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Table 9.6 Number of Mergers and Acquisitions by Country

 

 

 

1990

1995

1999

 

 

 

 

Banking – Europe1

 

 

 

National – intra

22

66

113

National

– cross

8

33

23

Global – intra

15

29

36

Global – cross

4

16

12

Total

 

 

49

144

184

Value ($m)

 

4 946

27 631

124 873

Securities

Europe2

 

 

 

National – intra

18

46

49

National

– cross

7

26

28

Global – intra

5

17

25

Global

cross

6

8

18

Total

 

 

36

97

120

Value ($m)

 

3 036.8

4 975

16 162

Banking – USA

 

 

 

National – intra

107

356

208

National

– cross

4

14

34

Global – intra

2

11

10

Global

cross

0

0

3

Total

 

 

113

381

255

Value ($m)

 

3 986

71 417

68 399

Securities – USA

22

 

 

National – intra

22

42

45

National – cross

15

30

38

Global

intra

2

8

10

Global

cross

3

4

12

Total

 

 

42

84

105

Value ($m)

 

482.4

7 225.2

14 237

1 Europe includes: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK.

2 Securities includes investment banks.

Source: OECD (2001), Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, Annex 1.

According to an OECD (2001) report (covering 13 key industrialised countries51), during the 1990s, there were over 7600 deals involving the acquisition of one financial firm by another, with a total value of $1.6 trillion.52 Between 1990 and 1999, there was a threefold increase in the number of deals, and the total value of M&As increased more than tenfold. More detailed figures for Europe and the USA appear in Table 9.6.53 This table shows that

51Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA.

52Source: BIS (2000), p. 33, which obtained the data from the Securities Data Corporation.

53The insurance sector is not shown, but the numbers were comparatively small.

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while the total number of bank mergers in Europe (1267) was under half that of the USA (2871), by 1999, the value of European mergers was much higher: $124.9 billion compared to $68.4 billion in the USA.

The rise in the number of financial sector M&As with values in excess of $1 billion reflects the general trends:

 

1990

1995

1998

1999

 

 

 

 

 

Number

8

23

58

46

Value ($bn)

26.5

113

431

291

Source: OECD (2001), table 1.1.

Of these financial sector M&As, 60% were banks, 25% were securities firms (including investment banks) and about 15% involved acquisitions of insurance firms. In 1998 there were a number of ‘‘super mega mergers’’, i.e. mergers between banks with assets in excess of $100 billion each. They included:

žCiticorp Travelers

žBank America and Nationsbank

žBank One and First Chicago

žNorwest and Wells Fargo

žUBS-Swiss Bank Corporation

By 2000, the M&A boom was over – M&As in most countries peaked in 1999 or 2000. In 2001 the total number of US M&A deals (across all sectors) had dropped to 8545, and fell again in 2002 by 13.6% to 7387. In Europe the rate of decline was about the same – 13.2% between 2001 and 2002. Since most of the activity had been in the financial sector, the decline in bank mergers was dramatic. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating the causes and consequences of mergers and acquisitions in banking, since future changes in technology, regulation and other factors are bound to prompt a new round.

9.5.2. Reasons for Consolidation in the Financial Sector

The reasons for mergers and acquisitions fall into three broad categories. The first is shareholder wealth maximisation goals. If mergers lead to greater scale/scope economies and improved cost/profit X-efficiencies, the sector as a whole should become more efficient and create value, all of which benefits shareholders. However, consolidation invariably raises the degree of concentration, which could increase market power, leading to higher prices. While shareholders will still gain, consumers could be worse off. The second category is managerial self-interest: managers might see mergers as a way of enhancing or defending their personal power and status.

