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(Śiva’s) eagerness and delight.10 Whether it exists or not is not a matter to be discussed here in the primary commentary.11

This is why, even after examining the higher powers, [Somānanda] says “he assumes the nature of the thirty-six tattvas.”12 In any case, the restriction is that the ultimate truth of Śiva’s non-duality is not broken.13

Even on the path which is beyond māyā,14 [the Lord] enters into the tattvas that are referred to as the parāparā condition, which arises by dint of Īśvara’s will, who is known from scripture.15 This is so because the noncognition of the Supreme Lord’s non-duality16 is always the same, even when one is not in

10The classification to which Utpaladeva refers might best be summarized in the following chart:

Note that, in ŚD 1.19–20ab, Somānanda suggests that there are two parts of divine will, the first being, according to Utpaladeva, eagerness (aunmukhya) in the form of delight (nirvṛti). However, according to Utpaladeva’s commentary, the pure form of nirvṛti exists prior to this and is associated with the power of bliss. Note also that Utpaladeva differentiates Śiva from all of the thirty-six tattvas in a number of places, this reflecting his panentheism, while Somānanda, with his strict pantheism, does not do so. See the Introduction, section 6. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.29cd–33 (esp. my note 232) and ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.39–41ab, esp. my note 301. Thus, that the chart identifies the first tattva with Paramaśiva suggests, in this instance, the nature of the system as Somānanda and not Utpaladeva knew it.

11As noted in the Introduction (section 6), Utpaladeva does not employ these terms, aunmukhya and nirvṛti, in a techincal manner in his ĪPK, nor does he explicitly refer to the powers of eagerness (aunmukhya) and delight (nirvṛti). This passage therefore can be read to refer obliquely to this discrepancy, not to say contradiction, between the theological systems of teacher and student. Utpaladeva, moreover, here seems to suggest that this difference is trivial: both agree on the basic manner in which Śiva manifests the universe.

12In other words, Utpaladeva understands Somānanda not to emphasize the importance of these intervening tattvas (along with the powers of aunmukhya and nirvṛti, with which they are associated and about which Utpaladeva has nothing to say in his ĪPK) over and above the fact that Śiva manifests the universe in the form of the thirty-six tattvas. The quotation in question is ŚD 1.32cd–33ab: māyārūpamitītyādiṣaṭtriṃśattattvarūpatām / bibhrad bibharti rūpāṇi tāvatā vyavahārataḥ.

13In other words, Utpaladeva here affirms the consistency of doctrine in the Pratyabhijñā: both he and Somānanda adhere to a doctrine of Śiva’s non-duality.

14This is a reference to the śuddhādhvan or the pure “road” corresponding to the first five tattvas.

15This mention of Īśvara is not meant to refer to the īśvaratattva but to Paramaśiva. Utpaladeva uses the term in the same manner in, e.g., the avataraṇikā to ŚD 2.1. See above. As Kaul has noted, the point made here is that even these tattvas are subordinate to Paramaśiva. This means that any equation of paśyantī with one of the tattvas of the śuddhādhvan locates her at a level subordinate to Paramaśiva. (See Kaul’s note 3, p. 38 of the KSTS edition: tena nātra paratattvasthitir ity arthaḥ.

16One manuscript (G) records parameśvarābhedākhyāteḥ for parameśvarabhedākhyāteḥ, and I accept this reading. The latter reading does not accord with Pratyabhijñā theology, and anyway there are many parallel readings in the ŚDVṛ attesting to the noncognition of the non-duality (abhedākhyāti) of Śiva.

contact with the world of transmigration, because kārmamala does not increase when even Vidyā appears.17

[Somānanda] uses the expression “honorable” in the phrase “the honorable grammarians” in order to proclaim their stupidity. Indeed, even if paśyantī also had a supreme form,18 as it is said:19

