somananda e-book

Nor does an agent, whose nature is complete, pure knowledge, perceive pots, etc., in the absence of consciousness in the form of the non-dual power of reflective awareness, because objects are differentiated within consciousness.198 That alone is the power of consciousness, the general199 power of delight in the form of bliss.200

1.26–29ab

Anticipating the objection that Śiva-nature does not exist in the moment of cognition, [Somānanda] says:

1.26.buddhiṃ vinā kathaṃ bodhaḥ sā buddhiḥ prakṛteḥ prajā na ca tasya tayā yoga iti ced aparasthitau

1.27.sā buddhir yat punaḥ sūkṣmaṃ sarvadikkaṃ vyavasthitam jñānaṃ bodhamayaṃ tasya śivasya sahajaṃ sadā

1.28. nyāyādibhir na tulyatvaṃ tair hi yā prākṛtī matiḥ tasyā evātmadharmatvam iṣṭaṃ na parabodhake

1.29. eṣa eva hi vijñeyo nyāya icchāṃ prati sphuṭam

If you object by asking how there can be understanding in the absence of the intellect, the intellect being produced from matter and not connected to it,201 (we reply:) that is the intellect that exists in the aparā condition.

By contrast, the subtle, all-pervasive (power of) cognition, which is pure understanding,202 is eternally Śiva’s natural state. It is not the same as that of the Naiyāyikas and others, because they only contend that material knowledge is a quality of the (individual) self, not of the supreme knower. Of course, the same argument clearly should apply to (the power of) will.203

Objection: How can understanding, that is, the cognition “he knows,” being an activity of the intellect, exist without the active intellect? The intellect,

198Put differently, it is only in consciousness that one sees the diverse objects. Therefore, consciousness must exist when one cognizes a pot. Literally, saṃvinniṣṭhatvād viṣayavyavasthitīnām means “because the distinguishing of objects rests in consciousness.”

199Here, Utpaladeva is differentiating the universal form of delight from the form that is delimited by the object with which it is associated. See ŚD 1.22 and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereupon.

200Compare the present passage (saiva cicchaktiḥ sāmānyā nirvṛtiśaktir ānandarūpā) with ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab: karmāvachinnā nirvṛtir aunmukhyam, anavachinnā nirvṛtimātram ānandaśaktiḥ.

201The demonstrative pronoun (tat) here refers to the śivatattva, according to Utpaladeva, for which, see below.

202Utpaladeva glosses bodhamaya with “pure understanding” (bodhamātra); I translate following his

gloss.

203In other words, one can argue that the power of will, like the power of cognition, relates to the supreme agent, not simply to individual, monadic agents. ŚD 1.26d–27 is quoted in PTV ad PT 3–4 (p. 23 of Singh’s edition), reading avasthitam for vyavasthitam in ŚD 1.27b.

moreover, originating from prakṛti,204 is insentient, and it, that is, the untainted śivatattva, which possesses all of the powers,205 is not connected to it.

If you object in this manner, then we reply: not so. That is the intellect of cognitive agents who have subtle bodies,206 which exists in the one-faceted207 aparā condition, which is the noncognition of non-duality.208

By contrast, there is the (power of) cognition of (Śiva,) the one who resides in his completeness in the parā condition; for this reason it is subtle, i.e., nondual; (and) it must be taught to be unknowable; hence, it is all-pervasive, i.e., undivided in space and time, pure consciousness in an unknowable form. It is eternally Śiva’s natural state209 because it truly exists, even when the material intellect comes to light, since the latter would not exist in the absence of the former.210

Objection: Even if this were so, one (merely) attains parity with the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, etc., if one understands Śiva to be the basis of cognition, for they hold that cognition is inherent in the (individual) self, and Śiva (on your view) exists in the form of the (very same, monadic) self.211

Because the (followers of the) Nyāya, etc., could say as much (Somānanda replies): it is not the same as theirs, because they refer to the dualistic cognition of the intellect212 in the material, dualistic condition, but not in Īśvara, the supreme knower.213

204This refers to the insentient, material nature of the intellect. As in the Sāṅkhya, the Pratyabhijñā accepts that the intellect (buddhi) is material, an evolute of materiality (the prakṛtitattva), and the Pratyabhijñā also accepts a form of the prakṛtitattva of the Sāṅkhya, though they count it as the thirteenth, rather than the second, tattva. On the Sāṅkhya formulation of the tattvas, see, e.g., Larson 1969: 192–220.

