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In the area of securing Economic Growth, the mechanism of ticad aims at:

  • Policy and regulatory reforms to improve investment climate.

  • Promote infrastructure development, including promotion of Public Private Partnership (PPP).

  • Importance of agriculture sector for the economy and food security. Need for strengthening food supply capacity by promoting PPP as well as focusing on small scale farmers and women.

  • Promote regional integration and intraregional trade for trade facilitation.

  • Promote efforts on tourism and cultural exchange.

Af­ri­can coun­tries and their more pros­per­ing part­ners around the world pledged to at­tempt TO HALVE (to bring down by 50 per­cent) the EX­TREME POV­ER­TY (i.e., the per­cent­age of peo­ple liv­ing on less than $1 per day) on the Black Con­ti­nent by the year 2015, and al­so to achieve uni­ver­sal ELE­MEN­TARY SCHOOL ed­u­ca­tion. To this end, Ja­pan prom­ised 90 bil­lion yen, most­ly in­ form of­ grants, to fi­nance new ed­u­ca­tion­al and health fa­cil­i­ties in Af­ri­ca.

Top­ic 11. “TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TIES – II”: COMMON AND SPECIFIC FEATURES OF VARIOUS "POSTSO­CIAL­IST" COUNTRIES

Al­though the term "tran­si­tion­al so­ci­e­ties" is NOT such a new one, its fre­quent use when dis­cuss­ing in­ter­na­tion­al po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic af­fairs is a rather NEW phe­nom­e­non.

Now­a­days, this term usu­al­ly em­brac­es:

DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries, with their com­mon strive to­ward in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion, mod­ern­i­za­tion of so­cial struc­tures, na­tion­al sov­e­reign­ty and ec­o­nom­ic selfsuf­fi­cien­cy,

"POSTSO­CIAL­IST" so­ci­e­ties, pain­ful­ly giv­ing away the heavy her­i­tage of cen­tral­ly planned state econ­o­my and mov­ing to­ward a kind of­ nor­mal mar­ket econ­o­my and po­lit­i­cal de­moc­ra­cy (in this second case sometimes also the termtransitioning societies is being used – for example, by the IMF).

These two big groups of so­ci­e­ties form an im­por­tant ele­ment of mod­ern glo­bal (world) sys­tem and should be giv­en spe­cial at­ten­tion by pol­i­ti­cians, busi­ness peo­ple and so­cial work­ers.

We must learn both WHAT these groups of­ coun­tries have IN COMMON, and WHAT makes them DIFFERENT from each oth­er and, in­ some re­spects, OPPOSITE – at least as far as their par­tic­u­lar in­ter­ests and modes of po­lit­i­cal be­ha­vi­or are con­cerned.

* If we take the fea­tures of SIM­I­LAR­I­TY be­tween the de­vel­op­ing and "postso­cial­ist" coun­tries, i.e. WHAT they have IN COM­MON, fol­low­ing is­sues come to mind:

the coun­tries of BOTH groups are in a TRAN­SI­TION­AL state: a) the DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries make tran­si­tion FROM prim­i­tive, man­u­al workbased and most­ly ru­ral (agrar­i­an) econ­o­my with much fe­u­dal, or semife­udal, fea­tures TO­WARD in­dus­tri­al econ­o­my and de­vel­oped do­mes­tic mar­ket sys­tem; b) the "postso­cial­ist" coun­tries go through a deep and prin­ci­pal CHANGE of their DE­VEL­OP­MENT MOD­ELS – FROM high­ly cen­tral­ized STATE econ­o­my TO­WARD more ef­fi­cient MAR­KET econ­o­my based on pri­vate prop­er­ty re­la­tion­ship and free in­i­tia­tive of in­di­vid­u­als,

in BOTH cas­es na­tion­al so­ci­e­ties are un­der­go­ing deep STRUC­TU­RAL up­hea­vals (change) in­ their ECON­O­MIES with farreach­ing SO­CIAL con­se­quenc­es,

BOTH groups are fac­ing big and com­plex prob­lems of AD­JUST­MENT to new modes of PRO­DUC­TION and MAR­KET­ING ac­tiv­i­ties and to IN­TER­NA­TION­AL (GLO­BAL) EN­VI­RON­MENT, in which the tran­si­tion takes place,

in BOTH cas­es the de­vel­op­ment goes in the di­rec­tion of MORE "open" econ­o­mies, MORE ac­tive­ly INVOLVED in in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions and char­ac­ter­ized by GROW­ING ex­port or­ien­ta­tion and the ne­ces­si­ty to CON­TROL im­por­ta­tion of goods and ser­vic­es through some pro­tec­tion­ist and/or im­portsub­sti­tu­tion pol­i­cies,

BOTH groups suf­fer from LACK of FUNDS (fi­nan­cial re­sourc­es) for de­vel­op­ment, and have to re­ly, at least part­ly, on for­eign PRI­VATE (cor­po­rate) IN­VEST­MENT and/or on for­eign AID (fi­nan­cial as­sis­tance),

BOTH are in bad­ly need for for­eign TECH­NOL­O­GY, MAN­AGE­MENT and oth­er as­pects of the socalled "tech­nol­o­gy trans­fer" and "tech­ni­cal aid", which usu­al­ly go to­geth­er with FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI) and such mod­ern forms of in­ter­na­tion­al coop­er­a­tion as JOINT VEN­TURES (a kind of MIXED com­pa­nies rep­re­sent­ing BOTH for­eign and lo­cal cap­i­tal),

in BOTH cas­es the MOD­ERN sec­tor of econ­o­my (to some de­gree ex­portorient­ed and im­portbased) COEX­ISTS with many OLD­FASH­IONED pro­duc­tion and mar­ket struc­tures,

for BOTH groups, pain­ful but help­ful PO­LIT­I­CAL de­vel­op­ment is typ­i­cal, FROM dif­fer­ent kinds of to­tal­i­tar­i­an or au­thor­i­tarian rule TO­WARD de­moc­ra­cy and par­lia­men­tar­ian system in var­i­ous forms.