“and she is still in concentration”;20 “and she is pure”;21

“and she is the one for whom the appearance (of all objects) is becalmed”22 —or even if she has some other form exceeding this—she nevertheless possesses the power of sequence, given that she is the cause of sequence, “sa-ra” and “ra-sa,” arising in madhyamā.23 As it is said:24

17Vidyā refers to the śuddhavidyātattva, the fifth of the thirty-six tattvas and the lowest of the five socalled pure tattvas (śuddhādhvan). Utpaladeva here suggests that Śiva may be said to enter into or “assume the form” of even those tattvas that exist above the level of māyā. In making this assertion, he uses technical language. It is always Śiva who “enters into” the various levels, because it is his nature to do so: the noncognition of his very non-duality is always the same, and it is a function of the nature of his consciousness. (See the Introduction, section 13, the subsection entitled “Bhartṛhari’s avidyā and Utpaladeva’s abhedākhyāti.”) This applies even to the pure levels, at which there is no contact with the world of transmigration (saṃsāra). Furthermore, the reason for this is that kārmamala, the impurity associated with limited action, is the same at all of the levels, just as its source is the same, even when at the level of the

śuddhavidyātattva.

18The VPVṛ of course mentions just such a supreme form of paśyantī, for which see, e.g., VPVṛ ad VP 1.159. Cf. edition of Iyer 1966: 216 and Iyer [1969] 1992: 144.

19These and the immediately following quotations are found in the commentary on VP 1.159. The relevant passage of the VPVṛ reads as follows: pratisaṃhṛtakramā saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī. sā calācalā pratilabdhasamādhānā cāvṛtā ca viśuddhā ca, sanniviṣṭajñeyākārā pratilīnākārā nirākārā ca, paricchinnārthapratyavabhāsā saṃsṛṣṭārthapratyavabhāsā praśāntasarvārthapratyavabhāsā cety aparimāṇabhedā.

20Here, I follow Iyer’s translation. Kaul glosses pratilabdhasamādhānā ca with kevalaśabdārtharahitasvarūpasamāhitiḥ, “she is a contemplative state [samāhiti] whose nature is devoid of the meaning of the word alone.” Iyer also notes that the VPP glosses this word with yogic terminology, viz.: pratilabdhasamādhānā cety avikṣiptā yogināṃ śabdapūrvayogena samāhitatvāt. See Iyer 1965: 125 and 128.

21According to Iyer, “Vṛṣabha explains viśuddhā in two ways: (1) free from all differentiation, as Yogis see it, (2) free from all corrupt forms, as grammarians know it.” See Iyer 1965: 128. Kaul glosses with grāhyagrāhakakallolarahitā, i.e., “separated from the waves of objects and agents of perception.”

22The reading of the text, praśāntapratyavabhāsā ca, is at slight variance with praśāntasarvārthapratyavabhāsā, the reading found in the printed edition of VPVṛ ad VP 1.159. All of the ŚD manuscripts bear the same reading, however, and I have therefore not emended the text. See edition of Iyer 1966: 215. Note that it is also possible that praśāntapratyavabhāsā means “in whom the appearance (of all objects) is becalmed.”

23The argument here is that sequence must exist in a potential form in paśyantī, because it is impossible for it to be manifested at the madhyamā level if it is not latent in paśyantī, which manifests it. Because sequence exists in latent form in it, paśyantī cannot be supreme. Sequence appears at the madhyamā level, though only mentally in the form of the sequence of syllables (“sa-ra” versus “ra-sa”). When combined with the vital breath (prāṇa), speech becomes fully manifested in the form of vaikharī, everyday speech. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 149–151. See also VPVṛ ad VP 1.159: madhyamā tv antaḥsaṃniveśinī parigṛhītakrameva buddhimātropādānā.