205That is, will (icchā), etcetera.

206The term in question is puryaṣṭakapramātṛ. A descriptive (karmadhāraya) compound, the term literally refers to “subtle-bodied cognitive agents.” See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.5–6ab and the notes thereon (esp. note 83) for further explanation of the puryaṣṭaka.

207The term ekarasā literally means “a single/unitary flavor.”

208Utpaladeva has repeatedly asserted that the aparā condition and the concomitant duality is nothing but the nonperception of non-duality. See Utpaladeva’s commentary on, for example, ŚD 1.11cd–13ab (māyāśaktikṛtapūrṇasvarūpākhyātimaya ); ŚD 1.7cd–8 (māyīyābhedākhyāti ); the passage farther on in Utpaladeva’s commentary on 1.11cd–13ab (abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitam, tac ca na kiñcid akhyātirūpamātratvāt); and ŚD 1.1 (māyāśaktikṛtaikyākhyātyā).

209Kaul suggests that the term here translated, sahaja, refers to Śiva’s nature, which is such that it reflects on itself: sahajaṃ svarūpapratyavamarśasvabhāvam, nānyat.

210The idea is that the intellect of the individual would not exist in the absence of Śiva’s power of cognition. By extension, the present passage evokes the notion that no particular instance of knowledge exists without a corresponding, general one, as no cognition of a pot can exist without the general knowledge of “pot,” for example. Compare the passage in question—tatsadbhāvāt tad vinā tadabhāvāt—to Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.22: tadabhāve viśeṣanirvṛter abhāvād yathā bodhābhāve viśiṣṭaghaṭādibodhasya.

211See ŚD 1.2: ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣu sphuran nirvṛtacid vibhuḥ / aniruddhecchāprasaraḥ prasaraddṛkkriyaḥ śivaḥ.

212Literally, buddhibhedātman means “(cognition) the dualistic nature of which is the intellect.”

213Insofar as Īśvara is the supreme deity according to the Nyāya, etc., he is analogous with Śiva in the Pratyabhijñā. The argument here expressed suggests that, while the Naiyāyikas, etc., understand the intellect to be associated with the individual cognizer, the authors of the Pratyabhijñā understand it ultimately to be connected with God, the supreme agent.

That is why [Somānanda] says that the same argument clearly should apply to (the power of) will.214 The will that those others conceive of as a thought in the mind is based on the individual nature of consciousness and is only dualistic; it is, by contrast, not the nature of the Supreme Lord, nor is it (even) located in the parāparā condition.215

1.29cd–33

[Somānanda] says that the condition of the śivatattva is such that it consists of all of the tattvas:

tad evaṃ prasṛto devaḥ kadācic chaktimātrake 1.30 bibharti rūpam icchātaḥ kadācij jñānaśaktitaḥ sadāśivatvam udrekāt kadācid aiśvarīṃ sthitim

1.31.kriyāśaktisamābhogāt kadācit sthūlavedanāt vidyātvavidyeśānatvamantramantreśvarātmatām

1.32.ātmapracchādanakrīḍāṃ kurvato vā kathañcana māyārūpam itītyādiṣaṭtriṃśattattvarūpatām

1.33.bibhrad bibharti rūpāṇi tāvatā vyavahārataḥ

yāvat sthūlaṃ jaḍābhāsaṃ saṃhataṃ pārthivaṃ ghanam

Thus, God comes forth in this way at a certain time. Sometimes,216 he assumes a form, through (the power of) will,217 in the one possessed of pure power. Sometimes, through the power of cognition, (he assumes) the nature of Sadāśiva,218 due to an abundance (of that power of cognition).219

Sometimes, because the power of action rules supreme, (he assumes the form of) the Īśvara state.220 Sometimes, because perception is coarse, (he

214In other words, the Pratyabhijñā equates the individual agent’s power of will with that of Śiva. The Naiyāyikas, etc., do not.