In the third category are a number of miscellaneous factors that create an environment favourable to M&As. They include changes in the structure of the banking sector, such as increased competition from non-bank competitors – as indicated by the decline in the

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banks’ share of non-financial short-term corporate debt, from about 58% in 1985 to around 48% a decade later (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). However, as was noted in Chapter 1, banks have expanded into new areas (e.g. bancassurance) and increased off-balance sheet activities. Changes in regulation may also be a factor. In the USA, changes to the Bank Holding Company Act in 1970, together with liberalisation of state laws on the treatment of BHCs, increased merger activity. More recently, allowing commercial banks to have section 20 subsidiaries, relaxing the laws on interstate branching, and the repeal of Glass Steagall, so that financial holding companies can have banking, securities and insurance subsidiaries, encouraged greater consolidation and nation-wide banking. In Europe, the Banking and Investment Services Directives, the introduction of the euro, and the Lamfalussy report should have encouraged greater integration of EU markets.54 Another factor is technological change, which (as was seen in an earlier section) has affected cost and profit X-efficiency, both by encouraging more revenue earning financial innovations (e.g. the derivatives markets) and cutting costs, such as the delivery of retail banking services. It is estimated that IT accounts for 15 – 20% of total bank costs, and is growing. Mergers can help control these costs and improve IT systems.

9.5.3. Empirical Studies on Mergers and Acquisitions in the Banking Sector

The literature on bank mergers and acquisitions is vast, much of it based on US data. Researchers have asked different sets of questions. These include the following.

žAnnouncement Effects: Using event study methodology, researchers have asked: how does the announcement of M&As affect the share price performance of the bidding and target firms, that is, do bank shareholders gain or lose?

žPerformance: What are the performance characteristics of the banks before and/or after the merger? The most common performance measures include cost ratios, cost-X- efficiency, scale/scope economies and profits.

žManagerial Motives: Do bank M&As maximise wealth by creating value and benefiting shareholders or are they undertaken by managers to maximise their own utility? The most common reason given for why managers might pursue managerial utility is because compensation has been shown to rise with the size of a firm.

žMarket Power/Competition: How will M&As affect competition in the financial sector? Greater consolidation can increase market power of the remaining banks, causing them to raise prices and/or reduce services.

žSystemic Risk: Will M&As encourage more diversified, and therefore bigger, less risky banks or could bank managers assume more risks because a merger has made them ‘‘too big to fail’’?

Some studies test for the effects of M&As indirectly. They examine whether economies of scale or scope are achieved (and if so, at what asset level), or how concentration affects

54 See Chapter 5 for more detail on the changes in US and EU regulation.

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prices and profitability, and from these results draw inferences on the effects of M&As. Since these topics were covered in earlier sections, they are not revisited here. The focus is on dynamic studies which consider the behaviour of financial institutions before and/or after the merger or acquisition. Space constraints prevent a comprehensive survey. In what follows, a selection of studies that address the above questions have been chosen, with some attempt to balance the US literature with studies based on European data.55

9.5.4. Announcements and Event Study Analysis

This group of studies looks at the change in the stock market value for the acquiring and target firms before and after the merger announcement. Event study analysis is used to test whether the merger announcement gives rise to significant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over some time interval. The typical estimating equation is:

Rit = αj + βjRBIt + εjt

(9.23)

where

Rit : return on share i at time t

RBIt : the return on a country’s stock market bank index I at time t

Estimates of α and β are obtained using daily returns over a period of time before (usually a year) the event. Then, the expected returns are computed from:

E(Rit) = α j + β jRBit

(9.24)

where

 

α j, β j : estimated coefficients obtained from a regression of equation (9.23)

 

E(Rit) : expected returns

 

Abnormal returns are defined as:

 

ARjt = Rjt (E)Rjt

(9.25)

where

 

ARjt : abnormal stock returns calculated for one or more event windows. For example, event window T = [−1, +1] is for 3 days: 1 day before the event56 (in this case the announcement of the merger or acquisition), the event day itself (0), and

1 day after the announcement. T = [−20, +20] is 41 days: 20 days before the event, the event day itself, and 20 days after the event. Studies vary in the number of event windows they use.

55Readers are referred to a paper by Berger et al. (1999), who provide an excellent survey of key studies on consolidation. It appears in a special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance (see references), which is devoted to mergers and acquisitions.

