somananda e-book

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter One of the Śivadṛṣṭi and Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti: Śiva and His Powers

(1) Homage to the Three-eyed [Śiva],1 the source of the generation of all marvelous things, the one who creates the portrait of the universe on his own body, which is made of the ether of consciousness.2

(2–3) I have been urged by my son, named Vibhramākara, and his3 fellow student, called Padmānanda; (and) I am (therefore) composing the Padasaṅgati4 on the treatise (entitled) “The Śivadṛṣṭi,” which was composed by my guru, the details of which I explained in my Īśvarapratyabhijñā.5

1Literally “uneven-eyed”, the present phrase is a reference to Śiva, who is said to have three eyes. 2The present verse is an auspicious, propitiatory verse (maṅgala) in praise of Śiva as the creator of the universe, one that notes that the universe exists as a part of Śiva in the form of consciousness. Madhusudan Kaul, the editor of the KSTS edition of the Śivadṛṣṭi, suggests that by referring to Śiva’s third eye, Utpaladeva reminds his reader that it is only with this special form of vision that one can see the ultimate unity of the universe. See Kaul’s note 1, p. 1 of the KSTS edition: viṣamacakṣuṣe iti yad dhi pramāṇaprameyalakṣaṇaṃ viśvaṃ tad bhedābhāsena mithyaiveti netradvitayena dyotyate bhagavatā. paramārthatas tadvattāyām api svātmasphurattāmātrarūpatvād asya viśvasya na kāpi bhedakalaṅkadoṣakalpaneti tṛtīyanetreṇa dyotyata iti. tac ca bhagavata evānyasya tu na bhedādhiṣṭhātṛtvād iti. Cf. ŚSū 1.14: dṛśyaṃ śarīram. This may be translated: “The body is the perceptible

[universe].”

3It is possible that sabrahmacārin in the fourth pāda of Utpaladeva’s second introductory verse refers to Utpaladeva’s fellow student and not to Utpaladeva’s son’s fellow student.

4The Padasaṅgati is the name of Utpaladeva’s commentary on the ŚD, regularly referred to in this book by its commonly accepted name, the Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti (ŚDVṛ). See Maheśvarānanda’s commentary (the Parimala) on his own Mahārthamañjarī, commentary on verse 19, where he refers to it by that name. (See Dwiveda 1972: 52.) Cf. note 11 in the Introduction to the present volume.

5Utpaladeva’s mention here of the Īśvarapratyabhijñā should be taken to refer not only to his verse text, the ĪPK, but also to his short and long auto-commentaries, the ĪPVṛ and the ĪPṬ. Later in this chapter, in commenting on verses 1.13cd–17 of Somānanda’s text, Utpaladeva refers explicitly to the ĪPṬ, and Pandey cites this passage as proof that Utpaladeva wrote the kārikās and their commentaries before he wrote his commentary on the Śivadṛṣṭi. See Pandey [1963] 2000: 164.

1.1

The author pays homage to his chosen deity in a manner appropriate to the learned work under discussion:6

1.1. asmadrūpasamāviṣṭaḥ svātmanātmanivāraṇe śivaḥ karotu nijayā namaḥ śaktyā tatātmane

May Śiva, who has penetrated my form by warding himself off by means of his own self, pay homage to his (all-)extensive self by means of his own power.7

I, who pay homage, am Śiva, who has attained unity with my form, for in reality Śiva’s form, in the manner that will be explained,8 is that of all the tattvas.9 He makes entities appear to be located outside of himself for the sake of the world of transmigration, in the way explained in greater detail in my Īśvarapratyabhijñā, by not perceiving (his) unity (with those entities) as a result of the power of māyā.10

6That is to say that he does so in accordance with the non-dual Śaiva philosophy of the Pratyabhijñā. 7ŚD 1.1 is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 56 of Singh’s edition). The same is also quoted at MM 6.

Cf. also ĪPK 4.1 for a parallel passage to ŚD 1.1.