215In other words, the choices made by individuals, according to the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, are made at the level of an individual’s intellectual deliberations. They do not involve a direct access to the very nature of the divine, as does any act of volition, according to the Pratyabhijñā. Unlike in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Pratyabhijñā maintains that every act is willed and performed by Śiva himself. Thus, by considering the possibility that, according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, will is not associated with the parāparā condition, one should understand Utpaladeva to weigh the status of will in those schools by the measure of his own system of thought. These other schools do not recognize the existence of the parāparā condition, etc.

216Following Utpaladeva’s commentary, I translate kadācit (ŚD 1.29d) twice, once with what precedes it and once with what follows (dehalīdīpavat).

217See the commentary, below, for Utpaladeva’s two interpretations of icchātaḥ.

218This is a reference to the third of the thirty-six tattvas, and there is a slight subject-object distinction at this level. Here, one experiences “I am this,” but “I-ness” is emphasized slightly over “this-ness.” This is the level at which Mantramaheśvaras reside. See Pandit 1997: 73–74.

219Note that Kaul glosses udrekāt with jñānaśakter udrekāt.

220The īśvaratattva is the fourth of the thirty-six tattvas. At this level, there is a slight distinction of subject from object, though, unlike at the level of Sadāśiva, “this-ness” is here emphasized slightly over “I-ness.” This is the level at which Mantreśvaras reside. See Pandit 1997: 73–74.

assumes) the nature of Vidyā,221 the Vidyeśvaras, the Mantras, and the Mantreśvaras.222 Alternatively, māyā, belonging to (Śiva,) the one who is somehow playing the game of self-concealment, assumes the nature of the thirty-six tattvas, beginning with that which is called form,223 and thus assumes as many forms as are discussed, down to the coarse, compact, solid earth, which has an insentient appearance.

Therefore, the Supreme Lord, Śiva, whose two powers, consciousness and delight, penetrate his nature,224 who consists of prakāśa and bliss and is complete, comes forth in this way, i.e., according to the sequence articulated earlier,225 at a certain time, i.e., in the first place.226

In the one possessed of pure power, i.e., in eagerness, the first part of will that is closely associated with the objects of sense227 and consists of delight, which is to say in the condition found at the beginning of the parāparā condition, he assumes a form that accords with that [power], one on which those who meditate must concentrate;228 sometimes (he does this) through (the power of) will,

221Vidyātva here refers to śuddhavidyā, the fifth of the thirty-six tattvas, which is the last of the pure tattvas.

222Vidyeśvaras reside at the level of either mahāmāyā or śuddhavidyā. Also called Mantras, this group of beings “sees the Self as omnisicient, omnipotent, pure and infinite Consciousness, but considers objective existence to be different from the self.” (See Pandit 1997: 189.) Mantreśvaras reside at the level of the īśvaratattva. According to Pandit, they “see objective existence as their own self.” (See Pandit 1997: 166.)

223As Utpaladeva explains, the present passage refers to the enumeration of the thirty-six tattvas, of which the most coarse levels constitute material form, the earth, etc. Somānanda suggests that the power of “illusion” (māyā) creates these levels “beginning with form” because it is common practice to count the thirty-six tattvas beginning with the thirty-sixth, the earth-tattva, rather than with the first tattva, the śivatattva. Note that I take ityādiṣaṭtriṃśattattvarūpatām to be a single compound. The KSTS edition suggests that there are two compounds: ityādi ṣaṭtriṃśattattvarūpatām.

224It is possible that the past participle (anupraviṣṭa) in the compound (svarūpānupraviṣṭacinnirvṛtirūpaśaktidvaya) has a passive and not an active meaning, in which case one could translate, “whose two powers, consciousness and delight, are penetrated by his nature.” The compound in question is an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound.

225That is, according to the sequence of Śiva’s powers as enumerated in ŚD 1.7cd–21, namely: aunmukhya (ŚD 1.7cd–11ab), icchā (ŚD 1.13cd–17), jñāna (ŚD 1.20c–21a), and kriyā (ŚD 1.21a–c). In addition, Śiva is of course “one whose consciousness is delighted” (nirvṛtacit) by virtue of this being his very nature.

