente deal as you will remember there was to be progress towards a second Salt deal, it was to be signed within 5 years of the Moscow summit, remember that the USA had criticised it for its lack of equal ceilings. Discussions start over Salt II in November 1972, but n 1973 discussions got bogged down regarding the issue of ‘equal ceilings’, Soviets don’t want to give this up – especially as British, French and Chinese nuclear missiles on the Soviets. But by mid 1974 realisation Soviets need to back down – November 1974 equal ceilings deal (Vladivostock) in principle Kissinger says 90% of treaty done – should be signed 1975 – however the extra 10% very difficult – attacks on the US administration regarding the deal. Disagreements over new nuclear capabilities and missiles. US cruise and Soviet backfire bombers The new US president (from 1976) Jimmy Carter Carter and Salt II, Carter seeks lower ceilings then Vladivostok in 1977 – Brezhnev opposed to this move, Only in September 1977 did Carter accept Vladivostok again

By the late 1970s Salt II is criticised in the States, we will have a look at this later – but still open discussion over problems.

The greatest moves towards détente were however in Europe – the height of which were the Helsinki accords of 1975

Why did détente continue in Europe? In the West – détente continues as US loses moral support due to Vietnam, division of Europe, fear of Nuclear war all important in this way, continuing diversity in Eastern Europe, stay close to Moscow but do things their own way

Some examples of this diversity – Romania continued to work with the Chinese, despite the Sino-Soviet split and in 1971 they joined the GATT (the forerunner of the WTO), Hungary also moved towards the West, in 1973 they joined GATT and they became a member of the IMF in 1982.

Détente in the 1970s – allows the East to receive technology from the West, investment from Western banks, positive with governments in the East and for the West détente was also positive. This was not just because of the relief of tension but also was a strategy by the United States. East Europeans weaned away from Communism through contact which would increase awareness of the economic benefits in the West. Nixon had supported it by trips to Romania in 1969 and Poland in 1972, this continued by extending Most favoured nation – 1975 Romania and Hungary 1978 (In effect, a country that has been accorded MFN status may not be treated less advantageously than any other country with MFN status by the promising country.)

Western trade and tourism as well as treaties such as Helsinki – opened the East up to disruptive influences. Socio-economic success in the East base for the regimes in the East – when this started to fail legitimacy goes in the East (dangerous effects on the East eventually – end of the 1970s). Issues with détente and by the end of the 1970s these become especially clear.  Eastern bloc countries owe 70 billion to Western banks 1979, especially high levels of debt in Poland and Hungary

But let’s look at some specific examples of European détente –

1)Ostpolitik - Continuing improvement of relations West and East Germany after Brandt’s moves at the end of the 1970s, remember West Germany concluded Treaties with Poland and USSR in late 1970 (some criticism of Ostpolitik – especially from Christian Democrats – consider it an acceptance of the division of Germany)

Several ways it continued – firstly treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1973 – acceptance of Sudetenland as being part of the Cz/sk.

Also moves regarding East Germany – We saw in the seminar – Brandt’s Two Germanies in one nation – accept the division for now but that reunification in the long run would happen Eventually would lead to the end of the division of Germany

Remember September 1971 – Berlin deal – West get access to West Berlin – confirmed – further movements - Communications agreements signed in late 1971 and early 1972, Leads to a Basic Treaty December 1972 West Germany recognised East Germany,  important move

Both of them in the United Nations in 1974, Division of Germany an accepted fact of European life, Helmut Schmidt continues Brandt’s policy – has to resign in 1974 – as East German spy in his private office

In addition to Ostpolitik the height of European détente came with the Helsinki accords in 1975

Multilateral summit July-August 1975 – European states and US/Canada – important agreements: Three baskets:

1. Basket one 1)Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of others, 2)Respect for human rights, 3)Eastern borders inviable (something that states had been worried about in the East for a long time – end of Western revanchism). Idea of peaceful change accepted

Basket two - Economic, commercial, cultural and scientific forms of co-operation, Large growth in the 1970s of West-East European trade, But the East was being undermined by Economic contact with the West

Basket three - Respect for human rights, exchanges of visits, free flow of information and ideas, Soviets agree for other gains (other baskets) but West hopes this individual freedom idea, human rights would bring about political evolution in the Eastern bloc, East European dissident groups strengthened – how far could they push the accords?

