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$3.7 billion in 2000, up from $1.3 billion in 1998. The London ofﬁce began to have a great deal of power because by 2000, 60% of the bank’s proﬁts came from investment banking. Ironically, Herr Breuer, who had always declared a move into investment banking as the key strategy, saw his position being marginalised by the brash traders of the London ofﬁce.

In early 2001, Breuer appeared to favour scaling down Deutsche Bank’s emphasis on investment banking. Substantial job cuts in this area were announced, with 2600 staff made redundant, mainly in Frankfurt, though London and New York were also affected. A potential source of worry was a comment by the chairman, who admitted there were weaknesses in their investment banking business that could not be overcome through an acquisition. Herr Breuer revealed a new strategic focus: to increase proﬁts in asset management and private banking – Breuer himself took control of the new division. There were also indications the bank wanted to increase its presence in retail asset management, having purchased an American on-line brokerage ﬁrm in December 2001. However, Breuer’s new division soon lost money due to costly hiring and reduced equity purchases by retail clients.

Meanwhile, investment banking continued to make some impressive deals in 2001, and investment banking revenues were higher at Deutsche than at Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. Over 80% of these revenues came from outside Germany, indicating the bank was well diversiﬁed in this area.

In May 2002, Mr Josef Ackermann was set to take over from Herr Breuer as head of the Vorstand, or management board. The German management system was beginning to become an issue for the bank, especially after it listed on the New York Stock Exchange in late 2001, which meant adopting US accounting standards. Under the German system the Vorstand can overrule the head, and there were pressures from senior management, most of whom are not German nationals, to replace this German style of management with the American system which has a chairman and CEO. Mr Ackerman supported the move to cut the size of the Vorstand in half, so it will have just four members. The ofﬁcial language of communication was changed to English in 2002.

10.8.7. Deutsche Weathers a Banking Storm in Germany

Mr Ackerman, a Swiss national, succeeded Breuer as head of Deutsche Bank in the summer of 2002. It is not just his background that will make it likely investment banking will continue to be given priority. German bankers called 2002 their ‘‘annus horribilis’’ because of the record number of corporate insolvencies and the decline in their investment portfolios due to the sharp drop in the stock market.76 However, the Deutsche Bank weathered the storm better than other commercial banks in Germany. In a year where the pre-tax proﬁts for the other three major commercial banks were negative, Table 10.4 illustrates that not only was Deutsche Bank in the black, its real proﬁts were up on 2001. Deutsche Bank has remained proﬁtable because it is far less dependent on the German markets than the other commercial banks at a time when Germany was suffering its worst recession in post-war history. For example, Commerzbank was in the red in 2002 and 2003, with the size of negative pre-tax proﬁts rising over the two years. The same was true for HypoVereinsbank

76 Wagner, J. (2003), ‘‘Getting Back in the Black’’, The Banker, March 25 –27, p. 26.

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and Dresdner Bank. By contrast, Deutsche’s international operations in both investment banking and funds management ensured the bank remained proﬁtable, though proﬁts were slightly down in 2003. Deutsche also managed to cut its cost to income ratio from 90% in 2001 to 79% and 81% in 2002 and 2003, respectively. HypoVereinsbank Commerzbank have also kept costs down – their ratios of cost to income dropped from 69% to 64% and 77% to 73%. Dresdner, by contrast, has seen costs soar from 71% in 2002 to 117% in 2003 – in other words, cost exceeded income.

Unlike other European countries, these big commercial banks lack a strong retail presence – each has about 5% of the deposit market, at most. The state owned regional

Table 10.4 Annual Results for Deutsche Bank and Bankers Trust

	Capital	Assets	Pre-tax	Real	C:I (%)	ROA (%)	ROE (%)	Basel 1
	($m)	($m)	proﬁts	proﬁts				(%)
			(%)	growth
				(%)

Deutsche Bank
Dec-90	10 413	267 702	1 631	−32.8	Na	0.61	Na	Na
Dec-91	11 258	296 266	2 280	36.9	Na	0.77	Na
Dec-92	11 303	303 840	2 315	3.9	Na	0.76	Na	10.5
Dec-93	11 723	322 445	2 664	18.3	Na	0.83	Na	11.3
Dec-94	13 089	368 261	2 049	−33	Na	0.56	Na	10.4
Dec-95	18 937	503 429	2 487	−1	Na	0.49	Na	10.1
Dec-96	18 571	569 906	3 145	35	71.7	0.55	Na	9.9
Dec-97	17 371	581 979	1 140	−59	68.51	0.2	6.4	10.6
Dec-98	18 680	732 534	4 713	282.1	78.1	0.64	Na	11.5
Dec-99	17 418	843 761	4 106	0.9	72.1	0.49	11.1	12
Dec-00	20 076	874 706	6 261	61.6	74.5	0.72	20.1	12.6
Dec-01	21 859	809 220	1 589	−73.9	90.45	0.2	7.1	12.1
Dec-02	23 849	795 255	3 722	94.3	78.75	0.47	10.2	12.3
Dec-03	27 302	1 104 845	3 481	−23.2	81.81	0.34	5.2	13.9
Bankers Trust
Dec-90	2 616	62 854	819	Na		1.33	Na	Na
Dec-91	2 987	63 684	857	0.4		1.35	Na	Na
Dec-92	3 637	72 172	925	4.8		1.41	Na	13.89
Dec-93	4 846	92 082	1 566	64.4		1.7	Na	14.46
Dec-94	5 010	97 016	901	−43.9		0.93	Na	15.37
Dec-95	5 262	104 002	350	−62.2		0.34	Na	14.18
Dec-96	5 929	120 235	897	149.1	84.2	0.75	Na	13.3
Dec-97	6 431	140 102	1 259	40.4	85.69	0.9	Na	14.1
Dec-98	5 399	79 996	−52	−104.1	105.2	−0.04	Na	14.11