24That is, they say that paśyantī possesses the power of sequence (kramaśakti). The following is a quotation of VPVṛ ad VP 1.159, though it is slightly at variance with the reading in Iyer’s published

pratisaṃhṛtakramāpy antaḥ saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī

Although she is the one in whom sequence is contracted, paśyantī is penetrated by the power of sequence, even when non-duality exists.25

Therefore, she is not the complete, ultimate condition. So, how can she exist as the form of the supreme state, the form of the Supreme Brahman, the form of Brahman-as-Speech?

2.2

Accordingly, [Somānanda] says that they say the following:

2.2. ity āhus te paraṃ brahma yad anādi tathākṣayam tad akṣaraṃ śabdarūpaṃ sā paśyantī parā hi vāk

They say the following. The supreme Brahman, which is beginningless and endless, imperishable, whose form is speech, is paśyantī, supreme speech.26

They say the following. The supreme Brahman in the form of consciousness, which is beginningless and without end, is imperishable, i.e., unchanging, (and) is one whose form is speech; and this is itself supreme speech, called paśyantī. Were it not to have speech as its form, even the light of consciousness,27 called the Supreme Brahman, would not appear; for, she reflects on herself,28 and they say that illumination is nothing but reflective awareness.29

2.3

In addition, [Brahman] is the very self. This [Somānanda] formulates as follows:

2.3 sa evātmā sarvadehavyāpakatvena vartate antaḥpaśyadavasthaiva cidrūpatvam arūpakam

edition. Iyer’s edition reads: pratisaṃhṛtakramā saty apy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī. Since all of the manuscripts for the ŚD witness the same reading, I have not emended the text.

25Compare this to Iyer’s translation, which I have consulted in this instance. See Iyer 1965: 125. See also VP 1.167ab: avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā.

26Kaul distinguishes between the two terms, akṣaya and akṣara, by suggesting that the former means “without an end” (akṣayam antarahitam) and the latter means “free from mental constructs” (akṣaraṃ kalpanojjhitam). ŚD 2.2 paraphrases VP 1.1.

27The Sanskrit here reads citprakāśa. The term prakāśa, so fundamental to the Pratyabhijñā, was probably borrowed from Bhartṛhari (see Torella 1994: xxiii–xvi), where it is used to describe vāc. It refers to “knowledge or consciousness,” and it is pratyavamarśinī, that which reflects on itself. See, Iyer [1969] 1992: 108. See also the Introduction, section 6.

28The term in question is pratyavamarśinī.

29As in the Pratyabhijñā, Utpaladeva understands Bhartṛhari’s paśyantī to be self-reflective: it consists of consciousness as light (prakāśa) that illumines itself. Thus, the “illumination” (prakāśana) is a “reflective awareness” (pratyavamarśana). For an explanation of the nature of consciousness in this view, see Dyczkowski 1987: 59–75. The commentary here echoes VP 1.132. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.8cd–11, which also echoes the same passage of the VP.

It is the very self that pervades the entire body, the very state of seeing internally. It has consciousness as its form, (and yet) it has no form.

The state of internal seeing, whose form is that of being one who enjoys, is devoid of a cognizable form,30 (and) has consciousness as its form, i.e., is pure consciousness. They say it is the very self that pervades the entire body, i.e., the one who, situated in the seat of its enjoyments, enjoys worldly delights.31

2.4ab

It alone is the omniscient, supreme self. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

2.4. tāvad yāvat parā kāṣṭhā yāvat paśyaty anantakam

The supreme goal exists to the degree to which it sees the endless.32

From intensity of practice, the goal is reached, i.e., it becomes pure seeing, since it sees the entire, unending universe, in consequence of which the goal of her33 act of seeing is fulfilled.

2.4cd–5

Because nescience is quieted at that very moment,34 it is the supreme reality. Thus [Somānanda] says:

akṣādivṛttibhir hīnaṃ deśakālādiśūnyakam

2.5. sarvataḥ kramasaṃhāramātram ākāravarjitam brahmatattvaṃ parā kāṣṭhā paramārthas tad eva saḥ

Devoid of the activity of the senses, devoid of space, time, etc.,35 being nothing but the complete contraction of sequence, (and) devoid of form, the brahmatattva is the supreme goal. It alone is the supreme realty.