Consequences of Helsinki – important moves for European détente – but criticised on a number of levels -

1) Criticised in the West as being an acceptance of Soviet domination in the East (inviability of borders)

2) US criticism the Soviet union wouldn’t reform human rights (Soviets end the Helsinki monitoring group in 1976_) – Gerald Ford who replaced Nixon as a result of the Watergate scandal was attacked by the democrats (Carter) for being too weak on the Soviets (cricitisms of détente in the US) More later

But – seen positively in Europe in general - Greater personal contacts, trade and tourism with the East as a result of Helsinki, West not seen as a direct military threat

The exchanges Called into question the command economy, high military expenditure and the totalitarian state

Specifically important aspect of Helsinki was the human rights element – Eastern European dissident movements used these clauses to push for changes within their countries, Charter 77 in the Czech republic – 200 signatures – human rights

And in Poland KOR (Committee of the defence of the workers) and Solidarity used this against the Communists – brings about the downfall of the regime?

The Helsinki accords also provided for a follow up conference regarding it in 1977 in Belgrade where various issues were discussed

End of 1977 détente strong in Europe, criticism in the states

So we have seen there was a development of criticism in the United States regarding détente, this surrounded Soviet roles in the Middle East war in 1973 and a not tough enough line in the Helsinki accord discussions. Let’s have a look at some more issues in the third world and their effects on Soviet-US relations. In some respects events in other parts of the world increased American suspicion regarding Soviet beliefs in détente and weakened their resolve to support it. This in many ways was due to different understandings of détente on the side of the Americans and the Soviets – American believed that détente was to occur all around the world and that the twelve principles should be maintained. The Soviets believed that conflict was inevitable in parts of the third world and believed they had the right to support liberation movements wherever they were. We will see that this was one of the main problems facing détente until it ended in 1980 (sort of ironic in some ways as the Americans were just as happy to support non-communists in the developing world but when they Communists did it it was somewhat worse – double standards).

So let’s look at a couple of major events during 1973-6 which deepened the US’ worries about détente

1)Chile – here it was more irritation on the side of the Soviets regarding US actions. We saw how Salvador Allende, Marxist had become Chilean president in 1970, opposed by the US (strategic backyard), 1970 onwards US worried about nationalisation policies in the country, cuts off aid, growing discontent in Chile. Allende toppled in September 1973 by right-wing army coup – general pinochet US not directly linked to his downfall but Economic pressure on Chile and support of the Chilean military, also undercover CIA operations there (US willing to intervene)

US less successful in parts of East Asia – where Communism seemed to spread ominously during this period – US forces had left Vietnam in 1973 as part of a peace deal, US still support the South Vietnamese army – but the country in severe turmoil by the mid 1970s

 By early 1975 the North Vietnamese took control and by April 1975 a united Vietnam formed, Land reform, industrialisation Ho Chi Minh city, US cut off all aid to Vietnam (Vietnam turns communist and Soviet Union becomes a main ally – China seen as an old enemy by the Vietnamese)

In Cambodia the situation also went badly for the US  Cambodia Pol Pot’s Communist Khmer Rouge take power in Cambodia in April 1975, Pol Pot – emptying of Phnom Penh – genocide against upper and middle classes – by 1978 – 2 million had died – killing fields Khmer Rouge leave power in 1978 – but keep fighting, throughout the 1980s Cambodia was a Communist country

Laos – Pathet Lao in Laos (communist party supported by the Soviet Union) succeeded in civil war against the Laos monarchy which was backed by the United States

So Communists had gained power in three South East Asian countries (not all a disaster for the United States – Communism doesn’t succeed in Thailand).