56It has been observed that the share prices of the two firms often start to react to rumours of a merger several days before the formal announcement and for this reason, more recent studies compute the cumulative abnormal returns for the seller and the buyer from several days (e.g. 10) before the public announcement is made.

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Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the interval [−t1, t2] is the sum of the mean of the abnormal returns, and defined as:

 

n

 

 

 

CAR[t1, t2] = (1/n) ×

ARjt

(9.26)

[t1 ,t2 ]

j=1

 

where

n : number of shares included in the analysis

The dependent variable, abnormal returns, is usually weighted either by total assets of each firm or by stock market value prior to the announcement. Separate estimates are obtained for the acquirer and acquired firms.

The vast majority of work in this area is based on US data. Rhoades (1994) conducted a survey of 21 US studies that used event study methodology and published results in the period 1980 – 93. Seven found the merger announcement had a significantly negative influence on the shareholder returns for the bidding firm, another seven found no effect, three report a positive finding, and four find mixed effects. By contrast, eight of the nine studies that look at targets report positive shareholder returns, and one finds no abnormal returns. Four papers measure the net wealth effects: one finds a positive effect, another finds a negative, and two studies reported net gains for some merger announcements. Recently, some studies have used European data. Below, the key findings from relatively recent work using US and European data are reported.57

Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000; cited as COM below) was one of the first major European studies. Over the period 1988 to 1997, COM include European M&As from 14 countries,58 involving 54 buyers and 72 target financial firms. The sample includes banks, securities and insurance firms, but at least one party to the merger must be a bank. For the acquiring banks, when a general market index is used as the benchmark, they find significant and positive abnormal returns in the shorter event periods (e.g. 1 or 2 days on either side of the announcement) of 0.99% and 1.4%. Finding a significantly positive return for the bidding bank contrasts with virtually all US studies, which find a significantly negative effect. Table 9.7 summarises the sample details of the studies cited here. Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Zhang (1995), Pilloff, (1996), Siems (1996) and Bliss and Rosen (2001) all report an immediate drop in the share price of the acquiring firm in the region of 1.96% to 3.8%. As Table 9.7 shows, the average size of US banks (measured by total assets) is smaller. Of the US studies, Siems (1996), looking at 19 mega bank mergers, had the highest mean size of $61 billion for the bidder, compared to $136.3 billion in COM. Bliss and Rosen (2001) also looked at mega mergers, and found the net percentage share price change in a 3-day window was, on average, −2.4%.59

57Studies based on M&As in other regions are virtually non-existent, though this will change because in Japan and some Asian countries, M&As have increased in recent years.

58Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.

59A mega merger is defined as one where the target bank is at least 10% the size of the bidder. Bliss and Rosen’s sample consisted of the largest US banks by asset size: a bank was in the sample if it was in the top 30 in any of the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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C O M P E T I T I V E I S S U E S I N B A N K I N G

 

Table 9.7 Information on Samples from Different Event Studies

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Countries

Years

Total Bank

Bidder Size in

Target Size in

 

 

 

 

 

Mergers

Assets

 

Assets

 

 

Cornett and

USA

1982

– 87

30

$17.7B

$6.4B

 

Tehranian

 

 

 

 

$17 698M

$6399M

(1992)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Houston and

USA

1985

– 91

153

$100M

$100M

 

Ryngaert

 

 

 

 

(minimum)

(minimum)

(1994)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Zhang (1995)

USA

1980

– 90

107

$13.9B

$2.4B

 

Pilloff (1996)

USA

1982

– 91

48

$13B

$3.7B

 

Siems (1996)

USA

1995

 

19 ‘‘mega’’

$60.6B

$18.7B

 

 

 

 

 

mergers

 

 

 

 

 

Bliss and Rosen

USA

1986

– 95

32

$11.9B

 

 

 

 

(2001)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cybo-Ottone

13 EU states

1988

– 97

126

$105.6B

$23.67B

 

and Murgia

plus Switzerland

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DeLong (2003)

US and non-US

1988

– 99

397 US, 18

na

na

 

 

 

 

 

non-US

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beitel et al.