8This is the subject of the first chapter of the text. See in particular, ŚD 1.29cd–33. See also ĪPK 3.1.2–11.

9The exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound, sarvatattvavigraha, refers in a technical sense to the thirtysix tattvas; it also could be rendered more idiomatically to suggest the less technical notion that Śiva is one “in the form of all reality.” Cf. ĪPK 4.14 for reference to Śiva as full of the (infinite) tattvas.

10Utpaladeva explains worldly manifestation in terms of the dual polarities of prakāśa and vimarśa, and he describes the process of manifestation in particular in terms of the apparent internality and externality of phenomena, the latter of which is caused by the power of illusion (māyā). For reference to the power of māyā in the creation of worldly phenomena, see ĪPVṛ 1.4.8, where Utpaladeva states that māyā causes agents and objects of experience to appear distinct, and ĪPK 1.8.7 (and the Vṛtti thereon), where he suggests that it causes appearances (ābhāsas) to seem external to Śiva. Utpaladeva also refers to māyā as that which obscures one’s recognition of Śiva-nature (ĪPVṛ 1.1.3 and ĪPVṛ 1.1.5). Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.89–91, where he refers to the power of māyā as the noncognition of Śiva’s non-duality: māyāśaktyā śivābhedākhyātyā. Utpaladeva also suggests that māyā causes consciousness to appear as cognition, imagination, etc. (ĪPK 1.5.18). In ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.5.21, he further suggests that it is māyā that causes consciousness to appear to be spatially and temporally divided. In ĪPK 1.6.4–5 (and in the Vṛtti on the same), he suggests that māyā causes Śiva to identify his sense of self with entities such as the physical body, etc., and in 1.6.7, he suggests that it is by dint of māyā that Maheśvara penetrates (āviśat) into and creates limited agents. Finally, he suggests that māyā is the source of the individual’s impurities in ĪPK 3.2.5. Cf., also, ŚSū 3.3: kalādīnāṃ tattvānām aviveko māyā. “Māyā is the lack of understanding of the tattvas beginning with kalā.”

This extensive reference to the power of māyā is almost entirely missing from the ŚD itself. Somānanda rather speaks of Śiva’s nature as consciousness and as manifesting itself in the form of multiple realities. This he does through his threefold powers of will, cognition, and action, along with aunmukhya and nirvṛti; Somānanda does not resort to the concept of māyā to explain the apparent multiplicity of the world, this being of course the nature of his strict pantheism, explained in detail in the Introduction to the present volume. Note that the KSTS edition, leaving out a hyphen at the end of the line in question, prints īśvarapratyabhijñā prapañcitanyāyena, which must be read as a single compound.

After that,11 wishing further to establish some of those [entities], the breath and so on,12 as the kind of cognitive agent in worldly activities13 that has my form, he sees them, which were made distinct and are objects of cognition, as different from pots, cloth, etc.,14 as not different from himself, and he penetrates them. This is what [Somānanda] says.

In addition, accomplishment is possible only to the extent to which it is made possible by penetration.15 To start with, the first [penetration] is the connection with (the powers of) cognition and action conformable to agency,16 as it is stated in the Spandaśāstra:17

11This is to say that this occurs following the appearance of worldly entities as apparently distinct from Śiva. Note that Kaul glosses tataḥ with anātmasthatve, which is presumably a locative absolute. There are therefore two stages to this process of manifestation, according to Utpaladeva, as was explained in the Introduction (section 6): Śiva first manifests a world of entities that appears to be separated from his all-pervasive self. Then, he divides these apparently distinct entities into agents (pramātṛs) and insentient entities, and he “penetrates” (samāviśati) the agents in order to animate them. One could interpret ĪPK 4.2 (and the Vṛtti on the same) also to suggest that there are two stages of manifestation, the first involving the appearance of worldly phenomena and the second involving the development of the individual agent’s (false) sense of self. Utpaladeva there suggests that the sense of self is manifested by Śiva in the manifested, objective world: tatra svasṛṣṭedambhāge buddhyādi grāhakātmanā / ahaṃkāraparāmarśapadaṃ nītam anena tat.