Capital: Tier 1; C:I: cost to income; Basel 1: risk to assets ratio; ROA: return on assets; ROE: return on average equity.

Source: The Banker, July editions, 1991–2004; ROE: Deutsche Bank (2003), Annual Review.

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(landesbanken) and local savings banks have about 80% of the retail deposit and loan market. They also enjoy a state guarantee77 and thus an AAA rating, meaning they can attract deposits and make loans at lower rates. The savings banks have remained proﬁtable during the recession because of their dominance in the retail and corporate markets. For this and other reasons, they are resisting the Chancellor’s call for them to merge with private and cooperative banks, a strategy which has been so successful in France and Italy over the last few years. The Federal government has little control over their actions because they are owned and controlled by state governments. The result is over-banking in the German market, which keeps margins thin. Another important player in the retail market is Postbank, a bank operated by the German Post Ofﬁce. It has about 6% of bank deposits and was privatised in June 2004. The Post Ofﬁce, which was privatised in 2000, maintains management control, because 49% of Postbank was sold off. Deutsche Bank acted as lead manager of the IPO and, reportedly, turned down an approach by the government to block buy the shares because the bank considered the shares to be overpriced, and probably balked at the idea that they would not have management control.78 Had DB been interested, there would have been a tricky conﬂict of interest to resolve. Should one of the commercial banks eventually take over Postbank, it would give it about an 11% share of deposits, making it a potentially serious competitor, especially after protection of the savings and regional banks is withdrawn.

Deutsche is now considered an investment bank, and it continues to cut back on its relatively small amount of corporate lending in Germany, though it has kept its domestic retail branch network. In 1999, DB integrated its on-line banking service with its retail banking department. The on-line system had attracted half a million customers (though it is unclear how many were already DB clients) and it was hoped the combination will allow customers to pick and choose on-line and off-line services according to their tastes. DB has even offered to share its on-line facility with other banks.79

In October 2003, Deutsche Bank received The Banker’s country and Western Europe awards, and was recognised as the top investment bank for interest rate swaps. The awards are based on 2002 results, so the country award comes as no surprise. It was named the ‘‘Bank for Western Europe’’ because of the big reduction in its operating costs (see the cost to income ratios in Table 10.4), and took the number one spot for fund management in Europe, placing in the top ﬁve globally. It was also the leading equities house in Europe. It attracted 500 000 new business and private clients in Europe.80 Thus, by 2003, it had become the leading European investment bank. While it continues to be outclassed by

77An agreement with the EU means the guarantee must be phased out by July 2005.

78This proved correct when in the end, the shares were sold at about 3 euros less (¤28.50) than the Chief Executive of Deutsche Post had been hoping to get. The shares are split between German retail and institutional investors; about 48% of the shares sold went to foreign investors.

79Its German rivals have adopted other strategies to return to proﬁt. Dresdner is focusing on bancassurance (it purchased the failing insurance giant Allianz) and niche investment banking through its London outlet, Dresdner, Kleinwort Wasserstein. HVB is looking to Eastern Europe (through its ownership of Bank Austria and offering retail banking services in Northern Germany). Commerzbank looks the most vulnerable, hoping to gain from Deutsche’s withdrawal from corporate lending. See Wagner, J. (2003), ‘‘Getting Back in the Black’’, The Banker, March 25–27, p. 27.

80The Banker Awards 2003, September.

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many of the US banks on the global front, it seems that Deutsche Bank has achieved what Bankers Trust set out to do at the beginning of the case study: to move away from traditional core banking and into investment banking. The only major difference is that it has opted to keep its retail network in Germany. After BT sold its retail network, it became a wholesale commercial bank, with expertise in trading and risk management advice. However, that was not enough to keep its independence, and the name is all but forgotten in the new century. As Deutsche Bank strives to become a top tier global bank, what does Mr Ackerman and the Vorstand have to do to ensure its continued independence?

Questions

1.In the USA, what is the difference between a money centre commercial bank and an investment bank?

2.Why has the term ‘‘money centre’’ largely disappeared in the USA?