* How­ev­er, there are al­so some typ­i­cal FEATURES char­ac­ter­iz­ing these TWO groups of coun­tries which, of­ten be­ing of rath­er SIM­I­LAR na­ture as well (just like the previous group), nev­er­the­less pro­voke CON­TRA­DIC­TIONS bet­ween them and give birth to CON­FLICT­ING IN­TER­ESTS, which we have to con­sid­er se­ri­ous­ly:

they are COM­PET­I­TORS on the world mar­kets – ex­act­ly be­cause BOTH are tra­di­tion­al ex­port­ers of RAW MA­TE­RI­ALS and BOTH want to en­hance their in­ter­na­tion­al sales of­ MAN­U­FAC­TURES (es­pe­cial­ly FIN­ISHED GOODS),

they have to SHARE in­ter­na­tion­al­ly avail­a­ble DE­VEL­OP­MENT FUNDS (for ex­am­ple, if "postso­cial­ist" coun­tries get MORE of in­ter­na­tion­al AID and for­eign IN­VEST­MENT, then there prob­ably would re­main LESS for the de­vel­op­ing world),

al­though practically all "postso­cial­ist" na­tionstates have many fea­tures of UN­DER­DE­VEL­OP­MENT char­ac­ter­iz­ing their ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial STRUC­TURES, psy­cho­log­i­cal­ly, de­vel­op­ing coun­tries tend to re­gard them (first of all – Rus­sia and the EastEu­ro­pe­an na­tionstates) as an IN­TE­GRAL PART of the "In­dus­tri­al North" (in con­trast to the "Ag­ri­cul­tu­ral South" to which they them­selves be­long),

MANY "postso­cial­ist" coun­tries are AL­READY rath­er high­ly IN­DUS­TRI­AL­IZED na­tions (that this in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion was very spe­cif­ic – SELForient­ed and MIL­I­TARYorient­ed but not HU­MANorient­ed or, more ex­act­ly, not CON­SU­MERorient­ed – is an­other mat­ter); thus, as such, those coun­tries are MORE ready to ex­cept NEW ap­proach­es to in­ter­na­tion­al coop­er­a­tion – "trade, NOT aid", "in­vest­ment, NOT aid", etc., than the ma­jor­i­ty of de­vel­op­ing na­tions,

af­ter dec­ades of­ to­tal­i­tar­i­an rule and So­viet dom­i­na­tion, many "postso­cial­ist" coun­tries are NOT in­clined to con­tin­ue tight ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions with the for­mer So­viet Un­ion (and be­tween each oth­er, for that mat­ter); the CEN­TRIF­U­GAL forc­es in the for­mer "so­cial­ist com­mu­ni­ty" are very strong, while the de­vel­op­ing coun­tries, with all dif­fer­enc­es be­tween them in in­di­vid­u­al re­gions and world­wide, tend to COOP­ER­ATE and to use JOINT AC­TIONS in their re­la­tion­ships with the in­dus­tri­al­ized world (in the WTO and UNC­TAD ne­go­ti­a­tions, etc.),

* At the core of TRAN­SI­TION­AL so­ci­e­ties, i.e., the very thing that MAKES them "TRAN­SI­TION­AL", are their EC­O­NOM­IC RE­FORMS aimed at the crea­tion of MAR­KETorient­ed pro­duc­tion and en­vi­sion­ing (fore­see­ing) deep chang­es in the whole EC­O­NOM­IC MECH­A­NISM. It hap­pens name­ly through in­tro­duc­tion of ev­er new ELE­MENTS of the MAR­KET MECH­A­NISM with its COM­PE­TI­TION (which brings about and af­firms the ma­jor role of IN­DI­RECT ties) in­stead of cen­tral­ized PLANorient­ed sys­tem of DIS­TRI­BU­TION of re­sourc­es for pro­duc­tion and con­sump­tion by the STATE or­gans (based on ab­so­lute pre­dom­i­nance of DI­RECT, ad­min­is­tra­tive ties).

Now, please, turn back to­ Diagram 1.2.3 from Top­ic 2 – to­ re­mem­ber the prin­ci­pal BUILD of­ a MAR­KET STRUC­TURE. The THREE LEV­ELS of­ ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty are in­ dy­nam­ic func­tion­al IN­TER­AC­TION, and on­ly ALL TO­GETH­ER form a sound and ef­fec­tive sys­tem of­ MAR­KET re­la­tions.

If the ex­is­tent FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURE of an econ­o­my LACKS vi­tal ELE­MENTS of this "THREELAYER CAKE", there is NO oth­er WAYOUT as to create them. Deep CHANG­ES, usu­al­ly on­ ALL THREE lev­els of­ the coun­try­'s EC­O­NOM­IC STRUC­TURE, be­come nec­es­sary, and to se­cure these chang­es the RE­FORM­ING AC­TIV­I­TY of the coun­try in ques­tion must de­vel­op SPE­CIAL POL­I­CIES and IN­STRU­MENTS .

Nec­es­sary chang­es we are speak­ing about can be clear­ly ob­served on the Diagram 1.11.1.

> First of all, the nor­mal MI­CROLEV­EL of the mar­ket struc­ture should be creat­ed, with many PRI­VATE FIRMS ("au­ton­o­mous pro­duc­tion units") work­ing for the MAR­KET and buy­ing nec­es­sary re­sourc­es on the MAR­KET. Un­der the socalled "So­cial­ism" with its STATE ECON­O­MY and over­whelm­ing CEN­TRAL PLAN­NING, in­de­pen­dent ac­tiv­i­ties of this kind did hard­ly ex­ist at all. So the key pro­cess here be­comes the PRI­VAT­I­ZA­TION in various forms, fore­see­ing for the ma­jor­i­ty of­ state en­ter­pris­es their COR­PO­RAT­I­ZATION, I.e., tran­si­tion to the JOINTSTOCK form of own­er­ship (through is­su­ing SHARES and their DIS­TRI­BU­TION in the so­ci­e­ty, most­ly through SUB­SCRIP­TION or­ SALE).

> On the ME­SOLEV­EL, a sys­tem of spe­cial­i­za­tion and coop­er­a­tion of pro­duc­ers as well as of co­or­di­na­tion of­ their busi­ness ac­tiv­i­ties DID ex­ist, but in RIG­ID, dis­tort­ed form of AD­MIN­IS­TRA­TIVE DIS­TRI­BU­TION of re­sourc­es and man­u­fac­tured prod­ucts by cen­tral­ized PLAN­NING OR­GANS.

On this lev­el, the task is to trans­form this sys­tem of DI­RECT ver­ti­cal ties in­to a reg­u­lar MAR­KET SUP­PLY based on CONTRUCTING and SUBCON­TRACTING re­la­tion­ship, i.e., on IN­DI­RECT hor­i­zon­tal ties. This pro­cess is de­vel­op­ing right now, but very slow­ly and pain­ful­ly. The old (PLANbased) sys­tem is al­ready quite de­stroyed, while the new (MAR­KETbased) sys­tem still is at an ear­ly or in­ter­me­di­ate stage of emer­gence.