226This is a reference to the śivatattva, the first of the thirty-six tattvas. Thus, Utpaladeva appears to suggest that the first tattva is created, while also suggesting elsewhere that the first tattva is the nature of all the thirty-six tattvas. In other words, he both suggests that the śivatattva is one with Śiva himself, in all his diverse forms, and that the same tattva is the product of a form of Śiva that transcends all the thirty-six tattvas. I understand this to be an expression, therefore, of Utpaladeva’s panentheism, one that, as noted in the Introduction, does not appear in Somānanda’s œuvre.

227Note that “closely associated with the objects of sense” is a translation of viṣayān anuṣakta, which the KSTS edition prints as a single compound (viṣayānanuṣakta) with precisely the opposite meaning: that which is not closely associated with the objects of sense.” This interpretation does not accord, however, with the notion that eagerness, aunmukhya, is the form of delight (nirvṛti) that is delimited by the object in question, this per the system of overlapping pairs of powers posited by Somānanda and explained in the Introduction. See the Introduction, section 5.

228This is a reference to the second of the thirty-six tattvas, the śaktitattva. It is unclear, however, why Utpaladeva here describes this level as one on which one should concentrate.

i.e., because he has the power of will as his nature.229 Alternatively, (construe icchātas as follows:) after he has reached the form of will, he assumes a form, as before, that accords with it.230

Sometimes, moreover, he assumes the form of Sadāśiva,231 because he is in the form of the power of cognition. The cognition, however, exists as an action, this as a result of the predominance, in the previously stated manner (of the power of cognition at the level of the sadāśivatattva).232

And sometimes he assumes the Īśvara state,233 because the power of action rules supreme, that is, because it has reached its full extension.234

Sometimes he assumes the nature of Mantras, etc., in accordance with the condition of the cognitive agents who are located in the parāparā condition235 and have as their nature a form of understanding that encompasses without exception the various agents and objects of knowledge.236

229The present passage constitutes Utpaladeva’s first interpretation of icchātas (ŚD 1.30a). He here suggests that Somānanda uses the term to say that Śiva manifests himself in the manner that he does because he is by nature the power of will.

230Here, Utpaladeva is offering a second interpretation of the term icchātas in ŚD 1.30a. According to the first interpretation, the term in question describes how Śiva assumes the form in question: he does so because he exists in the form of the power of will. Here, Utpaladeva suggests that the force of the suffix (-tas) suggests the moment after which Śiva acts: after having reached the form of the power of will, he then assumes a form that conforms to it. In other words, the first interpretation emphasized Śiva’s nature as will, while the second interpretation emphasized the sequential process of manifestation by which Śiva creates the universe. Note also that this second interpretation suggests that Utpaladeva here understands the “form of will,” i.e., the manifestation of the power of will (icchāśakti), to occur at the level of the śaktitattva. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where a chart in the notes maps the formulation of the schema in question.

231This refers to the third of the thirty-six tattvas, the sadāśivatattva.

232What is meant is that while the level of the sadāśivatattva is primarily one at which the power of cognition is present, the power of action also exists there in a latent form, this because the power that is predominant in one tattva exists in a nascent form in the preceding and hierarchically superior one. Thus, the power of action exists in a nascent form in the third tattva, the sadāśivatattva, even though the power of cognition is predominant there and despite the fact that the power of action is predominant at the level of the īśvaratattva, the fourth of the thirty-six tattvas. As Kaul suggests, Utpaladeva may therefore be understood here to refer, with prāguktanaya, to his commentary on ŚD 1.20cd–21, where he describes the sequential arising of the powers of cognition and action, as well as the principle that a subsequent power in the sequence of powers exists in potential form in the stage prior to it. See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.20cd–21. See also Kaul’s note 5, p. 24 of the KSTS edition: antaḥkaraṇa iva vedyam iti nayena. This sequence, of what I have described as Somānanda’s theory of overlapping pairs of powers, was outlined in section 5 of the Introduction, as well. Cf. also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.1, where Utpaladeva suggests that the power of action is present in a latent form in the sadāśivatattva.

