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Part 1. “Economic Base of World Politics”

Top­ic 1. TWO BASIC FORMS OF ECONOMIC TIES AND SIX PREVAILING SOCIALECONOMIC MODELS

It is well known that there is a tight connection and functional interdependence be­tween eco­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment and po­lit­i­cal choic­es and ac­tions. The ec­o­nom­ic sit­u­a­tion often dic­tates a cer­tain po­lit­i­cal course and con­crete gov­ern­ment ac­tions both in domes­tic con­text and in­ter­na­tion­al­ly, i.e., in re­la­tions with oth­er coun­tries or in the framework of particular in­ter­na­tion­al or­gan­i­za­tions.

In their turn, po­lit­i­cal de­ci­sions may have strong im­pact on over­all ec­o­nom­ic sit­u­a­tion, on cer­tain ec­o­nom­ic pro­cess­es and on the so­cial stat­us of­ par­tic­u­lar groups with­in the pop­u­la­tion, as well as on in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions and in­ter­na­tion­al po­si­tion of the coun­try in ques­tion.

We must al­ways keep in mind that, to a great ex­tent, the in­ter­na­tion­al POLICY of any na­tion is an ex­pres­sion of its ECONOMIC INTERESTS. To real­ly un­der­stand the MOTIVATIONS be­hind cer­tain POLITICAL ACTIONS we need to know these in­ter­ests and to be able to rec­og­nize their base in the so­cial and ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem (or so­cial and ec­o­nom­ic MOD­EL) of this par­tic­u­lar coun­try.

* Ba­si­cal­ly, there are ONLY TWO main forms of ec­o­nom­ic ties (or two kinds of ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tion­ship) known to ec­o­nom­ic sci­ence which pre­des­tine the so­cial and ec­o­nom­ic char­ac­ter­is­tics of a coun­try. Those are:

DI­RECT ties,

IN­DI­RECT ties.

# The DI­RECT TIES are VERTICAL, more of­ten than not AD­MIN­IS­TRA­TIVE and DIS­TRI­BU­TIONorient­ed re­la­tions be­tween per­sons or ec­o­nom­ic en­ti­ties (pro­duc­tion units) based on COM­MANDS, sub­or­di­na­tion and strict dis­ci­pline.

The DI­RECT TIES pre­dom­i­nat­ing in the econ­o­my we find ei­ther:

in­ prim­i­tive so­ci­e­ty of the young pe­ri­od in the his­to­ry of man­kind with its weak pro­duc­tive forc­es and mea­ger con­sump­tion close to the sub­sis­tence lev­el

or (in quite recent times, namely throughout big stretches of the 20th century) un­der the socalled "Prac­ti­cal So­cial­ism" a so­ci­e­ty based on STATE ECON­O­MY with its strong and high­ly cen­tral­ized AD­MIN­IS­TRA­TIVE mech­a­nism of strict – though usually not quite effective – gov­ern­ment PLAN­NING and TO­TAL­I­TAR­I­AN RULE.

So, we can con­clude that a TOO WIDE use of AD­MIN­IS­TRA­TIVE (i.e., COM­MANDbased) RE­LA­TIONS is as­so­ciat­ed with in­ef­fi­cien­cy, slavela­bor con­di­tions and cry­ing pov­er­ty of the pop­u­la­tion ("The So­ci­e­ty of Pov­er­ty and Sub­mis­sion")

# The IN­DI­RECT TIES rep­re­sent HORIZONTAL, vol­un­tary (freewill), PARTNERSHIPorient­ed, CON­TRACTbased MAR­KET RELATIONS pro­vid­ing mu­tu­al in­ter­est (mu­tu­al gains), COMPROMISE and mu­tu­al COMPENSATION of the ex­pens­es (tend­ing to equiv­a­len­cy of ex­change). Usu­al­ly such re­la­tion­ship is be­ing serviced by MON­EY (one of the grounds why we call this re­la­tion­ship IN­DI­RECT).

When the econ­o­my is based most­ly on IN­DI­RECT TIES, it means that MAR­KET RE­LA­TIONS play the lead­ing role in the ec­o­nom­ic mech­a­nism of this so­ci­e­ty (na­tion, coun­try). Prac­ti­cal­ly, with this kind of ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tion­ship pre­dom­i­nat­ing, we get ei­ther the FREE MARKET ECONOMY (ex­am­ples: ad­vanced in­dus­tri­al na­tions of Eu­rope in the 19th cen­tu­ry or the USA of the 1920s) or the SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY of to­day (like Swe­den, Ger­ma­ny or Hol­land as the most col­or­ful mod­ern ex­am­ples). So, gen­er­al­ly speak­ing, IN­DI­RECT (MAR­KET) TIES breed “The So­ci­e­ty of Wel­fare and Free­dom.”

* We have to grasp the im­por­tant fact that BOTH kinds of re­la­tion­ship are rep­re­sent­ed in ANY ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem. In MAR­KET ECON­O­MY, there is enough place for DI­RECT TIES too (in the ad­min­is­tra­tive di­rec­tion of SMALL plants or firms or in the BUDGET sys­tem of the state where funds are al­lo­cat­ed by de­cree or par­lia­men­tarian de­ci­sion) but we al­ways find them in their prop­er place and NOT as a uni­ver­sal prin­ci­ple.

Ac­cord­ing­ly, IN­DI­RECT TIES (re­la­tion­ship of MAR­KET type) can be found al­so in the most cen­tral­ized and strict­ly PLANNED econ­o­mies (for ex­am­ple, in the form of per­son­al cash spend­ing of the pop­u­la­tion for goods and ser­vic­es) but in­ev­i­ta­bly in un­der­de­vel­oped, sub­or­di­nat­ed and dis­tort­ed state, pushed some­where to the out­skirts of the ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem. Par­a­dox­i­cal­ly enough, even the PRI­VATE (PER­SON­AL) CON­SUMP­TION in the for­mer So­viet Un­ion was or­ga­nized most­ly as a kind of ad­min­is­tra­tive­lyman­aged DIS­TRI­BU­TION SYS­TEM, while the nor­mal "buy­ingsell­ing" re­la­tion­ship (based on nor­mal IN­DI­RECT TIES of­ mar­ket type) was rath­er an ex­cep­tion than the rule.

Generally, as practice of the current global crisis has shown, in BAD TIMES the role of government with its regulating tools tends to grow and the scope of DIRECT TIES tends to expand. In contrast, in GOOD TIMES those are exactly INDIRECT (MARKET) TIES that tend to grow in importance and scope.

Thus, IN­DI­RECT and DI­RECT ties are bi­nary com­po­nents of any ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem. It is the PRE­DOM­I­NANCE of ONE of them that de­ter­mines (pre­des­tines) the so­cialec­o­nom­ic char­ac­ter of the so­ci­e­ty:

is it a MAR­KET ECON­O­MY and DE­MOC­RA­CY

or is it a CEN­TRAL­IZED STATE ECON­O­MY and TO­TAL­I­TAR­IANISM.

Tak­ing this in­to con­sid­er­a­tion, some au­thors have cat­e­go­rized the states of the world as:

CAP­I­TAL­IST (with ab­so­lute pre­dom­i­nance of MAR­KET re­la­tions in their ec­o­nom­ic mech­a­nism and almost none or min­i­mal STATE REG­U­LA­TION, like in Europe and the Unit­ed States about hundred years ago),

SO­CIAL­IST (with ab­so­lute heg­e­mo­ny of DI­RECT, i.e. AD­MIN­IS­TRA­TIVE, ties and STATE ECON­O­MY, like the for­mer So­viet Un­ion or to­day's North Ko­rea)

and MIXED (where ele­ments of­ BOTH mar­kettype econ­o­mic relationship between PRIVATE economic entities and of STATE ec­o­nom­ic ac­tivity can be ob­served and are kept in a cer­tain BALANCE, like in Sweden, in the Neth­er­lands, in Aus­tria, or in Ja­pan).

* How­ev­er, BOTH types of so­cialec­o­nom­ic sys­tem (i.e., COM­MAND and MAR­KET ECON­O­MY) are ca­pa­ble of­ achiev­ing their own kind of SYN­ER­GISM (es­pe­cial­ly high re­sults in cer­tain fields).

The socalled "Prac­ti­cal So­cial­ism" with its STATE own­er­ship and cen­tral­ized PLAN­NING creates good con­di­tions for the de­vel­op­ment of MIL­I­TARYIN­DUS­TRI­AL COM­PLEX (the MIC heavy, warorient­ed in­dus­try plus mil­i­tary es­tab­lish­ment), while the pro­duc­tion of­ CON­SU­MER GOODS and SER­VIC­ES is ne­glect­ed.

In con­trast to this, MARKET ECONOMY tends to pro­mote the de­vel­op­ment of the CON­SU­MERORIENT­ED in­dus­tries and the SER­VICE SEC­TOR.

This ex­plains why the RE­FORM­ING PRO­CESS in mod­ern Rus­sia has been rep­re­senting BOTH the emer­gence of a new STATE OR­DER (i.e., of­ the PAR­LIA­MEN­TAR­I­AN DE­MOC­RA­CY) and tran­si­tion to a new MOD­EL of ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment (from heavyin­dus­trybased STATE ECON­O­MY to con­su­merorient­ed MAR­KET ECON­O­MY).

The RE­FORM­ING which, in this par­tic­u­lar case, means pro­found change of SO­CIAL and EC­O­NOM­IC MOD­EL, creates a ful­ly NEW sit­u­a­tion when an ex­ist­ing so­ci­e­ty of "so­cial­ist" kind (afore­men­tioned "Prac­ti­cal So­cial­ism") gives place to a TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TY on its way to more com­mon (nor­mal) ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem based on MAR­KET ECON­O­MY and de­vel­oped DE­MOC­RA­CY (see Diagram 1.1.1 at the end of the TextBook).

* Let us com­pare some char­ac­ter­is­tics of each SO­CIAL and EC­O­NOM­IC MOD­EL the­o­ret­i­cal­ly pos­si­ble and prac­ti­cal­ly found in the mod­ern world, in­clud­ing the tran­si­tion­al ones. We shall start with "Free Mar­ket Econ­o­my" MOD­EL which his­tor­i­cal­ly creat­ed the BASE for mod­ern in­dus­tri­al and postin­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ties (we shall bet­ter un­der­stand all these terms a lit­tle lat­er).

MOD­EL 1 FREE MAR­KET ECON­O­MY (now on­ly rare­ly found in so­cialec­o­nom­ic prac­tice, most­ly as short pe­ri­ods in his­to­ry of in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries; the most strik­ing his­tor­i­cal ex­am­ple Eu­ro­pe­an and American "cap­i­tal­ism" of the 1819th cen­tu­ries, or the United States in the 1920s – 1930s):

1. In­di­vid­u­al PRI­VATE PROP­ER­TY as the base of in­de­pen­dent ec­o­nom­ic ac­tions of per­sons and firms

2. Suf­fi­cient FREE­DOM of ec­o­nom­ic ac­tions (pri­vate in­i­tia­tive) guar­an­teed by emerg­ing sys­tem of bour­geois law and or­der

3. NO sys­tem­at­ic EC­O­NOM­IC REG­U­LA­TION by the STATE (gov­ern­ment) yet, un­der­de­vel­oped sys­tem of STATE FI­NANC­ES (state bud­get), NO so­cial pro­grams

4. Grad­u­al de­vel­op­ment of DEM­O­CRAT­IC FORMS of so­cial and po­lit­i­cal life, usu­al­ly big role of AU­TO­CRAT­IC pow­er (of kings, czars, chief­tains, etc.)

5. Big dif­fer­enc­es in IN­COME, strong so­cial con­tra­dic­tions

6. Ide­ol­o­gy of the NA­TIONSTATE and ego­is­tic, of­ten EX­PAN­SION­IST for­eign pol­i­cy (in­clud­ing PROTECTIONIST meas­ures in trading pol­i­cy)

MOD­EL 2 SO­CIAL MAR­KET ECONO­MY (in­dus­tri­al and postIn­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ties of to­day and, most probably, of tomorrow):

1. Ex­pan­sion of col­lec­tive (group) form of­ PRI­VATE PROP­ER­TY based on jointstock cap­i­tal and CORPORATIZATION

2. Strong LEG­IS­LA­TIVE BASE al­low­ing enough pri­vate in­i­tia­tive and free­dom of ec­o­nom­ic ac­tion

3. High­ly de­vel­oped sys­tem of EC­O­NOM­IC REG­U­LA­TION by the STATE, strong STATE FI­NANC­ES (bud­get sys­tem), many some­times largescale and rich – SOCIAL PROGRAMS

4. De­vel­oped PAR­LIA­MEN­TAR­I­AN DE­MOC­RA­CY with some­times strong SOCIALREFORMIST ten­den­cies

5. Di­min­ish­ing dif­fer­enc­es in­ the IN­COME LEV­ELS and slack­en­ing of so­cial ten­sion, large and growing MIDDLE CLASS, firm SO­CIAL OR­DER

6. Prag­mat­ic, but con­struc­tive FOR­EIGN POL­I­CY (tol­er­ance, "liveandletlive" pol­i­cies), TRADE LIBERALIZATION pol­i­cies on the world are­na, tendency to growing COOPERATION (economic INTEGRATION) on regional basis, on the corporate level growing role of OUTSOURCING, leading to "siamization" (or “twinning”) of economies)

MOD­EL 3 "PRAC­TI­CAL SO­CIAL­ISM" (state econ­o­my and to­tal­i­tar­i­an rule):

1. STATE PROP­ER­TY in dis­guise of PUBLIC prop­er­ty, pri­vate prop­er­ty out­lawed

2. Ab­so­lute pre­dom­i­nance of AD­MIN­IS­TRA­TIVE, com­mandbased re­la­tions, sub­mis­sion and strong, semimil­i­tary dis­ci­pline

3. STATE DIS­TRI­BU­TION of re­sourc­es (fi­nan­cial, ma­te­ri­al and even hu­man), CEN­TRAL­IZED PLAN­NING of pro­duc­tion and con­sump­tion

4. TO­TAL­I­TAR­I­AN RULE, mere trac­es of de­moc­ra­cy, NO or very lit­tle re­spect for HUMAN RIGHTS, strong POWER STRUCTURE (par­ty state KGB trade un­ions)

5. Rich and in­fluen­tial "NO­MEN­CLA­TU­RA" (rul­ing class), in­comes of the work­ing pop­u­la­tion on a sub­sis­tence lev­el, SHORTAGE of every­thing in­tend­ed for the peo­ple

6. Ex­pan­sion­ist, op­pres­sive and pro­voc­a­tive FOR­EIGN POL­I­CY, low re­li­a­bil­i­ty as po­lit­i­cal part­ner for de­moc­ra­cies, many NONCON­STRUC­TIVE po­lit­i­cal ac­tions and pol­i­cies

MOD­EL 4 "POSTSO­CIAL­ISM" (a spe­cial va­rie­ty of­ TRAN­SI­TION­AL so­ci­e­ty in the state of SELFREFORMING):

1. PRIVATIZATION and CORPORATIZATION of the STATE PROP­ER­TY, de­cline in the pub­lic sec­tor, pain­ful struc­tu­ral ev­o­lu­tion

2. Sprouts of free­dom for the PRI­VATE IN­I­TIA­TIVE but lack of leg­is­la­tive GUAR­AN­TIES, lack of STA­BIL­I­TY and OR­DER

3. Dis­or­der in the DIS­TRI­BU­TION (plan­ning) SYS­TEM, and at the same time emerg­ing MARKETS and cor­re­spond­ing ec­o­nom­ic INSTRUMENTS (com­mer­cial banks, in­su­rance com­pa­nies, ad­ver­tis­ing agencies, con­sult­ing firms, etc.)

