- •November 16, 2002
- •February 14, 2003
- •February 21
- •February 28
- •March 7
- •March 10
- •March 12
- •March 14
- •March 15
- •March 17
- •March 19
- •March 21
- •March 24
- •March 26
- •March 28
- •March 30
- •March 31
- •April 2
- •April 2
- •April 8-10
- •April 12
- •April 16
- •April 20
- •April 20
- •April 23
- •April 25
- •April 27
- •April 29
- •June 6
- •June 13
- •June 17
- •June 21
- •June 23
- •June 24
- •July 2
- •July 5
- •August 14
- •September 8
- •September 24
- •References
- •Virology
- •Discovery of the SARS Virus
- •Initial Research
- •The Breakthrough
- •Coronaviridae
- •SARS Co-V
- •Genome Sequence
- •Morphology
- •Organization
- •Detection
- •Stability and Resistance
- •Natural Host
- •Antiviral Agents and Vaccines
- •Antiviral Drugs
- •Vaccines
- •Outlook
- •References
- •Routes of Transmission
- •Factors Influencing Transmission
- •Patient Factors in Transmission
- •Asymptomatic Patients
- •Symptomatic Patients
- •Superspreaders
- •The Unsuspected Patients
- •High-Risk Activities
- •Transmission during Quarantine
- •Transmission after Recovery
- •Animal Reservoirs
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Modeling the Epidemic
- •Starting Point
- •Global Spread
- •Hong Kong
- •Vietnam
- •Toronto
- •Singapore, February 2003
- •China
- •Taiwan
- •Other Countries
- •Eradication
- •Outlook
- •References
- •Introduction
- •International Coordination
- •Advice to travelers
- •Management of SARS in the post-outbreak period
- •National Measures
- •Legislation
- •Extended Case Definition
- •Quarantine
- •Reduce travel between districts
- •Quarantine after Discharge
- •Infection Control in Healthcare Settings
- •General Measures
- •Protective Measures
- •Hand washing
- •Gloves
- •Face Masks
- •Additional protection
- •Getting undressed
- •Special Settings
- •Intensive Care Units
- •Intubating a SARS Patient
- •Anesthesia
- •Triage
- •Internet Sources
- •Additional information
- •Infection Control in Households
- •Possible Transmission from Animals
- •After the Outbreak
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Case Definition
- •WHO Case Definition
- •Suspect case
- •Probable case
- •Exclusion criteria
- •Reclassification of cases
- •CDC Case Definition
- •Diagnostic Tests
- •Introduction
- •Laboratory tests
- •Molecular tests
- •Virus isolation
- •Antibody detection
- •Interpretation
- •Limitations
- •Biosafety considerations
- •Outlook
- •Table, Figures
- •References
- •Clinical Presentation and Diagnosis
- •Clinical Presentation
- •Hematological Manifestations
- •Atypical Presentation
- •Chest Radiographic Abnormalities
- •Chest Radiographs
- •CT Scans
- •Diagnosis
- •Clinical Course
- •Viral Load and Immunopathological Damage
- •Histopathology
- •Lung Biopsy
- •Postmortem Findings
- •Discharge and Follow-up
- •Psychosocial Issues
- •References
- •Appendix: Guidelines
- •WHO: Management of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
- •Management of Suspect and Probable SARS Cases
- •Definition of a SARS Contact
- •Management of Contacts of Probable SARS Cases
- •Management of Contacts of Suspect SARS Cases
- •SARS Treatment
- •Antibiotic therapy
- •Antiviral therapy
- •Ribavirin
- •Neuraminidase inhibitor
- •Protease inhibitor
- •Human interferons
- •Human immunoglobulins
- •Alternative medicine
- •Immunomodulatory therapy
- •Corticosteroids
- •Other immunomodulators
- •Assisted ventilation
- •Non-invasive ventilation
- •Invasive mechanical ventilation
- •Clinical outcomes
- •Outlook
- •Appendix 1
- •A standardized treatment protocol for adult SARS in Hong Kong
- •Appendix 2
- •A treatment regimen for SARS in Guangzhou, China
- •References
- •Pediatric SARS
- •Clinical Manifestation
- •Radiologic Features
- •Treatment
- •Clinical Course
- •References
Infection Control in Healthcare Settings 93
face shield, then the mask, wash you hands again, etc. − requires previous exercise. Some healthcare workers have contracted the SARS virus although they had been using all recommended precautions.