> On the MAC­ROLEV­EL, pro­cess­es are al­so de­vel­op­ing in the di­rec­tion of more CIVILIZED forms of STATE REG­U­LA­TION, although many oldfash­ioned ad­min­is­tra­tive in­stru­ments and struc­tures still re­main try­ing to ex­er­cise their for­mer pow­er over the econ­o­my.

* What is go­ing on in the way of SELFRE­FORM­ING in­side par­tic­u­lar STATES and their NA­TION­AL ECON­O­MIES (and many of such states are very young, i.e., just emerg­ing as IN­DE­PEN­DENT PO­LIT­I­CAL EN­TI­TIES) re­peats it­self on INTERNATIONAL scale.

The ma­jor or­gan­i­za­tion in charge of ec­o­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion be­tween about a doz­en of for­mer "so­cial­ist" states (most­ly Eu­ro­pe­an ones) – the Coun­cil of Mu­tu­al Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion (or CO­MEC­ON) has dis­solved im­me­di­ate­ly af­ter dra­mat­ic events around an­tidem­o­crat­ic "PUTSCH" (or­ "RI­OT") in Mos­cow in Au­gust 1991.

Up to its in­glo­ri­ous end, the CO­MEC­ON has re­gard­ed as its main task "co­or­di­na­tion of na­tion­al plans" and served as mighty ad­min­is­tra­tive tool in dis­tri­bu­tion and redis­tri­bu­tion of re­sourc­es in­side the "so­cial­ist com­mu­ni­ty". In fact, it was ma­jor tool of "SO­VIET" (USS­R's) dom­i­na­tion in the world ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem which at that time was con­trol­ling up to 20 per­cent of the world's cu­mu­la­tive OUT­PUT (GNP).

Now, the CEN­TRIF­U­GAL (DI­VID­ING) forc­es in­side the dispersed group of for­mer CO­MEC­ON mem­bers – most­ly "TRAN­SI­TION­ING SO­CI­E­TIES" in­ Cen­tral and East Eu­rope – are much strong­er than the CEN­TRIP­E­TAL ones (di­rect­ed at UNI­TY and COOP­ER­A­TION).

As for the fu­ture, it is ob­vi­ous: when the time comes for nor­mal ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions be­tween for­mer "broth­er states" to reemerge and grow again (and there are many ob­jec­tive fac­tors act­ing in that very di­rec­tion, in­clud­ing HIGH de­gree of­ COM­PLE­MEN­TAR­I­TY in­ their EC­O­NOM­IC STRUC­TURES), these re­la­tions should and nec­es­sar­i­ly will take shape of most­ly in­di­rect MAR­KET ties, first of all – in the field of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRADE and of PRODUCTION COOPERATION.

* During the era of the historic confrontation EastWest, a large group of “Eastern” coun­tries has been dubbed "his­tor­i­cal­ly planned econ­o­mies" (or HPE). Those were most­ly the same coun­tries we now call "postso­cial­ist", plus some na­tions in the Third World at one time char­ac­ter­ized by the socalled "so­cial­ist or­ien­ta­tion" of their ec­o­nom­ic and po­lit­i­cal de­vel­op­ment – like Al­ge­ria, An­go­la, Cam­bo­dia, Chile, Con­go, Cu­ba (a for­mer mem­ber of the CO­MEC­ON), Ethi­o­pia, Guin­ea, Mon­go­lia (an­other for­mer CO­MEC­ON mem­ber), Nic­a­ra­gua, Yemen, etc.

It is worth­while to no­tice that NOW­A­DAYS prac­ti­cal­ly ALL such for­mer "de­vel­op­ing coun­tries with so­cial­ist or­ien­ta­tion" have lost their ide­o­log­i­cal col­or­ing and po­lit­i­calsat­el­lite stat­us and are on their own try­ing to build up nor­mal MAR­KETbased ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial sys­tem.

In his­tor­i­cal and po­lit­i­cal lit­er­a­ture, you can al­so find oth­er names used for a wide va­rie­ty of­ coun­tries out­side the First World ("cap­i­tal­ist" or "in­dus­tri­al") and the Third World ("de­vel­op­ing" or "lessde­vel­oped") – like the Sec­ond World, or "com­mu­nist" coun­tries, or "non­mar­ket econ­o­mies" (NME), or "cen­tral­ly planned econ­o­mies" (CPE), or East­ern bloc. Now, these terms have LOST their ob­jec­tive ba­sis in global IDE­O­LOG­I­CAL and SO­CIALEC­O­NOM­IC divide which was char­ac­ter­is­tic for GLO­BAL po­lit­i­cal SYS­TEM some dec­ades ago.

How­ev­er, among the HPE group, coun­tries VARY in wheth­er their highest po­lit­i­cal bod­ies have or have NOT made a com­mit­ment to be­come a MAR­KET ECON­O­MY and DE­MOC­RA­CY.

For ex­am­ple, the Czech Re­pub­lic, Slo­vak­ia, Hun­gary, Po­land, Slo­ve­nia and, from 199798, al­so Bul­gar­ia, Ro­ma­nia and Al­ba­nia (in Eu­rope), or Mon­go­lia (in Asia) and Chile (in Lat­in Amer­i­ca) have clear­ly made such a com­mit­ment. How­ev­er, two very pe­cu­liar cas­es, those of­ Chi­na and Viet­nam (by the way, both in­ Asia), main­tained that a com­bi­na­tion of CEN­TRAL PLAN­NING and ONEPAR­TY RULE, on the one side, and MAR­KET ECON­O­MY, on the oth­er side, is pos­si­ble. And on­ly few coun­tries, like North Ko­rea (in Asia) or Cu­ba (in Cen­tral Amer­i­ca), have com­mit­ted nei­ther to a MAR­KET trans­for­ma­tion nor to PO­LIT­I­CAL re­forms.

