Modern Banking
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while the total number of bank mergers in Europe (1267) was under half that of the USA (2871), by 1999, the value of European mergers was much higher: $124.9 billion compared to $68.4 billion in the USA.
The rise in the number of financial sector M&As with values in excess of $1 billion reflects the general trends:
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1990 |
1995 |
1998 |
1999 |
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Number |
8 |
23 |
58 |
46 |
Value ($bn) |
26.5 |
113 |
431 |
291 |
Source: OECD (2001), table 1.1.
Of these financial sector M&As, 60% were banks, 25% were securities firms (including investment banks) and about 15% involved acquisitions of insurance firms. In 1998 there were a number of ‘‘super mega mergers’’, i.e. mergers between banks with assets in excess of $100 billion each. They included:
žCiticorp Travelers
žBank America and Nationsbank
žBank One and First Chicago
žNorwest and Wells Fargo
žUBS-Swiss Bank Corporation
By 2000, the M&A boom was over – M&As in most countries peaked in 1999 or 2000. In 2001 the total number of US M&A deals (across all sectors) had dropped to 8545, and fell again in 2002 by 13.6% to 7387. In Europe the rate of decline was about the same – 13.2% between 2001 and 2002. Since most of the activity had been in the financial sector, the decline in bank mergers was dramatic. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating the causes and consequences of mergers and acquisitions in banking, since future changes in technology, regulation and other factors are bound to prompt a new round.
9.5.2. Reasons for Consolidation in the Financial Sector
The reasons for mergers and acquisitions fall into three broad categories. The first is shareholder wealth maximisation goals. If mergers lead to greater scale/scope economies and improved cost/profit X-efficiencies, the sector as a whole should become more efficient and create value, all of which benefits shareholders. However, consolidation invariably raises the degree of concentration, which could increase market power, leading to higher prices. While shareholders will still gain, consumers could be worse off. The second category is managerial self-interest: managers might see mergers as a way of enhancing or defending their personal power and status.
In the third category are a number of miscellaneous factors that create an environment favourable to M&As. They include changes in the structure of the banking sector, such as increased competition from non-bank competitors – as indicated by the decline in the
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prices and profitability, and from these results draw inferences on the effects of M&As. Since these topics were covered in earlier sections, they are not revisited here. The focus is on dynamic studies which consider the behaviour of financial institutions before and/or after the merger or acquisition. Space constraints prevent a comprehensive survey. In what follows, a selection of studies that address the above questions have been chosen, with some attempt to balance the US literature with studies based on European data.55
9.5.4. Announcements and Event Study Analysis
This group of studies looks at the change in the stock market value for the acquiring and target firms before and after the merger announcement. Event study analysis is used to test whether the merger announcement gives rise to significant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over some time interval. The typical estimating equation is:
Rit = αj + βjRBIt + εjt |
(9.23) |
where
Rit : return on share i at time t
RBIt : the return on a country’s stock market bank index I at time t
Estimates of α and β are obtained using daily returns over a period of time before (usually a year) the event. Then, the expected returns are computed from:
E(Rit) = α j + β jRBit |
(9.24) |
where |
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α j, β j : estimated coefficients obtained from a regression of equation (9.23) |
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E(Rit) : expected returns |
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Abnormal returns are defined as: |
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ARjt = Rjt − (E)Rjt |
(9.25) |
where |
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ARjt : abnormal stock returns calculated for one or more event windows. For example, event window T = [−1, +1] is for 3 days: 1 day before the event56 (in this case the announcement of the merger or acquisition), the event day itself (0), and
1 day after the announcement. T = [−20, +20] is 41 days: 20 days before the event, the event day itself, and 20 days after the event. Studies vary in the number of event windows they use.
55Readers are referred to a paper by Berger et al. (1999), who provide an excellent survey of key studies on consolidation. It appears in a special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance (see references), which is devoted to mergers and acquisitions.