30This is a gloss of arūpaka, “it has no form,” in ŚD 3d.

31This is a reference to Bhartṛhari’s suggestion that the śabdabrahman embodies the form of the individual enjoyer, without becoming separate from himself. The use of the terms “enjoyer” (bhoktṛ) and “worldly delights” (bhoga) reminds one of similar terminology in non-dual Śaivism. See VP 1.4 and the commentary thereon.

32This is a reference to the accomplishment of the highest state, that of paśyantī, or, as Utpaladeva puts it “pure seeing” (paśyanty eva). The ātman reaches the highest state of existence, or in other words attains enlightenment, when it sees the entire, endless universe, presumably as a unitary whole. (This is Chaturvedi’s interpretation, for which see Chaturvedi 1986: 35.)

33The feminine genitive pronoun (asyāḥ) apparently refers here to paśyantī; thus, Utpaladeva here seems to suggest that it is the goal of paśyantī’s seeing that is fulfilled.

34That is, this occurs in the moment when paśyantī becomes pure seeing. This clearly refers to the aforementioned attainment of the “supreme goal,” which suggests that nescience (avidyā) is quieted only when paśyantī sees in a purely non-dualistic manner.

35The term ādi, “etcetera,” in deśakālādiśūnyaka refers to jāti or class. See Utpaladeva’s commentary,

below.

At that time,36 there is no use for the means (of knowing), the senses, etc.,37 the eye, etc., in the activity of illumining objects, nor is there any distinction by space, time, or class. For the same reason, the brahmatattva is nothing but the complete quieting of sequence—be it spatial or temporal—for sequence per se means saṃsāra, and for this reason, it is devoid of every form of object and agent of cognition.38 Hence, since nothing superior exists, it is the supreme goal, and when it is reached,39 it is nothing but40 the supreme reality in the form of paśyantī.

2.6

And it alone is also as follows, as [Somānanda] says:41

2.6. āste vijñānarūpatve sa śabdo ’rthavivakṣayā madhyamā kathyate saiva bindunādamarutkramāt

That is speech, which resides in a state of knowledge because of the (speaker’s) desire to convey meaning. The same is called madhyamā, because of the sequence of breaths, bindu and nāda.42

36The present refers to the moment when Brahman becomes pure seeing. This is a reference to the state described in ŚD 2.4ab.

37I am unsure to what the word “etcetera” (ādi) here refers, though it probably refers to the intellect.

38The Sanskrit here reads sarvagrāhyagrāhakākāravarjita, a gloss of ākāravarjita (ŚD 2.5b). The terms grāhya and grāhaka are common in non-dual Śaivism, as they are in Bhartṛhari’s works (though it should be mentioned that, although these terms are not unknown to Somānanda, they are much more prevalent in Utpaladeva’s commentary than in the mūla). Like consciousness in the non-dual Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, Bhartṛhari’s paśyantī both reveals and is revealed, that is, it both cognizes objects and is experienced as the object of cognition. See VP 1.56. The terms are also common in Buddhist Sanskrit. See, e.g., PV (pratyakṣa chapter) 3.215.

39The present expression (prāptaṃ tat) echoes that of the commentary on ŚD 2.4ab: kāṣṭhā prāptā sā paśyanty eva bhavati.

40Utpaladeva reads the emphatic, enclitic particle eva with saḥ and not tat, as the word order of 2.5d suggests.

41The point made in this passage is that, just as Brahman itself reaches the highest state, it also issues forth as the various levels of speech, paśyantī, madhyamā, etc.