4. De­vel­op­ing but still weak PARLIAMENTARIAN DE­MOC­RA­CY, emer­gence of­ MULTIPARTY sys­tem, ten­den­cy to pres­i­den­tial rule with AU­TO­CRAT­IC (au­thor­i­tar­i­an) fla­vor, weak­ened pow­er struc­ture, strong left­ist and rightex­tre­mist move­ments, out­bursts of na­tion­al­ism and vi­o­lence

5. Grow­ing dif­fer­enc­es in IN­COMES, po­la­ri­za­tion in so­ci­e­ty ("new rich" ver­sus im­pov­er­ished ma­jor­i­ty of pop­u­la­tion), LACK of po­lit­i­cal and so­cial STA­BIL­I­TY, dan­ger of mu­ti­nies (re­volts), many po­lit­i­cal CRISES as a re­sult of sharp so­cial and in­tereth­ni­c con­tra­dic­tions

6. Gen­er­al­ly, more pos­i­tive and con­struc­tive FOR­EIGN POL­I­CY but many hes­i­ta­tions, setbacks, lack of sta­bil­i­ty and re­li­a­bil­i­ty, very of­ten PRO­TEC­TION­IST ten­den­cies in TRADE pol­i­cy

* So, these are FOUR the­o­ret­i­cal­ly de­fined mod­els of so­cial ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem, ei­ther based on pre­dom­i­nance of ONE of the TWO ma­jor forms of ec­o­nom­ic ties (re­la­tion­ships), or be­ing in a state of TRANSITION from one ba­sic mod­el to an­other.

How­ev­er, there al­so ex­ists an­other quite spe­cial group of na­tions (high­ly dif­fer­en­tiat­ed and strong in num­ber) con­sist­ing of the socalled DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES the for­mer COL­O­NIES which, as a rule, ob­tained their po­lit­i­cal in­de­pen­dence af­ter the World War II (most­ly in the 1960s). Their ec­o­nom­ic mech­a­nism is rath­er ECLECTIC and still in a state of for­ma­tion.

These young na­tions rep­re­sent still another kind of TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TIES (in contrast with the FOURTH group which we call "PostSo­cial­ism"). Their TRANSITION is one from POV­ER­TY and AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL ECON­O­MY to­ward a de­gree of WELLBE­ING and a more or less mature IN­DUS­TRI­AL SO­CI­E­TY. All of them are go­ing through IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION and are in search­ for na­tion­al iden­ti­ty and so­cial or­der.

Let us try to clas­si­fy this group on the same prin­ci­ples as be­fore.

MOD­EL 5 DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES (of­ten summedup un­der the ti­tle the "Third World"):

1. Weird com­bi­na­tion of feu­dal and mod­ern PRI­VATE PROP­ER­TY in­clud­ing dif­fer­ent kinds of "landlord­ism", NATIONAL trad­ing and in­dus­tri­al cap­i­tal and di­rect FOREGN in­vest­ment

2. Much of the FEUDAL tra­di­tions but suf­fi­cient FREE­DOM OF IN­I­TIA­TIVE

3. Strong STATE SECTOR side by side with smallscale ag­ri­cul­tu­ral and ar­ti­san pro­duc­tion, PLAN­TA­TION econ­o­my and FOR­EIGN in­dus­tri­al en­ter­pris­es

4. Most­ly AU­THOR­I­TAR­I­AN RULE, some­times of the "jun­ta"type (mil­i­tary pow­er), weak DEM­O­CRAT­IC IN­STI­TU­TIONS but with pros­pects of fur­ther de­vel­op­ment

5. Big dif­fer­enc­es in IN­COME LEV­ELS, con­sid­er­a­ble so­cial and in­tereth­ni­c ten­sion ("tri­bal­ism", etc.), but "spir­it of free­dom" and a strong feel­ing of na­tion­al cause pre­vail­ing

6. Striv­ing for EC­O­NOM­IC IN­DE­PEN­DENCE, mu­tu­al coop­er­a­tion in in­ter­na­tion­al pol­i­tics (on re­gion­al and mul­ti­lat­er­al basis), ego­is­tic (but weak) trad­ing pol­i­cy

SUBMOD­EL 6 "NEW IN­DUS­TRI­AL COUN­TRIES" (NIC, or NIE from "New­ly In­dus­tri­al­ized Econ­o­mies"):

16. HALF­WAY to the de­vel­oped mar­ket econ­o­my (some­times of NOT quite "so­cial" va­rie­ty, like Hong Kong or Mexico) but al­ready many typical fea­tures of IN­DUS­TRI­AL SO­CI­E­TY com­bin­ing ele­ments of TRADITIONAL life­style with MODERN traits and rel­a­tive­ly HIGH in­comes.

EX­AM­PLES:

FREE MAR­KET ECON­O­MY in re­al­i­ty, rath­er an ex­cep­tion, usu­al­ly ob­served in­ in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries dur­ing relatively SHORT pe­ri­ods when their MAR­KET mech­a­nisms are emerg­ing (in contrast, at least two economies those of Singapore and Hong Kong represent something close to this model for a rather LONG time already); from ad­vanced na­tions, CLOS­EST to this mod­el re­mained (at least until the GLOBAL CRISIS has begun) the Unit­ed States of Amer­i­ca with its cult of in­di­vid­u­al free­doms, strong feel­ings against "big gov­ern­ment" and the spir­it of "New Fron­tiers"

SO­CIAL MAR­KET ECON­O­MY again we must mention the U.S. (as a case with min­i­mal STATE REG­U­LA­TION); all West Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries, like Swe­den, Ger­ma­ny, Hol­land, France, Aus­tria, etc.; Can­a­da and Aus­tra­lia and, of­ course, Ja­pan (as a case with max­i­mal STATE REG­U­LA­TION and very strong CON­TROL over ec­o­nom­ic pro­cess­es)

"PRAC­TI­CAL SO­CIAL­ISM" North Ko­rea, Cu­ba, Chi­na (mainly in re­spect to INTERNAL in­dus­tri­al and ag­ri­cul­tu­ral re­gions and POLITICAL struc­ture)

"POSTSO­CIAL­ISM" Rus­sia, Ukraine, Bel­ar­us, Ar­me­nia (and oth­er Com­mon­wealth of In­de­pen­dent States CIS coun­tries, i.e., for­mer So­viet Re­pub­lics); Lith­u­a­nia, Lat­via, Es­to­nia (the so called "Bal­tic States"); Ro­ma­nia, Bul­gar­ia, Po­land, Czech Re­pub­lic and Slo­vak­ia, Hun­gary, Al­ba­nia, parts of former Yugoslavia; Mon­go­lia, Chi­na (at least, in re­spect to COASTAL re­gions with re­gime of­ free ec­o­nom­ic zones), Viet­nam (ec­o­nom­i­cal­ly much more than po­lit­i­cal­ly)

DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES ma­jor­i­ty of states in Asia, Af­ri­ca (ex­clud­ing on­ly the Re­pub­lic of South Af­ri­ca RSA ) and Lat­in Amer­i­ca

ex­cept:

NEW IN­DUS­TRI­AL COUN­TRIES (NIC) South Ko­rea, Tai­wan, Hong Kong, Sin­ga­pore (the socalled "first gen­er­a­tion" of Asian NIC, or "Four Asian Ti­gers"); Mex­i­co, Bra­zil, Ar­gen­ti­na (in Lat­in Amer­i­ca);

The "sec­ond gen­er­a­tion" of NIC (or NIE New­ly In­dus­tri­al­ized Econ­o­mies) in­cludes: In­do­ne­sia, Ma­lay­sia, Thai­land and the Phi­lip­pines (in Asia the socalled "Four Asian Drag­ons"); Chile, Co­lum­bia, maybe also Peru (in Lat­in Amer­i­ca).

* This short com­par­a­tive re­view shows the real scale of im­por­tance of the BA­SIC EC­O­NOM­IC FAC­TORS in the for­ma­tion and char­ac­ter­is­tics of so­cialpo­lit­i­cal sys­tems of so­ci­e­ties (na­tions, coun­tries) and their in­ter­na­tion­al (for­eign) pol­i­cy.

Ob­vi­ous­ly, those are the SEC­OND mod­el ("So­cial Mar­ket Econ­o­my"), the FOURTH mod­el ("PostSo­cial­ism"), the FIFTH model ("De­vel­op­ing Coun­tries"), and the SIXTH submod­el ("New In­dus­tri­al Coun­tries"), which rep­re­sent LEAD­ING TRENDS in the de­vel­op­ment of NA­TIONSTATES (na­tion­al econ­o­mies with their reg­u­la­tive mech­a­nisms and struc­tu­ral char­ac­ter­is­tics).

At the same time, the FIRST model (representing the socalled "hardheart­ed cap­i­tal­ism, in which work­ers are sac­ri­ficed at the al­tar of low­er pric­es and high­er prof­its") be­comes LESS and LESS ­pop­u­lar. And the same – only much stronger – can be said about the THIRD mod­el ("Prac­ti­cal So­cial­ism"), where ec­o­nom­ic mech­a­nism based on DI­RECT TIES cannot se­cure mod­ern life style and con­sump­tion pat­tern for the pop­u­la­tion (this mod­el is al­ready rath­er ex­tinct, and will prob­ably completely die out in the next fu­ture).

Al­so, it be­comes more and more clear that some­thing should be done with an overreg­u­lat­ed, nontrans­par­ent and bu­reau­cra­tized va­rie­ty of MAR­KET ECON­O­MY as it ex­ists in some oth­er­wise "nor­mal", and even pros­per­ous, coun­tries around the world. For ex­am­ple, in­ East Asia, Ja­pan, and South Ko­rea rep­re­sent strik­ing cas­es of OVERREG­U­LAT­ED ECON­O­MY, while In­do­ne­sia for a long time has been serving as a clas­si­cal case of the socalled "cro­ny cap­i­tal­ism" (when econ­o­my is con­trolled by a nar­row group which, in Indonesian case, was cen­tered around now former pres­i­dent Su­har­to and his fam­i­ly).

If we take Ja­pan, there a very spe­cial kind of "softheart­ed cap­i­tal­ism" ob­vi­ous­ly tends to­ pre­fer "ec­o­nom­ic se­cur­i­ty" (un­der­stood as the pres­er­va­tion of "stat­us quo" in­clud­ing its NEG­A­TIVE fea­tures, such as in­ef­fi­cient banks over­bur­dened by BAD DEBTS or a vis­i­ble SLUMP in con­su­mer de­mand) rath­er than pain­ful but heal­ing CHANG­ES which could create con­di­tions for “more jobs and growth".

A new term "THIRD WAY" has been in­vent­ed re­cent­ly to de­scribe a kind of "OP­TI­MAL MAR­KET ECON­O­MY" where there is enough FREE­DOM for pri­vate BUSI­NESS to se­cure high ec­o­nom­ic dy­nam­ics while EC­O­NOM­IC ROLE of the STATE or­gans is rath­er re­strict­ed, but civ­il­ized and clev­er. Please, com­pare this mod­ern con­cept with the "MIXED ECON­O­MY" mod­el. Pay attention to the fact that the "THIRD WAY" pol­i­cies have been first proclaimed in Europe (particularly, in Great Britain).

* It is not sur­pris­ing that in the last dec­ade of the 20th century the TEN MOST DY­NAM­IC na­tions in the world came from the SIXTH group (Asia's NIE Sin­ga­pore, Hong Kong, Tai­wan, Ma­lay­sia) and the SEC­OND group (so­cial mar­ket econ­o­mies of New Zea­land, the U.S., Lux­em­bourg, Swit­zer­land, Nor­way and Can­a­da, thus rep­re­senting all THREE ma­jor re­gions of the in­dus­tri­al world). Of­ course, be­hind their re­mark­a­ble suc­cess are very dif­fer­ent com­bi­na­tions of­ fac­tors and pol­i­cies which should be­ re­gard­ed in­di­vid­u­al­ly.

As “the rule of thumb,” we can stress that the BEST RE­SULTS are usu­al­ly achieved by coun­tries with enough EC­O­NOM­IC FREE­DOM and with ef­fec­tive, but NOT over­de­vel­oped, EC­O­NOM­IC REG­U­LA­TION by the STATE.

Since the begin of the 21st century, China, India, Brazil, as well as other BRICS countries (Russia, South Africa) have been demonstrating an enviable growth potential. It is difficult to judge, however, to what degree their not petty achievements are resulting from FACTORS which can be summed up under the concept of ECONOMIC FREEDOM.

As Thom­as Paine, English born American author, whose writings were important influences on the American Revolution, once wise­ly no­ticed, "That gov­ern­ment is best which gov­erns least."

The dy­nam­ic na­ture of Asian na­tions, since the 1990s, could be seen es­pe­cial­ly clear­ly in the field of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRADE. With their rap­id­ly grow­ing IM­PORTS which il­lus­trate the re­gion's tre­men­dous PUR­CHAS­ING PO­TEN­TIAL, de­vel­op­ing Asian coun­tries have be­come the FOURTH FO­CUS of glo­bal com­mer­cial ac­tiv­i­ty. In 1999, the MER­CHAN­DISE IM­PORTS of­ the main Asian traders (in­clud­ing "four ti­gers", "four drag­ons", Chi­na and India, but WITHOUT Japan) amount­ed to $889 bil­lion, while com­par­a­ble im­ports of the U.S. were $1.059 bil­lion (the whole NAFTA area – $1.280 billion), of­ the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion $2.232 bil­lion (of which import from countries outside the EU – about $890 billion), and of­ Ja­pan $311 bil­lion. Re­cent es­ti­mates in­di­cate that HALF of the world's 10 larg­est econ­o­mies by the year 2020 will come from East Asia.

* You might know that, since mid­sum­mer 1997, some Asian coun­tries (most of­ all, Thai­land, In­do­ne­sia, Ma­lay­sia, South Ko­rea) have been fac­ing se­ri­ous fi­nan­cial and ec­o­nom­ic dif­fi­cul­ties (the so­called "fi­nan­cial melt­down" and "ec­o­nom­ic slow­down"). By the mid­dle of 1998, these lo­cal trou­bles have over­grown in­to a REGIONAL CRISIS (i.e., the famous Asian crisis) and even threat­ened to pro­voke, in the worst case, a GLOBAL MAR­KET SLUMP. Fortunately, this threat did not materialize, and since the second half of 1999 Asian crisis generally dissolved and economic growth resumed.

* At least part­ly as a re­sult of those sad events in oth­er Asian coun­tries, al­so ECON­O­MY OF JA­PAN got in real dan­ger (first time in more than two dec­ades, ac­tu­al­ly). Af­ter about SEV­EN years (19901997) of near­ly STAG­NA­TION ("nearze­ro ec­o­nom­ic growth"), in­ 1998 1999 Ja­pan's main MAC­ROIN­DI­CA­TORS like Gross Na­tion­al Prod­uct GNP, or new in­vest­ment – have shown a DOWN­WARD trend. The head of So­ny Corp. warned that Jap­a­nese econ­o­my might be “on the verge of col­lapse". Since 2000, however, also in Japan the economic growth resumed, albeit at low rates and with danger of new relapses into stagnation and slump.

Thus, the need of REFORMING remains very TOPICAL. "The po­lit­i­cal in­er­tia and in­a­bil­i­ty of world's sec­ondlarg­est econ­o­my to re­store growth looms as the ma­jor ob­sta­cle to ec­o­nom­ic re­cov­ery in Asia," wrote Los An­geles Times on the very eve of the New Millennium celebrations.

