Lecture 10, 1985 – 1991

So last week we looked at the gradual move away from détente between the United States and the Soviet Union as the 1970s moved onwards. This was caused by the fall from grace of Richard Nixon, along with right and left wing critiques of the détente policy. In addition American policy makers looked with irritation at Soviet moves in the third world which seemed to disprove détente. The Soviet war in Afhghanistan ended détente and 1980-1985 saw a renewed cold war with tension over arms once more, increasingly aggressive language from Ronald Reagan and the weakening of the Soviet Union through a succession of old and infirm leaders, a weak economy and social movements like Solidarity in Poland. In 1985 however Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, a young, dynamic leader he attempted to reform the country which was economically and politically suffering, with his combined policies of Glasnost (openness) and perestroika (rebuilding). In the field of foreign policy Gorbachev took the initiative and pushed for an end to the Cold War, arms reductions and co-operation with the West. Gorbachev aimed to reform but his policies started a chain of events which led to the end of the Cold War when Communist countries in Eastern Europe fell in 1989 and eventually the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. We are going to look at the events which brought about the end of the Cold War.

First of all we’re going to look at the initial impact of Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985, what were his policies at home and abroad and why were they so different to what had gone before? We will then move on to how his policies played out on the international stage, with initial uncertain relations as Reagan and Gorbachev sought to work out the other’s aims, to the success of the INF treaty of 1987 where the US and USSR agreed to a degree of arms reduction. We will then move on to the Soviet retreat in the third world, firstly regarding the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to a generally peaceful position in Africa and in South-East Asia. We will then look at renewed initial suspicion between the new US president George Bush senior in 1989 and Gorbachev which turned into Bush’s support for the younger man. We will then look at the moves which finally ended the cold war – the removal of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the End of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the end I will offer some explanations regarding the End of the Cold War and some conclusions.

Ok so first let’s have a look at the impact that Gorbachev made at home and abroad when he succeeded Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985. Gorbachev was to be the last Soviet leader but no-one would have expected it when he came to power.

Gorbachev was very young compared to the previous general secretaries – he was 54 when he came to power. Part of a body of USSR opinion determined to break from the stagnation of the Brezhnev era, look at economic and political problems in the country, corruption – over centralised planning. In addition he sought to adopt a less doctrinal foreign policy, less ideological . Caution at first, discussions about openness and technological innovation.

Glasnost and perestroika from the early days of his reign (openness and restructuring) – aime tto reform communism, make it work better. Organizational changes and better incentives for workers initially, replacement of leading officials in February 1986, freeing of dissidents, increased respect for human rights. Pace of reform moves quicker in 1987 – limited use of elections at a local level, alternatives to communism, nationalism begins to stir in the Soviet Union. Soviet Union’s gravedigger?

Mixed messages initially regarding foreign policy – Initial announcements regarding nuclear arms control (this was nothing new compared to the Brezhnev era). Continued support of Communist groups in Afghanistan, Cuba, Vietnam and Nicaragua 1985-7.

But in general there was a more determined approach from Gorbachev regarding détente. He sought better relations with the West, initial calls for nuclear disarmament and something akin to peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev and his foreign minister (the moderate Eduard Shevardnadze) believed in a ‘new diplomacy’ ‘ a less confrontational stance towards the outside world would provide greater security than endless rearming’ So the West has someone it can deal with.

‘The new diplomacy’ called for tensions to be lowered on a global scale. This meant pulling back from the successful positions the Soviet Union held in the third world from the 1970s onwards. October 1985 Gorbachev had called for an early withdrawal from Afghanistan. The less developed world, in oposition to Brezhnev, was relatively unimportant to Gorbachev (although he continued to aid movements there). Willing to make concessions in the developing world. Not prepared at all costs to finance left-wing movements there.

Thirdly Gorbachev (and perhaps most crucially) was willing to revise former Soviet positions regarding Eastern Europe. Remember Brezhnev was famous for his doctrine which stated the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would intervene if socialist countries in the bloc moved towards Capitalism.

Gorbachev had a very different attitude. He believed that Eastern Europe was a serious strain on Soviet resources but also that it was an embarassment regarding Soviet dealings with the West. Soviets police the region and provide cheap oil supplies and favourable trade deals.

So his police was the Sinatra doctrine that Eastern European countries could do it ‘their way’ – decide the path they wanted to follow, glasnost and perestroika were to be followed there as well. Striking change.