* There are many typ­i­cal PAIN­FUL PROB­LEMS or "STUM­BLING BLOCKS" on the way to a mar­ket econ­o­my and de­moc­ra­cy. Among them we shall call but MA­JOR ones:

SO­CIAL TEN­SION when go­ing through EC­O­NOM­IC SHOCKS of the re­form­ing pro­cess, es­pe­cial­ly on its in­i­tial stage, when the NEG­A­TIVE con­se­quenc­es for the pop­u­la­tion are ob­vi­ous (de­cline in pro­duc­tion, grow­ing un­em­ploy­ment, surg­ing in­fla­tion, etc.), while the fu­ture BEN­E­FITS are still far away and ques­tion­a­ble,

EX­CESS­ES and neg­a­tive BYPROD­UCTS of PRI­VAT­I­ZA­TION, which hardly can and should de­vel­op oth­er­wise as a slow and cum­ber­some pro­cess, of­ten un­der­min­ing SE­CUR­I­TY of for­mer state em­ploy­ees, bring­ing grow­ing so­cial in­e­qual­i­ty and PUB­LIC SCAN­DALS with COR­RUP­TION charg­es, etc.,

sharp DE­TE­RI­O­RA­TION of the over­all FI­NAN­CIAL SIT­U­A­TION – be­cause col­lect­ed TAX­ES di­min­ish, while the BUD­GET FI­NANC­ING of un­prof­it­a­ble state en­ter­pris­es still goes on (the socalled "SOFTBUD­GET fi­nanc­es"), due PAY­MENTS for goods and ser­vic­es, as well as­ WAG­ES and SAL­A­RIES in the STATE SEC­TOR, tend to be in ar­rears (i.e., come too late if ev­er), etc.,

acute NEED in RE­STRUC­TUR­ING HU­MAN RE­SOURC­ES – be­cause mam­moth bu­reau­cra­cy of the "so­cial­ist" times should be re­placed by flex­i­ble and lean mod­ern man­age­ment, the LA­BOUR FORCE should be reed­u­cat­ed and retrained, the FREEEN­TER­PRISE tra­di­tions both of UR­BAN and RU­RAL pop­u­la­tion re­stored or creat­ed from scratch, etc.,

on the PO­LIT­I­CAL front, SO­CIAL and (even more!) IN­TERETH­NIC ten­sion has ten­den­cy to grow dra­mat­i­cal­ly, be­cause some peo­ple get VERY RICH, while oth­ers be­come EVEN POOR­ER than ev­er b­e­fore, and es­pe­cial­ly – be­cause the MUL­TINA­TION STATES tend to dis­in­te­grate; the in­ner bor­ders of FED­ER­A­TIONS crum­ble and be­come sub­ject to dis­putes pro­vok­ing armed con­flicts and even cas­es of GEN­O­CIDE in form of­ "ETH­NIC CLEANS­INGS" (re­mem­ber the Che­chen wars in­ the for­mer So­viet Un­ion, as well as des­per­ate at­tempts of the then Ser­bi­a's lead­er Slob­o­dan Mil­o­sev­ic to­ stop the dis­in­te­gra­tion of­ Yu­go­sla­via by wag­ing bru­tal wars in Bos­nia, Croa­tia, and Ko­so­vo),

new MUL­TIPAR­TY po­lit­i­cal sys­tem emerg­es on the back­ground of strong TO­TAL­I­TAR­I­AN and AU­THOR­I­TARIAN ten­den­cies, on­ the oth­er hand, and on the other – LOW and OR­DER get weak (at least, for a time be­ing), etc.

* Still, in EVE­RY coun­try the con­fig­u­ra­tion of FAC­TORS is dif­fer­ent, the cur­rent SIT­U­A­TION and main IS­SUES of RE­FORM­ING de­mand various do­mes­tic and for­eign POL­I­CIES; the ACHIEVE­MENTS and CRI­SES come in dif­fer­ent time and dif­fer­ent se­quence. In­di­vid­u­al coun­tries have rath­er dif­fer­ent CHANC­ES to achieve SUC­CESS in their RE­FORM­ING POL­I­CIES, etc.

"Postso­cial­ist" coun­tries are al­so very DIFFERENT be­tween them­selves. For ex­am­ple, Rus­sia and Chi­na are "em­pirelike" GIANTS with rough­ly in­dus­tri­al­ized but selfsuf­fi­cient ec­o­nom­ic com­plex­es and with very com­plex ETH­NIC com­po­si­tion of pop­u­la­tion. At the same time, the for­mer East Ger­ma­ny has been SMALL in size, rath­er wellin­dus­tri­al­ized and eth­ni­cal­ly ho­mo­ge­ne­ous, which means it­ could be­ quick­ly and nat­u­ral­ly IN­TE­GRAT­ED in­to ALLGER­MAN ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial struc­ture.

Czech­o­slo­va­kia has come apart (dis­in­te­grat­ed) form­ing TWO new na­tionstates (the Czech Re­pub­lic and Slo­vak­ia). Po­land, Hun­gary, Ro­ma­nia and Bul­gar­ia, as well as for­mer "So­viet Bal­tic Re­pub­lics" – Lith­u­a­nia, Lat­via and Es­to­nia – ALL have tak­en rath­er IN­DE­PEN­DENT ec­o­nom­ic course with ONE fea­ture in com­mon – ALL have giv­en up (at least, for a cer­tain his­tor­i­cal time) their "spe­cial re­la­tions" with Rus­sia (the for­mer So­viet Un­ion) and ALL tend to es­tab­lish close ties with West­ern Eu­rope and to be ul­ti­mate­ly in­te­grat­ed in­to the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion.

Var­i­ous coun­tries are get­ting dif­fer­ent FI­NAN­CIAL AS­SIS­TANCE in­ter­na­tion­al­ly. The size of FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI), both as an­nu­al IN­FLOWS and ac­cu­mu­lat­ed STOCK val­ue, al­so var­y dra­mat­i­cal­ly from rath­er BIG (like in Hun­gary, Po­land, or Czech Re­pub­lic) to very SMALL (like in Lith­u­a­nia, Lat­via, Mol­do­va, Bel­ar­us, Uz­be­ki­stan or Al­ba­nia).

So, ob­vi­ous­ly, the BEST way for us is to an­a­lyze SOME EX­AM­PLES of RE­FORM­ING in in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries, look­ing for typ­i­cal sit­u­a­tions and po­lit­i­cal so­lu­tions, try­ing to un­der­stand spe­cif­ic cir­cum­stanc­es con­nect­ed with unique cul­tu­ral, po­lit­i­cal and busi­ness EN­VI­RON­MENTS in in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries.

Case 1. CHI­NA. From all the coun­tries of­ the het­er­o­ge­neous (var­i­able) group of TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TIES, it was Chi­na, who FIRST be­gan ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial chang­es in the di­rec­tion of MAR­KET econ­o­my (way back in 1978). As a re­sult, in the last decades Chi­na's giant ec­o­nom­ic com­plex has been de­vel­op­ing at UN­PREC­E­DENT­ED an­nu­al rates (of about 10 percent), its struc­tu­ral com­po­si­tion has been rap­id­ly chang­ing, and GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL­LY the coun­try has become ev­er MORE di­vid­ed:

in­to MOD­ERN SEC­TOR of­ econ­o­my of the COAST­AL re­gions with their THOU­SANDS of "free mar­ket ar­e­as" (or "special ec­o­nom­ic zones" SEZ) and many BIL­LIONS of dol­lars in­vest­ed in­ joint pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing, and

in­to TRA­DI­TION­AL ("qua­siso­cial­ist") SEC­TOR of­ econ­o­my of the IN­NER re­gions with the stateowned and cen­tral­ly planned HEAVY IN­DUS­TRIES and on­ly part­ly pri­va­tized, yet al­ready rath­er ef­fi­cient AG­RI­CUL­TURE.