The issue of the "Big Bang" a nickname for a deep and en­er­get­ic re­form of Ja­pan's financial and ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem in the di­rec­tion of rad­i­cal DER­E­GU­LA­TION and more OPEN­NESS of­ do­mes­tic mar­kets to for­eign busi­ness­es – looms high on the political agenda. You should know that this ambitious program of financial reforming has been initiated by the then Prime Minister Ryataro Hashimoto as early as November 1996 and is often associated with his name. It envisaged several stages and was expected (as it turned out, wrongly) to be concluded by the end of the year 2001. It is worthwhile to notice that many elements of Japan’s Big Bang, including its nickname, are based on a similar program implemented in Britain since mid1980s.

Also, at the begin of 1999, Japan’s government adopted a basic plan for reforming country’s CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY as to fit new conditions in the 21st century. Since January 2001, the number of ministries and central government agencies was reduced from 21 to 12, and the number of bureaus and secretariats – from 128 to 96. Correspondingly, the number of national government employees was to be cut by about 25 percent during 10 years.

* On the oth­er hand, at least since the Asian cri­sis, there has been a lot of­ sharp crit­i­cism di­rect­ed at the mod­ern – often dubbed “AngloSaxon” ver­sion of­ FREEMAR­KET ide­ol­o­gy. This new brand of ECONOMIC POLICY often called “NEOLIBERALISM” and characterized by a radically LIBERAL, or “laissezfaire”, approach to economic matters has been rudely im­posed on many trou­bled de­vel­op­ing coun­tries by the In­ter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund (IMF) in exchange for financial “rescue packages” aimed at stabilizing their financial situation. Pol­i­ti­cians, ec­o­nom­ic an­a­lysts, even late Pope John Paul II blamed NE­O­LIB­ER­AL­ISM for so­cial and ec­o­nom­ic PLIGHT be­fal­len many coun­tries in­ Lat­in Amer­i­ca (first of­ all, Mex­i­co), in­ South East Asia and Af­ri­ca at the end of the 20th century.

* The current GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS has brought many changes in the economic mechanisms of individual countries. As a general trend, a new turn TOWARD Keynesian recipes and AWAY from monetarist methods of state regulation can be named. The financial troubles have also put on the international agenda the necessity of further developing and improving REGIONAL and GLOBAL (multilateral) economic INSTRUMENTS and INSTITUTIONS. We shall discuss related questions in some of the following Topics of the course.

* As of late, the ECONOMIC MECHANISM of Japan, together with its MODEL of economic MANAGEMENT, has been provoking more and more theoretical and political DISPUTES. Traditionally, Japanese corporations are responsible to their STAKEHOLDERS, which include not only their owners (SHAREHOLDERS) but, most importantly, their EMPLOYEES, CUSTOMERS, SUPPLIERS, CREDITORS and the COMMUNITIES where they do their business. This system, ruling economic life first of all on the MICROLEVEL, is mainly oriented on keeping STATUS QUO, which more often than not may undermine economic DYNAMISM. However, it undoubtedly has also its strong points which have been becoming obvious under the conditions of global crisis. In contrast, the Western (predominantly, AngloSaxon) model is based on the relationship between shareholders, management and the board of directors, and emphasizes the socalled “SHAREHOLDER VALUE” as the main criterion of business success. Its advocates (who are usually also the toughest critics of Japanese management) favor the principles of modern “CORPORATE GOVERNANCE” as it is seen in the United States, in the United Kingdom, in many other places in Europe and worldwide, for example and especially, in Hong Kong and Singapore. No one knows the truth, however, at least for the time being.

Top­ic 2. IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION AND EMER­GENCE OF MOD­ERN MAR­KET ECON­O­MY

To be able to clear­ly see the mo­tives be­hind cer­tain po­lit­i­cal ac­tions and modes of prac­ti­cal po­lit­i­cal be­ha­vi­or of coun­tries with dif­fer­ent so­cialpo­lit­i­cal sys­tems we need to have pro­found un­der­stand­ing of the OR­I­GIN (gen­e­sis) and the MECH­A­NISM of their econ­o­mies.

As a mat­ter of fact, the so­cialec­o­nom­ic PRINCIPLES on which par­tic­u­lar coun­tries with their ec­o­nom­ic sys­tems and for­eign pol­i­cy are based can vary dramatically. And ma­jor role in this dif­fe­ren­ti­a­tion plays their be­long­ing or NOT be­long­ing to the fam­i­ly of­ MAR­KET ECON­O­MIES and the de­gree to which they have de­vel­oped their mar­ket re­la­tion and mas­tered the POTENTIAL of the SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR to achieve rea­son­able (and there­fore prof­it­a­ble) SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION of na­tion­al pro­duc­tion, its high EF­FI­CIEN­CY and suf­fi­cient COM­PET­I­TIVE­NESS of goods pro­duced for do­mes­tic and for­eign mar­kets.

How­ev­er, to de­vel­op a nor­mal MAR­KET SYS­TEM with enough space and free­dom for crea­tive forc­es of COMPETITION, the so­ci­e­ty must pos­sess (or­ con­scious­ly create) some nec­es­sary PRE­CON­DI­TIONS (or PRE­REQ­UI­SITES) for emer­gence and ma­tur­ing of the ex­change (market) re­la­tions.

* PRE­REQ­UI­SITES. Here are the THREE PILLARS on which any MAR­KET ECON­O­MY (or COM­MOD­I­TY ECON­O­MY, where com­mod­i­ties, or GOODS, are man­u­fac­tured NOT for the pro­duc­er's own needs, but with spe­cial aim of sell­ing them on the mar­ket) is based:

# ec­o­nom­ic ISO­LA­TION (AU­TON­O­MY, or in­de­pen­dent le­gal stat­us) of pro­duc­ers of goods and services, who are al­so their own­ers, and of oth­er economic sub­jects (trad­ers, car­riers, mon­eylend­ers, etc.)

# suf­fi­cient FREE­DOM of ac­tion for EACH of such ec­o­nom­ic sub­jects in HIS or HER (or ITS, if we speak of a firm) striv­ing to se­cure own in­ter­ests

# DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR be­tween them, i.e., a sys­tem, where eve­ry ec­o­nom­ic sub­ject "works (pro­duc­es) FOR the mar­ket" and "lives FROM the mar­ket" (that means pur­chas­es every­thing nec­es­sary for his life and busi­ness ON the mar­ket).

His­tor­i­cal ex­pe­ri­ence has shown that the FIRST CON­DI­TION is eas­i­er and full­er se­cured on the ba­sis of PRI­VATE OWN­ER­SHIP (or PRI­VATE PROP­ER­TY) re­la­tions. It is im­por­tant to no­tice that the in­sti­tute of PRI­VATE PROP­ER­TY is not so easy to create. For ex­am­ple, in­ West­ern Eu­rope it has tak­en CEN­TU­RIES (ap­prox­i­mate­ly from the 15th cen­tu­ry to­ the sec­ond half of­ the 20th cen­tu­ry) to es­tab­lish com­plete sys­tem of pri­vate own­er­ship based on a wide set of leg­is­la­tive acts to guar­an­tee and to de­fend it.

The SEC­OND CON­DI­TION comes out as cer­tain EC­O­NOM­IC LIB­ER­TIES, i.e., free­dom of COM­PET­I­TIVE BE­HA­VI­OUR, free­dom of EC­O­NOM­IC MAN­AGE­MENT aimed ex­act­ly at pro­tect­ing the in­ter­ests of a con­crete pro­duc­er or trad­er, so that he could ex­pect a rea­son­able PROF­IT (of course, if he is good at his job).

The THIRD CON­DI­TION, in its turn, is con­nect­ed with the de­vel­op­ment grade of ec­o­nom­ic SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION in the sphere of PRODUCTION, i.e., with the wid­en­ing and deep­en­ing of the SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR.

It is the ex­is­tence of these PRE­REQ­UI­SITES in a so­ci­e­ty that makes the IN­DI­RECT (MAR­KET) form of ec­o­nom­ic TIES the main, pre­dom­i­nant one. MAR­KET with its COM­PE­TI­TION pro­vides a firm ba­sis for a COM­MOD­I­TY PRO­DUC­TION (al­so called "PRO­DUC­TION OF GOODS") and be­comes the prin­ci­pal ele­ment of the EC­O­NOM­IC MECH­A­NISM of the so­ci­e­ty.

On the mar­ket, i.e., in the sphere of IN­DI­RECT, part­ner­shipbased, com­pen­sa­to­ry ties, there is much SPONTANEITY, the fac­tor of UNCERTAINTY is strong­ly felt, a clash of INTERESTS of in­di­vid­u­al ec­o­nom­ic sub­jects takes place. The au­ton­o­mous ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty and sove­reign, "ego­is­tic" be­ha­vi­or of par­tic­i­pants in MAR­KET COM­PE­TI­TION have as their side ef­fect the sat­is­fac­tion of SOCIAL REQUIREMENTS (very of­ten with­out any com­pre­hen­sion of this on the side of ec­o­nom­ic ac­tors).

There is al­so strong DIF­FE­REN­TI­ATION among the pro­duc­ers them­selves: for the most suc­cess­ful and pro­gres­sive ones mar­ket tem­po­rary se­cures their ad­van­tag­es due to INNOVATION (a kind of "tech­no­log­i­cal mon­op­o­ly"), while the weak­est, back­ward ones are mer­ci­less­ly ruined by it. Thus, SE­LECT­ION of the best pro­duc­ers takes place, hand in hand with gen­er­al STIM­U­LA­TION of sci­en­tif­ic and tech­ni­cal (tech­no­log­i­cal) achieve­ments which once again serve to meet so­cial in­ter­ests.

* MECH­A­NISM. As a sys­tem, MAR­KET rep­re­sents a cer­tain bal­ance of the TWO prin­ci­ples:

COM­PET­I­TIVE prin­ci­ple (in­de­pen­dent, spon­ta­ne­ous, ego­is­tic ac­tions),

REG­U­LA­TIVE prin­ci­ple (ele­ments of regulation, or­gan­i­za­tion, control, co­or­di­na­tion; man­i­fes­ta­tions of mon­op­o­lis­tic col­lu­sion; a kind of es­tab­lished "rules of the game") see Diagram 1.2.1 at the end of the TextBook.

On the one hand, a mul­ti­tude (big num­ber) of in­de­pen­dent COMMODITY PRODUCERS with dif­fer­ent pro­duc­tion con­di­tions, in­di­vid­u­al char­ac­ter­is­tics of their prod­ucts, dif­fer­ent re­source base etc. take part in COM­PE­TI­TION. Their COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR is char­ac­ter­ized by sove­reign, iso­lat­ed, of­ten un­co­or­di­nat­ed, but large­ly spon­ta­ne­ous ac­tions aimed at guar­an­tee­ing their own in­ter­ests. There­in lies the COM­PET­I­TIVE PRIN­CI­PLE in­her­ent in the mar­ket sys­tem.

On the oth­er hand, how­ev­er, on EACH mar­ket and for EACH con­crete type of prod­uct the SUP­PLY and DE­MAND are rep­re­sent­ed NOT by an in­fi­nite, but by quite def­i­nite and NOT nec­es­sar­i­ly large num­ber of ec­o­nom­ic sub­jects (in­di­vid­u­al persons, in­dus­tri­al and trad­ing firms). Very of­ten, with­in a lim­it­ed num­ber of SELL­ERS (and/or BUY­ERS) of some or oth­er prod­uct, there may arise an open or­ se­cret DEAL (ex­act­ly this is­ called "COL­LU­SION") on in­di­vid­u­al ques­tions of mar­ket pol­i­cy, most­ly on PRICES (those are typ­i­cal fea­tures of MON­OP­O­LIS­T be­ha­vi­or). There al­ways is a cer­tain CO­OR­DI­NA­TION of ac­tions on the mar­ket. It does NOT pre­clude COM­PE­TI­TION among SELL­ERS and BUY­ERS, but im­parts to it some ORDER, some UNIFORMITY of be­ha­vi­or.

Let us add to this that each com­mod­i­ty mar­ket is char­ac­ter­ized by a cer­tain UNIFORMITY (com­mu­ni­ty) of DEMANDS made by pur­chas­ers (con­su­mers) on a giv­en prod­uct. Each mar­ket is al­so char­ac­ter­ized by gen­er­al­ly sim­i­lar ef­fect of SEASONAL and FASHION fac­tors, by com­mon QUALITY CRITERIA re­gard­ing goods cir­cu­lat­ing on it, as well as by­ ex­ist­ing trad­ing meth­ods, typ­i­cal terms of pay­ment, etc.

So, each mar­ket has its own meas­ure of REG­U­LAT­ING and COM­PET­I­TIVE be­ha­vi­or of both sell­ers and buy­ers, i.e., its own "RULES OF THE GAME".

Like in a good soc­cer match, in a well de­vel­oped mar­ket sta­bil­i­ty of "game" qual­i­ty well agrees with the dy­na­mism and mutability of sit­u­a­tions, strict­ness of the "RULES OF THE GAME" with im­prov­i­sa­tions of "players" and un­pre­dict­a­bil­i­ty of the out­come of the con­fron­ta­tion, cer­tain har­mo­ny and aes­thet­ics with pas­sion and dra­ma.

The com­bi­na­tion and di­a­lec­tic in­ter­ac­tion of COM­PET­I­TIVE (spon­ta­ne­ous) and REG­U­LA­TIVE (or­ga­niz­ing) prin­ci­ples in­her­ent in the MAR­KET pro­duce an EFFECTIVE MECHANISM to guar­an­tee IN­DI­VID­U­AL (pri­vate), GROUP (col­lec­tive) and PUBLIC (na­tionwide) in­ter­ests.

Thus, the MAR­KET MECH­A­NISM can be char­ac­ter­ized as a sys­tem of "OR­GA­NIZED COM­PE­TI­TION"(or of “REGULATED COMPETITION”). In fact, this sys­tem (the ec­o­nom­ic mech­a­nism of a so­ci­e­ty) has a large SELFAD­JUST­MENT PO­TEN­TIAL (we can al­so name it AU­TO­MAT­ICTUN­ING QUAL­I­TY) and an in­her­ent ten­den­cy to­ward an OP­TI­MAL com­bi­na­tion of the com­pet­i­tive and reg­u­la­tive prin­ci­ples. This OP­TI­MUM (typ­i­cal for NOR­MAL mar­ket con­di­tions) can be de­fined as “MAX­I­MUM of com­pe­ti­tion with MIN­I­MUM of reg­u­la­tion (or­gan­i­za­tion, control, coordination)”.

DEPARTURES from this OP­TI­MUM bear the DANGER of great loss­es for the so­ci­e­ty. For in­stance, un­re­strained COM­PE­TI­TION cou­pled with weak­en­ing of reg­u­la­tive mech­a­nism ("rules of the game") may en­tail DESTRUCTIVE con­se­quenc­es: bank­rupt­cies, un­em­ploy­ment, fraud­u­lence (cheat­ing) and prod­uct fal­si­fi­ca­tion.

On the con­trary, EXCESSIVE OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION and hy­per­tro­phied reg­u­la­tive ten­den­cies threat­en to bring about STAG­NA­TION and DE­CAY, as well as loss of im­pe­tus for in­no­va­tions and shame­less rob­bery of con­su­mers by way of very HIGH ("ex­clu­sive") PRICES (a kind of MON­OP­O­LY sit­u­a­tion).

In to­day's ec­o­nom­ic struc­ture with strong po­si­tions of BIG PRO­DUC­ERS the pos­si­bil­i­ties for SELFAD­JUST­MENT of the mar­ket mech­a­nism are rath­er WEAK. So, "OR­GA­NIZED COM­PE­TI­TION" in its OP­TI­MAL form (as "MAX­I­MUM of com­pe­ti­tion with MIN­I­MUM of reg­u­la­tion") can on­ly be as­sured by the con­scious and re­fined use of SPE­CIAL ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies of the STATE aimed at re­stor­ing and main­tain­ing this op­ti­mum. Al­though such pol­i­cies al­so rep­re­sent a kind of STATE REG­U­LA­TION, their SPE­CIAL GOAL is to strength­en the MAR­KET FORC­ES, to give im­pe­tus to COM­PE­TI­TION and to stim­u­late SMALL and ME­DI­UMSIZE busi­ness­es (here we can men­tion such things as AN­TI­TRUST ac­tiv­i­ties and FI­NAN­CIAL SUP­PORT of in­de­pen­dent pro­duc­ers).