12This is a reference to the four entities that, according to Utpaladeva, are falsely perceived as the self: the body (deha), the intellect (buddhi), the life-breath (prāṇa), and the void (śūnya). Regarding the last of these, śūnya is the state in which the intellect, the mind, the senses, etc., are all absent. It is a state in which, in deep sleep, nothing whatsoever is experienced except the void itself. (See Torella 1994: 203.) Thus, Utpaladeva refers to the list with “the breath and so on” in order to suggest the various levels below that of the void, or in other words to refer to the various entities who are not entirely aware of their Śiva-nature. Cf. ĪPK 1.6.4–5, 3.1.8, 3.1.9, and 3.2.13, as well as the corresponding passages of the Vṛtti.

13As Kaul notes, Utpaladeva here implies that an agent of cognition can only exist when an object of cognition exists: prameyabhedenaiva pramātṛbheda ity āśayaṃ sūcayati lokayātrāsv ityādinā.

14According to the Pratyabhijñā everything is made up of consciousness, and all worldly entities appear as objects of Śiva’s cognitive awareness (prameya). Here, Utpaladeva distinguishes between worldly entities that appear in the form of cognizing agents (pramātṛs) and entities that do not. In contrast to pots, etc., Śiva is said to penetrate the entities that appear as cognizing agents.

15The meaning of this sentence remains slightly obscure, but it seems to refer to the fact that individual, worldly agents are capable of cognition and action only to the degree to which they are “penetrated” by Śiva. Utpaladeva thus seems to suggest that the samāveśa described in the maṅgala verse is central to all successful action, and as such it is more pervasive than the verse states explicitly.

16There are four levels of penetration (samāveśa) according to Utpaladeva, corresponding to the four levels to which Śiva contracts himself, namely, at the level of the void (śūnya), the vital breath (prāṇa), the intellect (buddhi), and the body (deha). Śiva alone performs every action, but he does so by contracting his self-awareness, this by identifying with a limited agency at one of these four levels. Possession is “the state in which the pure agency of consciousness reasserts itself within them, revealing their dependence on it.” See Sanderson 1986: 176–177. Here, Utpaladeva refers to the first level, that of identification with the body. At this level, Śiva’s powers of cognition and action are manifested, and, quoting the SpKā in support of his argument, Utpaladeva suggests that the individual operates at this level by dint of the very presence of Śiva within him, as his own self. It is to this fact that Utpaladeva refers when he mentions that the first samāveśa is constituted by a connection with the powers of cognition and action that are present in the limited individual. (See ĪPK 3.2.11–12, ĪPV and ĪPVV on 3.2.12, and Torella 1994: xxxii.)

Note that Utpaladeva emphasizes the powers of cognition and action over and above the power of will (icchā), the latter having a less prominent place in the way in which he explains the Pratyabhijñā. See ĪPK 1.1.2, where he refers to Maheśvara as the kartṛ and jñātṛ, and compare to NP 1.2, quoted in note 102, section 7 of the Introduction. Cf. ĪPK 1.1.4, where he refers to cognition and action as the life-force of living beings; ĪPK 1.1.5; ĪPK 4.15; ŚSū 1.13 and 3.41, and SpKā 33.

17See SpKā 8.