3.In the ﬁrst paragraph of the case, it was noted that in 1987 ‘‘the stock yielded a 41% return on equity before extraordinary allowance for credit losses. . .’’.

(a)Is ROE a good indication of the success of the new strategy at Bankers Trust?

(b)Identify other ways of measuring the success (or otherwise) of this bank.

4.The case revealed, either directly or indirectly, the multifaceted nature of BT’s strategy. Answer the following questions:

(a)Why did BT sell its retail banking network? Given that retail banking is usually one of the most proﬁtable areas of banking, was it the right decision?

(b)Why were ‘‘section 20’’ subsidiaries seen as a means of bypassing the Glass Steagall Act? Why was it important in BT’s acquisition of Alex Brown?

(c)Explain the meaning and consequences of a global product focus at the expense of a regional client focus.

(d)What effect would the absence of a distribution and sales network have on BT operations?

(e)Explain why BT’s loan securitisation programme would stabilise balance sheet growth, increase liquidity and earn a higher return on equity.

(f)What is RAROC? Identify the key problem associated with RAROC.

5.To fulﬁl the objectives of its new strategy, BT had to change its management style and employee compensation. Explain the meaning of the following terms, and discuss how they might encourage BT staff to achieve BT’s strategic goals:

(a)A horizontal management structure and how it differs from management style at commercial banks.

(b)‘‘Excellence through common purpose’’.

(c)Incentive compensation and the bonus system.

6.What are the main lessons to be learned from the 1994 swaps debacle?

7.What were the main contributory factors to BT’s acquisition by Deutsche Bank?

8.What are the advantages and disadvantages of absorbing a well-known bank name after a takeover? Why did Deutsche Bank erase the Bankers Trust label within weeks of takeover but keep the Alex Brown name, and for a decade, Morgan Grenfell’s name?

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9.(a) What actions did Mr Newman take to improve BT’s bottom line and its status as an investment bank?

(b)According to Mr Newman, a diversiﬁed bank makes for a stronger, more proﬁtable bank. So what was wrong with the strategy he devised for Bankers Trust?

10.With reference to becoming a successful investment bank, why did Deutsche Bank succeed where Bankers Trust failed?

11.Deutsche Bank is now a leading European investment bank but it is best described as a universal investment bank. Why? Is this a good strategic position for a bank wanting to be a leading global player?

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Berger, A.N. (1995), ‘‘The Proﬁt Structure Relationship in Banking – Tests of Market Power and Efﬁcient Structure Hypothesis’’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27(2), 404 – 431.

Berger, A. (1998), ‘‘The Efﬁciency Effects of Bank Mergers and Acquisition: A Preliminary Look at the 1990s Data’’, in T. Amihud and G. Miller (eds), Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Berger, A.N. (2003), ‘‘The Economic Effects of Technological Progress: Evidence from the Banking Industry’’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 141 – 176.

Berger, A.N. and T.H. Hannan (1989), ‘‘The Price– Concentration Relationship in Banking’’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(May), 291 – 299; also, their ‘‘Reply to a Comment’’ by W.E. Jackson (1992), Review of Economics and Statistics (May), 373 – 376.

Berger, A. and T. Hannan (1998), ‘‘The Efﬁciency Cost of Market Power in the Banking Industry: A Test of the ‘Quiet Life’ and Related Hypotheses’’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 454 – 465.

Berger, A. and D. Humphrey (1991a), ‘‘The Dominance of Inefﬁciencies Over Scale and Product Mix Economies in Banking’’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 28, 117 – 148.

Berger, A. and D. Humphrey (1991b), ‘‘Megamergers in Banking and the Use of Cost Efﬁciency and an Antitrust Defense’’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 37(3), 541 – 600.

Berger, A. and D. Humphrey (1997), ‘‘Efﬁciency of Financial Institutions: International Survey and Directions for Further Research’’, European Journal of Operation Research, 98, 175 – 212.

Berger, A. and L. Mester (1997), ‘‘Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the Efﬁciencies of Financial Institutions’’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 895 – 947.

Berger, A. and L. Mester (2003), ‘‘Explaining the Dramatic Changes in the Performance of US Banks: Technological Change, Deregulation, and Dynamic Changes in Competition’’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12(1), 57 – 96.

Berger, A., W. Hunter and S. Timme (1993), ‘‘The Efﬁciency of Financial Institutions: A Review and Preview of Research Past, Present, and Future’’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 17, 221 – 249.

Berger, A., D. Humphrey and L. Pulley (1996), ‘‘Do Consumers Pay for One-Stop Banking? Evidence from an Alternative Revenue Function’’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 1601 – 1621.

Berger, A.N., R.S. Demsetz and P.E. Strahan (1999), ‘‘The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for the Future’’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 23, 135 – 194.

Berlin, M., A. Saunders and G.F. Udell (eds) (1991), ‘‘Deposit Insurance Reform’’, Special Issue,

Journal of Banking and Finance, 15(4/5), 733 – 1040.

Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1990), ‘‘Financial Fragility and Economic Performance’’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(1), 87 – 114.

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