The situation in Angola illustrated the limitations in détente between US and the Soviet Union in the developing world ideally

Carnation revolution in Portugal in 1974, removes the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal, what was to happen with its empire – Angola, (now Guinnea Bissau) and Mozambique. In all three places there were civil wars in the aftermath of Portuguese rule. In Mozambique the FRELIMO movement fought in a war of independence against the Portugues from 1962 onwards. FRELIMO took power in 1975 on independence and became a Marxist party in 1977.

Guinnea Bissau was able to achieve independence in 1974 from the Portuguese and the PAIGC party also became a member of the Socialist international.

It was in Angola where the Soviets and America really clashed – Angola was the wealthiest of Portugal’s colonies and was thus the most important in the post-independence situation. Clash between two main political movements in Angola FNLA vs MPLA. From the mid 1960s MPLA links to Soviet Union and Cuba. Chinese supported the FNLA in the 1970s – supported with arms from 1973 onwards

As the Portuguese dictatorship fell a power vacuum opens up, External aid transforms the situation in the country

Soviets and Cubans support the MPLA 1975 onwards, Soviet military aid very important for the MPLA – Expel FNLA from the capital in July 1975

the US then grants aid to both the FNLA with the Chinese

January 1976 – 14,000 Cuban troops in Angola and Soviet Aid , MPLA victorious – US fail with the FNLA

Turning point regarding détente – Cold War more important than co-operation – Shows the clash of the two powers – nothing has really changed

So now let’s look a bit more closely at US opposition to détente – or growing doubts – these were the beginnings of what is called neoconservatism, a movement which would support Reagan’s policies and George W Bush after 2001. These Neocons were democrats who began to criticise the new left and anti anticommunism (those who had opposed US policy in Vietnam)

They criticised détente for a number of reasons:

Conservatives

 

1)See Salt I as favouring the Soviets – they have higher limits of weapons

2)Irritated by the Soviets in Middle East, Angola and Vietnam, seem to be following their own policies

3)Saw Soviets advancing in the developing world, sewing seeds of Nato decline and seeking nuclear superiority – worried about the Soviet threat

4)Believe that Moscow about spreading Marxism – détente meant nothing

 Important neocon academic - Richard Pipes criticism of Détente – Confrontation in the developed world instead of in the West, relaxed tension at the same time as pursuing a major rearmament program

Patriotic anti-Communism – starts to rise

A second important thing for the détente doubters – the fall of Nixon via Watergate, 1974 Two important bad things for 1)Link to Nixon – Watergate fucks peoples beliefs up about Détente, 2)Removal of leading right wing politician who was trusted by the Kremlin and able to convince US republicans that it was good to work with the Soviets

War powers act –is a federal law intended to check the power of the President in committing the United States to an armed conflict without the consent of Congress, 1973 

The 1976 election showed the general lack of faith in détente – Gerald Ford – who replaced Nixon didn’t even want to mention it in his election campaign

Criticism of détente from both right and left – the left looked at Nixon’s foreign policy as immoral as it had supported the immoral, human rights abusing regimes of the Soviets and the Chinese

US saw Helsinki as not strong enough regarding human rights and too accepting of the Soviet borders

Ronald Regan – who took up the ideas of the neoconservatives saw détente as a way of attacking the Washington establishment and attacking Kissinger

For Carter, who would become the new president in 1976, he was a democrat he focused on the principles of human rights, an issue which ran counter to the idea of détente – détente accepted there would be change sometime in the future, human rights was interfering directly in the sovereignty of the Soviet Union – so détente had taken a lot of hits by the later 1970s in the States

So let’s have a look at the relationship between Carter the new president and Brezhnev. In general Carter has been criticised for his foreign policy. Incoherent, misguided and at the mercy of events. The Conservative Brezhnev’s foreign policy as we have seen was based on peaceful coexistence and détente, but at the same time as the support for liberation movements in other parts of the world. Brezhnev was confused by Carter’s policies – (as was the rest of the world). Work between the two men was not very smooth, completely different to the way that Nixon and Brezhnev had worked.