Indeed, the individual does not function by dispatching the impulse of (his) will, but rather, because of (his) contact with his own power, he becomes equal to it.18

It is similarly stated elsewhere that “(all) activity is the Lord’s.”19 With this doctrine,20 he implies the following as well: for the sake of (acquiring) the various kinds of powers, one must also practice more penetration through one’s

18Following Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa’s commentary, I take this verse to mean that the individual in the world, the everyman, does not act simply as a limited agent, directing his will to perform this or that function. Rather, he operates by first having identified with his true nature as Śiva (ŚD 1.2). It is only by identifying with his power that an individual may act, for it is through this contact that the senses acquire cognitive power. As Dyczkowski (1987: 152) notes, this implies that the senses give one contact with a world that is projected outward from within oneself; it is not a world that is external to the self, as the source of the contents of consciousness is ultimately Śiva himself, who is ultimately the one who extends and withdraws the very senses of the individual subject. In a word, Utpaladeva quotes this verse to suggest that human beings are cognizant of and act in the world only insofar as they are penetrated by Śiva himself. See SpKāVṛ ad SpKā 8: na cecchāpreṣaṇena karaṇāni preṣayati, api tu svasvarūpe sthitvā kevalaṃ yādṛśī tasyecchā pravartate tathāvidham eva sa bāhyāntaraṃ kāryam utpādayati. tena na karaṇaviṣayam eva sāmarthyam, kintu tasya sarvatra. Note that Kṣemarāja’s commentary on the kārikā suggests essentially the same thing. Cf. SpNir ad SpKā 8: ayaṃ laukikaḥ puruṣa icchaiva nodanaṃ pratodas tasya prerakatvena karaṇapravartanārthavyāpāraṇāya yasmān na pravartate, api tv ātmanaś cidrūpasya yad balaṃ spandatattvātmakaṃ tatsparśāt tatkṛtāt kiyanmātrād āveśāt tatsamo bhavet, ahantārasavipruḍabhiṣekād acetano ’pi cetanatām āsādayaty eva.

This verse should be read in the context of the preceding two (SpKā 6–7): “That principle [tattva] should be examined with great care and reverence by which this group of senses, though insentient, acts as a sentient force by itself, and along with the inner group of senses, goes towards objects, takes pleasure in their maintenance, and withdraws into itself, because this natural freedom of it prevails everywhere” (yataḥ karaṇavargo ’yaṃ vimūḍho ’mūḍhavat svayam / sahāntarena cakreṇa pravṛttisthitisaṃhṛtīḥ // labhate tat prayatnena parīkṣyaṃ tattvam ādarāt / yathaḥ svatantratā tasya sarvatreyam akṛtrimā). The translation is Singh’s, for which, see Singh 1994: 51. Finally, see Dyczkowski 19921: 86–87.

19This quotation may have a more technical meaning in that it might also refer to the īśvaratattva, the fourth of thirty-six tattvas. At this level, the power of action (kriyā) is manifested. At the level of the third tattva, the sadāśivatattva, the power of cognition (jñāna) is manifested. Thus, to say that activity is related to the īśvaratattva is to suggest that it exists at an ontological level prior and superior to the manifestation of individual, human agents, which is precisely the point emphasized in SpKā 8. The source of this quotation is unknown to me.

20There are two possible interpretations of anayaiva dṛṣṭyā. The first, which I have accepted in this translation, is to take it simply as a connective phrase that should not be read as a part of the iti clause. In this interpretation, anayaiva dṛṣṭyā, “with this doctrine,” refers to the fact that Śiva penetrates and thereby animates the individual agent. In other words, insofar as Śiva has penetrated the individual, the individual must, like Śiva, practice penetration (samāveśa) in order to increase his or her power. The second interpretation, following Kaul, takes anayaiva dṛṣṭyā as a part of the iti clause and interprets it to mean that one should penetrate everything with, by means of, the very same form of seeing by which Śiva cognizes his identity with the distinct objects of cognition. For this interpretation, see Kaul’s note 1, p. 3 of the KSTS edition: yathā bhinnīkṛtān api prāṇādīn prameyān ātmābhedena paśyati tathaiva sarvam api vyāpyam ity arthaḥ.

own effort. He also says that both Śiva and (individuals,) Devadatta, etc., are penetrated, because they both become unified in the same way.21