233This refers to the īśvaratattva, the fourth of the thirty-six tattvas.

234This stands in contrast to the status of the power of action at the level of the sadāśivatattva, where it is present only in a nascent form.

235The parāparā condition comprises the sadāśivatattva and the īśvaratattva, the third and fourth of the thirty-six tattvas. See ĪPK 3.1.5 for Utpaladeva’s definition of the parāparā condition.

236The agents residing in the parāparā condition, i.e., at the level of the sadāśiva- and īśvaratattvas, are non-dual agents. The only diversity apparent to them is extremely subtle and, as it were, mental rather than physical. They know in their consciousness a slight subject-object distinction, but it exists in a sort of premanifested state. As such, agents in the parāparā condition encompass all agents and objects of knowledge, and it is to this that Utpaladeva here refers.

The fact that the object perceived, i.e., the universe, is coarse is nothing but the differentiated state of the absolute,237 and the cognitive agents,238 although they have consciousness as their nature,239 are coarse, because, since Śiva wills it so, they suffer from duality. Hence, perception is also coarse, and this is the state of Vidyā.240 And others hold that Vidyā is mahāmāyā,241 because duality appears (in it).

Sometimes, Śiva,242 who is somehow—because it is his nature—only playing the game, that is, making an illusion in the form of the world of transmigration, which consists of the self-concealment that is characteristic of the noncognition of non-duality, has his power of māyā, it being the source of the aparā condition,243 assume in a general form244 the nature of the thirty-six tattvas, the lower245 tattvas of which being referred to as form, and thus [māyā] also assumes their specific forms, as many as are brought about according to this well-known way of discussing them. Let there (also) be other, rather more obscure ways of discussing them,246 for the objects of Īśvara’s creation are not restricted,247 but the fact that all of those248 have his nature cannot be denied, as this much can be logically proven. This is what we propose.249

237The term in question, ekānta, literally meaning the “only end or aim,” likely refers to Śiva. What is meant is that the coarse nature of the absolute is merely the state of differentiation appearing in the one, unitary Śiva. It is not really coarse (sthūla), but rather is Śiva himself. Thus, ekāntabhinnatā serves to contrast the multiplicity of the world with the innate unity of Śiva.

238This refers to the cognitive agents at the level of manifestation in question.

239See the commentary and relevant notes, above.

240Vidyā refers to the śuddhavidyātattva, the fifth of the thirty-six tattvas. In this passage, Utpaladeva has suggested that the object in question (i.e., the universe), the agent who perceives it, and the perception itself are all coarse (sthūlatva), i.e., dualistic, at this level. The level of the śuddhavidyātattva is commonly associated with the first budding of duality, in the system of the thirty-six tattvas, and it is to this idea that Utpaladeva here refers.

241There are two views regarding the location, as it were, of the form of “illusion” that creates the apparently external, dualistic universe (mahāmāyā). Some suggest that it exists as an interstitial level between the śuddhavidyā- and māyātattvas, while others suggest, as mentioned here, that mahāmāyā is another name for the śuddhavidyātattva. The important point here is that the level in question is “coarse” insofar as it involves the presence of the appearance of duality.

242The text literally refers to the one who plays a game, but the reference to Śiva is unambiguous.

243I read aparāvasthābījabhūtā as a single compound, though the KSTS edition prints them as distinct words: aparāvasthā bījabhūtā.

244The adverbial term here translated is sāmānyena.

245Literally, the text refers to the “first” tattvas, but the implication is that the lower levels are being described, as one often counts the tattvas beginning with the lowest one, the earth-tattva.

246That is, there may be other legitimate ways to describe the tattvas.

247In other words, Īśvara is capable of producing whatever universe he wishes to produce, even if it is not the one to which the mundane perceiver is accustomed.

248This refers to the hypothetical tattvas mentioned in the hypothetical schemes other than that of the thirty-six. In other words, all the levels of reality, be they represented by the scheme of thirty-six tattvas or otherwise, have Śiva’s nature. This is an essential fact: Śiva is not delimited by the schemes by which we describe him.

249Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.2, where Utpaladeva proposes that the ŚD aims to prove the vailidity of the way Somānanda speaks of Śiva, while Śiva-nature remains unaffected by the language used to describe it. Cf., also, the avataraṇikā to ŚD 1.3–4.

The thirty-sixfold enumeration extends250 down to the earth, i.e., the earth- tattva; nothing is found after it here.251 Thus, the earth-tattva, because it is (entirely) coarse, stands at the end.

An object,252 the particular attribute of which is brought about by many ancillary causes, is more coarse than its cause, and it is not subtle because it is more developed (than its cause). Although great, a cause, such as the source of material existence,253 is very subtle.254 Thus, insofar as everything is connected to prakāśa, since everything is made up of consciousness, everything, from Śiva255 down even to the white-colored water tattva, should be regarded as a cause.256

On the other hand, as much as this is the case257 even at the (level of the) earth(-tattva), a difference exists (there), even though its258 nature is prakāśa,259 because it is the pure noncognition of the non-duality of the light of consciousness.260 Therefore, he says it has an “insentient appearance,” an exocentric compound meaning it is one “whose appearance, i.e., form, because dark, is insentient, i.e., is not prakāśa.” It is compact because its nature consists of the

250The verb pūryate literally means “is filled.”

251“Here” (atra) refers in this instance to the system of classification at hand, that of thirty-six tattvas. The earth-tattva is the last of the thirty-six.

252The term kārya can also refer to the effect of a cause (kāraṇa).

253The present term, pradhāna, probably refers to mūlaprakṛti, the source of material manifestation, according to the Sāṅkhya, and the thirteenth of thirty-six in the Śaiva system of the tattvas. It is also possible that this term should be taken to refer to the power of illusion (māyā), however. On mūlaprakṛti in the Sāṅkhya, see Larson 1969: 192–197.

254In other words, one might object that that which causes the creation of the universe is not very subtle, because that which it creates is not subtle. The response given is that, even though that which causes the universe is great, it is nevertheless very subtle. Thus, the tattvas each are causes, the preceding one of the one following, even if they are not the most subtle of entities in existence.

255Literally, the text reads “the fact of being real,” which suggests a reference to the highest tattva, the śivatattva.

256The water tattva is the thirty-fifth tattva. Excluding the last tattva, the earth-tattva, every tattva is the cause of the following one. Reference to the white color of the water tattva calls forth the classification of the Naiyāyikas, etc., who associate particular colors and qualities with particular elements. Note that my translation is slightly free, here, as the text literally refers to the thirty-fifth tattva as “one whose color shines forth as white,” this with an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound: śuklaprakāśavarṇa.

257In other words, as much as everything is a cause, this insofar as everything is Śiva in the form of consciousness, the following obtains.

258That is, there is a difference between the earth-tattva and the thirty-five tattvas above it, even though the former is by nature prakāśa, as are the other thirty-five.

259As Kaul notes, this is because nothing appears that is not prakāśa: tat pārthivaṃ tattvaṃ nāprakāśaḥ prakāśata iti nyāyena prakāśātmatve ’pi citprakāśaikyākhyātimātrāt pṛthag evāsti. See note 4 on p. 26 of the KSTS edition.

260The earth-tattva is different from the other tattvas insofar as it marks the last stage of manifestation. As such, it is not merely the noncognition of non-duality, but rather it is, as it were, the limit or the lowest form of that which Śiva manifests. Here, then, Utpaladeva points to the earth-tattva as the de facto limit of manifestation. It represents the stage at which consciousness is entirely unaware of the fact that it is an undivided whole. But insofar as consciousness is cognizant of this noncognition, consciousness is still conscious. Paradoxically, then, it is at this level that consciousness is fully aware of its not being aware of its ultimate unity.

array of the five objects of experience,261 which consist of the (five) physical entities beginning with ether.262 It has no interstices in it 263—that is, it is the last object—because nothing more can be added (to it).264 For the same reason, it is solid, because many [entities] are compressed (in it); it blocks others from occupying its space; it is totally intolerant of mixing with anything else;265 it is nourishing of dualistic vision,266 (and) it is placed at the end (of the tattvas).

