2.5 Причастие 2. Participle 2

Past Participle(Participle II) - неличная форма глагола (3-я форма неправильных глаголов), имеет одну неизменяемую форму со страдательным значением и обозначает действие, которое испытывает на себе лицо или предмет. Оно соответствует в русском языке причастию страдательного залога.

Past Participleправильных глаголов имеет ту же форму, что иPast Simple, и образуется при помощи прибавления суффикса-edк основе глагола to ask - asked,to help - helped.

Подобно причастию I, причастие II обладает свойствами глагола, прилагательного и наречия. Как и глагол, оно обозначает действие. Время действия, обозначаемое причастием II, определяется временем действия глагола-сказуемого или контекстом.

The book discussed yesterday was interesting. Книга,обсуждавшаясявчера, была интересной.The books discussed at the lessons are always interesting. Книги, обсуждаемые на уроках, всегда интересны.

В предложении причастие IIможет быть:

1. Определением.

Lost time is never found again. Потерянное время никогда не вернёшь (дословно - не найти).A written letter lay on the table. Написанное письмо лежало на столе. They are reconstructing the house built in the 18^th century. Они реставрируют здание,построенноев 18 веке.

2. Обстоятельством.Перед причастием II в функции обстоятельства могут стоять союзы if, unless, when. В таком случае английское причастие переводится обстоятельственным придаточным предложением, в котором подлежащее то же, что и в главном предложении.

If built of the local stone, the road will serve for years. Если построить дорогу(Если дорога построена) из местного камня, она будет служить долгие годы.

Задание 6. Переведите предложения на русский язык и определите вид причастия.

1. Knowing English, he’ll be able to translate a newspaper article without a dictionary.

2. While being examined, the boy couldn’t help crying.

3. Being busy, he postponed the trip.

4. Arriving at the station, I called a porter.

5. Having worked for this company for many years, he couldn’t leave.

6. The large building being built in this street is our new office.

7. Being packed in strong cases, the goods arrived in good condition.

8. This firm is interested in the purchase of automobiles produced by our plant.

9. The ship chartered by the buyers will arrive next week.

10. Having been sent to the wrong address, the letter didn’t reach him.

11. They sent us a list of goods imported by that firm.

12. The man sitting at the window is my boss.

13. While drawing up a contract, it is necessary to give a detailed description of the goods.

14. He sat at the table thinking.

15. Stones thrown into the water go to the bottom.

16. The stone thrown by the boy reached the opposite bank.

17. People managing a firm are called top managers.

18. Taking all the documents he left the room.

19. The documents taken by the secretary were lost.

20. Here is the letter received yesterday.

Раздел III

Тексты для самостоятельного чтения

(ко всем текстам должен быть составлен словарь незнакомых слов)

Text 1 The Bologna process

In recent years the European Union has fostered competition in markets for capital and goods. The European Commission planned to create a knowledge-based European economy. So they introduced a scheme called the Bologna process, which is designed to make it easier to compare courses between countries, and to move between them.

Before that marking schemes in European countries were different. The standardized Euro-grades were from A (excellent) to F (fail). Some used to stick to a two-level system of pass and fail, with one extra level “pass with distinction”. In England student achievement is measured in terms of hours spent in seminars and lectures.

The Bologna process is a voluntary agreement among governments, it extends far beyond the EU with 46 signatory nations, from Norway to Azerbaijan. Russia joined the Bologna process in 2003. The main effect was to change the continental type of first degree, which typically takes five or six years and is expensive for the taxpayer and wastefully languid for students. So shorter degrees is the best way of saving money.

Now the international system of higher education exists in three chunks: a standard three-or four-year Bachelor’s degree, a Master’s degree for the ambitious, and a PhD for real brainboxes.

Student and employer demand for advanced education and certification within professional fields of study has sparked much of the growth in master’s degree enrollments. These increases in demand have been caused by global shifts toward a technology-driven, information-centered economy in which the need for highly trained professionals in management, finance, information technology has skyrocketed. In business, computer and information science, education, engineering, health professions, library science, and public administration – accounted for slightly more than two-thirds of all master’s degrees annually conferred.