May Śiva, thus qualified,22 pay homage to his (all-)extensive self, i.e., to the one called Paramaśiva, whose nature is (the same as) his own, whose expansion is limitless because he comes forth as the Lord Sadāśiva in the form of the parāparā (condition), etc.23 The imperative verbal suffix24 is in the sense of a summons, etc., like the verb “homage” in “homage to you.”25 That means: “May we, being Śiva, pay homage to the Supreme Lord.” He uses the third person, which refers to someone other than himself,26 in order to show that the artificial sense of self has mere agency as its nature, since it does not have any specific form.27

21It is a common doctrine in the non-dual Śaivism of Kashmir that “penetration” (āveśa, samāveśa) is both active and passive: the terms refer to the penetration of and the being penetrated by a single entity. In this passage, Utpaladeva suggests that both meanings are implied in the invocatory verse. See Torella 1994: xxxii.

22The term here translated, tathāvidha, refers to Śiva’s acquisition of Somānanda’s human form; it refers to the fact that the verse describes Śiva as asmadrūpasamāviṣṭa, one who has “penetrated my [Somānanda’s] form.” Note that the term in question, samāviṣṭa can be both active and passive.

23This is a reference to the act (kriyā) of manifestation, beginning with the sadāśivatattva, the third of the thirty-six tattvas. (Note that two manuscripts, P and R, explicitly refer to this action: they read parāpararūpabhagavatsadāśivādikriyāprasaraṇamukha for parāpararūpabhagavatsadāśivādiprasaraṇamukha.) It is at this level that the first distinction between subject and object is manifested, but coarse forms, distinct entities such as pots, do not appear at this level. The subject-object distinction is here rather more mental than physical in form. As such, it is considered to be a level intermediate to the supreme (parā) condition, which is associated with Śiva’s quiescent state, as it were, and the mundane condition (aparā) of the everyday world, in which the apparent duality of the universe is fully manifested. See ŚD 1.5–6ab and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon for further mention of the same. Cf. Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.29cd–33.

24This is loṭ, Pāṇini’s term for the imperative. Karotu is the third-person, singular form of the imperative of the verb kṛ: “make, do.”

25This is to say that the verb directs the practitioner to pay homage rather than merely indicating, as the grammar of the verse would suggest, Śiva’s act of obeisance. See A 3.3.162: loṭ ca. Kaul explains by quoting the following verse, which is a variation of VP 3.7.126: “Loṭ [the imperative] for verbs such as prach [to ask] is enjoined with respect to those [agents] who have not undertaken (the act in question). Ṇic [the causative] is enjoined for those [agents] who have undertaken (the act in question)” (apravṛttasya hi praiṣe pṛcchyāder loḍ vidhīyate/ pravṛttasya yadā praiṣas tadā sa viṣayo ṇicaḥ). VP 3.7.126 reads: dravyamātrasya tu praiṣe pṛcchyāder loḍ vidhīyate/ sakriyasya prayogas tu yadā sa viṣayo ṇicaḥ. Kaul’s conclusion is that, “For this reason, one should not mistakenly think that somebody else is enjoined here by the word karotu” (tena karotv ity atrānyaprerakatvam iti na bhramitavyam).

26Literally, paratvena means “as another.” That is to say that the use of the third-person form of the verb (karotu) refers to someone other than the one who is speaking. (One normally expects an author to use the first-person form of the verb in a maṅgala verse.)

27Because invocatory verses more commonly are composed in the first-person, Utpaladeva here comments on Somānanda’s use of the third person, suggesting that he uses it to underscore the fact that the individual practitioner is identical with Śiva. Śiva generates the agent’s limited and artificial sense of self by directing his consciousness to recognize just such limited agency, as Utpaladeva referred to earlier in his commentary on ŚD 1.1, beginning with: “After that, wishing further to establish.” So to be a limited agent is merely to act, because there is no distinct nature—no ultimate and autonomous existence—associated with limited agency (which is, ultimately speaking, nonexistent, after all) other than the fact of being one who acts. And since there is only one agent, Śiva, to act is to be Śiva. A “limited” agent is thus in reality no one but Śiva, the one and only actor, and therefore Somānanda employed the third-person, and not the first-person, form of the verb in the opening verse of the ŚD.