Special Settings
Patients who are experiencing rapid clinical progression with a severe cough during the second week of illness should be considered particularly infectious. Procedures that might generate aerosols (e.g. nebulized medications, BiPAP, or HFOV) should be avoided if possible. When intubation is necessary, measures should be taken to reduce unnecessary exposure to health care workers, including reducing the number of health care workers present and adequately sedating or paralyzing the patient to reduce the cough (MMWR; 52: 433-6).
All high-risk procedures should be performed only by highly experienced staff.
Intensive Care Units
A brief summary of infection control measures in intensive care units (grouping critically ill patients with SARS in one ICU; transferring all pre-existing patients to other uncontaminated centers; the ICU restricted to patients with SARS; instructions to staff and visitors to put on gowns, gloves, caps, and masks in a designated area before they enter the unit; designation of "police nurses"; spot checks to ensure the correct fitting of masks; goggles and visors are worn during direct patient care, etc.) has been published by Li et al.
The use of nebulizer medications should be avoided in SARS patients (Dwosh).
Intubating a SARS Patient
In some high-risk instances (i.e., endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, sputum induction) airborne transmission may be possible, resulting in exposure to a particularly high viral load.
The best summary of the measures that need to be taken to minimize the risk to the anesthetist when intubating a suspected SARS patient, were recently published by Kamming, Gardam and Chung from the Toronto Western Hospital (Kamming et al.):
Kamps and Hoffmann (eds.)
94 Prevention
1.Plan ahead. It takes 5 min to fully apply all barrier precautions.
2.Apply N95 mask, goggles, disposable protective footwear, gown and gloves. Put on the belt-mounted AirMate and attach the respirator tubing and Tyvek© head cover. Then apply extra gown and gloves. All staff assisting to follow same precautions. If a powered respirator is unavailable, then apply N95 mask, goggles, disposable theatre cap, and a disposable full-face shield.
3.Most experienced anaesthetist available to perform intubation.
4.Standard monitoring, i.v. access, instruments, drugs, ventilator and suction checked.
5.Avoid awake fibreoptic intubation unless specific indication. Atomized local anaesthetic will aerosolize the virus.
6.Plan for rapid sequence induction (RSI) and ensure skilled assistant able to perform cricoid pressure. RSI may need to be modified if patient has very high
A−a gradient and is unable to tolerate 30 s of apnoea, or has a contraindication to succinylcholine. If manual ventilation is anticipated, small tidal volumes should be applied.
7.Five minutes of preoxygenation with oxygen 100% and RSI in order to avoid manual ventilation of patient's lungs and potential aerosolization of virus from airways. Ensure high efficiency hydrophobic filter interposed between facemask and breathing circuit or between facemask and Laerdal bag.
8.Intubate and confirm correct position of tracheal tube.
9.Institute mechanical ventilation and stabilize patient. All airway equipment to be sealed in double zip-locked plastic bag and removed for decontamination and disinfection.
10.Assistant should then wipe down the Tyvek‚ head cover with disinfectant (accelerated hydrogen peroxide is most effective) after exiting the negativepressure atmosphere. The protective barrier clothing is then removed paying close attention to avoid self-contamination. The outer gloves are used to remove the outer gown and protective overshoes. The outer gloves are then discarded and the inner gloves remove the disinfected head cover and the inner gown. The inner gloves are then removed. The head cover is discarded, the AirMate‘ tubing is pasteurized and the belt pack wiped down with disinfectant. The N95 mask and goggles are only removed after leaving the room.
11.After removing protective equipment, avoid touching hair or face before washing hands.
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