MASTER’S DEGREES IN THE US

The master’s degree is designed to provide additional education or training in the student’s specialized branch of knowledge, beyond the level of baccalaureate study. Master’s degrees are offered in many different fields, and there are too main types of programs: academic and professional.

Academic Master’s: The Master of Arts (M.A.) and the Master of Science (M.S.) degrees are usually awarded in the traditional arts, sciences and humanities disciplines. The M.S. is also awarded in technical fields such as engineering and agriculture. These programs usually require the completion of between 30 or 60 credit hours and last for one or two academic years of full study. They may lead directly to the doctoral level. Many master’s programs offer a thesis and a non-thesis option. The degree is the same in both cases, but the academic requirements are different. Students in non-thesis programs usually take more coursework in place of researching and writing a thesis, and they take a written comprehensive examination after all coursework is finished. Students in degree programs that include a thesis component take an oral comprehensive exam covering coursework and defend their thesis.

Professional Master’s: These degree programs are designed to lead the student from the first degree to a particular profession. They include Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.), Master of Social Work (M.S.W.), Master of Education (M.Ed.), Master of Fine Arts (M.F.A.). Other subjects of professional master’s programs include journalism, international relations, architecture and urban planning. Professional master’s programs are oriented toward direct application of knowledge rather than research. They last from one to three years and students are not required to write a thesis. Students usually choose the field of study identical or similar to their Bachelor’s degree.

Text 2 Capital controls

Against the tide

WITH each great rush of capital into or out of a region of the world, and with the blooming of crisis that seems inevitably to follow such swings, macroeconomists inch ever further away from the assumption that free capital flows are always and everywhere a good thing. Not long ago we were all digesting the IMF's evolution on the issue. After a series of tellingresearch findings on the effects of capital movements the Fund officially updated its view on the matter. Macroprudential measures (by both source and destination countries) designed to temper flows are probably a good idea, the IMF announced, and in rare cases stricter capital flow limits could be warranted.

The matter may not end there, however. The discussion certainly hasn't. This week's Free exchange column looks at new research by Helene Rey, presented at the Kansas City Fed's Jackson Hole conference, on the risks of the "global financial cycle":

Ms Rey reckons that governments face a dilemma, or an “irreconcilable duo”: free capital flows may inevitably mean a loss of monetary-policy independence.

Ms Rey points out that prices of risky assets, such as equities and corporate bonds, move in lockstep across the global economy, regardless of what exchange-rate regime is in place. She links these moves to swings in the VIX—an index of market volatility derived from S&P 500 stock-options prices—which is also correlated with capital flows and credit growth. Ms Rey reckons that these movements are indicators of a global financial cycle. The worldwide correlation of price and capital-flow movements suggests that central bankers sitting in one corner of the world cannot easily lean against a barrage of investment coming from another corner.

Exactly as emerging-market finance ministers complain, this global financial cycle is influenced by rich-world monetary policy. Ms Rey reckons changes in the Federal Reserve’s benchmark interest rate can fuel the cycle. A drop in the rate increases the appetite for market risk as captured in the VIX. That, in turn, encourages credit creation, bank leverage and capital flows into risky assets. The boom feeds on itself as credit growth lifts asset prices, further whetting risk appetites. But a flip in monetary policy that raises interest rates can send the dynamic into reverse.

Fed policy is not a lone villain. Ms Rey estimates an interest-rate change can explain between 4% and 17% of variance in the VIX. Yet that may make all the difference given financial feedback loops; a small change in policy could therefore tip the system into boom or bust.

Addressing the problem may mean macroprudential rules, she says, or capital controls. Others are bound to disagree that such moves are wise. Capital controls impose their own costs (ask Chinese consumers). And an important empirical question is just how much control over monetary policy central banks are giving up; on a country-by-country basis, how much less precision is there in targeting inflation (for example) associated with a particular level of financial liberalisation?