Moreover, because everything is composed of Śiva, the means of action in homage—speech, the mind, etc.—are also nothing but Śiva. For this reason, he says, “by means of his own self.”

The obstacles that are to be warded off also have nothing but his nature. Therefore, he says, “by warding himself off,” and he says “by means of his own power” because in homage the power of one’s will, etc., are associated with Śiva himself.

This [verse] shows that all actions, such as moving or eating, along with their kārakas28 and their fruits, should be understood in the very same way.29

1.2

Now, [Somānanda] introduces,30 in brief, the meaning of the entire teaching, accompanied by the reasoning (involved in it).31

1.2. ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtacid vibhuḥ aniruddhecchāprasaraḥ prasaraddṛkkriyaḥ śivaḥ

Śiva is the very self appearing in all entities, whose consciousness is delighted, the all-encompassing one, whose will expands unchecked, (and) whose cognition and action are expanding.32

That one should say that Śiva is the very self in all entities is the proposition.33 The series of adjectives beginning with “whose consciousness is delighted” is

28The kārakas, according to Pāṇinian grammar, correspond closely with the various components that make up action, the instrument, the agent, the object, etc. On the role of the kārakas in tantrism, see TĀ 15.148ff., where Abhinavagupta equates Śiva with all of the six kārakas. See, also, ĪPK 2.2.6.

29This is to say that all actions, like the aforementioned, exemplary act of worship, emanate from Śiva in the form of, by means of, and in view of Śiva.

30The verb pratijānīte is etymologically linked to the noun pratijñā and implies, as the latter term denotes, the matter to be proven in a logical syllogism. Here, the verb has the same flavor: it suggests that the following verse will state that which Somānanda wishes to establish in his treatise.

31The term translated here, sayuktika, refers to the fact that, in the following verse, Somānanda hints at the logical argument he will present in defending his theology. Utpaladeva fleshes out this argument in his commentary following the verse.

32ŚD 1.2 is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 39 of Singh’s edition), with a variant reading (also attested in two manuscripts, P and R) of vapuḥ for vibhuḥ (ŚD 1.2b). Perhaps there is a faint echo of VBh 100 in this verse: ciddharmā sarvadeheṣu viśeṣo nāsti kutracit / ataś ca tanmayaṃ sarvaṃ bhāvayan bhavajij janaḥ.

33Utpaladeva here interprets Somānanda’s verse by suggesting that a logical syllogism is implicit in it. He here mentions the proposition (pratijñā) of the argument. Here and in what follows, Utpaladeva appears to furnish only a two-membered logical syllogism, including only the proposition and the reason (hetu), this in accordance with the expectations outlined by the Buddhist epistemologists. (I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer of the present manuscript for clarifying this point.) The Hindu Naiyāyika syllogism is traditionally one of five members. The five members of the Naiyāyika’s syllogism are: (1) the pratijñā or proposition: “there is fire on the mountain”; (2) the hetu or reason: “because there is smoke there”; (3) the dṛṣṭānta or example: “where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the hearth of the kitchen”;

(4)the upanaya or recapitulation of the cause: “the mountain smokes”; (5) the nigamana or conclusion: “therefore, there is fire on the mountain.” Note that the present passage is not a proof of Śiva’s identity with self, but rather it argues that one must speak of Śiva as the self existing in all entities; it thus assumes the identity of Śiva and the self.

the reason. “Appearing” indicates that the self-awareness form of direct perception34 proves the reason, as well as that in which the reason appears.35 For this reason, “appearing” is a separate word.36 Moreover, he also shows by implication that the fact of being one “whose consciousness is delighted,” etc., this being Śiva’s nature, is characteristic of Śiva.37 And, once this scope38 is established, it is established that one can simply refer to that which has those characteristics as Śiva-nature, according to the stages articulated in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā.39 Moreover, the way in which consciousness, delight, will, cognition, and action appear in every entity appearing (in experience), down to a pot or a cloth, will