However important to state that Gorbachev was an idealist – he did not hope for the end of the USSR just wanted it to work better. Seen as a great man in the West as he brought about the end of Communism, in the Soviet Union he was seen as a failure as he didn’t protect its security and his reforms failed

Let’s have a look at some of the key events in the move towards the end of the Cold War. When Gorbachev came to power, he had the reputation of being a reformer. Margaret Thatcher in 1984 stated that he was someone that she could work with. And for a hardline anti-Communist this was quite a statement. This had an important impact on Washington-Moscow relations as she could act as a go between. Reagan in his second term (in stark contrast to his first term) wanted to make his reputation as a peacemaker and lower the dangers of nuclear war. All of these things suggested that relations between East and West had the potential to develop well. Indeed Gorbachev announced a freeze in April 1985 of deployments of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe. In August G announces a Moratorium on nuclear testing. In May 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan agreed to meet up for a summit in Geneva in November 1985. September 1985 Shevardnadze proposed halfing both powers nuclear arsenals but this was linked to the issue of Reagan’s SDI nuclear program (Star Wars). G sought that SDI be shelved as there was a clear link between defensive nuclear power and offensive nuclear weapons.

But a relatively friendly environment between G and Reagan in November 1985 in Geneva – nothing really worked out, Reagan offers to share SDI with the Soviets – good working relationship between the two heads of state – Reagan finally feels there is a leader he can talk to, turning point in US-Soviet relations.

Confusion in the White House over G’s policies – throughout 1986 G takes the initiative in foreign policy – January 1986 letter to Reagan, offers to eleminate INF in Europe and all nuclear weapons by the end of the century – this was however linked to SDI – G wanted Reagan to get rid of it. Gorbachev shows he is willing to work with the west – taking the initiative – however Washington won’t budge on the issue of SDI. Agreement in September 1986 that there was going to be a second summit in Rekjavik (interim summit) in October 1986.

At the same time there was continued tension in the US-Soviet relationship

Firstly this regarded the Soviet position in Afghanistan. Gorbachev sought withdrawal as mentioned before, however he did not want it to be seen as a defeat for the USSR. He also wanted to strengthen the position of the Communist Kabul government before leaving and appease hard-line Soviets. 1985-6 G orders Red Army offensives – use of special forces. Laying of mines. High civilian casualties. This pushed the US to fund the Mujahadeen further – 630 million dollars of aifd in 1986. Anti-Aircraft missiles to the Mujahadeen. Continued conflict in the region.

In addition the US continued to show they would intervene in the third world – clash between Gaddafi and Reagan as Gaddafi was very anti-Israeli, supported extremist groups in Palestine, Syria, aligned himself with the Soviets. In April 1986 Libyan agents exploded a bomb in a West Berlin discotheque, killing 3 and injuring 220 people (79 Us servicemen). IN revenge the US bombed Libya. Soviets were annoyed at this (stirring up trouble in the third world). and Sheverdnadze cancelled a trip to Washington in May 1986.

Another sign that there were still issues between the two powers could be seen towards the end of 1986 at Rekjavik in Iceland

Throughout 1986 Gorbachev had linked Soviet disarmament plans to Reagan’s abandonment of SDI. In October 1986 the two leaders met in Iceland. Gorbachev again took the initiative proposed halving their arsenals and the INF treaty as well as making Abm treaty for 10 years instead of five. G would accept even onsite verification if the US would budge over SDI. But Reagan won’t move – conference ends in failure and recrimination. G wants to continue with the hardline and into early 1987 realtions between the two powers strained. Rumours about further SDI deployment. One good thing from Rekjavik – G realises that US will not budge over SDI so G moves towards work on INF away from SDI. Things moving in a positive direction, despite tensions. Scene was set for the end of the cold war.

Still worries about the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1987, it was still a strongly centralised state and people didn’t believe that G would give up the Soviet

Union’s well-earned position of strength. But Gorbachev initated what might be called perestroika mark two in 1987, further and deeper element of reform. Economic reform in early 1988, state enterprises were to be more efficient and making their own business plans, decetralisation. Mid 1988 an element of choice in elections to a Congress of People’s deputies in 1989 – movement against these reforms from Soviet hardliners. Reforms lead to anti-Communist and Nationalist elements in the Soviet Union rising – unravelling of the Soviet system.

In foreign policy from the 1987 continued searching of détente with the West – expansion of Communism worldwide was no longer a priority. Reduction of defence spending and a pulling away from conflict in the Third World. Gorbachev didn’t intend to bring about the fall of the Soviet Union but he didn’t defend its positions very well.

Let’s now look at the INF treaty which was signed in December 1987 between the US and the Soviets. So as I was saying G due to Rekjavik changes his policy regarding SDI, this was less important for the Soviet Leader. This movement for INF to be delinked from SDI meant there was more space for the two leaders to agree. G realised the US would not give up SDI – letter to Reagan January-February 1987. this was immediately seen as a positive thing by Reagan.