How­ev­er, the FU­TURE of this great na­tion re­mains vague (un­clear). EC­O­NOM­I­CAL­LY Chi­na rep­re­sents strong case in fa­vor of MAR­KET ECON­O­MY and a clear ex­am­ple of achieve­ments and hard­ships on the path TO­WARD it and AWAY from "so­cial­ist" ten­ets (dog­ma). But PO­LIT­I­CAL­LY it re­mains a PAR­TYruled to­tal­i­tar­i­an state with NO or LIT­TLE de­moc­ra­cy.

The fact that the Com­mu­nist Par­ty is un­der­go­ing deep IDE­O­LOG­I­CAL cri­sis look­ing for NEW in­spi­ra­tions as well as for jus­ti­fi­ca­tion of its rule in the Con­fu­cian her­i­tage does NOT change much. No one knows, just WHAT is in score for the coun­try – new "cul­tu­ral rev­o­lu­tion" and blood­shed, like one that has tak­en place at Tia­nan­men Square in 1989, or a Chi­nese kind of "po­lit­i­cal per­es­troi­ka" and, fi­nal­ly, COLLAPSE of the ONEPAR­TY sys­tem.

Most prob­ably, since the hand­o­ver of­ Hong Kong to­ Chi­na on June 30, 1997, this "Spe­cial Ad­min­is­tra­tive Re­gion" (SAR) may play ma­jor role in in­flu­enc­ing fur­ther struc­tu­ral chang­es in Chi­nese so­ci­e­ty, both in di­rec­tion of MAR­KET ECON­O­MY and PO­LIT­I­CAL PLU­RAL­ISM.

How­ev­er, we have yet to see if the "ONE COUN­TRY, TWO SYS­TEMS" prin­ci­ple can real­ly work for long. In the sum­mer 1999, as the world marked the TENTH AN­NI­VER­SARY of the bloody Tia­nan­men mas­sa­cre by vig­ils in re­mem­brance of its vic­tims, as well as on several other occasions since then (but, fortunately, NOT in 2009 – twenty years after that ugly state crime!), there have been wor­ry­ing signs that the CEN­TRAL POW­ER in­ Beij­ing has been pre­par­ing a mas­sive at­tack on the "SPE­CIAL STAT­US" of the SAR and the HU­MAN RIGHTS of its pop­u­la­tion (fortunately, it hasn’t materialize).

Case 2. VIET­NAM. Chi­na's south­ern neigh­bor, Viet­nam shares a DU­AL char­ac­ter of its so­ci­e­ty. On the one hand, Viet­nam re­mains a "com­mu­nist" state with ONEPAR­TY rule and CEN­TRAL PLAN­NING of econ­o­my. On the oth­er hand, the socalled "DOI MOI" ("ren­o­va­tion") pol­i­cy fore­sees: (a) FREEMAR­KET re­forms; (b) fur­ther IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION; (c) EXTERNAL OPENING of the economy as the THREE ma­jor ev­o­lu­tion­ary pro­cess­es in na­tion­al de­vel­op­ment.

One of the last par­ty con­gresses set the am­bi­tious longterm goal of mak­ing Viet­nam by 2020 an IN­DUS­TRI­AL coun­try with a GNI (formerly called GNP) of a size EIGHT to TEN times the 1990 lev­el. Till now, about 80 per­cent of the pop­u­la­tion lives in RURAL ar­e­as, while the share of AG­RI­CUL­TURE in the GNI is al­most the same as that of IN­DUS­TRY (between 25 and 30 percent).

In achiev­ing these largescale goals, Viet­nam has in mind to re­ly heav­i­ly on FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT, albeit it does NOT go as successfully as in China. In particular, Vietnam tries to at­tract both Jap­a­nese and South Korean in­ves­tors (the fa­mous "CHAE­BOLS"). Ko­re­an com­pa­nies have ear­marked some $2.3 bil­lion for 169 pro­jects in Viet­nam in­clud­ing sev­er­al big ven­tures in OIL and MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING sec­tors. The Dae­woo Group is the biggest for­eign in­ves­tor in Viet­nam now­a­days.

How­ev­er, at the same time rul­ing Viet­na­mese com­mu­nists in­ their pol­i­cy re­port swear "to thwart res­o­lute­ly all is­sues of 'de­moc­ra­cy' and 'hu­man rights' which stir up po­lit­i­cal trou­ble" as well as "not to ac­cept plu­ral­ism and mul­ti­par­ty sys­tem". Al­though Viet­nam re­mains a STATEDOM­I­NAT­ED econ­o­my, the par­ty con­gress made it clear that the aim is to have even MORE state con­trol over ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment and to en­hance the role of "stateowned en­ter­pris­es" (SOE).

Case 3. MON­GO­LIA. Generally, this southern neigh­bor of Chi­na goes more stable RE­FORM­ING course. The hard­line com­mu­nism was thrown off two decades ago, and in 1996 the Peo­ple's Rev­o­lu­tion­ary Par­ty was tossed out and lost its rul­ing po­si­tion (Mon­go­lia has been known as the SEC­OND old­est "com­mu­nist" coun­try in the world). How­ev­er, in May 1997, in the al­ready FOURTH “free and fair” elec­tion in Mon­gol­i­a's his­to­ry, the com­mu­nist can­di­date N. Bag­a­ban­di was elect­ed pres­i­dent (and in May 2001 he was reelected). People liked that his gov­ern­ment actually SLOWED DOWN the pain­ful tran­si­tion from a CEN­TRAL­IZED econ­o­my to a kind of "Mon­go­lian cap­i­tal­ism".

And yet, even with com­mu­nist pres­i­dent, Mon­go­lia chang­es rapidly enough re­turn­ing to Bud­dhist roots, and mix­ing more and more Asianmade Toy­o­tas and Hyn­dais to its au­to­mo­bile park of Rus­sianmade La­das and Vol­gas.