56It has been observed that the share prices of the two firms often start to react to rumours of a merger several days before the formal announcement and for this reason, more recent studies compute the cumulative abnormal returns for the seller and the buyer from several days (e.g. 10) before the public announcement is made.
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Table 9.7 Information on Samples from Different Event Studies |
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Countries |
Years |
Total Bank |
Bidder Size in |
Target Size in |
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Mergers |
Assets |
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Assets |
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Cornett and |
USA |
1982 |
– 87 |
30 |
$17.7B |
$6.4B |
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Tehranian |
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$17 698M |
$6399M |
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(1992) |
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Houston and |
USA |
1985 |
– 91 |
153 |
$100M |
$100M |
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Ryngaert |
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(minimum) |
(minimum) |
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(1994) |
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Zhang (1995) |
USA |
1980 |
– 90 |
107 |
$13.9B |
$2.4B |
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Pilloff (1996) |
USA |
1982 |
– 91 |
48 |
$13B |
$3.7B |
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Siems (1996) |
USA |
1995 |
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19 ‘‘mega’’ |
$60.6B |
$18.7B |
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mergers |
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Bliss and Rosen |
USA |
1986 |
– 95 |
32 |
$11.9B |
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(2001) |
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Cybo-Ottone |
13 EU states |
1988 |
– 97 |
126 |
$105.6B |
$23.67B |
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and Murgia |
plus Switzerland |
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(2000) |
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DeLong (2003) |
US and non-US |
1988 |
– 99 |
397 US, 18 |
na |
na |
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non-US |
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Beitel et al. |
EU states plus |
1985 |
– 2000 |
98 |
$181.8B |
$37B |
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(2003) |
Switzerland, |
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Norway |
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Average size over the period, in $M (millions) or $B (billions).
Average assets of sample, in billions (B) – no distinction between bidder and target.
De Young’s data are available on request. He notes the non-US acquirers are twice the size of their US counterparts; non-US targets 2.5 times larger.
For the target banks, the results were consistent with findings in most US studies. A positive, significant abnormal return was found for all the event windows (e.g. ranging from 1 or 2 to 20 days on either side of the announcement). The COM return over 5 days is 13%, which is similar to that of Houston and Ryngaert (1994). Likewise, Siems (1996) reported a 13% return in a window of plus or minus a day, which is similar to that of COM at 12.03%. However, other US studies report lower returns. For example, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) report an average CAR for the target of about 8%.
Along with more in-depth analysis of the CAR results, the authors also test for the influence of other factors on M&As using standard regression, with CAR (over 11 days) as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables included size, and dummies for different types of deals, countries and time. The main findings from their investigations may be summarised as follows.
ž Dummies for time and country suggest they do not play any role.
years included in the study, from 1986 to 1995. They only report a net percentage change in share prices, not the individual changes for bidding and target banks.
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the bidders, but none is found to be significant. However, significant variables are found by using the targets’ CAR of successful and unsuccessful bidders. The results show that successful bidders choose targets which are smaller in size, have relatively high growth rates, and relatively low cost to income (or cost to asset) ratios.
To summarise, most studies employing US data find the net effect of a M&A announcement to be negative for the share price of the bidder, but positive for the shareholders at the target bank.62 In many cases, there is a wealth transfer from the acquiring bank to the acquired because the stock price of the bidding firm falls and that of the target firm rises. Cyber-Ottone and Murgia (2000), using data from 14 European states, find both groups of shareholders gain, as do Beitel et al. (2003). However, the positive CAR is substantially higher for the target than for the bidder – shareholders of the target bank do best. DeLong (2003) found that most differences in CAR disappear once a sample is divided into banks that operate in a market based economy and those from bank based economies. A word of caution is needed on the tendency of many of these studies to draw inferences on the reason for a positive or negative CAR. The abnormal returns reflect market reaction to the announcement of a merger. The reasons for the investor reaction are unknown, unless explicit tests are done. For example, in the absence of econometric evidence, it is incorrect to assert that the presence of positive abnormal returns for domestic bank mergers and their absence among cross-border mergers suggests the former are more likely to improve productive efficiency. In the absence of efficiency tests, little more can be said other than the CAR are found to be positive or negative. There are plausible reasons (all of which require explicit testing) why the prey’s shares should outperform the predator at the time of the merger around the event: the possibility of a higher second bid for the target and the fear of ‘‘winners’ curse’’ for the bidder. The shares of European predators could outperform US bidders because regulatory changes are causing greater integration in US retail banking and subjecting it to more competitive pressures, leaving the US banks with less scope for widening spreads than in many European countries.