Compare the present passage with Abhinavagupta’s description of the argument of Utpaladeva’s ĪPK: tad ayaṃ pramātā jñānakriyāśaktiyogād īśvara iti vyavahartavyaḥ purāṇāgamādiprasiddheśvaravat; tadaprasiddhāv api sarvaviṣayajñānakriyāśaktimattvasvabhāvam evaiśvaryaṃ tanmātrānubandhitvād eva siddham; tad api ca kalpiteśvare rājādau tathā vyāptigrahaṇāt, yo yāvati jñātā kartā ca sa tāvatīśvaro rājeva, anīśvarasya jñātṛtvakartṛtve svabhāvaviruddhe yataḥ, ātmā ca viśvatra jñātā kartā ceti siddhā pratyabhijñā. (See ĪPV ad ĪPK 1.1.3.) Lawrence suggests that “This may be put formally as follows: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he/she has the Cognition and Action Powers. (3) Whoever has Cognition and Action powers is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Purāṇas and scriptures, and like the King. (4) The subject, since he/she has them, is the Lord. (5) The subject is the Lord.” See Lawrence 1999: 49–57, esp. 55. Compare also to ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.1.2, where Utpaladeva argues that, since the self possesses the powers of cognition and action, proven through inner awareness, one should not attempt either to prove or disprove the existence of God: sarveṣāṃ svātmanaḥ sarvārthasiddhisamāśrayasya tattatsarvārthasādhanānyathānupapattyā kroḍīkṛtasiddheḥ svaprakāśasya pramātrekavapuṣaḥ pūrvasiddhasya purāṇasya jñānaṃ kriyā ca. svasaṃvedanasiddham evaiśvaryam, teneśvarasya siddhau nirākaraṇe ca jaḍānām evodyamaḥ.

34I understand svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa to be a descriptive (karmadhāraya) compound: “the perception that is one’s self-awareness.” Cf. also, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.1.3, where Utpaladeva refers to svasaṃvedana as the means of proving Īśvara: kevalam asya svasaṃvedanasiddhasyāpīśvarasya . . .

35Here Utpaladeva suggests that the svasaṃvedana form of cognition is the valid means of knowledge that proves that a logical inference is appropriate in this context. This, in turn, depends on the formulation of this idea as it is found in the writings of the Buddhist epistemologists. The idea is that all cognitions are simultaneously self-conscious: all cognitions involve the awareness of themselves. Utpaladeva’s argument therefore seems to revolve around the idea that there is an agent who experiences all of the cognitions in question, the agent being Śiva, of course. By this logic, the proposition (pratijñā)—that Śiva is the “self” in all entities—is proven by the experience that occurs in the ātman: there is a real agent there who experiences the self-luminosity of consciousness. The same svasaṃvedana also proves that the experiences in question, the delighted condition, etc., appear in the self under consideration. Utpaladeva makes a similar point regarding the role of svasaṃvedana in proving the nature of Śiva in his ĪPVṛ, for which see ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.1.2, 1.1.3, and 1.1.5. Cf., also, ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.3.2, where Utpala describes the nature of cognitions as self-aware. On svasaṃvedana in the theories of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, see Dunne 2004: 391, fn. 1, and 276–278. Cf. Hattori 1968: 100–101, fn. 1.60 and 104–106, fn. 1.64; Stcherbatsky [1930–1932] 1993, vol. 1: 163–169.

36In other words, one should not understand sphurannirvṛtacidvibhuḥ to be a single compound. The implication is that sphurat is not part of the series of adjectives expressing the reason (hetu) of the proposition.

37Utpaladeva should therefore be understood here to suggest that the Śiva-nature of Śiva himself is identical to that of the ātman.

38Viṣaya refers to the “scope” of the definitions of Śiva (śivalakṣaṇa). In other words, the language used to describe Śiva’s nature is the same language that can be applied to the self appearing in all entities.