1.34

After that,267 he himself creates as objects the worlds, etc., which are the innumerable powers of these very beings.268 Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.34. tathā nānāśarīrāṇi bhuvanāni tathā tathā visṛjya rūpaṃ gṛhṇāti protkṛṣṭādhamamadhyamam

In like manner, he produces the many bodies, (and) the various worlds and assumes their forms, be they the highest, the lowest, or in between.269

Thus, he comes forth as a form, as the thirty-sixfold object in the form of the tattvas, which is fit to extend the expansion of the universe. In the same way, i.e., by means of these same tattvas, he produces as objects the bodies of Gods, etc.,270 and the worlds. The former are brought about not directly from the creator, but in the form of men who are born and dwell in the world of transmigration—(indeed,) he himself produces271 the Gods, etc., by means of the form of such beings as one’s father and mother, since, in the manner stated

261These are: sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell.

262Again, reference is here made to the materialists’ conception of the elements, according to which the earth is the lowest of the five and includes all of the qualities of the preceding four, as well as a fifth, taste.

263This is a gloss of saṃhata, “compact.”

264The term here translated is saṃparkāntarāsaṃbhava, more literally meaning “because it is not

possible for there to be another addition.”

265This is again to say that nothing else can be added to the earth-tattva, or in other words it is the last level of manifestation, according to this thirty-sixfold system of classification.

266I take paripuṣṭadvaitadṛṣṭi to be a neuter exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound. Kaul counts it as part of a larger compound: paripuṣṭadvaitadṛṣṭiparyantaniviṣṭam.

267That is, after creating the thirty-six tattvas, he does the following.

268This refers to the Vidyeśvaras, Mantras, etc., who are mentioned in the previous passage, ŚD 1.29cd–33. The idea is that Śiva first creates the basic elements of creation, and he appoints these various beings, who in turn use their powers to create the various worlds, etc.

269Note that I here translate the singular “form” (rūpa) with the plural, this to render the present in idiomatic English.

270The word “etcetera” (ādi) here refers to human beings and the beings who dwell in the parāparā condition, the Mantras, etc.

271Here I read the absolutive (visṛjya) a second time, this to make sense of the clause beginning with kevalam. It is only Śiva who produces the bodies of the Gods, etc.: even if one is born of one’s own parents, it is in reality Śiva himself who causes the creation of the child who is born of those parents.

in the Pratyabhijñā,272 no one else creates anything;273 the latter (are brought about) in the form of places where they live. He then assumes the form of the highest, etc., i.e., the forms of Gods, humans, and those born of animals.

1.35

He assumes (the form of) the bodies, worlds, and mental impressions that mutually conform to one another.274 Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.35 sthānānurūpato dehān dehākāreṇa bhāvanāḥ ādadat tena tenaiva rūpeṇa pravibhāvyate

Acquiring (the form of) the bodies that are commensurate with the places and the feelings that are commensurate with the bodies, he appears in these very forms.275

The different activities of these Gods, etc.,276 come about in a commensurate form, and, acquiring (the form of) the bodies, etc., he is seen in, i.e., is brought about by, these same māyic forms.

1.36–37ab

He alone exists even in hell, etc., as a result of failing to cognize his own true nature.277 Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.36.krīḍayā duḥkhavedyāni karmakārīṇi tatphalaiḥ saṃbhatsyamānāni tathā narakārṇavagahvare

1.37.nivāsīni śarīrāṇi gṛhṇāti parameśvaraḥ

Playfully, the Supreme Lord assumes (the form of) the bodies in which suffering will be perceived, which perform (sinful) acts and then, dwelling in the abyss of the ocean of hell, will be consumed by their fruits.

272See in particlar ĪPK 2.4.21 and his Vṛtti on the same, where Utpaladeva says that causality, agency, and action are only Śiva’s will. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.4, where Utpaladeva explains the nature of causality, arguing that all action, including creation, must be authored by a single, unitary God.

273The idea presented here is echoed elswhere in Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1. See, for example, Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.1: paratvena prathamapuruṣaprayogo ’kiñcidrūpatvena kṛtrimāhaṃbhāvasya kartṛtāmātraṃ tattvam iti darśanārthaḥ. Compare with the present passage: parasyākiñcitkaratvāt sa eva.