Ac­tu­al­ly, what we call here "OR­GA­NIZED COM­PE­TI­TION" is, in reality, FREE COM­PE­TI­TION of our day. It as­sures necessary correspondence (or ac­cor­dance) between the PRO­DUC­TION STRUC­TURE (sup­ply) and the SO­CIAL NEEDS AND WANTS (de­mand). It al­so stim­u­lates the ap­pli­ca­tion of new ma­chin­ery and new tech­nol­o­gies (in­no­va­tions), en­cour­ag­es the BEST pro­duc­ers, "pun­ish­es" the WORST and lies in wait for the SLOW­EST.

* HIS­TOR­I­CAL GEN­E­SIS. May­be it sounds un­ex­pect­ed, but ac­tu­al­ly the by far long­est part of its his­to­ry the man­kind has been living WITH­OUT MAR­KET, un­der the con­di­tions of the socalled NAT­U­RAL ECON­O­MY. It was the world of DI­RECT EC­O­NOM­IC TIES, of COLLECTIVE WORK un­der the COMMAND of tri­bal chiefs or heads of fam­i­lies, with low pro­duc­tiv­i­ty and EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION of food and all oth­er ma­te­ri­al re­sourc­es, in closed selfsuf­fi­cient com­mu­ni­ties (the socalled "AU­TAR­CHY"). There were al­most NO con­tacts with the out­side world and prac­ti­cal­ly NO op­por­tu­ni­ties for regular EX­CHANGE of goods or ser­vic­es (i.e., no IN­DI­RECT EC­O­NOM­IC TIES that serve the MAR­KET RE­LA­TIONS).

If we im­a­gine that the 1, 5 million years old man­kind is now at the end of a 1000me­ter run­ning dis­tance, it turns out that MORE than 998 me­ters of this his­tor­i­cal path it has run in the ab­sence of MAR­KET RE­LA­TIONS. And from the re­main­ing less than TWO me­ters, on­ly the last 3040 cm (about 600 years) were cov­ered un­der con­di­tions of visibly pre­vail­ing MAR­KET ECON­O­MY (i.e., with pro­duc­tion of goods most­ly for sale and a rapidly developing sys­tem of so­cial di­vi­sion of la­bor), while the IN­DUS­TRI­AL SO­CI­E­TY with de­vel­oped MOD­ERN MAR­KETS takes mere­ly about FOUR last centimeters of this im­ag­in­able dis­tance.

How­ev­er, in the pe­ri­od of the so­called "feu­dal­ism", i.e., in Mid­dle Ag­es and in the epoch of the Ren­ais­sance, MAR­KET al­ready ap­peared as a rel­a­tive­ly OMNIPRESENT (uni­ver­sal, wide­ly spread), al­though not ful­ly de­vel­oped, BASIC ELEMENT of ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial life, grad­u­al­ly pre­par­ing con­di­tions for the com­ing INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, bour­geois up­hea­vals and the spread of hired la­bor sys­tem (what is usu­al­ly summed up as "cap­i­tal­ism").

In West­ern Eu­rope of that time, typ­i­cal was a rap­id growth of cit­ies (town­ships). Those were "mi­croso­ci­e­ties" where the socalled "MONOSTRUC­TURES" pre­vailed. It means that these cit­ies lived their own life un­der the strong rule of­ lo­cal mas­ters (lords or­ princ­es) and in­ each of­ them there usu­al­ly was a pret­ty SMALL NUMBER of pro­duc­ers (sell­ers) and con­su­mers (buyers), while the va­rie­ties of prod­ucts cir­cu­lat­ing on the lo­cal mar­kets as goods (com­mod­i­ties) were not nu­mer­ous ei­ther.

There­by the SUP­PLY on­ these lo­cal mar­kets was orig­i­nal­ly RESTRICTED, nor could it great­ly ex­ceed the lim­its of­ the DE­MAND de­pend­ing on the size and in­comes of the towns­folk (lo­cal pop­u­la­tion).

We can add to this that the RUL­ERS (lords and princ­es) ex­er­cised a strong CON­TROL over the pro­duc­tion, first of all over the NUM­BER of pro­duc­ers (through the socalled "gilds"), is­su­ing spe­cial PER­MITS (li­cens­es) to open new work­shops. So, the SUP­PLY on the lo­cal mar­kets was re­strict­ed thus ar­ti­fi­cial­ly es­tab­lish­ing a kind of FEU­DAL MON­OP­O­LY. The "REG­U­LA­TIVE" forc­es on the mar­kets PREVAILED over the forc­es of COM­PE­TI­TION.

How­ev­er, the "MONOSTRUC­TURES" could NOT have lived long. The guild (work­shop) sys­tem was based on the prin­ci­pals of MANUFACTURY (i.e., on­ a pro­found and so­phis­ti­cat­ed sys­tem of TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of MAN­U­AL LABOR and its coop­er­a­tion). It brought about such a con­sid­er­a­ble GROWTH IN PRODUCTIVITY that the town boun­dar­ies be­gan to tum­ble down (to­ col­lapse) and the lo­cal prod­ucts (goods, com­mod­i­ties) start­ed to cir­cu­late in the neigh­bor­ing coun­try and in­ oth­er towns, some­times rath­er far away. The "mi­croso­ci­e­ties" opened their doors form­ing wid­er MAR­KET STRUC­TURES which em­braced sev­er­al towns, whole re­gions and even coun­tries (the emerg­ing NA­TIONSTATES).

Ac­cord­ing­ly, the for­mer "MONOSTRUC­TURES" were re­placed by new "MUL­TI STRUC­TURES", i.e., by a LARGE NUMBER of in­de­pen­dent (most­ly small) pro­duc­ers, a rel­a­tive­ly mass de­mand and rap­id growth of the num­ber of types of prod­ucts ("com­mod­i­ty no­men­cla­ture") sold on the emerg­ing na­tion­al mar­kets. Es­pe­cial­ly pros­pered in­ven­tive pro­duc­ers who in­tro­duced NEW PROD­UCTS and so en­joyed a kind of mon­op­o­lis­tic po­si­tion on the mar­kets ("mon­op­o­ly of dis­tinc­tion").

In the mar­ket mech­a­nism it­self, with feu­dal pow­er be­ing clear­ly on the de­cline, there was a sharp turn to­wards the COM­PET­I­TIVE forc­es. There arose what in the­o­ry is called AT­O­MIS­TIC STRUC­TURE of the mar­ket char­ac­ter­ized by DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION, a MULTITUDE of small pro­duc­ers, mar­ket in­sta­bil­i­ty and strong POLARIZATION (dif­fe­ren­ti­ation) of pro­duc­ers (suc­cess­ful and un­lucky, get­ting rich and close to ruin).

The ac­cel­er­at­ed de­vel­op­ment of SCI­ENCE AND TECH­NOL­O­GY laid foun­da­tion for the fu­ture IN­DUS­TRI­AL REV­O­LU­TION. Thus, NEW lines of pro­duc­tion sprang up all over, tens and hun­dreds of NEW types of prod­ucts were an­nu­al­ly de­vel­oped and tried on the mar­ket, NEW tech­nol­o­gies, tech­ni­cal im­ple­ments and or­gan­i­za­tion­al prin­ci­ples were test­ed in MAN­U­FAC­TURE PRO­DUC­TION grow­ing over in­to MA­CHINE PRO­DUC­TION (fac­to­ries and plants in­stead of old gilds and work­shops).

* Over TWO cen­tu­ries (in case of Brit­ain the "pi­o­neer" of the In­dus­tri­al Rev­o­lu­tion a whole cen­tu­ry BE­FORE oth­er Eu­ro­pe­an na­tions) at least SEV­EN rad­i­cal pro­cess­es si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly de­vel­oped in the ec­o­nom­ic sphere build­ing up the cu­mu­la­tive pro­cess of IN­DUS­TRI­AL REV­O­LU­TION:

* spread of MA­CHINE TECH­NOL­O­GIES (in­stead of MAN­U­AL WORK tech­nol­o­gies)

* crea­tion of LEG­IS­LA­TIVE BASE (sys­tem of­ law and or­der) stim­u­lat­ing growth of in­dus­tri­al MAR­KET ECON­O­MY by the new bour­geois gov­ern­ments

* tran­si­tion to the use of HIRED LA­BOUR on a mass scale

* emer­gence of COL­LEC­TIVE (group) forms of PRI­VATE PROP­ER­TY (jointstock prop­er­ty, cor­po­rat­i­za­tion)

* rap­id AC­CU­MU­LA­TION of cap­i­tal (mas­sive IN­VEST­MENT in pro­duc­tion)

* crea­tion of a mighty RAW MA­TE­RI­AL BASE for Eu­ro­pe­an in­dus­tri­al cen­ters in the CO­LO­NI­AL PE­RIPH­ERY

* es­tab­lish­ment of an IN­DUS­TRI­AL PRO­DUC­TION STRUC­TURE (in its first "rough" var­i­ant typ­i­cal for coun­tries on ear­ly stag­es of IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION)

ALL these pro­cess­es TOGETHER meant ex­act­ly IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION and rep­re­sent­ed the FIRST PHASE in the for­ma­tion of mod­ern IN­DUS­TRI­AL SO­CI­E­TIES. In con­trast to this, Carl Marx re­gard­ed these pro­cess­es as EMER­GENCE OF "CAP­I­TAL­ISM" and built up his "rev­o­lu­tion­ary ide­ol­o­gy" around this con­cept.

* In the course of in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion, the de­vel­op­ment and ap­pli­ca­tion of MA­CHINES went very UN­E­VEN (with dif­fer­ent speed). It con­cerns both SECTORS (in­di­vid­u­al in­dus­tries) and COUNTRIES, on the one side, and pro­duc­tion and mar­ket po­si­tions of in­di­vid­u­al FIRMS, on the oth­er side. Lead­ing IN­DUS­TRI­AL and TRAD­ING COM­PA­NIES be­gan to ap­pear. The CON­CEN­TRA­TION of pro­duc­tion and cap­i­tal was sup­ple­ment­ed with the CEN­TRAL­I­ZA­TION of cap­i­tal, par­tic­u­lar­ly along the lines of HOR­I­ZON­TAL IN­TE­GRA­TION through in­tra­sec­to­ral MERGERS and TAKEOVERS (now more often called "mer­gers and ac­qui­si­tions" M&A) of for­mer­ly in­de­pen­dent firms. Here, a pow­er­ful im­pe­tus was giv­en by the spread of the JOINTSTOCK form of prop­er­ty and or­gan­i­za­tion­al struc­tures of a CON­CERN type. Jointstock FINANCING be­gan to play an im­por­tant role in cap­i­tal for­ma­tion.

As a re­sult, by the end of the 19th cen­tu­ry in the Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries (in Brit­ain a hun­dred years ear­li­er), in North Amer­i­ca and Ja­pan IN­DUS­TRI­AL STRUC­TURE of pro­duc­tion came in­to be­ing and gained in strength push­ing the NONMECH­A­NIZED man­u­al la­bor to the PERIPHERY of the ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem. In each of the in­dus­tries (sec­tors) thus formed, a SMALL GROUP of pro­duc­ers took the lead­ing, even dom­i­nat­ing role en­joy­ing what ec­o­nom­ic the­o­ry calls MONOPOLIST POSITION (mon­op­o­ly).

What one could ob­serve in the be­gin­ning of the 20th cen­tu­ry was, how­ev­er, NOT "the last stage in the de­vel­op­ment of cap­i­tal­ism" (as Vlad­i­mir Le­nin re­gard­ed it). It was a pain­ful, in­ter­nal­ly con­tra­dic­to­ry, but still in­ev­i­ta­ble as the ear­ly fruit of the in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion, FIRST STAGE in the de­vel­op­ment of a NEW tech­no­log­i­cal mode of pro­duc­tion, i.e., of the MA­CHINE PRO­DUC­TION the base of the ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem of mod­ern IN­DUS­TRI­AL and POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL so­ci­e­ties.

The AT­O­MIS­TIC STRUC­TURE pre­ced­ing the in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion and based on the MAN­U­AL WORK was be­ing re­placed by a new kind of ec­o­nom­ic struc­ture, which we call "RIG­ID" MON­OP­O­LY, char­ac­ter­ized by HEGEMONY (ab­so­lute pow­er) of a couple (one two three five) of MAJOR COMPANIES in each of­ the ba­sic in­dus­tries. So, for a cer­tain pe­ri­od of­ time the REG­U­LA­TIVE PRIN­CI­PLE (in its ex­treme, MON­OP­O­LIS­T form) pre­vailed once more, while the forc­es of COM­PE­TI­TION were put down (re­strict­ed) and could NOT ful­ly ex­er­cise their fruit­ful in­flu­ence on the econ­o­my.

In the last sixseven dec­ades, how­ev­er, un­der the in­flu­ence of­ fur­ther tech­no­log­i­cal de­vel­op­ment, this "RIG­ID" MON­OP­O­LY STRUC­TURE has been losing its "ri­gid­i­ty" and trans­forming to even new­er kind of pro­duc­tion and mar­ket struc­ture to that called OL­I­GOP­O­LY. It is the stage of the MA­TURE in­dus­tri­al sys­tem char­ac­ter­ized by COEXISTENCE in eve­ry in­dus­tri­al sec­tor of BIG, ME­DI­UMSIZE and SMALL firms (pro­duc­ers and trad­ers) liv­ing in a kind of "sym­bi­o­sis", i.e., in a very com­plex re­la­tion­ship com­bin­ing ele­ments of COM­PE­TI­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION be­tween them ("liveandletlive" prin­ci­ple). By the way, the NATIONSTATES con­trib­ut­ed much to the emer­gence of the OL­I­GOP­O­LY SYS­TEM by their ANTI­TRUST LAWS and pol­i­cy of SUP­PORT­ING small busi­ness.

In a book de­scrib­ing emer­gence and growth of mod­ern to­bac­co in­dus­try in the U.S. ("Ash­es to Ash­es" by Rich­ard Klug­er) this his­tor­i­cal pro­cess of change is il­lus­trat­ed on ex­am­ple of one par­tic­u­lar in­dus­try based on ad­vanced MA­CHINE tech­nol­o­gy. In about 30 years, the at­ first splin­tered TO­BAC­CO in­dus­try made a tran­si­tion from HANDREDS of small, fam­i­lyowned con­cerns to an ABSOLUTE MONOPOLY of ONE man, James Bu­cha­nan Duke, and then to mar­ket OLIGOPOLY con­di­tions which brought about a big va­rie­ty of new to­bac­co prod­ucts thus en­hanc­ing the con­su­mers' choice.

It is worth­while to no­tice that in mod­ern times the "RIG­ID" MON­OP­O­LY con­di­tions can be found on­ly SELDOM, i.e., in rather RARE cases, as a kind of EX­CEP­TION, for a SHORT PE­RI­ODS of time and in very spe­cial cas­es (for ex­am­ple, in very NEW and TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL­LY UNIQUE in­dus­tri­al sec­tors en­joy­ing GOV­ERN­MENT AS­SIS­TANCE, like AER­O­SPACE in­dus­try, where right now the world mar­ket of com­mer­cial air­planes is dom­i­nat­ed by on­ly TWO ma­jor pro­duc­ers Amer­i­can Bo­eing, which since 1997 al­so in­cludes McDon­nell, and Eu­rope's Air­bus In­dus­trie con­sor­tium). Usu­al­ly, how­ev­er, in a couple of years the sit­u­a­tion chang­es, and the ex­traor­di­nary MON­OP­O­LY con­di­tions evolve to­ be­come sim­i­lar to that of the more "reg­u­lar" OL­I­GOP­O­LY.