42The madhyamā level of speech is the level at which the breaths emerge. This is the stage of speech in the pre-articulated but conceptually formulated state. At this level the sounds that ultimately produce everyday speech are formulated. It is at this level that sequence appears in a nascent form, only to be fully manifested at the level of mundane speech, called vaikharī. Bhartṛhari most commonly uses the term nāda synonymously with dhvani, referring to the sounds that manifest speech. In some places, however, he seems to suggest that nāda is a type of sound manifested by the dhvanis and is a gross form or accumulation of them. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 175. See also VP 1.49: nādasya kramajanmatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ / akramaḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedavān iva jāyate. For a description of madhyamāvāk see VPVṛ ad 1.142: madhyamā tv antaḥsaṃniveśinī parigṛhītakrameva buddhimātropādānā. sā tu sūkṣmaprāṇavṛttyanugatā kramasaṃhārabhāve ’pi vyaktaprāṇaparigrahaiva keṣāṃcit. The term bindu appears only once in the VP and not in the technical sense used by the Pratyabhijñā. See VP 2.158c. It therefore appears that Somānanda has a peculiarly tantric understanding of the grammarians’ hierarchy of levels of speech. One possible source for this (not uncommon) formulation of levels of sound is the VBh, where nāda and bindu are frequently listed. See, e.g., VBh 12a for a reference to Bhairava as being made up of nāda and bindu

(nādabindumaya).

The breath first manifests the phonemes, and then is reabsorbed in those same phonemes.48

Then, having reached the cavity of the mouth at the different places of articulation, the throat and so on, being in the form of distinct phonemes, “ka,” etc., she is called vaikharī:

When breath is released in the places of articulation, vaikharī speech, guided by the activity of the breath of those who use speech, produces full-fledged phonemes.49

And after that,50 on account of an impression, in the form of nescience, of external objects, the same speech, in turn, is manifested by forms such as pots and cloth, (and) is reduced to being that which is perceived51 by (the organs of sense,) the eye, etc.

2.8cd–11

Next, [Somānanda] refers to them as saying:52

yasmāt tair ucyate sadbhir evaṃ vastupravṛttaye

2.9. anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram vivartate ’rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ

2.10.na so ’sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte śabdabrahmaṇi niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati

2.11.avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā ityādivākyaracanais tair evaṃ pratipāditam

As a result, the good people say the following about the appearance of things:53 “Brahman, which is beginningless and endless, has speech as its true nature, (and) is imperishable, appears as the objects. The activity of the world exists because of that”; “there is no understanding in the world that is not connected with speech”; “the one deeply versed in śabdabrahman obtains the supreme Brahman”; “and paśyantī is nondistinct, (and) is in every way one whose sequence is contracted.” They have declared this much by constructing utterances such as these.

48This is a quotation of VP 1.118cd. Utpaladeva quotes this half-verse to prove that Bhartṛhari accepts that paśyantī reaches the cavity of the mouth through the breaths, which first arise at the madhyamā level.

49This is a quotation of VP 1.165.

50That is to say that this occurs following the emanation of gross speech.

51The term in question, grāhyabhāva, could be translated: “it becomes that which is grasped [i.e., cognized].”

52ŚD 2.9 is a quotation of VP 1.1. ŚD 2.10ab is a quotation of VP 1.131ab. ŚD 2.10cd is a quotation of MBh (Śāntiparvan) 12.224.60cd and is echoed in part in VP 1.22cd (tad vyākaraṇam āgamya paraṃ brahmādhigamyate); the same is also quoted in VBh 38cd. Finally, ŚD 2.11ab is a quotation of VP 1.167ab.

53I am unsure of my translation of vastupravṛtti. Note that one manuscript (G) has svābhidheyapratītaye written above the term in question, while another (J) records sābhidheyapratītaye.