9.5.5. Efficiency
Mergers and acquisitions may increase efficiency by:
žImproving economies of scale and scope, which in turn adds to shareholder valued-added.
žX-efficiency may be increased through improvements in organisation and management if an efficient bank merges with and improves an inefficient bank.
žIf the merger creates a more diversified bank, then there is an opportunity to raise expected returns for the same amount of risk.
Effects of M&As on cost X-efficiency
Numerous studies of US M&As which took place in the 1980s find little evidence of change in terms of bank cost X-efficiency, or economies of scale/scope. For example, Berger
62 This is a common finding when tests of the effect of a merger announcement on CAR are done for other sectors of the economy, not just banking.
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mergers result in increased efficiency for the merged building societies. However, no explicit econometric test is conducted to verify this claim.
A few studies look at the effects of M&As on profit X-efficiency, i.e. whether the M&A moves the firm closer or further from the optimal profit point. Akhavein et al. (1997) and Berger (1998), using data on US M&As from the 1980s and 1990s, found that M&As improved profit efficiency, mainly because of the effects of diversification: these firms could increase their assets (loans) because of diversification.
Calomiris (1998) suggests mergers may be due to inefficiency or may stimulate inefficient banks to become more efficient so they are not taken over. This might reconcile the somewhat negative findings by the authors (above) and the relatively high levels of bank profitability in the 1990s.
9.5.6. Performance
Rhoades (1994) surveyed 19 US based studies on operating performance that were published between 1980 and 1993. They used accounting data to look at changes in costs, profits or both, before and after the merger. All but two use a control group of banks not involved in mergers and compare them against the banks involved in mergers. Some employed univariate t-tests to compare the performance of ratios before and after, while others used multiple regression analysis. The majority used expense ratios66 to measure performance, but three estimate translog production functions to test for X-efficiency, scale efficiency and the position of the bank in relation to an efficiency frontier. Virtually all of the studies show no gain in efficiency or profitability. Of the few that do, the results are mixed. For example, one study by Cornett and Tehranian (1992) found higher ROE post-merger but no change in ROA or cost efficiency. Another finds higher ROA but no change in the cost ratios or efficiency. Seven studies also looked at horizontal (or in the market) mergers where the two banks have overlapping branches. Again, there is no change in efficiency as a result of the merger, even though one would expect greater efficiency from closing branches and integrating back office operations and IT. On average, merging banks have not achieved considerable improvements in performance.
Outside the USA, Vander Vennet (1996) examined domestic and cross-border M&As of credit institutions67 in Europe over the period 1987 – 93. The sample consists of 422 domestic and 70 cross-border M&As. He conducts a univariate comparison of performance pre- (3 years before) and post-merger (3 years after). The variables included performance (measured by preand post-tax ROE and ROA), the ratio of labour costs to total costs, an operating expense ratio and cost efficiency. A translog total cost function is used to estimate cost efficiency. The findings for the four subsamples he looks at are described briefly below.
žDomestic majority acquisitions: Pre-merger, the acquirers are profitable, efficient, large banks. The performance of the acquired banks is declining, with falling operational efficiency. Post-merger, the performance of the target banks worsens still further in terms
66The most common ratios were total expenses/assets, non-interest expenses/assets, revenues/employees and total expenses/total revenues.
67Credit institutions is the term used by the EU for deposit-taking firms.