When Mon­go­lia em­barked on sweep­ing DE­MOC­RAT­IZA­TION and FREEMAR­KET RE­FORM ef­forts in the ear­ly 1990s, Ja­pan and oth­er in­dus­tri­al­ized na­tions pro­vid­ed gen­er­ous EC­O­NOM­IC AS­SIS­TANCE in hopes of mak­ing the small pas­to­ral na­tion a SUC­CESS­FUL MOD­EL for oth­er Asian na­tions. Now, we see that this en­dea­vor brought its fruits.

At the same time, Mon­go­lia is NOT as at­trac­tive for PRI­VATE for­eign IN­VES­TORS as Viet­nam or Chi­na. Viet­nam is lo­cat­ed in the world's fast­est grow­ing re­gion and was duly ad­mit­ted to the AS­EAN. Mon­go­lia, on the oth­er hand, is hand­i­capped for ge­o­graph­i­cal and oth­er rea­sons. It is an INLAND coun­try SANDWICHED be­tween the two BIG POWERS – Chi­na and Rus­sia. It is still UNKNOWN how much NAT­U­RAL RE­SOURC­ES Mon­go­lia has, and its HU­MAN RE­SOURC­ES are scarce and NOT very well ed­u­cat­ed.

Be­fore be­com­ing a DY­NAM­IC econ­o­my like Viet­nam, Mon­go­lia may have to wait for the pos­si­ble for­ma­tion of a kind of­ SUB­RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC ZONE en­com­pass­ing sev­er­al East Asian neigh­bors in­clud­ing Chi­na, the Rus­sian Far East, and South Ko­rea.

Case 4. RUS­SIA. Be­fore Au­gust 1998, it­ looked like our na­tive coun­try has had its MOST SE­VERE ec­o­nom­ic trou­bles be­hind it. With all its DRAW­BACKS and in­her­ent PAL­LI­A­TIVE char­ac­ter, PRI­VAT­I­ZA­TION was pro­ceed­ing and gen­er­al­ly ful­fill­ing its aim – crea­tion of a NEW "mid­dle class". The for­mer par­ty func­tion­ar­ies, com­mu­nistyouth or­ga­niz­ers and "red di­rec­tors" were in a haste to be­come businessmen, and to find their place in the new way of life. The re­lat­ed pro­cess of­ COR­PO­RAT­I­ZA­TION in­ject­ed new blood in many for­mer­ly STATEOWNED plants and giant com­bi­nes (at the same time bring­ing, how­ev­er, a dra­mat­ic in­crease in CON­CEN­TRA­TION of ec­o­nom­ic POW­ER in the hands of sev­er­al PRI­VATE CLANS).

The ver­ti­cal­ly or­ga­nized STATE DIS­TRI­BU­TION sys­tem has COLLAPSED and was be­ing SUBSTITUTED by nor­mal hor­i­zon­tal (con­tractbased and prof­itorient­ed) MAR­KET re­la­tions. The largescale plants were go­ing through CON­VER­SION (to­ward CON­SU­MER goods and away from MIL­I­TARYorient­ed pro­duc­tion). The STORES and CITY MAR­KETS were full of food and var­i­able in­dus­tri­al goods, BOTH for­eign and do­mes­tic. With­in the coun­try, the ru­ble has be­come CON­VERT­I­BLE, and you could ex­change ru­bles for dol­lars prac­ti­cal­ly eve­ry­where. Al­though PRIC­ES were still mov­ing UP­WARD, the most dan­ger­ous phase of IN­FLA­TION was ob­vi­ous­ly OVER.

The "EC­O­NOM­IC TEAM" of­ young re­form­ers which the reelect­ed, although not very strong physically, Pres­i­dent B. Yelt­sin gath­ered around him was much more ef­fi­cient and MAR­KETECON­O­MYmind­ed than peo­ple who made Rus­sian ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy under M. Gorbachev. Con­sid­er­a­ble for­eign MON­EY was flowing in­to the coun­try, there were thou­sands of new JOINT VENTURES in ac­tion, big in­vest­ment pro­jects in Si­be­ria, in the North and in the Far East were be­ing ne­go­tiat­ed by the lead­ing re­sourc­esorient­ed TNC, the FIRST ev­er sale of Rus­sian fiveyears Eu­ro­bonds at­tract­ed Amer­i­can, Eu­ro­pe­an and South Ko­re­an in­ves­tors, etc.

And yet, in 1998, as the fi­nan­cial and ec­o­nom­ic CRI­SIS in Asia deep­ened and a new wave of DE­VAL­U­A­TIONS threat­ened to un­der­mine the shaky and nontrans­par­ent IN­TER­NA­TION­AL FI­NAN­CIAL SYS­TEM, the sit­u­a­tion in Rus­sia again turned for the WORSE.

In­ Au­gust, quite un­ex­pect­ed­ly, the ru­ble was de­val­ued. Rus­sia DEFALTED on some FOREIGN DEBT (did NOT pay on time). Shortterm for­eign cap­i­tal fled the coun­try. All this un­leashed a wave of IN­FLA­TION and pro­voked a near melt­down of the BANK­ING SYS­TEM. Even the most wealthy and mighty "ol­i­garchs" found their own and their clos­est friends­' pri­vate banks in a pit­i­ful state.

The on­ly fivemonths old gov­ern­ment of en­er­get­ic Ser­gei Ki­riy­en­ko had to go. Af­ter a short po­lit­i­cal cri­sis, a new gov­ern­ment was formed by a com­pro­mise fig­ure – rath­er old and ex­pe­ri­enced Yev­ge­ny Prim­a­kov, the for­mer KGBboss and, lat­er, for­eign min­is­ter. His cab­i­net in­clud­ed rath­er many com­mu­nists, but on­ly few re­formmind­ed pro­fes­sion­als. By May 1999, how­ev­er, his turn came to be dis­missed and for­got­ten. Al­though at­ that time Prim­a­kov's an­ticri­sis pro­gram was still in the mak­ing, the pub­lic opin­ion praised him for "bring­ing sta­bil­i­ty". Then, for pit­i­ful 82 days, it was Ser­gei Step­a­shin's gov­ern­ment that stood at the helm of the coun­try.

How­ev­er, al­ready in­ Au­gust 1999, pres­i­dent Yelt­sin ar­ranged a new re­shuf­fling of the cab­i­net, mak­ing the then spy chief Vlad­i­mir Pu­tin his next prime min­is­ter and de­clar­ing him "heir ap­par­ent", i.e., the main con­tend­er in­ pres­i­den­tial elec­tion (which, at that time, were due in June 2000) en­joy­ing full Krem­lin back­ing.