As a result, the good people, i.e., the honorable—which is to say the fool- ish—grammarians, have declared that the form of paśyantī54 is the following, i.e., has the form (here) stated:

Brahman,55 which has speech as its true nature, is imperishable, (and) is beginningless and endless, appears as the objects of the universe, i.e., assumes in itself their unreal form.56 Vivarta is the state of acquiring an unreal, distinct, and disparate form;57 [Brahman] appears58 because of it.59 Activity, i.e., the variety of arrangements of entities, beings, worlds, etc., exists because of that appearance.60

And: There is no understanding of “pot,” “cloth,” etc., in the activity of the world that is devoid of denotative speech. Without its having the form of speech, even the light of the brahmatattva would not shine forth.61 (Bhartṛhari says:) “Indeed, she reflects on herself.”62

And: The one deeply versed63 in this kind of Brahman, being in the form of paśyantī, called speech, has obtained the supreme Brahman.

And: [Brahman] in the form of paśyantī is devoid of the distinction of agent from object of cognition and of sequence, and paśyantī is nondistinct and is one whose spatial and temporal sequences are contracted.

Since [Somānanda] says “such as these” (ŚD 2.11c), he says that they have (also) said this much with the previously quoted utterances concerning madhyamā, vaikharī, and so on.

2.12ab

This view is now being disputed, as [Somānanda] says:

2.12. tadvicārāya rāddhāntaḥ saṃpraty eṣa vidhīyate

To dispute this, the following doctrine is now laid out.

54It is possible that paśyantīrūpa should be taken with śabdatattva, etc., following it. See below.

55If one construes paśyantīrūpa with what follows it, i.e., śabdatattva, etc., then one should understand paśyantīrūpa to be an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound referring to Brahman who “has the form of paśyantī.”

56This line seems to echo that of the VPP. Compare the present phrase (tadasatyarūpam ātmany upagacchati) with the commentary of the VPP: tatrānyarūpopagrāhitety ekasyābhinnasyānyarūpopagrāhitā anyarūpasvīkāro ’nyagatasya rūpasya svātmani saṃdarśanaṃ vivartaḥ.

57This is a reference to the VPVṛ ad VP 1.1: ekasya tattvād apracyutasya bhedānukāreṇāsatyavibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ. See also the VPP on the same, quoted in fn. 56, above.

58As above, the verb in question is vivartate.

59That is, as a result of the aforementioned state.

60“Appearance” is a translation of vivartana.

61Utpaladeva here makes reference to VP 1.132, as he did in his commentary following ŚD 2.2.

62This is a quotation of VP 1.132: vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī / na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī. “If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification possible.” (Translation Iyer’s. See Iyer [1969] 1992: 111.) See also ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.2.

63Kaul glosses niṣṇāta with kṛtābhyāsa, “one who is practiced.”

Our settled opinion,64 which will be set forth to dispute what the grammarians have said, reaches the highest sophistication, because it makes use of reason.

2.12cd–13ab

To continue, [Somānanda] says:

ādau tāvad indriyatve sthitā vāk karmasaṃjñite

2.13. tasyātmatā brahmatā vā vaktuṃ śakyā na sādhubhiḥ

To begin with, speech is an organ of action. The honorable ones are not able to say that it65 has the nature either of the self or Brahman.

First of all, the very appropriateness of what they say is questionable. For instance, speech being an extremely coarse organ of action, the intellect must also be employed in knowledge;66 (thus,) its nature67 must be connected to that which resides at the highest level, viz., either to the self or the brahmatattva. Hence, those honorable ones—honorable in the same sense as before—are simply not able to say that it has such a nature.68

2.13cd–14ab

Because it69 is located in nescience, it is not fitting that it is the supreme reality to the exclusion of (the other organs of action, viz.:) hands, feet, etc. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

indriyatve ’pi sāmānye pāṇyāder brahmatā na kim 2.14. tatra cet sūkṣmakalanā sarvatra kalanāgrataḥ

64This is a somewhat idiomatic translation of the term siddhānta. Somānanda began the chapter (ŚD 2.2–11) by presenting his opponent’s view, or the pūrvapakṣa, namely, the doctrine of the grammarians as he understood it. The balance of the chapter is dedicated to defeating it in the process of proving his own view, the uttarapakṣa or siddhānta.