In this his­tor­i­cal tran­si­tion to OL­I­GOP­O­LY, the COM­PET­I­TIVE FORCES of the mar­ket at­ last found an OP­TI­MAL BALANCE with the REG­U­LA­TIVE FORCES, and that al­lowed to ful­ly re­al­ize the PO­TEN­TIAL in­her­ent in the MECH­A­NISM of "OR­GA­NIZED COM­PE­TI­TION" typ­i­cal for so­ci­e­ties based on MAR­KET ECON­O­MY, i.e., on the prin­ci­ple "MAX­I­MUM of com­pe­ti­tion with MIN­I­MUM of reg­u­la­tion".

* In Diagram 1.2.2, you can see a draw­ing which shows a typ­i­cal way of emerg­ing and ma­tur­ing of an IN­DUS­TRY (in­dus­tri­al sec­tor) and its MAR­KET. The curve clear­ly in­di­cates the "rollback" from "RIG­ID" MON­OP­O­LY re­gime and tran­si­tion to OL­I­GOP­O­LIS­TIC STRUC­TURES, i.e., to the men­tioned "sym­bi­o­sis" of BIG, ME­DI­UMSIZE and SMALL busi­ness.

In EACH in­dus­try, on EACH sec­to­ral mar­ket a sit­u­a­tion aris­es soon­er or lat­er when the bulk of fin­ished prod­ucts comes from a RELATIVELY NARROW CIRCLE of big pro­duc­ers ca­pa­ble of strong­ly in­flu­enc­ing the mar­ket sit­u­a­tion (first of all the PRIC­ES), there­by ef­fect­ing "GROUP MON­OP­O­LY" (i.e., OL­I­GOP­O­LY). How­ev­er, their own pro­duc­tion is ef­fi­cient pre­cise­ly be­cause it is based on the prin­ci­ples of pro­found DI­VI­SION and wide COOP­ER­A­TION of re­sourc­es and la­bor in­clud­ing SUBCON­TRACTING RE­LA­TIONS with in­de­pen­dent part­ners from among small and midsize firms.

More­o­ver, a cer­tain por­tion of any sec­to­ral pro­duc­tion comes from rel­a­tive­ly SMALL out­sid­er FIRMS of­fer­ing NEW prod­ucts or us­ing NEW tech­nol­o­gies and be­ing there­fore ca­pa­ble to work at a prof­it. By the way, such firms have it rel­a­tive­ly EASY ex­act­ly be­cause of the CON­DI­TIONS on­ the sec­to­ral mar­ket creat­ed by the ol­i­gop­o­ly sup­ply which helps to keep PRIC­ES at suf­fi­cient­ly HIGH lev­el.

The last dec­ades have shown that "nar­rowed", but still quite EX­TEN­SIVE (in com­par­i­son with the "rig­id" mon­op­o­ly con­di­tions) OL­I­GOP­O­LY STRUC­TURES of sec­to­ral mar­kets pro­vide suf­fi­cient lat­i­tude (enough space) for COM­PE­TI­TION, there­by en­cour­ag­ing tech­no­log­i­cal and or­gan­i­za­tion­al IN­NO­VA­TIONS and that even more among SMALL and ME­DI­UMsize firms than among the BIGGEST.

Here lies the fun­da­men­tal dis­tinc­tion of the OL­I­GOP­O­LY and its de­ci­sive ADVANTAGE over "RIG­ID" MON­OP­O­LY, when the mar­ket has been real­ly strong­ly un­der­mined, and stag­na­tion and ruin in the vor­tex of con­tra­dic­tions have threat­ened the emerg­ing in­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ty.

The TRANSITION from "ROUGH" in­dus­tri­al struc­tures with their "RIG­ID" sec­to­ral mo­nop­o­lies to more flex­i­ble and "spa­cious" (extensive) OL­I­GOP­O­LY STRUC­TURES with enough COM­PE­TI­TION and big op­por­tu­ni­ties for tech­no­log­i­cal coop­er­a­tion among firms of dif­fer­ent siz­es start­ed in the Unit­ed States in the 1920s1930s, while in Eu­rope, in Australia and New Zealand it has dis­played it­self con­sid­er­a­bly lat­er, on­ly over the second half of the 20th century.

How­ev­er, to­day OL­I­GOP­O­LY pro­duc­tion and mar­ket STRUCTURES have be­came typ­i­cal for na­tion­al econ­o­mies of prac­ti­cal­ly ALL in­dus­tri­al coun­tries, en­cour­ag­ing com­pe­ti­tion, rap­id tech­no­log­i­cal progress and struc­tu­ral change, high ef­fi­cien­cy of pro­duc­tion, so­cial and po­lit­i­cal sta­bil­i­ty, and in­ter­na­tion­al coop­er­a­tion.

In Ja­pan, the emer­gence of mod­ern OL­I­GOP­O­LY re­la­tions de­vel­oped over a long his­tor­i­cal pe­ri­od dat­ing back to the mid­dle of the 17th cen­tu­ry when the two first zai­bat­su Mit­sui and Su­mi­to­mo came in­to be­ing. Since then, the zai­bat­su type of or­gan­i­za­tion links, now­a­days re­gard­ed as a kind of in­ter­mar­ket group, such as giant in­dus­tri­al CONGLOMERATES Mit­su­bi­shi and Mit­sui, has more and more tak­en the char­ac­ter of an OL­I­GOP­O­LY ar­range­ment. The same is val­id al­so for kei­ret­su, or a spe­cif­ic kind of in­tramar­ket group usu­al­ly formed around a SINGLE large com­pa­ny op­er­at­ing in a SINGLE mar­ket (such as Toy­o­ta in au­to­mo­biles or Mat­su­shi­ta in elec­tron­ics) which in­cludes many sub­sid­i­ar­ies and af­fil­i­ates (about both zai­bat­su and kei­ret­su we shall fur­ther speak in Top­ic 4).

* How­ev­er, aside of the BA­SIC MECH­A­NISM of MAR­KET ECON­O­MY (char­ac­ter­ized ear­li­er as effective sys­tem of "OR­GA­NIZED COM­PE­TI­TION"), we can al­so dis­tin­guish its FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURE, i.e., PRINCIPAL BUILD of a mod­ern IN­DUS­TRI­AL and POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL economy (see Diagram 1.2.3).

* FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURE. To bet­ter un­der­stand spe­cif­ic char­ac­ter of­ this struc­ture let us com­pare it with a sweet de­li­cious cake like one you may or­der in a cof­fee shop. As­ you well know, a cake of­ten con­sists of THREE dif­fer­ent layers. While EACH of these LAYERS has its spe­cial pur­pose and unique char­ac­ter­is­tics, ON­LY ALL THREE TO­GETH­ER rep­re­sent the WHOLE (i.e., a tas­ty CAKE or, for that mat­ter, an ef­fec­tive FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURE of the MAR­KET ECON­O­MY).

# At the bot­tom of the struc­ture lies the so­called MI­CROLEV­EL formed by in­de­pen­dent busi­ness ac­tiv­i­ties in pro­duc­tion, sci­ence, fi­nance, trade and ser­vic­es un­der­tak­en by IN­DE­PEN­DENT PRO­DUC­ERS (ei­ther by­ in­di­vid­u­al OWN­ERS, small and me­di­umsize FIRMS, or by big COR­PO­RA­TIONS, al­so called "CON­CERNS" a term which you will bet­ter un­der­stand af­ter Top­ic 4).

Here, at the MI­CROLEV­EL, com­mod­i­ty pro­duc­ers work DI­RECT­LY for the mar­ket, man­u­fac­tur­ing fi­nal (fin­ished) or in­ter­me­di­ate (semifab­ri­cat­ed) PROD­UCTS and ren­der­ing dif­fer­ent kind of SER­VIC­ES. While do­ing so, they strict­ly CAL­CU­LATE their ex­pens­es and fu­ture earn­ings in their striv­ing for PROF­IT. These pri­vate firms use such im­ple­ments as mod­ern AC­COUNT­ING, re­fined MAR­KET­ING and LO­GIS­TICS tech­niques to achieve HIGH EF­FI­CIEN­CY of their pro­duc­tion and suf­fi­cient COM­PET­I­TIVE­NESS of goods man­u­fac­tured by them. Their prod­ucts (ser­vic­es) may be meant ei­ther for or­di­nary COM­MER­CIAL sale (through their own stores and/or with the help of­ spe­cial­ized trad­ing com­pa­nies) or on­ a SUBCON­TRACTING ba­sis i.e., for a par­tic­u­lar pur­chas­er, most­ly on the ba­sis of longterm PRO­DUC­TION COOP­ER­A­TION re­la­tions (all this is also called SUBCONTRACTING system).

# In the lat­ter case, ac­tu­al INDEPENDENCE of pro­duc­ers is some­what LIMITED, as they find them­selves in a rath­er STRICT, tech­no­log­i­cal­ly pre­de­ter­mined SYSTEM which dic­tates the rhythm and qual­i­ta­tive char­ac­ter­is­tics of ship­ments (de­liv­er­ies). As a rule, PRIC­ES fig­ur­ing in such COOP­ER­A­TION trans­ac­tions are some­how LOW­ER than those in COM­MER­CIAL TRADE (i.e., on an "open" mar­ket). This is a kind of "pay­ment" for the op­por­tu­ni­ty to work for a GUARANTIED MARKET (i.e., a cer­tain "price" for steady part­ner­ship re­la­tions) which as­sures SALES on a longterm ba­sis.

Pre­cise­ly such stable and re­li­a­ble COOP­ER­A­TIVE TIES form the ME­SOLEV­EL (mid­dle, in­ter­me­di­ate lev­el) of the FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURE of a high­lyin­dus­tri­al­ized MAR­KET ECON­O­MY (like, in our met­a­phor, a cream fill­ing forms the me­di­um layer of a cake).

Very of­ten coop­er­a­tionbased re­la­tion­ship rests on TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of la­bor WITH­IN the pro­duc­tion com­plex of a com­pa­ny. In such cas­es, we usu­al­ly find MANY typ­i­cal ele­ments of ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION, i.e.­ of­ DI­RECT ties, es­pe­cial­ly in SMALL and ME­DI­UMSIZE firms.

As for BIG mod­ern con­cerns, WITH­IN their DE­CEN­TRAL­IZED or­gan­i­za­tion­al struc­tures the role of IN­DI­RECT ties (i.e., of MAR­KETtype re­la­tion­ship) of­ten is a ma­jor one. There, more and more typ­i­cal be­come high­ly COM­MER­CIAL­IZED re­la­tions be­tween com­pa­ny di­vi­sions which sup­ply each oth­er with their prod­ucts and ser­vic­es NOT on or­der (com­mand) but on the ba­sis of­ fi­nan­cial com­pen­sa­tion us­ing the socalled TRANS­FER PRIC­ES. In cas­es when pro­duc­tion coop­er­a­tion is­ be­ing or­ga­nized through in­vit­ing IN­DE­PEN­DENT part­ners on a CON­TRACTING ba­sis, we al­so deal with a ma­jor role of IN­DI­RECT ties, i.e., with re­la­tions of a pure­ly MAR­KET type, even if the DISCIPLINE of de­liv­er­ies in­ such part­ner­ship can be very strict (the socalled "justintime" JIT sys­tem is of­ten re­gard­ed as the high­est form of such re­la­tion­ship).

In BOTH last cas­es the COM­PET­I­TIVE forc­es re­main at ac­tive play, NOT al­low­ing the SUBCON­TRAC­TORS (DI­VI­SIONS of the same com­pa­ny or IN­DE­PEN­DENT SUP­PLI­ERS work­ing on a SUBCON­TRACTING ba­sis) to feel safe. Com­pe­ti­tion, MAR­KET mo­ti­va­tion stay in force. Pre­cise­ly that as­sures very high EF­FI­CIEN­CY of mod­ern COOP­ER­A­TION sys­tems and tech­no­log­ical PROGRESS for so­ci­e­ty as a whole.

# Fi­nal­ly, the MAC­ROLEV­EL of the mar­ket struc­ture is formed by the reg­u­la­tive ac­tiv­i­ty of the STATE, its ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy (in­clud­ing in­ter­na­tion­al, most­ly trad­ing as­pects of such pol­i­cy). We speak here of a WHOLE TOOLKIT of means and policies at­ the dis­po­sal of­ the state (gov­ern­ment) allowing it­ to ex­er­cise IN­FLU­ENCE on the mar­ket sit­u­a­tion and the con­di­tions of ec­o­nom­ic life as a whole.

Let us make spe­cial stress on­ the fact that a typ­i­cal FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURE of the mod­ern MAR­KET ECON­O­MY nec­es­sar­i­ly in­cludes many and var­i­ous ele­ments of STATE REG­U­LA­TION. For ex­am­ple, very im­por­tant among such ele­ments are those di­rect­ed at se­cur­ing the REGULAR COURSE of ec­o­nom­ic pro­cess­es, pre­vent­ing RECESSIONS (slumps) in pro­duc­tion and dan­ger­ous­ly high rate of­ UNEMPLOYMENT. Oth­ers are aimed at a cer­tain RE­DIS­TRI­BU­TION of in­come and wealth (most­ly through TAX­A­TION pol­i­cies) as to as­sist small pro­duc­ers and to sup­port eld­er­ly peo­ple, dis­abled, etc. (we shall speak of different MOD­ELS of EC­O­NOM­IC REG­U­LA­TION ex­er­cised by the STATE in the next Top­ic).

It is al­so worth­while to no­tice that now­a­days ef­fec­tive FUNC­TION­AL STRUC­TURES, in­clud­ing as nec­es­sary ele­ment dif­fer­ent tools of­ STATE REG­U­LA­TION, are emerg­ing NOT on­ly on lo­cal and NATIONAL MARKETS (i.e., WITH­IN in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries), but al­so on the scale of large REGIONAL MARKETS (like Eu­rope or North Amer­i­ca). This new trend has got a new strong impetus from the repercussions of the modern GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS a phenomenon we are observing right now.

Top­ic 3. EC­O­NOM­IC AND PO­LIT­I­CAL FEA­TURES OF IN­DUS­TRI­AL AND

POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL SO­CI­E­TIES

You al­ready know that in the sec­ond half of the 20th cen­tu­ry the pro­duc­tion and mar­ket struc­tures of OLIGOPOLY have be­come typ­i­cal for the na­tion­al econ­o­mies of prac­ti­cal­ly ALL in­dus­tri­al coun­tries. Here it is worth­while to no­tice that the cu­mu­la­tive pro­cess of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of ec­o­nom­ic life, which shall be an­a­lyzed lat­er, has given rise to a ten­den­cy to RE­CREATE such struc­tures also with­in a WID­ER in­ter­na­tion­al frame­work – on world com­mod­i­ty MARKETS, in par­tic­u­lar ec­o­nom­ic REGIONS (like Eu­rope or North Amer­i­ca), and on a GLO­BAL scale.

In the ar­ea of DE­VEL­OPED in­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ties, i.e., in West­ern Eu­rope, North Amer­i­ca, in the Pa­cif­ic ba­sin (Ja­pan, Aus­tra­lia, New Zea­land), the IN­DUS­TRI­AL MAR­KET SYS­TEM has taken fi­nal shape and reached its ma­tur­i­ty in the second half of the 20th century or, in his­tor­i­cal terms, lit­er­al­ly be­fore our eyes.

What are the MAIN COM­PO­NENTS of this sys­tem and in what DI­REC­TIONS does it con­tin­ue to de­vel­op? Let us turn to Diagram 1.3.1.