Plans to meet up and agree an INF deal. Which would destroy INF weapons and agree to on-site verification. European leaders agreed to some sort of deal in May 1987 (Helmut Kohl of Germany agreed to dispose of West Germany’s Pershing 1A missiles).

Washingto treaty an important landmark – agreed to a number of important things. Firstly it was a concrete return to coexistence and détente – although to the Reagan administration détente was a dirty word.

Secondly reduced tensions in Europe – although some in NATO felt it harmed its deterrance measures. What were the exact agreements at the INF treaty?

1)A real cut in nuclear arsenals not like SALT which only limited nuclear arms production and produced ceilings.

2)Eliminated all INF systems in Europe and Asia – missiles between 500-5,500.

3) Losses of weapons -

4)Agreed on-site verification

5)Still it only affected 6-7% of nuclear arsenals. Stil an important deal.

Aftermath of INF, Washington and Moscow good relations – Summit agreed End of May-Early June 1988 – Reagan and Gorbachev. No real agreements but a very positive environment between the two leaders. Very different from the ‘Empire of Evil’ five years previously.

Gorbachev speaks to the UN late 1988 – first time since K in 1960. Talks of independence, freedom, promises of conventional arms reductions. Marxist-Leninism not an absolute truth. So movement towards the end of the Cold War – not there yet.

Let’s now look at other reasons which showed that g was pushing for an end of the Cold War and proved more and more that the United States could work with him and the Soviet Union

We have seen how Gorbachev’s ultimate aim was to pull Soviet forces out of Afghanistan, however he wanted to support the Commuunists there still, so conflict and tension still existed in the area. G was still preparing for ultimate withdrawal. In May 1986 Gorbachev replaced Babrak Karmal with the more moderate Mohammed Najibullah, who recognised the Communists could not win the war, prepared to reach a settlement with their opponents. Offered a ceasefire, opponents into government and a new constitution agreed in 1987.

1987 saw the Afghanisation of the army – preparations for Soviet departure – in addition there were continued discussion in Geneva between Afghanistan and Pakistan governments regarding a peace deal.

In February 1988 G announced that he aimed to pull out troops by May 1989. This led to a peace agreement being signed in April 1988 in Geneva. Very important agreement – against the wishes of most Soviet politicians and the Afghanistan Communists, even many American figures were not sure of supporting a settlement as they saw the Afghan war as a way to bleed the Soviets dry.

Important agreements – read through the different accords – Important for the Soviets to say to the US that they had changed but some negative elements of it.

4-6 million refugees repatriated 1988-90

US could still supply the Mijahadeen until the Soviets stopped supplying the Afghan communists (which both didn’t do)

2) Soviets basically were not confirming a peace but basically meant Civil war continued – good chance the Communist would lose – this eventually happens in 1992

So the Soviets were showing the West they were not just prepared to co-operate but to go over and above this. But last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan in February 1989 – important move. The classic Soviet war that had undermined détente fatally was thus over. Important obstacle to the end of the Cold War had disappeared. The Soviet also moved to remove tension in other parts of the Cold War – in areas which had provoked tension in the 1970’s and early 1980s.

Firstly let’s have a look at the situation in Africa. The main problem here in the 1980s was the tying of the Civil war in Angola to the situation in neighbouring Namibia. The problem in Namibia was the prevention of independence in the country by SouthAfrican occupation. The UN put pressure on South Africa to deal with SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization who the UN considered the voice of the Namibian people. South Africa supported the UNITA party which fought against the Marxist MPLA in Angolan civil war. Throughout the 1980s the two (Namibia and Angola issues linked).

Soviets fund the Cubans who maintain 40,000 troops in Angola, South Africans and us support Unita in Angola.

By early 1988 G pushes the Cubans to talk to the US and the Angolans – by 1988 SA and Angola government willing to talk.

May 1988 deal Cubans to leave Angola if South Africans left Namibia. South Africans pull troops out of Angola, plan for Cuba to pull out by 1990. Fornal agreement in December 1988.

Namibia becomes independent in 1990, Cuban troops leave Angola. But civil war continues throughout the 1990s in Angola – US support UNITA. But still Soviets prepared to broker deals.

Finally let’s look at Cambodia – We saw in a previous lecture the removal of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia by a Vietnamese force which set up government in the area under Hun Sen. Khmer Rouge still dangerous. Attempts to broker a peace deal in the mid 1980s. By the late 1980s Soviets under G put pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw to relax tensions between East and West. Vietnam withdrawals in 1987 and 1988. Continued peace talks in 1988 – Soviets put pressure on the Vietnamese and they agree to pull out their troops by September 1989. Ceasefire and a new interim government, repatriation of refugees and foreign aid agreed.