Yet the way Ms Rey sets up these trade-offs, such that capital controls buy you monetary independence, could prove seductive to macroeconomists and policy-makers. When the spectrum of trade-offs was a trilemma, such that a country could have two of monetary independence, fixed exchange rates, or free capital flows, the choice for liberals was easy: take independence and free capital flows and let currencies float. But there is a certain sanctity to monetary independence among macroeconomists. If minimal capital flow limits let you float your currency and guarantee monetary independence, well, economists might warm to that compromise.

Text 3

Cross-cultural management

Managing a truly global multinational company would obviously be much simpler if it required only one set of corporate objectives, goals, policies, practices, products and services. But local differences often make this impossible. The conflict between globalisation and localisation has led to the invention of the word “glocalisation”. Companies that want to be successful in foreign markets have to be aware of the local cultural characteristics that affect the way business is done.

A fairly obvious cultural divide that has been much studied is the one between, on the one hand, the Latin cultures of southern Europe and South America, where personal relations, emotion and sensitivity are of much greater importance.

The largely Protestant cultures on both sides of the North Atlantic (Canada, the USA, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Scandinavia) are essentially individualist. In such cultures, status has to be achieved. You don’t automatically respect people just because they’ve been in a company for 30 years. A young, dynamic, aggressive manager with an MBA (a Master in Business Administration degree) can quickly rise in the hierarchy. In most Latin and American cultures, on the contrary, status is automatically accorded to the boss, who is more likely to be in his fifties or sixties rather than in his thirties. This is particularly true in Japan, where companies traditionally have a policy of promotion by seniority. A 50-year-old Japanese manager, or a Greek or Italian or Chilean one, would quite simply be offended by having to negotiate with an aggressive, well-educated, but inexperienced American or German 20 years his junior. A Japanese would also want to take the time to get to know the person with whom he was negotiating, and would not appreciate an assertive American who wanted to sign a deal immediately and take the next plane home.

In Northern cultures, the principle of pay-for-performance often successfully motivates sales people. The more you sell, the more you get paid. But the principle might well be resisted in more collectivist cultures, and in countries where rewards and promotion are expected to come with age and experience. Trompenaars gives the example of a sales rep in an Italian subsidiary of a US multinational company who was given a huge quarterly bonus under a new policy imposed by head office. His sales- which had been high of years- declined dramatically during the following three months. It was later discovered that he was deliberately truing not to sell more than any of his colleagues, so as not to reveal their inadequacies. He was also desperate not to earn more than his boss, which he thought would be an unthinkable humiliation that would force the boss to resign immediately.

Trompenaars also reports that Singaporean and Indonesian managers objected that pay-for-performance caused salesmen to pressure customers into buying products they didn’t really need, which was not only bad for long term business relations, but quite simply unfair and ethically wrong.

Another example of an American idea that doesn’t work well in Latin countries is matrix management. The task-oriented logic of matrix management conflicts with the principle of loyalty to the all-important line superior, the functional boss. You can’t have two bosses any more than you can’t have two fathers. Andre Laurent, a French researcher, has said that in his experience, French managers would rather see an organisation die than tolerate a system in which a few subordinates have t report to two bosses.

In discussing people’s relationships with their boss and their colleagues and friends, Trompenaars distinguishes between universalists and particularists. The former believe that rules are extremely important; the latter believe that personal relationships and friendships should take precedence. Consequently, each group thinks that the other is corrupt. Universalists say that particularists “cannot be trusted because they will always help their friends”, while the second group sys of the first “you cannot trust them: they would not even help a friend”. According to Trompenaars’ data, there are many more particularists in Latin and Asian countries than in Australia, the USA, Canada, or north west Europe.