We shall be­gin with the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL BASE of to­day's in­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ty, in­clud­ing its MEANS OF PRO­DUC­TION (i.e., ma­te­ri­al fac­tors ma­chines, dif­fer­ent kind of equip­ment, etc.) and MAN­POW­ER (i.e., hu­man fac­tor).

* The prin­ci­pal spe­cif­ic fea­ture of the mod­ern SYS­TEM OF PRO­DUC­TION con­sists in MA­CHINE TECH­NOL­O­GY applied for mak­ing (man­u­fac­tur­ing) prac­ti­cal­ly every­thing, in­clud­ing MA­CHINES them­selves. We shall call this his­tor­i­cal­ly NEW phe­nom­e­non the "MA­CHINE pro­duc­tion of MA­CHINES". There­in lies the fun­da­men­tal dif­fer­ence of the IN­DUS­TRI­AL so­ci­e­ty and IN­DUS­TRI­AL pro­duc­tion from the epoch of HAND­I­CRAFT, i.e., of MAN­U­AL work and its ingenious "MAN­U­FAC­TURE" or­gan­i­za­tion.

There is a wide­spread, albeit wrong, idea that the tran­si­tion to MA­CHINE SYS­TEMS is dat­ed near­ly from the mid18th cen­tu­ry. How­ev­er, their MASS AP­PLI­CA­TION in me­chan­i­cal en­gi­neer­ing it­self (or, us­ing an­other term, in MA­CHIN­ERY in­dus­try) was first ob­served on­ly on the eve and dur­ing the World War I, i.e., in the first TWO dec­ades of the last cen­tu­ry. As­ for the Amer­i­can in­dus­tri­al boom of the 1920s (pre­ced­ing the "Great De­pres­sion" of­ the 1930s) and the World War II­, both gave a strong im­pe­tus to fur­ther spread­ing of IN­DUS­TRI­AL TECH­NOL­O­GIES and to deep RE­OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION of BIG BUSI­NESS thus high­ly ac­cel­er­at­ing the ECONOMIC DE­VEL­OP­MENT pro­cess (we shall re­turn to these ques­tions in fol­low­ing Top­ics).

Among oth­er things, this pe­ri­od brought a steep rise in the EF­FI­CIEN­CY of­ the IN­DUS­TRI­AL PRO­DUC­TION through the socalled "sci­en­tif­ic or­gan­i­za­tion" of the WORK PRO­CESS (or "Tay­lor­ism" by the name of its in­ven­tor), as well as through the use of­ CON­VEY­ER (AS­SEM­BLY LINE) as the tech­no­log­i­cal base of MASSSCALE PRO­DUC­TION (some­times al­so la­beled "Ford­ism" af­ter Hen­ry Ford I).

We can state that the first "rough" stage of IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION as a UNI­VER­SAL form of­ EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT in­ the socalled "civ­il­ized world" gen­er­al­ly end­ed by the MID­DLE of the 20th cen­tu­ry. Since then, in­ grow­ing parts of the world, this cu­mu­la­tive pro­cess of EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT is tak­ing a new form, which re­ceived the name of­ TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL REV­O­LU­TION.

Among oth­er fea­tures, it is char­ac­ter­ized by such NEW­EST TEN­DEN­CIES in the de­vel­op­ment of ma­te­ri­al and tech­ni­cal (tech­no­log­i­cal) base of mod­ern pro­duc­tion as wide ap­pli­ance of CON­TIN­U­OUS pro­cess­es ( first of­ all in­ the CHEM­I­CAL in­dus­try), AU­TO­MA­TION and RO­BOT­I­CS; a break­through is al­so tak­ing place in the sphere of BI­O­TECH­NOL­O­GIES (remember the “blackbox” principle!) and of NANOTECHNOLOGIES (based on principle of manipulating matter on an atomic and molecular scale).

So far, how­ev­er, MA­CHINE TECH­NOL­O­GIES (but no long­er al­ways ME­CHAN­I­CAL ones) still pre­vail. Of course, these tech­nol­o­gies them­selves con­tin­ue to im­prove. As PRO­GRAMcon­trolled tech­nol­o­gies, new gen­er­a­tion of AU­TO­MA­TIVE lines of pro­duc­tion and RO­BOTS (rob­o­tics) con­tin­ue to de­vel­op. The MA­CHINE as a func­tion­al sys­tem more and more of­ten in­cludes a NEW (fourth) com­po­nent: ­a CON­TROL DEVICE; tra­di­tion­al ma­chines in­clud­ed three blocs i.e., the ENGINE (mo­tor), the TRANSMISSION and the WORKING INSTRUMENT (tool) like cutter or drill, while the con­trol func­tion was per­formed by liv­ing peo­ple, i.e., by MACHINISTS (ma­chine op­er­a­tors) see Diagram 1.3.2.

* All this not on­ly rad­i­cal­ly chang­es the POSITION of MAN in the pro­duc­tion sys­tem, but al­so ad­vanc­es fun­da­men­tal­ly NEW DE­MANDS on man­pow­er it­self, i.e., brings NEW CRI­TE­RIA for as­sess­ment (eval­u­a­tion) of WORK­ING PER­SONS.

For the con­di­tions of­ the first ("rough") stage of in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion, it was the QUAL­I­FI­CA­TION of work­ers and en­gi­neers that formed the main cri­ter­i­on in as­sess­ing their QUAL­I­TIES as per­son­nel (line and staff) of the plant or the fac­to­ry i.e., as pro­duc­tion fac­tor. And QUAL­I­FI­CA­TION was (and still is) un­der­stood as their lev­el of pro­fi­cien­cy, i.e., the lev­el of pro­fes­sion­al skill of the work­ing per­sons, de­pend­ing first of all on their prac­ti­cal (pro­duc­tion) ex­pe­ri­ence.

In con­trast to that, and ac­cord­ing to mod­ern views on "HU­MAN CAP­I­TAL", it is NOT qual­i­fi­ca­tion, but the socalled COM­PLEX­I­TY of man­pow­er that serves as the base for the as­sess­ment of work­ing per­sons. The MORE com­plex the MANPOWER is, the MORE com­plex and im­por­tant the PRO­DUC­TION FUNC­TION of the work­er in­ ques­tion can be, the MORE com­plex is WORK it­self to which this per­son is fit, and the bet­ter are RE­SULTS of its ef­forts (meas­ured in PRO­DUC­TIV­I­TY, EF­FI­CIEN­CY, PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS, etc.).

These very qual­i­ties of a work­ing per­son, which can be summed up un­der the term "COM­PLEX­I­TY", de­pend on the to­tal vol­ume of ED­U­CA­TION this per­son has re­ceived FROM kin­der­gart­en, through 1112 years of or­di­nary school, and UP TO grad­u­at­ing from spe­cial in­sti­tu­tion of­ high­er learn­ing, like UNI­VER­SI­TY (pol­y­tech­nic or hu­man­i­tar­i­an) or VO­CA­TION­AL TRAIN­ING SCHOOL (TRADE SCHOOL) of some kind. In many cas­es, ed­u­ca­tion stretch­es even fur­ther – through the GRAD­U­ATE and/or POSTGRAD­U­ATE course, or the SEC­OND UNI­VER­SI­TY, or through some oth­er form of ad­di­tion­al learn­ing (what the Ger­mans call "die Wei­ter­bil­dung"). On the whole, such a mod­ern, very pro­longed ed­u­ca­tion­al pro­cess takes about 16 22 years, and more.

The mod­ern pro­duc­tion asks for high­ly ed­u­cat­ed peo­ple, with wide in­tel­lec­tu­al ho­ri­zon and deep un­der­stand­ing of his or her own place in the pro­duc­tion sys­tem. They should be ca­pa­ble of eval­u­at­ing the aris­ing SITUATIONS and available INFORMATION (in­clud­ing EC­O­LOG­I­CAL implications which are gain­ing new im­por­tance) and of tak­ing RESPONSIBILITY as well as farreaching op­er­a­tion­al DECISIONS quick­ly and cor­rect­ly.

If we are to speak of the very lat­est ten­den­cies in the de­vel­op­ment of la­bor force (man­pow­er), then the MAIN of them is, to all ap­pear­ance, the grow­ing sphere of MEN­TAL (in­tel­lec­tu­al) work, its sat­u­ra­tion (fill­ing) with CREA­TIVE ele­ments. Now, MAIN FIG­URES (or func­tion­al roles) in ANY pro­duc­tion sys­tem are CON­STRUC­TORS and DE­SIGN­ERS, COM­PUT­ER PRO­GRAM­MERS and SOFT­WARE CON­SUL­TANTS, TECH­NOL­O­GISTS and IN­STALL­ERS (ad­just­ers) of com­plex, most­ly au­to­mat­ic equip­ment and NOT tra­di­tion­al pro­duc­tion ENGINEERS or skil­ful MACHINE OPERATORS any more.

By the way, it chang­es the ec­o­nom­ic sit­u­a­tion in the so­ci­e­ty MUCH MORE than the naked eye can see. For in­stance, it brings about NEW fea­tures in the for­ma­tion of PRIC­ES be­cause of VERY SPE­CIAL char­ac­ter of LA­BOR en­gaged in the sci­ence and re­search ac­tiv­i­ties. The mat­ter is that com­pos­ite MEN­TAL work CANNOT be re­duced to sim­ple (phys­i­cal) work and eval­u­at­ed in terms of WORK­ING HOURS.

Now­a­days, it is gen­er­al­ly RECEARCH & DEVELOPMENT (R&D) that log­i­cal­ly finds it­self in the CEN­TER of the in­te­grat­ed sys­tem of "sci­ence pro­duc­tion sales ef­fort". It is NOT mere chance that PRO­DUC­TION is of­ten char­ac­ter­ized as "tech­no­log­i­cal shops of sci­ence". Ac­cord­ing­ly, research and development work with its CREA­TIVE PRIN­CI­PLE looms ev­er larg­er in the ag­gre­gate vol­ume of la­bor guar­an­tee­ing vi­tal func­tions of the so­ci­e­ty.

We should spe­cial­ly stress the im­por­tance of the de­ci­sive shift in the MAC­RO­EC­O­NOM­IC struc­ture (i.e., GNP struc­ture) of ad­vanced coun­tries away from MA­TE­RI­AL PRO­DUC­TION (ag­ri­cul­ture, min­ing, man­u­fac­tur­ing, etc.) to­ward NONMA­TE­RI­AL PRO­DUC­TION (some­times even called "SPIR­I­TU­AL" PRO­DUC­TION, be­cause it in­cludes such ele­ments as sci­ence, ed­u­ca­tion and arts) and SER­VICE SEC­TOR. It­ is ex­act­ly this deep struc­tu­ral shift that gives us the right to speak of the grad­u­al tran­si­tion of in­di­vid­u­al STATES and whole WORLD RE­GIONS to a NEW stage of de­vel­op­ment, thus be­com­ing what is usu­al­ly called POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL SO­CI­E­TY. In modern economic literature these and some oth­er NEW fea­tures of MOD­ERN ECON­O­MY are sometimes de­scribed as its extreme "weight­less­ness".

* The MODERN sys­tem of EC­O­NOM­IC RE­LA­TIONS with in­sti­tutes and in­stru­ments in­her­ent in it which serves the needs of SO­CIAL PRO­DUC­TION al­so sub­stan­tial­ly dif­fers from the "Cap­i­tal­ism" (i.e., "rough", un­reg­u­lat­ed va­rie­ty of mar­ket econ­o­my) of the 19th and even the ear­ly 20th cen­tu­ry.

Here, the emer­gence of the THREE new phe­nom­e­na of ec­o­nom­ic life, form­ing what we call the "MAG­I­CAL TRI­AN­GLE", are of vi­tal im­por­tance. These phe­nom­e­na are: "JOINTSTOCK prop­er­ty (cap­i­tal) MAN­AG­ERS MAR­KET­ING".

≠ It all start­ed ap­prox­i­mate­ly in­ the mid­dle of­ the 19th cen­tu­ry with the most rev­o­lu­tion­ary change in the ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem rep­re­sent­ed by the con­sol­i­da­tion and wide ap­pli­ca­tion of JOINTSTOCK form of cap­i­tal (while the first "soapbub­ble" va­rie­ty of COR­PO­RAT­I­ZA­TION has been de­scribed by­ Ad­am Smith a hun­dred years ear­li­er). It rad­i­cal­ly helped over­come the fi­nan­cial lim­i­ta­tions of IN­DI­VID­U­AL prop­er­ty, thus open­ing NEW VISTAS for na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic growth on a large scale. It al­so creat­ed a UNI­VER­SAL mech­a­nism of CAPITAL MOVEMENT in­clud­ing its flow BE­YOND the na­tion­al boun­dar­ies. In this way a foun­da­tion was laid for IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of cap­i­tal and pro­duc­tion it­self.

At the be­gin­ning of the 20th cen­tu­ry, the wide spread of "CAR­TELS" (re­sult­ing from mon­op­o­list COLLUSION in the sphere of TRADE), and of ­"TRUSTS" (re­sult­ing from the HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION of cap­i­tal through MER­GERS and TAKEOVERS of in­di­vid­u­al­ly owned pri­vate firms) had led to "rig­id" sec­to­ral MONOPOLIES. In oth­er words, im­me­di­ate­ly af­ter a "rough" in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion, CAR­TELS and TRUSTS rep­re­sent­ed typ­i­cal or­gan­i­za­tion form of BIG BUSI­NESS in in­di­vid­u­al INDUSTRIES (iron and steel, tex­tile, food and bev­er­ag­es, ship­build­ing, etc.) and ec­o­nom­ic SECTORS (like re­tail trade or bank­ing).

How­ev­er, af­ter the World War II, both these forms of mon­op­o­list or­gan­i­za­tion have given way to a NEW phe­nom­e­non the uni­ver­sal spread and pre­dom­i­nance of the socalled "CON­CERNS" , i.e., of or­gan­i­za­tion sys­tems based on FI­NAN­CIAL CON­TROL se­cured through JOINTSTOCK CAP­I­TAL mech­a­nism.

Ac­cord­ing­ly, as a typ­i­cal MOD­ERN or­gan­i­za­tion form of big in­dus­tri­al com­plex we shall men­tion the MUL­TI­SEC­TORIAL CON­CERN (or CORPORATION) as a rule, with ver­ti­cal­ly in­te­grat­ed and di­ver­si­fied pro­duc­tion based on pro­found func­tion­al (tech­no­log­i­cal) IN­TRA­FIRM di­vi­sion of la­bor (as­pects which we shall dis­cuss in the next Top­ic).

In the last sev­er­al years (ap­prox­i­mate­ly, from 1996) we ob­serve a re­new­al of hor­i­zon­tal in­te­gra­tion pro­cess­es (MER­GERS and TAKEOVERS, now­a­days more of­ten called MER­GERS and AC­QUI­SI­TIONS – M&A). How­ev­er, this time such M&A are un­fold­ing on a HIGH­ER lev­el, i.e. among the biggest COR­PO­RA­TIONS, or­ga­nized as MUL­TI­SEC­TO­RAL CON­CERNS men­tioned above, which are do­ing busi­ness in the MOST MOD­ERN ver­ti­cal­ly in­te­grat­ed in­dus­tries (like car­making, aer­o­space or­ elec­tron­ics). So, now­a­days as nev­er be­fore, the JOINTSTOCK form of prop­er­ty (share cap­i­tal, equity capital) shows its use­ful­ness and ad­van­tag­es fullscale. For ex­am­ple, the fa­mous Daim­ler Chrys­ler deal (one of­ the first grandscale IN­TER­NA­TION­AL M&A when the lead­ing Ger­man car­mak­er ac­quired con­trol over the thirdinsize Amer­i­can au­to­mo­tive com­pa­ny for $41 bil­lion) could nev­er have tak­en place with­out such tools as JOINTSTOCK CAP­I­TAL (materialized in shares) and the STOCK MAR­KET (or­ the socalled stock ex­change) where such shares can be sold and bought.