Soon, a Che­chen guer­ril­la ex­pe­di­tion in­to neigh­bor­ing Dage­stan and four suc­ces­sive ter­ror­ist bomb­ings, two of them in Mos­cow, have pro­voked a new mas­sive mil­i­tary cam­paign against Che­chen war­lords. V. Pu­tin's firm stance in­ this pro­longed con­flict was gen­er­al­ly re­gard­ed as ma­jor fac­tor con­trib­ut­ing to his ris­ing pop­u­lar­i­ty among the Rus­sian elec­to­rate be­fore the end of the year which brought the unexpected dramatic abdication of President Yeltsin.

Thus, in January 2000, Vladimir Putin became acting President, the presidential elections were moved from June to March, and he won them with flying colors. After four years in office, on March 14, 2004, Vladimir Putin was reelected for a NEW fouryears term, and in spring 2008 D. Medvedev, as the candidate of the Yedinaya Rossiya party, won the next presidential election, while V. Putin was heading the federal government.

So, since May 2000, Russia has a succession of young and physically fit presidents who proclaim strong federal power, further economic reforming and active foreign policy. For example, during his first four years as Russia’s President, V. Putin was engaged in a practically nonstop political dialogues with the U.S., European Union and the NATO, and also was negotiating with Japan on a wide scope of economic and political problems including the painful territorial issue and an eventual peace treaty. Though without final success, he actively pushed the creation of a Eurasian Economic Community with the four former Soviet republics (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)..

In June 2001, China and Russia transformed what was previously known as the Shanghai Five into a fullblown new alliance called Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) encompassing China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Tajikistan and a new member – Uzbekistan. This new regional organization is aiming at combating Islamic militancy and at boosting TRADE and INVESTMENT cooperation among the resourcerich Asian neighbors.

On the home front, President Putin has been waging a prolonged and tough fight against GOVERNORS with their ambitions to be small Czars locally (who were finally robed of their right to be elected by their constituencies and began to be nominated instead by President himself), as well as against the socalled OLIGARCHSwith their ambitions to control massmedia channels (like Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, both pushed into immigration) and with their fat foreign bank accounts often used to finance the emerging opposition parties (like Russia’s richest man – Michael Khodorkovsky, the main shareholder of Russia’s former second biggest oil producer YUKOS, who has spent a decade in Siberia sentenced to a labor camp term). In doing so Mr. Putin has given his opponents and the Western press some grounds for accusations in AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES and neglect of political freedoms, of human rights issues and of independent press.

* Af­ter all these dramatic developments, we may ask: WHAT has been and ba­si­cal­ly remains WRONG with our dear coun­try? WHY do for­eign firms NOT hur­ry to bring their cap­i­tal to this new Bo­nan­za and WHY do they run away at the first sight of the coun­try­'s fi­nan­cial weak­ness? WHY do littlereformed Communists still enjoy considerable popularity while the MORAL (mood, spir­it) among the work­ing peo­ple is rather LOW?

In my view, the prob­lem is that the EC­O­NOM­IC RE­FORM­ING has still gone NOT far enough. In particular, the au­thor­i­ties (pres­i­dent, gov­ern­ment, par­lia­ment) for years did NOT give their suf­fi­cient back­ing to the creation of an ad­e­quate LEGISLATIVE BASE for nor­mal busi­ness de­vel­op­ment (as well as NO suf­fi­cient GUAR­AN­TEES for for­eign in­ves­tors). The BUSI­NESS RULES re­main in­def­i­nite, the PRI­VATE OWN­ER­SHIP (es­pe­cial­ly, in­ re­gard to LAND) still semile­gal, the CUS­TOMS RE­GIME – a par­a­dise (heav­en) for bu­reau­crats and black­mail­ers, the TAX­ES remain numerous and generally HIGH but many busi­ness­es still manage to evade them. All this tended to un­der­mine the STATE BUD­GET, led to scan­dal­ous ARREARS in the pay­ment of WAGES, SAL­A­RIES and PEN­SIONS, and killed the im­pe­tus both for local BIG BUSINESS and for FOREIGN TNC to get involved in longterm INVESTMENT PROJECTS.

As a re­sult, now as before, MON­EY tends to flow­ out of the coun­try. Swiss banks keep MIL­LIONS and BIL­LIONS in­ hard cur­ren­cy on spe­cial ac­counts be­long­ing to Rus­sian "new rich" including some government officials. Un­til now, pay­ments due ac­cord­ing to ex­port con­tracts of­ten do NOT cross the Rus­sian bor­der and re­main in the West. The coun­try is NOT ready for com­ing HIGH UN­EM­PLOY­MENT, which is in store ex­act­ly be­cause of in­ev­i­ta­ble STRUC­TU­RAL CHANGE, and which so far has NOT ma­te­ri­al­ized ON­LY be­cause this CHANGE is tak­ing place so slow­ly and in­de­ci­sive­ly (to say nothing of the prolonged financial and economic crisis which developed worldwide since the second half of 2008 and has been influencing the Russian economy very strongly indeed).

* How­ev­er, WHAT we should always keep in mind is:

  • Rus­sia is tre­men­dous­ly RICH in nat­u­ral re­sourc­es and its generally welleducated and industries peo­ple are ca­pa­ble to work ef­fi­cient­ly un­der ad­e­quate con­di­tions; so, objectively, Rus­sia may not only play its constructive role as a reliable source of raw materials and energy for its foreign partners but also con­trib­ute in a ma­jor way to the development of directly international production systems of European, American, Japanese and other TNC,

  • Rus­sia can of­fer NOT on­ly wide va­rie­ty of cheap RAW MA­TE­RI­ALS, but al­so some HIGHTECH prod­ucts – from qual­i­ty ar­ma­ments to aerospace machinery and equipment (with the CON­VER­SION still go­ing on such op­por­tu­ni­ties may even grow in scope),

  • Rus­sian MAR­KET is very big in­ AB­SO­LUTE terms (al­beit REL­A­TIVE­LY small, be­cause the majority of peo­ple are still rather POOR); the DE­MAND for mod­ern MAN­U­FAC­TURED GOODS in­clud­ing HIGHTECH prod­ucts (the socalled “sophisticated demand”) is stead­i­ly grow­ing,

  • Rus­sia needs foreign tech­ni­cal knowhow, man­a­ge­ri­al ex­pe­ri­ence and pri­vate in­vest­ment cap­i­tal MORE than it­ needs for­eign assistance or com­mer­cial cred­its,

  • in Rus­sia, foreign businesses may find BOTH pri­vate and stateman­aged coun­ter­parts (part­ners); usually, it is MORE prof­it­a­ble and ef­fi­cient to deal with PRI­VATE ac­tors, but some­times for­mer and current STATE en­ter­pris­es (still in the pro­cess of PRI­VAT­I­SA­TION and CON­VER­SION) look also attractive enough,