Text 4

Target, too

MARK CARNEY, named late last year as Mervyn King's successor as governor of the Bank of England, wasted no time in setting high expectations (so to speak). In a December Mr Carney reckoned that a central bank facing a demand shortfall while stuck at the zero lower bound might do well to adopt a new target: a level of nominal GDP. He noted: «Adopting a nominal GDP (NGDP)-level target could in many respects be more powerful than employing thresholds under flexible inflation targeting. This is because doing so would add “history dependence” to monetary policy. Under NGDP targeting, bygones are not bygones and the central bank is compelled to make up for past misses on the path of nominal GDP...»

In Britain, there have indeed been misses, as the chart at right shows. As of the third quarter of 2012 nominal output was nearly £300 billion (or 18% of NGDP) short of the trend level immediately pre-crisis. Even assuming that policy immediately prior to the crisis was too loose and that the crisis delivered a structural reduction in Britain's growth potential, the economy remains well below where it might reasonably have been expected to be at this point, in terms of the cash spent and earned in the economy.

That shortfall reflects the contribution of weak demand to Britain's economic troubles. The Bank of England has laboured to fix the shortfall through a variety of policy measures, including quantitative easing and a "funding for lending" scheme designed to reduce bank-funding costs. But it is constrained in two key ways. First, its policy interest rate is close to zero. And second, it is operating under a 2% inflation target. At the zero lower bound, central banks can continue to stimulate the economy by raising expectations of future inflation, which reduces the real interest rate and boosts output. But the Bank of England has faced pressure, internal and external, to pay heed to its 2% inflation target. That, in turn, limits the credibility of its stimulus efforts.Mr Carney points out in his speech: «The Bank has interpreted its 2% inflation target in a flexible way, keeping monetary conditions loose even as inflation has stayed higher. But it has not said how long such flexibility will last. Each time its interest-rate-setting committee meets, there is the possibility it will change its mind».

That is where the nominal GDP target comes in. By promising to keep monetary conditions loose until nominal GDP has risen by 10%, the Bank would provide certainty that interest rates will stay low even as the economy recovers. That will encourage investment and spending. At the same time an explicit target of 10% would set a limit to the looseness, preventing people’s expectations for inflation becoming permanently unhinged. It is an approach similar in spirit to the Federal Reserve’s recent commitment not to raise interest rates until America’s unemployment rate falls below 6.5%.

As the Leader points out, it isn't a perfect solution. Implementation is a challenge. Ideally, the Bank of England might like to specify a timeframe over which it plans to close the gap, or the precise annual growth rate of NGDP it feels is appropriate in attaining its goal. There is a risk, though, that too much guidance may muddle the message.

There would be political risks, too, for Mr Carney as well as the government, which seems increasingly hesitant to call for a switch in the Bank's mandate. It is possible that Britain's economy has indeed sustained a big blow to its capacity and is now running as fast as it can without generating accelerating inflation. In that case, successful execution of the NGDP plan would entail a period of high inflation—potentially at 5% or more per year. That is not entirely a bad thing; in the absence of such inflation, needed price and wage adjustments, or deleveraging, would be more painful. It would infuriate those on fixed incomes as well as public-sector workers looking at low, and fixed nominal pay increases in coming years.

But central banking is supposed to involve such trade-offs. The government is supposed to give the central bank the right policy goal and then allow the central bank room to execute it, damn the political fall-out. Not all of Britain's problems are on the demand-side. But appropriate demand-side policy is the best way to facilitate needed structural shifts, and a shift to NGDP targeting looks to us the most appropriate way to conduct monetary policy given present constraints. Hopefully Mr Carney and those who saw fit to appoint him will agree.

Text 5

The economic downturn has made it harder to speak sensibly of a region called “eastern Europe”

It has never been a very coherent idea and it is becoming a damaging one. “Eastern Europe” is a geographical oddity that includes the Czech Republic (in the middle of the continent) but not Greece or Cyprus (supposedly “western” Europe but in the far south-east). It makes little sense historically either: it includes countries (like Ukraine) that were under the heel of the Soviet empire for decades and those (Albania, say) that only brushed it. Some of those countries had harsh planned economies; others had their own version of “goulash communism” (Hungary) or “self-managed socialism” (Yugoslavia).