EU states plus

1985

– 2000

98

$181.8B

$37B

(2003)

Switzerland,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Norway

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Average size over the period, in $M (millions) or $B (billions).

Average assets of sample, in billions (B) – no distinction between bidder and target.

De Young’s data are available on request. He notes the non-US acquirers are twice the size of their US counterparts; non-US targets 2.5 times larger.

For the target banks, the results were consistent with findings in most US studies. A positive, significant abnormal return was found for all the event windows (e.g. ranging from 1 or 2 to 20 days on either side of the announcement). The COM return over 5 days is 13%, which is similar to that of Houston and Ryngaert (1994). Likewise, Siems (1996) reported a 13% return in a window of plus or minus a day, which is similar to that of COM at 12.03%. However, other US studies report lower returns. For example, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) report an average CAR for the target of about 8%.

Along with more in-depth analysis of the CAR results, the authors also test for the influence of other factors on M&As using standard regression, with CAR (over 11 days) as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables included size, and dummies for different types of deals, countries and time. The main findings from their investigations may be summarised as follows.

ž Dummies for time and country suggest they do not play any role.

years included in the study, from 1986 to 1995. They only report a net percentage change in share prices, not the individual changes for bidding and target banks.

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žThere is evidence of significant excess returns in domestic mergers but not for cross-border deals. Based on this result, COM suggest deals with a large geographical overlap are more likely to improve productive efficiency. The results for cross-border mergers are consistent with Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Rhoades (1993). Mergers with foreign banks do less well.

žThey find the combined value increased for M&As among insurance firms and banks. COM suggest this finding is due to scope economies or revenue efficiencies from cross selling – though there is no explicit test of this explanation.

žThere is no evidence to support gains from M&As between commercial banks and securities firms. This could be due to a clash in cultures between universal banks and investment banks.

DeLong (2003) compared 41 non-US mergers and 397 US mergers between 1988 and 1999. Some findings are similar to Cybo-Ottone and Murgia. Non-US bidders gain, but their US counterparts lose, on average, 2.1% – the difference is significant at the 99% level of confidence. Targets in both groups earn significant, positive abnormal returns but the non-US group earn about 8.6%, less than the US bank group, where the CAR is 15.39%, a difference of 6.8%. DeLong introduces control variables to try and explain these differences. Also, non-US mergers are subdivided into two groups: 18 mergers from ‘‘market based’’ economies, and 23 that are ‘‘bank based’’.60 This split produces returns that are roughly the same for both the US and non-US banks in market based economies, for bidders and targets. However, if the CAR of the US bank group is compared with the non-US group, the differences remain. DeLong (2003) cautions against concluding that the effects of M&As on shareholders are the same for all banks in market based economies. Some of his control variables suggest differences in structure influence the shareholder wealth effects of a merger. For example, strict anti-trust laws in the USA limit the size of the targets, but in other countries the limits are more relaxed. This could mean the overall gain for shareholders outside the USA is greater. In bank based economies shareholders of bidding and target banks stand to gain more.

Beitel, Schiereck, and Wahrenburg’s (2003) sample consists of 98 M&As between large financial institutions61 in the EU states plus Switzerland and Norway. They find the CAR of both bidders and targets in general rise. The CAR [−20, −2] for targets was 3.68% and 0.36% for bidders. For the event window [−1, +1] it was 12.4% and 0.01% for targets and bidders, respectively. The combined CAR of target and bidder is significantly positive for the majority of the 98 transactions. The net welfare gain of the 98 transactions is estimated to be $6.5 billion on the announcement day. These results are similar to those of Cybo-Ottone and Murgia and DeLong. Using each financial institution’s CAR as the dependent variable, Beitel et al. employ regression analysis to identify which variables explain the success of

60DeLong (2003) used the definitions of market and bank based economies developed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). The USA and UK are in the market based category because they have well-developed stock markets and securities markets, which means firms can raise finance from several sources, not just banks. Countries such as Germany and Switzerland are more bank based, with large universal banks that can offer customers both onand off-balance sheet banking services.