274In other words, mental impressions correspond with the body in which they are experienced, just as the bodies correspond with the world in they dwell.

275I here follow Gnoli’s translation, in part: “The bodies which he assumes are commensurate with the planes of reality; similarly, the mental habitus which he assumes is commensurate with the bodies. In other words, He assumes their forms which are, accordingly, sublime (the Gods), average (men) or base (animals).” See Gnoli 1957: 21.

276“Etcetera” refers to the beings mentioned in ŚD 1.34, as well as the worlds, the mental states, and so on that accompany them.

277That is to say, when Śiva takes the form of those who are condemned to hell, he has taken on a state of awareness in which he does not recognize his own nature.

Because it is his nature to play by creating the universe, he assumes (the form of) the bodies here278 that will be experienced as having a suffering nature in hell;279 or, they are those in which suffering will be experienced in hell.280 They perform sinful acts, due to the force of niyatiśakti,281 the nature of which is māyā, and then, dwelling in the deep, frightening belly of the ocean that is hell, they will reap the fruits of those acts.

The Supreme Lord alone exists, even in hell, and no one at all exists except him. Thus, oneness is fully corroborated.

1.37cd–38

[Somānanda] expresses the same with an example from the everyday world:

yathā nṛpaḥ sārvabhaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ

1.38. krīḍan karoti pādātadharmāṃs taddharmadharmataḥ tathā prabhuḥ pramodātmā krīḍaty evaṃ tathā tathā

Just as an omnipotent king, engrossed in the joy of his power, playing, performs the duties of a foot soldier as one whose nature is his282 nature, so also the Lord, whose nature is joy, plays in this way, again and again.

Just as an omnipotent king, penetrated by the wonder283 of sovereignty, performs uninhibitedly, as a game, the actions of a foot soldier by assuming the nature that is characteristic of him,284 so also the Supreme Lord, being complete and therefore naturally intoxicated by (the power of) bliss,285 plays in this

278The word iha, “here,” can be interpreted either to mean that Śiva takes the form of these bodies here in the world or that the bodies perform sinful acts in the world. I have here translated in a manner that reflects the former.

279Here, Utpaladeva suggests that duḥkhavedya can be interpreted as a determinative (tatpuruṣa) compound.

280In other words, it is in the body that individuals suffer. Here, Utpaladeva suggests that duḥkhavedya

can be interpreted as an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound.

281The reference here, one not found in the ŚD, is to one of the five “sheaths” or kañcukas, the powers by which Śiva constricts his own consciousness so as to create a limited, everyday world. Niyati is the fourth of the five, and its function is to limit causal relations. This power follows in the hierarchy of tattvas after kalā or limitation of action, vidyā or limitation of knowledge, and rāga or limitation of interest. Following it is kāla or that which limits time. See Pandit 1997: 71–79, esp. 76. See also ĪPK 2.3.6.

282That is, he acts as if he has the nature of one who is a member of the infantry.

283As he does in his commentary on ŚD 1.7cd-8, Utpaladeva here glosses “joy” (āmoda) with “wonder” (camatkāra).

284That is, he assumes the nature that is characteristic of the foot soldier.

285The KSTS edition reads ānandaghūrṇitais, but all four manuscripts of the edition (G, J, P & R) record the compound in the nominative case (ānandaghūrṇitas), an adjective describing the Supreme Lord (parameśvara). I here accept the reading of the manuscripts and translate accordingly, as it makes little sense to describe the modes as intoxicated by bliss. Note that Utpaladeva uses language similar to the term in question, namely ghūrṇita, in his commentary on ŚD 1.7cd–8. There, he equates Somānanda’s jṛmbhā, “expansion,” with ghūrṇana, “vibration.” The point is that the modes (prakāra) of consciousness are made active by Śiva’s power of bliss. It is in this light that one should understand Utpaladeva’s definition, in what follows, of play (krīḍā) as vibration (spanda). Cf., also, e.g., TĀ 26.24ab: iti jñātvā guruḥ samyak paramānandaghūrṇitaḥ.