The mass tran­si­tion to JOINTSTOCK prop­er­ty and its far reach­ing DE­MOC­RAT­IZA­TION by the "dif­fu­sion of shares" in the so­ci­e­ty could not but ef­fect the deeproot­ed prin­ci­ples of the HIRED LA­BOR sys­tem. The COL­LEC­TI­VIST (group) prin­ci­ples of prop­er­ty and of the pro­duc­tion sys­tem as a whole grew in strength. The CON­TRA­DIC­TIONS be­tween wage la­bor (em­ploy­ees) and cap­i­tal (em­ploy­ers) lost their acute­ness. Fa­vor­a­ble con­di­tions arose for a better com­bi­na­tion of PRI­VATE (in­di­vid­u­al), COL­LEC­TIVE (group) and COM­MON (na­tion­al) in­ter­ests.

≠ It was jointstock prop­er­ty that placed mod­ern MAN­AG­ERS, i.e., hired PRO­FES­SION­ALS with a spe­cial train­ing and pro­found knowl­edge of their busi­ness, on top of big in­dus­tri­al and marketing com­plex­es. This not on­ly raised the COM­PE­TENCE and QUAL­I­TY of man­age­ment, but al­so creat­ed a cer­tain "buf­fer" be­tween own­ers and hired per­son­nel, be­tween BIG share­hold­ers and a mass of OR­DI­NARY hold­ers. MAN­AG­ERS as TOP PEO­PLE in mod­ern busi­ness form the sec­ond side of the aforementioned "MAG­I­CAL TRI­AN­GLE"

≠ And what is the main tool, the ba­sic prin­ci­ple of man­age­ment at the dis­po­sal of mod­ern MAN­AG­ER? It is ex­act­ly MAR­KET­ING the third side ­ of this very TRI­AN­GLE.

If we try to de­fine MAR­KET­ING in the most gen­er­al terms it is the "mar­ketorient­ed con­cept of man­age­ment". And a more so­phis­ti­cat­ed and sub­stan­tial def­i­ni­tion could sound like this: "MAR­KET­ING is a mar­ket re­searchbased con­cept of man­age­ment aimed at a max­i­mum vol­ume of sales and a suf­fi­cient prof­it through serv­ing con­su­mers TO THE BEST of the firm's abil­i­ties".

It means that of par­a­mount im­por­tance here is the RE­SEARCH EF­FORT di­rect­ed at find­ing a good MAR­KET RE­CESS ("NICHE") and at crea­tion of such a PROD­UCT (com­mod­i­ty) for the SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION of the firm that would make pos­si­ble a stable and ev­er wid­er SELL­ING of it (the prod­uct) in the do­mes­tic and for­eign mar­kets, thus yield­ing suf­fi­cient­ly HIGH RETURNS on the firm's in­vest­ed cap­i­tal.

It is on­ly with the aid of SCI­ENCE, of­ RESEARCH and DEVELOPMENT (R&D) that ad­vanced firms are capable to ar­range busi­ness ac­cord­ing to re­sults of their MAR­KET SUR­VEYS.

MAN­AG­ERS study every­thing nec­es­sary for tak­ing com­pe­tent DECISIONS, i.e., all the as­pects of the MAR­KET sit­u­a­tion and trends of its de­vel­op­ment in­clud­ing:

ten­den­cies in the ev­o­lu­tion of the PROD­UCT it­self, its va­rie­ties and var­i­ants of use (PROD­UCT DIF­FE­REN­TI­A­TION),

the dy­nam­ics and struc­ture of SALES, their anal­y­sis and fore­casts for in­di­vid­u­al types of prod­ucts and groups of pur­chas­ers (MAR­KET SEG­MEN­TA­TION),

iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of the CIR­CLE OF CON­SU­MERS to whom the cho­sen va­rie­ty of­ PROD­UCT would be of­fered (PRO­DUC­TION PRO­FILE and MAR­KET NICHE),

the meth­ods of AD­VER­TIS­ING and PRO­MO­TION for the in­di­vid­u­al prod­ucts (MARKETING MIX).

They al­so study pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing ex­pe­ri­ence of COM­PET­I­TORS, as well as their INTENTIONS – so as to de­lim­it (to separate) the spheres of ac­tion with them as EAR­LY and as FAR as pos­si­ble, thus re­duc­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty of CLASHING with them at the fi­nal stage of the SALES EF­FORT (i.e., on the MAR­KET it­self).

How­ev­er, such are on­ly the prin­ci­pal com­po­nents of MAR­KET­ING RE­SEARCH. There is al­so BA­SIC (fun­da­men­tal) and AP­PLIED sci­ence, firms are en­gaged in re­search and de­vel­op­ment of a pure­ly TECH­NI­CAL and TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL na­ture, and that is where the cen­ter (core) of re­search and de­vel­op­ment ac­tiv­i­ty in the firm (i.e., of its R&D sys­tem) is com­mon­ly found.

MAR­KET­ING an­swers the ques­tion as to WHAT is to be pro­duced and FOR WHOM, where­as an an­swer to the ques­tion as to HOW it can be practically done (i.e., exactly HOW to as­sure LOW unit costs and HIGH qual­i­ty) should be giv­en by oth­er parts of the firm's R&D.

* How­ev­er, now­a­days in se­cur­ing a SO­CIAL­LY VAL­U­ABLE pro­duc­tion struc­ture and pre­vent­ing re­ces­sions or stag­na­tion of its vol­ume in in­di­vid­u­al sec­tors and in the framework of the na­tion­al econ­o­my as a whole, the role of the STATE and of its REG­U­LA­TIVE AC­TIV­I­TY gets a par­a­mount im­por­tance.

There are nu­mer­ous MOD­ELS of mod­ern ec­o­nom­ic reg­u­la­tion ex­e­cut­ed by the STATE through its spe­cial OR­GANS (bod­ies), which can be sum­mar­ized in­to THREE main groups:

# KEY­NE­SIAN ap­proach (named af­ter the wellknown Brit­ish econ­o­mist of the 1930s John May­nard Keynes) with fol­low­ing main spe­cif­ic fea­tures:

pre­dom­i­nant­ly DI­RECT in­flu­ence on the econ­o­my, first of all – through an ac­tive TAX­A­TION pol­i­cy and mas­sive gov­ern­ment SPEND­ING in times of re­ces­sion,

con­sid­er­a­ble STATE SEC­TOR in in­dus­try and util­i­ties,

rel­a­tive­ly big STATE BUD­GET with rich so­cial pro­grams, tol­er­ance in re­gard to bud­get DEF­I­CITS (com­mon use of the socalled def­i­cit fi­nanc­ing),

main at­ten­tion to the DE­MAND side of the econ­o­my and tools aimed at stim­u­lat­ing the AG­GRE­GATE DE­MAND, es­pe­cial­ly in the pe­ri­ods of pro­duc­tion slumps (re­ces­sions) the socalled "DE­MANDSIDE EC­O­NOM­ICS" ap­proach,

ma­jor SO­CIAL GOALS of Key­ne­sian meth­ods of ec­o­nom­ic reg­u­la­tion "full em­ploy­ment", stable and ad­e­quate in­vest­ment pro­cess and in­dus­tri­al growth, bring­ing some ele­ments of "so­cial jus­tice" to the ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem (like American President L. B. John­son tried to do with his con­cept of "Great So­ci­e­ty").

# MON­E­TAR­IST ap­proach (de­vel­oped most­ly in­ the 19601970s by the socalled "Chi­ca­go School of Ec­o­nom­ics" head­ed by Mil­ton Fried­man) with fol­low­ing typ­i­cal fea­tures:

MINIMAL in­ter­fer­ence in­to ECON­O­MY based most­ly on IN­DI­RECT meth­ods, while the MAIN STRESS is be­ing made on reg­u­lat­ing the MON­EY SUP­PLY – the ma­jor idea of the MON­E­TAR­IST POL­I­CY,

min­i­mal STATE SEC­TOR, as much as pos­si­ble of FREE MAR­KET ECON­O­MY con­di­tions,

gen­er­al­ly LOW TAX­ES, NOT big and strict­ly bal­anced BUD­GET, NO­ or­ very mod­est SO­CIAL PRO­GRAMS.

many ide­as of the GOP (the Re­pub­li­can par­ty) in the U.S. con­cern­ing its fight against "BIG GOV­ERN­MENT" and for "TAX CUTS" and "BAL­ANCED BUD­GET" are tak­en from the MON­E­TAR­IST ar­sen­al.

# NE­O­CON­SER­VA­TIVE ap­proach (de­vel­oped in the 1980s in the U.S. in form of the socalled "RE­AG­A­NOM­ICS", in Great Brit­ain un­der M. Thatch­er, in France un­der F. Mit­ter­rand and in Chile un­der Gen­er­al Pi­no­chet). It is char­ac­ter­ized by a cer­tain SYN­THE­SIS of the first two ap­proach­es, but main­ly on the base of the SECOND one, i.e., closer to the MON­E­TAR­ISM. It in­cludes:

most­ly IN­DI­RECT in­flu­ence on the econ­o­my through reg­u­lat­ing of the MON­EY SUP­PLY and the BANK RATES,

RE­PRI­VAT­I­ZA­TION of all in­ef­fi­cient com­po­nents of the STATE SEC­TOR, i.e., its "stream­lin­ing,"

gen­er­al­ly LOW TAX­ES and gov­ern­ment SPEND­ING, bal­anced BUD­GET, as few as pos­si­ble SO­CIAL PRO­GRAMS (com­po­nents of the "SMALL GOV­ERN­MENT" pol­i­cies).

main in­ter­est to the SUP­PLY side of the econ­o­my and tools aimed at in­flu­enc­ing PRO­DUC­TION con­di­tions – the socalled "SUP­PLYSIDE EC­O­NOM­ICS" ap­proach recom­mend­ed by some influential modern economists.

* There is a kind of general CONSENSUS in mod­ern po­lit­i­cal world con­cern­ing STATE REG­U­LA­TION in prin­ci­ple. It rep­re­sents some­thing like this:

"Gov­ern­ment pol­i­cy can di­rect a coun­try's econ­o­my in ways the mar­ket alone could not. Still, INDIRECT ways and means of in­flu­enc­ing ec­o­nom­ic pro­cess­es are pref­er­able over the DIRECT ones, and there should be as LITTLE state in­ter­fer­ence as pos­si­ble. Too much gov­ern­ment or mis­guid­ed gov­ern­ment can sub­vert ec­o­nom­ic growth.”

Typically, prac­tice shows that na­tions with FREER econ­o­my grow FAST­ER than STRICTLY REGULATED (Russia and Japan undoubtedly belong to the LATTER group; both are in bad­ly need of further DER­E­GU­LA­TION).

How­ev­er, NATIONAL SYSTEMS of ec­o­nom­ic reg­u­la­tion which we can ob­serve in in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries are very DIVERSE both in their meth­ods and ef­fi­cien­cy. For ex­am­ple, there are many STRONG as well as WEAK points char­ac­ter­iz­ing Amer­i­can gov­ern­ment pol­i­cies in com­par­i­son with those of Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries and the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion as a whole (or with Ja­pan, for that mat­ter). Thus, ac­tive JOB CREA­TION mech­a­nism and high IN­VEST­MENT EF­FI­CIEN­CY are but TWO of sev­er­al AD­VAN­TAG­ES the Unit­ed States en­joys thanks to its very spe­cif­ic EC­O­NOM­IC SYS­TEM based rath­er on "free­doms to fail and to get rich" than on the ef­forts by the state (fed­er­al gov­ern­ment) to prescribe and in­flu­ence the WAY busi­ness is done.

The above traditional attitudes toward GOVERNMENT and its REGULATIVE functions have, however, undergone profound and variable changes in the course and as a result of the modern FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS. In America, in Europe, in Australia and in Latin America new interest in government INSTITUTIONS and POLICIES can be observed. High on the agenda of such multilateral political and economic organizations as the UN, WTO, IMF and the World Bank figure new topics like the necessity of more strict and effective INTERNATIONAL REGULATION in such fields as CREDIT and FOREIGN INVESTMENT, as movement of HOT MONEY, and the like.

* The next im­por­tant fea­ture in the ev­o­lu­tion of the EC­O­NOM­IC RE­LA­TIONS of the mod­ern in­dus­tri­al and postin­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ties is a wide spread­ing of SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION of pro­duc­tion.

Thus, char­ac­ter­is­tic for the mod­ern ec­o­nom­ic relations is a very HIGH grade of SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION which pro­vides for MASSSCALE pro­duc­tion and LOW pro­duc­tion COSTS.

Typ­i­cal is al­so pre­dom­i­nance in mod­ern in­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ty of very COM­PLEX and SO­PHIS­TI­CAT­ED prod­ucts as­sem­bled from tens, hun­dreds and even thou­sands of in­di­vid­u­al PARTS (com­po­nents) which ne­ces­si­tates strict CO­OR­DI­NA­TION of ef­forts of many pro­duc­ers and their steady COOP­ER­A­TION, more of­ten than not on a longterm CON­TRACTING (SUBCONTRACTING) ba­sis. Thus, the pro­duc­tion of such COM­PLEX (com­pos­ite) goods is most­ly ar­ranged in form of long tech­no­log­i­cal CHAINS (or tech­no­log­i­cal NET­WORKS) typ­i­cal­ly in­volv­ing par­tic­i­pa­tion of many DI­VI­SIONS of the same com­pa­ny (the IN­TRA­FIRM coop­er­a­tion with the use of TRANS­FER PRIC­ES) and/or of in­de­pen­dent part­ners ("out­sid­ers") on the SUBCON­TRACTING ba­sis. Here, the OL­I­GOP­O­LY struc­ture of pro­duc­tion and mar­kets clear­ly shows its great po­ten­tial.

* Spe­cial­i­za­tion and coop­er­a­tion of pro­duc­tion, emer­gence on this ba­sis of tech­no­log­i­cal chains and net­works – all this asks for ef­fi­cient USE of re­sourc­es and their time­ly and ac­cu­rate TRANS­FER from link to link. The TIES be­tween in­di­vid­u­al links be­come high­ly COM­MER­CIAL­IZED (i.e., they most­ly are of the IN­DI­RECT type). Such ties pre­sup­pose largescale TRADE (or, at least, QUA­SITRADE) al­so WITHIN a cor­po­ra­tion, i.e., MAR­KET EX­CHANGE of dif­fer­ent re­sourc­es (raw ma­te­ri­als, in­ter­me­di­ary prod­ucts, components and re­lat­ed ser­vic­es) between its individual parts (links). And all this rais­es the im­por­tance of AC­COUNT­ING and CON­TROL­LING, of all sorts of CAL­CU­LA­TIONS, as a rule in MONEY terms (in other words, of calculations using the MON­EY units, very often the U.S. dollars).

So, MON­EY it­self chang­es its na­ture, serv­ing with­in such tech­no­log­i­cal CHAINS first of all NOT as an ex­pres­sion of VAL­UE, but rath­er as a TOOL of CAL­CU­LA­TIONS. We can clear­ly no­tice that a quite NEW func­tion of MON­EY is thus emerg­ing, i.e., the AC­COUNT­ING func­tion. That's why we can say about mod­ern MON­EY that it has be­come, to a sub­stan­tial de­gree, "MON­EY OF AC­COUNT­ING" (or we can say "AC­COUNT­ING MON­EY", "CAL­CU­LA­TION MON­EY").