61Their study included all large financial service providers, for example, insurance and securities firms, and banks.

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the bidders, but none is found to be significant. However, significant variables are found by using the targets’ CAR of successful and unsuccessful bidders. The results show that successful bidders choose targets which are smaller in size, have relatively high growth rates, and relatively low cost to income (or cost to asset) ratios.

To summarise, most studies employing US data find the net effect of a M&A announcement to be negative for the share price of the bidder, but positive for the shareholders at the target bank.62 In many cases, there is a wealth transfer from the acquiring bank to the acquired because the stock price of the bidding firm falls and that of the target firm rises. Cyber-Ottone and Murgia (2000), using data from 14 European states, find both groups of shareholders gain, as do Beitel et al. (2003). However, the positive CAR is substantially higher for the target than for the bidder – shareholders of the target bank do best. DeLong (2003) found that most differences in CAR disappear once a sample is divided into banks that operate in a market based economy and those from bank based economies. A word of caution is needed on the tendency of many of these studies to draw inferences on the reason for a positive or negative CAR. The abnormal returns reflect market reaction to the announcement of a merger. The reasons for the investor reaction are unknown, unless explicit tests are done. For example, in the absence of econometric evidence, it is incorrect to assert that the presence of positive abnormal returns for domestic bank mergers and their absence among cross-border mergers suggests the former are more likely to improve productive efficiency. In the absence of efficiency tests, little more can be said other than the CAR are found to be positive or negative. There are plausible reasons (all of which require explicit testing) why the prey’s shares should outperform the predator at the time of the merger around the event: the possibility of a higher second bid for the target and the fear of ‘‘winners’ curse’’ for the bidder. The shares of European predators could outperform US bidders because regulatory changes are causing greater integration in US retail banking and subjecting it to more competitive pressures, leaving the US banks with less scope for widening spreads than in many European countries.

9.5.5. Efficiency

Mergers and acquisitions may increase efficiency by:

žImproving economies of scale and scope, which in turn adds to shareholder valued-added.

žX-efficiency may be increased through improvements in organisation and management if an efficient bank merges with and improves an inefficient bank.

žIf the merger creates a more diversified bank, then there is an opportunity to raise expected returns for the same amount of risk.

Effects of M&As on cost X-efficiency

Numerous studies of US M&As which took place in the 1980s find little evidence of change in terms of bank cost X-efficiency, or economies of scale/scope. For example, Berger

62 This is a common finding when tests of the effect of a merger announcement on CAR are done for other sectors of the economy, not just banking.

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and Humphrey (1992), in a study of 60 large US commercial bank ‘‘mega’’ mergers in the 1980s, found no evidence of an increase in cost efficiency. Even though there might have been gains from combining back operations, sharing technology, etc., these were offset by problems such as ‘‘culture’’ differences or the inability of management to run larger banks. Likewise, Berger et al. (1999) surveyed a large number of studies and report little evidence in the way of scale, scope or cost X-efficiencies.

Wheelock and Wilson (2000) include all US commercial banks with assets of at least $50 million,63 using quarterly data from 1984(3) to 1993(4). They look at both bank failures and mergers. The part of the paper relevant to this section is the variables which influence the probability of acquisition. A stochastic frontier model was used to test for cost inefficiency. Input and output technical efficiency were measured using DEA. They find that the likelihood of a bank being acquired declines with cost inefficiency, i.e. the more cost inefficient a bank, the less likely it will be acquired, which is consistent with other studies that have found little in the way of gains in cost efficiency as a result of bank acquisitions. Wheelock and Wilson also found the probability of acquisition declines the higher the return on assets, and the higher a bank’s capitalisation (measured by equity to assets).64

Resti (1998) uses data envelope analysis (therefore non-parametric) to study the impact of 67 Italian mergers (1986 – 95) on cost efficiency. She measures the efficiency of the bidder and target banks in each of the three years before and after the deal. Banks taking part in a merger had their cost X-efficiency measured against a benchmark. Resti found:

žBidders were significantly less efficient than their targets, which suggests achieving greater market discipline does not appear to be a motive.