39The “stages” that Utpaladeva mentions refer to the process by which Śiva appears as the very self or essence of all entities. As in the ŚD, the ĪPK accounts for worldly appearances by suggesting they appear in the form of Śiva’s consciousness. The differences between Utpaladeva’s arguments and those of Somānanda have been described in the Introduction.

be discussed later on.40 He will (also) mention later on, in the manner stated in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā, that the five powers are associated with the agents of cognition who act in the world41 in the parāparā condition and below, because the powers and the one possessing the powers are not different, and because there is only one who possesses them.42

Nirvṛtacit is an exocentric compound meaning “whose consciousness is delighted,” that is, is not wishing for any object of knowledge, i.e., is complete, and he is the all-encompassing one, that is, the one who has internalized every object of cognition. Aniruddhecchāprasara is an exocentric compound meaning “whose will expands unchecked.” Prasaraddṛkkriya is an exocentric compound meaning “whose dṛk—that is, cognition—and action are expanding.” Śiva, having these attributes, is the very self in everything.

1.3–4

Thus, since it is established in one’s own awareness that everything has Śiva as its form, it is only how one should speak of this that has to be proven. This being so, to repudiate the opposing doctrines of those who speak for other points of view,43 [Somānanda] begins to explain that Śiva-nature, having such a form,44 exists equally from the parā condition down to the level of pots, cloth, and so on:45

40This discussion begins with ŚD 1.24. Note that Somānanda has referred to all of the aforementioned powers in the pratijñā verse itself: he mentions delighted consciousness (nirvṛtacit), which implies the powers of consciousness (cit) and bliss (ānanda), the power of will (aniruddhecchā), and the powers of cognition (dṛk = jñāna) and action (prasaraddṛkkriya). Elsewhere in the ŚD, he regularly refers only to the triad of powers, the śaktitraya of will, cognition, and action. See the Introduction, section 7.

41The term here translated with “the agents of cognition who act in the world” is vyavahartṛpramātṛ. I understand the present term to be a descriptive (karmadhāraya) compound.

42Śiva is identical with his powers, and every agent is ultimately Śiva. Therefore, Śiva is present, as are his powers, in every agent at every level of existence. In ŚD 1.29cd–33, Somānanda enumerates the various types of agents (pramātṛs), mentioning their relationship to Śiva’s five powers. In doing so, he illustrates the manner in which they are all ultimately Śiva himself. For a discussion of the various agents at the various levels of the parāparā and aparā conditions, see ĪPK 3.2.1–20 esp. 3.2.6–9. Finally, for mention of the identity of the powers and the one possessing them, see, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.5, as well as the Introduction to the present volume.

43By glossing vādyantaravimatim with vedāntānāṃ bhinnavedyavādināṃ ca, Kaul suggests that Somānanda’s primary opponent is the Vedānta. Judging the relative strength of his opponents by the amount of space devoted to refuting their philosophical positions, however, it may be clearly said that the Vedānta is a minor concern in the ŚD, and, moreover, that Somānanda’s main opponents are Bhartṛhari and the grammarians, and the Śāktas who subscribed to their philosophical position, or something close to it (about which see the Introduction). Somānanda also criticizes (non-Śaṅkara forms of) the Vedānta in ŚD 6.6–15. Other opponents mentioned in the text include the Mīmāṃsakas (ŚD 3.63–68ab, 4.40), the Sāṅkhyas (ŚD 6.27), the Pāñcarātrikas (ŚD 5.15–18ab), the Vaiśeṣikas (ŚD 4.38) and “Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas” (ŚD 6.28), the Cārvākas (6.88), the Vijñānavādins (ŚD 4.25–31, 6.33–87), and other Buddhists (ŚD 4.39, 6.32).

44That is, having the form described in ŚD 1.2.

45In other words, Śiva-nature (śivatā) exists equally in the parā, parāparā, and aparā conditions, the last being the condition in which pots, etc., are manifested.