  • until lately, Rus­sia be­longed to the "Group of Eight" (G8), a PO­LIT­I­CAL FOR­UM in­clud­ing HEADS OF STATE of­ the most in­fluen­tial in­dus­tri­al na­tions of the world, and could par­tic­i­pate in its SUM­MITS on reg­u­lar ba­sis (a desirable situation which might be reestablished sooner or later),

  • Russia was adopt­ed in­to "Par­is Club" which prom­is­es re­turn of some "BAD DEBTS" the for­mer So­viet Un­ion has gath­ered in its re­la­tions with DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries; in its turn, using prolonged periods of favorable OIL PRICES, Russia was successfully attempting to balance the budget and also to pay back big sums to foreign creditors radically reducing its own INTERNATIONAL INDEBTNESS (all these may be regarded as signs that Rus­sia has been rap­id­ly INTEGRATING itself in­to the world com­mu­ni­ty as its fullfledged and in­fluen­tial mem­ber),

  • for some time now, Russia has joined the WTO thus becoming a fullscale member in the MULTILATERAL trade system (this means both Russia’s ECONOMIC LEGISLATION and CUSTOMS SYSTEM will be further reformed along the lines compatible with the WTO standards),

  • al­though so­cialec­o­nom­ic sit­u­a­tion in Rus­sia has not yet reached real sta­bil­i­ty, there are grounds to as­sume that the EC­O­NOM­IC RE­FORM is gen­er­al­ly NONREVERSIBLE and will GO ON – maybe, even more energetically – under the current administration (in particular, be­cause too many vest­ed in­ter­ests de­pend on its suc­cess),

  • so, in a long per­spec­tive, it does NOT seem cor­rect for any eventual foreign part­ner to wait TOO LONG be­fore se­ri­ous­ly ex­plor­ing Rus­sian busi­ness op­por­tu­ni­ties (for ex­am­ple, the risk for Jap­a­nese busi­ness peo­ple to come TOO LATE, and to find all the plac­es oc­cu­pied by RI­VALS from China, Eu­rope and Amer­i­ca, runs rath­er high),

  • how­ev­er, Rus­sia re­gards as mat­ters of­ its PRI­MARY in­ter­est and importance the PRES­ER­VA­TION and DE­VEL­OP­MENT of ties WITH­IN the ar­ea of the for­mer So­viet Un­ion (now­a­days the Com­mon­wealth of­ In­de­pen­dent States, or­ CIS); thus, coop­er­a­tion with Eu­ro­pe­an, Amer­i­can or EastAsian part­ners (ex­act­ly in that se­quence) is con­sid­ered im­por­tant, but NOT pri­marily im­por­tant to the coun­try,

  • modern Rus­sia is NOT a po­lit­i­cal and mil­i­tary SU­PER­POW­ER any more, nor is it an empire like its predecessors – Czarist Russia or the Soviet Union,

  • yet it is rea­son­ably safe to­ as­sume that, as a great constellation of Eurasian peoples, the Rus­sian Federation potentially is and will sure be one of­ the MA­JOR AC­TORS in the global af­fairs of the 21st cen­tu­ry.

Case 5. EAST GER­MA­NY (a very SPECIAL case). The in­te­gra­tion of the for­mer Ger­man Dem­o­crat­ic Re­pub­lic – GDR (now, the socalled "Neue Bun­des­laend­er") in­to WESTGER­MAN and EU­RO­PE­AN econ­o­my rep­re­sent­ed BY FAR MORE EASY a task, than the "SELFRE­FORM­ING" in Rus­sia. WestGer­man cap­i­tal, WestGer­man man­a­ge­ri­al ex­pe­ri­ence, WestGer­man ad­min­is­tra­tion fa­cil­i­ties – ALL this was at hand to make the tran­si­tion as pain­less as pos­si­ble.

Still, there are many PROBLEMS to be solved be­fore East Ger­ma­ny would be­come a 100per­cent SOUND in­te­gral part of an ALLGER­MAN ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem. Among them fig­ure extremely HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, re­main­ing INEFFICIENCY and LOW COMPETITIVENESS of many plants, mo­ral de­pres­sion among the pop­u­la­tion, and a kind of "nos­tal­gia" for the UN­PLEAS­ANT but SAFE "so­cial­ist" times.

Case 6. ES­TO­NIA (another SPECIAL case). Like other Baltic states, which emerged af­ter the col­lapse of the Soviet empire, Estonia is strongly WESTORIENTED. Like them, it has a con­sid­er­a­ble RUS­SIAN POP­U­LA­TION which presents a wea­ri­some SOCIAL PROBLEM to NATIONALISTminded authorities.

Es­to­nia has achieved very much in bring­ing about MAR­KET ECON­O­MY con­di­tions. It has built up a STRONG na­tion­al cur­ren­cy (the "kroon") with a FIXED rate at­tached first to the Deuts­che Mark and later to a basket of currencies. The country has gath­ered con­sid­er­a­ble gold and for­eign ex­change re­serves. It has REORIENT­ED its trade to­ward the WEST and could strong­ly RE­DUCE its DE­PEN­DEN­CY on Rus­sian en­er­gy and raw ma­te­ri­als supply.

Esnonia is among few countries which have overcome the consequences of the GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES rather quickly and decisively. To­geth­er with Czech Re­pub­lic, Hun­gary, Latvia and Lithuania, Po­land, Slovakia and Slo­ve­nia, Es­to­nia be­longs to the group of EastEu­ro­pe­an coun­tries which have joined­ the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion as of May, 2004. Since January 2011, it has become the 17th country – member of the Euroland (the club of countries using the EURO, which will also include Lithuania from January 2015).

It looks like ALL THREE neigh­bor­ing Bal­tic re­pub­lics (Es­to­nia, Lat­via and Lith­u­a­nia), like Russia itself, rep­re­sent an ar­ea very much suit­a­ble for FOR­EIGN IN­VEST­MENT in man­u­fac­tur­ing (as­sem­bly plants). The la­bor force is ed­u­cat­ed and skillful enough but, so far, NOT ac­cus­tomed to HIGH in­comes.

By the way, the Jap­a­nese and oth­er for­eign in­vest­ment in Es­to­nia could play a se­ri­ous pos­i­tive role in NOR­MAL­IZ­ING the sit­u­a­tion around numerous Rus­sian work­ers – in particular, by creating NEW em­ploy­ment op­por­tu­ni­ties and help­ing them to better ad­just them­selves to lo­cal so­cial and busi­ness en­vi­ron­ment.

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