65Tasya here refers to the fact of being an organ of action (indriyatva). See Utpaladeva’s commentary and my notes thereon.

66This is to say that, because speech is as an organ of action, the intellect (buddhi), which organizes and directs the organs of action, must be deployed for one to use speech. As such, one must determine whose intellect is employed, that of Brahman or of the individual self (ātman). Somānanda has addressed this issue at ŚD 1.26–29ab.

67Utpaladeva here refers to the nature of the intellect.

68That is, the grammarians are not able to say whether speech, being an organ of action, is associated with the ātman or Brahman, this because they cannot associate the intellect that guides it with either. The reason for this is simply the fact that they do not recognize any entity superior to speech, but, as Utpaladeva here explains, the buddhi must intervene to direct speech, and it in turn must belong to an agent. None of this is possible in the grammarians’ system. Therefore, Utpaladeva suggests, it is not possible for the grammarians to argue that speech is supreme.

69That is, speech (vāc) is located in nescience.

Why don’t the hand, etc., have Brahma-nature, even while they are equally organs (of action)? If you argue there is a subtle touch70 there,71 (we reply:) there is a (subtle) touch in every case, about which see below.72

If you argue that speech has Brahma-nature, because it is a form of subtle paśyantī, and therefore you have answered our question,73 (we reply:) that fact of having a real form exists in every case, be it for the hand and the rest,74 or for pots and so on,75 as will be developed later on.76

2.14cd–15ab

Now, you might argue that, despite the designation of speech (as an organ of action), it is superior in the state of meditation, because it rises internally to the places of articulation—the heart, throat, palate, the interval between the eyebrows, the mind, and so on—whereas this is not the case for the hand, etc. About this, [Somānanda] says:

antaḥ kramo hṛdādeś cet prāṇādeḥ kiṃ na satyatā 2.15. sarvasyāntaḥparāmarśapūrṇatāsti pravartane

If you argue an internal sequence exists, beginning with the heart, (we reply:) why aren’t the outgoing breath and the rest real? When anything commences, the internal reflective awareness is complete.

(Reply:) Prāṇa, apāna, samāna, udāna, etc.,77 would also be real, because they rise to the heart, etc.

Moreover, internal reflective awareness exists for any object at the moment of its manifestation. Indeed, it is not the case that, in the condition they take

70The present is a tentative translation of sūkṣmakalanā. The idea clearly is that speech is more subtle than the other organs of action.

71The implication here is that speech would therefore have either Brahma-nature or the nature of the self, while the other organs of action would not. See Kaul’s note 3 on p. 46 of the KSTS edition: “And therefore, it is of the nature of the self, or of Brahman” (tataś cātmatā brahmatā vā).

72See ŚD 2.89–91. Somānanda offers further criticism of the grammarians’ privileging of speech above the other organs of action in ŚD 2.36.

73My translation is idiomatic. Literally, the text reads “therefore, this has been stated” (tenaiṣoktā

=tenaiṣā [vāco brahmatā] uktā). That is to say that the grammarians have said that speech has Brahmanature (brahmatā), and therefore, contrary to Somānanda’s criticism in ŚD 2.13ab, they are able to say whether the organ of speech was associated with Brahman or the individual soul (ātman): it is associated with Brahman.

74The present expression refers to the five organs of action, viz.: (1) speech (vāc); (2) touch

(hasta/pāṇi); (3) motion (pāda); (4) voiding the bowels (pāyu); and (5) the power of reproduction (upastha).

75“Etcetera” ( ādi) here refers to entities appearing in the world.

76See ŚD 2.89–91.

77That is, the five breaths, the last of which is vyāna. On the function of the breaths in Śaiva tantrism, see, e.g., Pandit 1997: 29–38.