žOn average, merged banks increased their cost X-efficiency in the post-merger years, though efficiency scores tended to decline in the third year after the merger.

žMergers of large banks did not increase efficiency. Resti suggests this may be due to Italy’s strict labour laws on dismissing employees, making it difficult to achieve cost savings.

žThere was a marked increase in cost X-efficiency for mergers between geographically adjacent banks.

žNo significant change in efficiency was observed if the banks were separated. So there is no support for the idea that the well-known inefficiencies of banks in the south could be improved by mergers with more efficient banks located elsewhere.

Haynes and Thompson (1997) examine mergers between UK building societies in the period 1981 – 93, when the number of mutuals fell from 200 to 80. All but one was due to intra-sector mergers. Data constraints left a final sample of 95 societies, of which there were 79 mergers.65 Using an augmented production function, they report significant productivity gains from the mergers, rising from 3% a year after a merger to 5.5% five years later. They argue their findings are consistent with acquirers being more efficient than targets, so the

63This gives them a bank sample of roughly 4000 banks, depending on the year.

64Wheelock and Wilson also found acquisition is more likely in states where branching is permitted.

65Of the 79 mergers, 47 took place prior to major reforms that took effect in January 1987 (see Chapter 5) and 31 in the post-reform period.

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mergers result in increased efficiency for the merged building societies. However, no explicit econometric test is conducted to verify this claim.

A few studies look at the effects of M&As on profit X-efficiency, i.e. whether the M&A moves the firm closer or further from the optimal profit point. Akhavein et al. (1997) and Berger (1998), using data on US M&As from the 1980s and 1990s, found that M&As improved profit efficiency, mainly because of the effects of diversification: these firms could increase their assets (loans) because of diversification.

Calomiris (1998) suggests mergers may be due to inefficiency or may stimulate inefficient banks to become more efficient so they are not taken over. This might reconcile the somewhat negative findings by the authors (above) and the relatively high levels of bank profitability in the 1990s.

9.5.6. Performance

Rhoades (1994) surveyed 19 US based studies on operating performance that were published between 1980 and 1993. They used accounting data to look at changes in costs, profits or both, before and after the merger. All but two use a control group of banks not involved in mergers and compare them against the banks involved in mergers. Some employed univariate t-tests to compare the performance of ratios before and after, while others used multiple regression analysis. The majority used expense ratios66 to measure performance, but three estimate translog production functions to test for X-efficiency, scale efficiency and the position of the bank in relation to an efficiency frontier. Virtually all of the studies show no gain in efficiency or profitability. Of the few that do, the results are mixed. For example, one study by Cornett and Tehranian (1992) found higher ROE post-merger but no change in ROA or cost efficiency. Another finds higher ROA but no change in the cost ratios or efficiency. Seven studies also looked at horizontal (or in the market) mergers where the two banks have overlapping branches. Again, there is no change in efficiency as a result of the merger, even though one would expect greater efficiency from closing branches and integrating back office operations and IT. On average, merging banks have not achieved considerable improvements in performance.

Outside the USA, Vander Vennet (1996) examined domestic and cross-border M&As of credit institutions67 in Europe over the period 1987 – 93. The sample consists of 422 domestic and 70 cross-border M&As. He conducts a univariate comparison of performance pre- (3 years before) and post-merger (3 years after). The variables included performance (measured by preand post-tax ROE and ROA), the ratio of labour costs to total costs, an operating expense ratio and cost efficiency. A translog total cost function is used to estimate cost efficiency. The findings for the four subsamples he looks at are described briefly below.

žDomestic majority acquisitions: Pre-merger, the acquirers are profitable, efficient, large banks. The performance of the acquired banks is declining, with falling operational efficiency. Post-merger, the performance of the target banks worsens still further in terms

66The most common ratios were total expenses/assets, non-interest expenses/assets, revenues/employees and total expenses/total revenues.

67Credit institutions is the term used by the EU for deposit-taking firms.

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