Already unreliable in 1989, the label has stretched to meaninglessness as those countries' fortunes have diverged since the collapse of communism. The nearly 30 states that once, either under their own names or as part of somewhere else, bore the label “communist” now have more differences than similarities. Yet calling them “eastern Europe” suggests not only a common fate under totalitarian rule, but a host of ills that go with it: a troubled history then; bad government and economic misery now.

The economic downturn has shown how misleading this is. Worries about “contagion” from the banking crisis in Latvia raised risk premiums in otherwise solid economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic - nonsense based on outsiders' perceptions of other outsiders' fears. In fact, the continent's biggest financial upheaval is in Iceland and the biggest forecast budget deficits in the European Union next year will not be in some basket-cases from the ex-communist “east” but in Britain and in Greece. The new government in Athens is grappling with a budget deficit of at least 12.7% of GDP and possibly as much as 14.5%. European Commission officials are discussing that in Greece this week.

None of the ten “eastern” countries that joined the EU is in so bad a mess. They include hotshots and slowcoaches, places that feel thoroughly modern and those where the air still bears a rancid tang from past misrule. Slovenia and the Czech Republic, for example, have overhauled living standards in Portugal, the poorest country in the “western” camp. Neither was badly hit by the economic downturn. Some of the ex-communist countries now have better credit ratings than old EU members and can borrow more cheaply. Together with Slovakia, Slovenia has joined the euro, which Sweden, Denmark and Britain have not. Estonia—at least in outsiders' eyes—is one of the least corrupt countries in Europe, easily beating founder members of the EU such as Italy.

Three sub-categories do make sense. One is the five autocratic 'stans of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). They scarcely count as “Europe”, though a hefty Britain-sized tenth of Kazakhstani territory (some 200,000 square kilometres) lies unambiguously in Europe. Kazakhstan also this year chairs the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a Vienna-based post-cold-war talking shop. But none of the 'stans has become a member of the Council of Europe. That shows the problem. The definition of “Europe” is as unreliable as the word “eastern”.

The 'stans vary (Tajikistan is poor, Kazakhstan go-getting). But all have slim prospects of joining the EU in the lifetime of anyone reading this article. That creates a second useful category: potential members of the union. It starts with sure-fire bets such as Croatia, and other small digestible countries in the western Balkans such as Macedonia. It includes big problematic cases such as Turkey and Ukraine and even—in another optimistic couple of decades—four other ex-Soviet republics, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan (the last, maybe, one day, on Turkey's coat-tails).

The third and trickiest category is the ten countries that joined in the big enlargement of 2004 and in the later expansion of 2007. They are a mixed bunch, ranging from model EU citizens such as Estonia (recently smitten by a property bust, but all set to gain permission this year to join the euro) to Romania and Bulgaria, which have become bywords in Brussels for corruption and organised crime respectively. Eight of them (Romania and Bulgaria are the exceptions) have already joined Europe's Schengen passportless travel zone. Most (Poland is a big, rankling exception) also have visa-free travel to America. All (unlike EU members Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta) are in NATO.

Some worries remain constant, mild in the countries in or near the EU, more troubling in those in the waiting room and beyond. Exclusion and missed opportunity from the communist years still causes anger, as does near-exclusion from top jobs in international organisations (another consequence of the damaging “eastern Europe” label, some say). Toxic waste from that era, such as over-mighty spooks and miles of secret-police files, create openings for blackmail and other mischief-making, especially where institutions are weak. Lithuania's powerful security service, the VSD, is in the centre of a political storm, but worries about lawlessness and foreign penetration ripple from the Baltic to the Black Sea.The new and future members also share capital-thirstiness. All need lots of outside money (from the EU's coffers, from the capital markets and from foreign bank-lending) to modernise their economies to the standards of the rest of the continent.

But the usefulness of the “new member state” category is clearly declining as the years go by. Poles, Czechs, Estonians and others hope that they will drop the “new” label rather sooner, so that they can be judged on their merits rather than on their past.