There were two main ways that Carter’s policies hurt détente

1. Carter continued to talk about human rights – an issue which would never be supported by the Kremlin who were still involved in a tight security regime and in putting down dissidents in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Human rights and détente didn’t really go together.

More of a moral foreign policy – US not to support dictators as much, Criticises apartheid in white south Africa

(At the same time there was an Ambigous element to his foreign policy – US still supports many immoral regimes – we will look at relations with China in a minute). Brezhnev was not happy with Carter’s discussion of human rights.

2)Second level of confusion of Carter’s policy was his lack of decision regarding his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Securrity Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski

Vance, Brzezinski one more happy to continue Détente – the other more happy to be conflictual with the Soviets – especially in the developing world

Brzezinski tough anti-communism dominates over Vance in the end by 1980 – aim to rescue the hostages in 1979-80

But for the first four years a mixture of détente and anti-communism at the top of the US hierarchy

A further cause for the United States to cast off détente was the continued interference of the Soviets in the developing world

One case of this was the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1978-9 –

Somalis claim the Ogden desert region of Southern Ethiopia, Somalia overruns most of the Ogden region

Soviets had supported both sides – but eventually supports the Ethiopians – late 1977 massive arms to Ethiopia, Early 1978 15, 000 and 1,500 Soviet troops enter to save the Ethiopians

US criticise the Soviet actions – but they had been careful not to go over the borders. By later 1978 – Brzezinski tries to state that the Soviets détente in the West, liberation in the East + large arms build up – B warns about the Soviets – Vance continues to state the importance of détente and Salt II

Another incoherence to Carter’s foreign policy – moves forwards with normalisation with China – After Mao’s death – Den Xaopeng, seeks modernisation of China, decentralisation, production of consumer goods and trade with the West

Carter ready to normalise relations with China – diplomatic recognition

Vance to Beijing August 1977 – Chinese unhappy about Salt II – seek US to be tougher on the Soviets, B takes control, visits China in 1978 – anti-Soviet statements – military secrets, Normalisation – official in March 1979 – embassies open up (hypocrisy of Carter? CGL)

 

Sino-American relations effect Soviet-US détente, Deng to USA 1979 – trade discussions – US intelligence gathering against the Chinese Soviets annoyed with American moves with China

Further Chinese-Soviet tensions in Vietnam – 1978 – Soviets worry about encirclement in the region as China and Japan normalise relations in the late 1970s, so they support the Vietnamese in the region

Chinese support Pol Pot in Cambodia, Vietnamese invade Cambodia – Pol Pot forced out, China invades Vietnam in 1979 (Vietnam repulses the Chinese)– Americans know about the attack on Vietnam in advance but don’t tell the Soviets, Soviets more and more critical of détente – Americans and China

Still discussion of Salt II – only hint that détente still going on

Vladivostok deal 1974 on equal ceilings – discussions continue - May 1979 Final treaty text to be agreed, Signed in June 1979 – Vienna – equal ceilings and controlling mirVs

No other agreements- Brezhnev criticises the US over China – Carter – the Soviets over their human rights record

 Soviets ratify it quickly – Carter doesn’t prepare the ground well enough – opponents can attack the treaty, Senate believe that things moving in Moscow’s direction – no control of Backfire bombers, Delay to SALT II in late 1979 due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

So let’s look at the actions which finally brought about the end of détente. This can be seen in the Soviets decision to invade Afhganistan in December 1979. 25 December 1979 Red Army ground troops invade Afghanistan, within weeks 80,000 troops to Afghanistan (negative American reaction to what happened – look at this later – discussions about Soviet expansionism – US worries about their sources of Oil in the Persian gulf region)> Brings about Second Cold War – Brzezinski gains the upper hand, Reagan would expand on these issues to create the second cold War between 1980 and 1985.