With the de­vel­op­ment of mod­ern pro­duc­tion which brings about strong ten­den­cies to­ward DE­CEN­TRAL­IZA­TION and COMMERCIALIZATION of IN­TRA­FIRM STRUCTURES (i.e., of functional and organizational in­tracor­po­ra­te systems), as well as toward ever wider use of the CON­TRACT re­la­tions of all kinds, the ROLE of such "ac­count­ing mon­ey" is vis­i­bly grow­ing.

At the same time, the role of CRED­IT and of all sorts of NEW­EST cred­it fa­cil­i­ties is al­so in­creas­ing, as well as that of "elec­tron­ic mon­ey" (i.e., of­ MON­EY form­ing the de­pos­its of mod­ern banks and used in many eve­ry­day trans­ac­tions in­side COM­PU­TER­IZED sys­tems). And, of course, fur­ther rev­o­lu­tion­ary chang­es are be­ing brought by a rap­id de­vel­op­ment of the socalled "ON­LINE SHOP­PING" (i.e., of "ECOM­MERCE" and/or “EBUSINESS”) – in other words, by ev­er wid­er use of the INTERNET to sat­is­fy con­su­mer de­mand DI­RECT­LY, avoid­ing tra­di­tion­al RE­TAIL channels and fa­cil­i­ties.

* Fi­nal­ly, the en­tire ec­o­nom­ic sys­tem of the in­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ty is great­ly in­flu­enced by the mas­sive pro­cess of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of practically all sides of ec­o­nom­ic life. In this, MAJOR ROLE is being played by the ex­pan­sion of the sphere of DIRECTLY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION of the socalled TRANS­NA­TION­AL COR­PO­RA­TIONS (TNC) the sub­ject we shall an­a­lyze in de­tail in the fol­low­ing two Top­ics.

* As for the PO­LIT­I­CAL SYS­TEM of the in­dus­tri­al and postin­dus­tri­al so­ci­e­ties, here we can stress the im­por­tance of the PAR­LIA­MEN­TAR­I­AN FORM of DE­MOC­RA­CY typ­i­cal for them and already bear­ing quite UNI­VER­SAL char­ac­ter. A de­vel­oped PAR­LIA­MEN­TAR­I­AN SYS­TEM based on the principle of the DIVISION OF POWER be­tween LEG­IS­LA­TIVE, EX­EC­U­TIVE and JU­DI­CIAL or­gans is a source of sta­bil­i­ty and so­cial progress.

Af­ter more than half a cen­tu­ry of in­sta­bil­i­ty, af­ter two WORLD WARS and a long pe­ri­od of TOTALITARIAN RULE in a big num­ber of coun­tries in prac­ti­cal­ly all parts of the world, the ma­jor­i­ty of­ mod­ern civ­il­ized so­ci­e­ties have cho­sen DE­MOC­RA­CY and have been de­vel­op­ing their own kind of PAR­LIA­MEN­TAR­I­AN SYS­TEM (very of­ten us­ing as MOD­ELS the Amer­i­can or Brit­ish ex­pe­ri­ence).

Now­a­days, many TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TIES, in­clud­ing a num­ber of "POSTSO­CIAL­IST" coun­tries and a big part of the DE­VEL­OP­ING WORLD, are al­so go­ing the way of par­lia­men­tarian de­moc­ra­cy. Still, the ROAD TO DEMOCRACY of­ten turns out to be LONG and full of OBSTACLES. Thus, in Asia, the CONCEPTS gov­ern­ing the pub­lic ap­proach to DE­MOC­RA­CY it­self and to HU­MAN RIGHTS is­sues in par­tic­u­lar are very SPECIFIC. One example represents the concept of the socalled “Asian values” (allegedly in contrast with “Western values”), which are deeproot­ed in Con­fu­cian tra­di­tion and formed un­der strong in­flu­ence of oth­er cul­tu­ral and po­lit­i­cal ele­ments of Asian na­tions' his­tor­i­cal her­i­tage. This is true not on­ly in re­gard to Chi­na, but to some Asian noncom­mu­nist coun­tries as well (from the Phi­lip­pines, South Ko­rea and Tai­wan to Ja­pan itself).

As for West­ern de­moc­ra­cies, it­ should be stressed that in many cas­es we can clear­ly see in their gov­ern­ment (state) ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy ele­ments of the socalled "SO­CIAL RE­FORM­ISM", i.e., of­ striv­ing to a cer­tain har­mon­i­za­tion of in­ter­ests in the so­ci­e­ty and to­ NATIONAL ACCORD (Swe­den, Can­a­da, Ger­ma­ny, the Neth­er­lands, some oth­ers). Us­ing very fa­mous words, one could say that in a num­ber of rath­er ad­vanced coun­tries the 20th cen­tu­ry has af­firmed it­self as "a cen­tu­ry of the so­cialdem­o­crat­ic con­sen­sus".

At the same time, it is worth­while to no­tice that prac­ti­cal­ly eve­ry­where in the de­vel­oped world so­cial­lyorient­ed gov­ern­ment pol­i­cies are be­ing im­ple­ment­ed on the back­ground of a wide and in­fluen­tial PO­LIT­I­CAL MOVE­MENT against "BIG GOV­ERN­MENT", against too much WEL­FARE (es­pe­cial­ly for IM­MI­GRANTS), and in fa­vor of a strict­ly BAL­ANCED STATE BUD­GET.

Top­ic 4. TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR AND ITS EC­O­NOM­IC AND PO­LIT­I­CAL CON­SE­QUENC­ES

As we al­ready know, SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR forms the or­gan­ic ba­sis of the MAR­KET ECON­O­MY and serves as one of ma­jor PRE­REQ­UI­SITES of its de­vel­op­ment in in­di­vid­u­al na­tionstates and on in­ter­na­tion­al scale.

We shall spe­cial­ly de­vote next Top­ic to mod­ern is­sues of INTERNATIONALIZATION of ec­o­nom­ic life and to the main fea­tures of mod­ern world econ­o­my as the GLOBAL SYSTEM of ec­o­nom­ic in­ter­ac­tion and in­ter­de­pen­dence of­ states and na­tions. How­ev­er, it is worth­while to stress the vi­tal and uni­ver­sal in­flu­ence of the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION pro­cess­es on the SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR both on the na­tion­al and on­ the glo­bal (worldwide) scale as ear­ly as pos­si­ble, i.e., right now, when our at­ten­tion is turned to the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL as­pects of mod­ern ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment and its so­cial and po­lit­i­cal con­se­quenc­es.

* Ba­si­cal­ly, there ex­ist TWO main forms of the SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR (both in "closed" na­tion­al econ­o­mies and on "open" world mar­kets) which are func­tion­al­ly in­ter­con­nect­ed with TWO different forms of the SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION OF PRO­DUC­TION:

COM­MER­CIAL (or COM­MERCEbased) di­vi­sion of la­bor, and

TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of la­bor.

#COM­MER­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF­ LA­BOR. For cen­tu­ries, the socalled OB­JECTbased (PROD­UCTbased) SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION rep­re­sents such a pro­file of pro­duc­tion which is re­strict­ed to the out­put of cer­tain GOODS (COM­MOD­I­TIES) in­tend­ed for sales on an OPEN mar­ket and based on a COM­PLETE tech­no­log­i­cal sys­tem ar­ranged WITH­IN the pro­duc­ing com­pa­ny. It was es­pe­cial­ly typ­i­cal at an EAR­LY stage of IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION and gave rise to rap­id de­vel­op­ment of COM­MER­CIAL trade, both on do­mes­tic and in­ter­na­tion­al scale, in the 18th and 19th cen­tu­ries, as well as in the first half of the 20th cen­tu­ry.

So, it is ex­act­ly the OB­JECTbased SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION that breeds COM­MER­CIAL TRADE with its clas­si­cal and high­ly tra­di­tion­al model of the SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR (to put it brief­ly: in­di­vid­u­al pro­duc­ers man­u­fac­ture their goods from start to fin­ish and of­fer them on an open mar­ket at home or abroad)

#TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR. How­ev­er, there are al­so OTH­ER forms of SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION OF PRO­DUC­TION.

1. One of them is the so­called PIECEbased (DE­TAILbased) SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION when in­di­vid­u­al pro­duc­tion units (plants, fac­to­ries) man­u­fac­ture cer­tain DETAILS (blocs, knots) for use as COMPONENTS on the as­sem­bly lines of OTH­ER firms manufacturing COM­POSITE GOODS. In­ their turn, these mod­ern sophisticated FIN­ISHED GOODS can be de­signed for use in­ dif­fer­ent SEC­TORS OF ECON­O­MY as their MEANS OF PRO­DUC­TION (com­posite IN­VEST­MENT goods – like com­plete ma­chines, ma­chine sys­tems, and spe­cial­ized equip­ment). Or they can be­ of­fered on CON­SU­MER MAR­KETS – com­posite DUR­A­BLE goods, like mo­tor cars or­ boats, in­clud­ing mod­ern house­hold ap­pli­anc­es (like wash­ing ma­chines or re­frig­er­a­tors), and spe­cial­ized de­vic­es (like TV sets, tapere­cord­ers or PCs).

2. Please, notice that very close to this is also OP­ER­A­TIONbased SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION when an in­di­vid­u­al pro­duc­er (an in­de­pen­dent firm or pro­duc­tion di­vi­sion WITH­IN a bigger com­pa­ny) takes over a cer­tain FUNCTION (stage, link) of the ex­ist­ing TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL pro­cess and per­forms this par­tic­u­lar OP­ER­A­TION in strict COORDINATION with other tech­no­log­i­cal links with­in the over­all pro­duc­tion sys­tem. Usu­al­ly, such func­tion is ex­e­cut­ed on a CON­TRACTING (or­ SUB­CON­TRACTING) ba­sis. The pro­duc­er in ques­tion re­ceives its raw ma­te­ri­als (in­ter­me­di­ary prod­ucts and components) from the PRE­VI­OUS link of the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAIN, per­forms the pro­duc­tion OP­ER­A­TION which it has cho­sen for its spe­cial­i­za­tion, and sup­plies with the emerg­ing high­ergrade prod­uct the NEXT stage (link) in the in­te­grat­ed pro­duc­tion sys­tem. Ex­am­ples of such op­er­a­tionbased spe­cial­i­za­tion can be found in many in­dus­tries, such as pro­duc­tion of met­als, wood pro­cess­ing, pulpandpaper in­dus­try, chem­i­cal in­dus­try, tex­tile in­dus­try, etc.

Both these kinds of spe­cial­i­za­tion fore­see STEADY and LONGTERM char­ac­ter of re­la­tions be­tween pro­duc­ers form­ing the tech­no­log­i­cal (pro­duc­tion) chain. Now­a­days, such CON­TRACTING (SUB­CON­TRACTING) re­la­tions more and more of­ten are called "OUT­SOURC­ING” be­cause the firm gets many COM­PO­NENTS (pro­duc­tion fac­tors) nec­es­sary for ar­rang­ing its pro­duc­tion pro­cess from OUT­SIDE SOURC­ES. Usu­al­ly, re­la­tions of­ this long­stand­ing type se­cure STRICT DIS­CI­PLINE of de­liv­ery (sup­ply), on the one hand, and FIXED fi­nan­cial and oth­er TERMS of such de­liv­ery (first of all PRIC­ES and TERMS of PAY­MENT), on the oth­er hand.

Of course, long­stand­ing CON­TRACT re­la­tions based on OUT­SOURC­ING vis­i­bly DIFFER from com­mon COM­MER­CIAL TRADE when a firm "works" for an OPEN mar­ket (i.e., for an UN­KNOWN cus­tom­er) and re­ceives PRIC­ES it could man­age to get in the course of mar­ket com­pe­ti­tion.

So, a spe­cial kind of SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR emerg­es which is based on TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL ties and is marked by some pe­cu­liar fea­tures. It is this spe­cial kind of so­cial di­vi­sion of la­bor that we call TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of la­bor breed­ing a new va­rie­ty of mar­ket re­la­tions and grow­ing in im­por­tance through­out the 20th cen­tu­ry.

On this HIGH stage of de­vel­op­ment of mod­ern in­dus­tri­al pro­duc­tion, re­la­tions of PRO­DUC­TION SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION over­grow IN­TO re­la­tions of PRO­DUC­TION COOP­ER­A­TION by far more strong­ly than ev­er be­fore.

* It is com­mon knowl­edge that mod­ern econ­o­my is char­ac­ter­ized ex­act­ly by such stable, longterm, tech­no­log­i­cal­ly con­di­tioned and or­gan­i­za­tion­al­ly se­cured rela­tions of SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION. Over the past few dec­ades, PIECE and OP­ER­A­TIONbased SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION fore­see­ing close COOP­ER­A­TION with­in the in­dus­tri­al struc­ture has ad­vanced to the fore­front of ec­o­nom­ic pro­cess­es.

In the PRE­IN­DUS­TRI­AL so­ci­e­ty with its MAN­U­FAC­TURE pro­duc­tion, the TECH­NOLOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of la­bor reached a kind of per­fec­tion. It was achieved through the use of the socalled HET­ER­OG­E­NOUS and OR­GAN­IC MAN­U­FAC­TURE prin­ci­ples (please, re­mem­ber ex­am­ples with or­gan­i­za­tion of MAN­U­AL pro­duc­tion of CLOCKS and CAR­RIAG­ES, on the one hand, and SEW­ING NEE­DLES, on the oth­er). How­ev­er, this con­sid­er­a­ble his­tor­i­cal progress took place

on a MAN­U­ALLA­BOR ba­sis (or­ we can al­so say on­ a HAND­WORK ba­sis), and

as­ IN­TER­NAL di­vi­sion of la­bor i.e., with­in in­di­vid­u­al WORK­SHOPS (pro­duc­tion units) on­ly.

Now­a­days, prin­ci­ples of­ TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR have NOT on­ly ex­ceed­ed (over­grown) the lim­its of iso­lat­ed PRODUCTION ENTITIES (units), i.e., the lim­its of work­shops, fac­to­ries, or pro­duc­tion com­plex­es of in­di­vid­u­al com­pa­nies. More, they free­ly reach across STATE BOR­DERS, stretch­ing over oceans and seas, bind­ing to­geth­er pro­duc­ers in dif­fer­ent coun­tries as LINKS with­in pro­longed in­ter­na­tion­al PRO­DUC­TION CHAINS.

Analyzing different aspects of TECHNOLOGICAL DIVISION OF LABOR, we use several new TERMS which you should well know. Among them stand out:

SUBCONTRACTING (describing the basic organizational principle and the character of relationship between individual LINKS of the technological CHAINS and NETWORKS),

OUTSOURCING (in regard to MATERIAL ELEMENTS – components, subassemblies, etc.) and OUTCONTRACTING (in regard to necessary SERVICES – like logistics, advertising and promotion, etc.),

SUPPLY CHAIN (describing the DESIGN, SCHEME or SHAPE of the technological process), and finally –

OFFSHORING (with a stress on the fact that the OUTSOURCING relations have INTERNATIONAL (TRANSBORDER) character.

* The fact that the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR has over­stepped the bounds of the firms, in­dus­tries and na­tion­al econ­o­mies is seen in emer­gence of giant in­ter­na­tion­al sci­encebased pro­duc­tion and mar­keting COM­PLEX­ES. These are ar­ranged as long and ram­i­fied tech­no­log­i­cal CHAINS (or NET­WORKS) with their LINKS in dif­fer­ent coun­tries and even on dif­fer­ent con­ti­nents.

First of all, we have in mind the socalled TRANS­NA­TION­AL COR­PO­RA­TIONS (TNC) with head­quar­ters in North Amer­i­ca, Eu­rope, Ja­pan and Aus­tra­lia that serve as a ce­ment­ing prin­ci­ple and or­gan­i­za­tion­al form of such in­ter­na­tion­al (re­gion­al and glo­bal) sys­tems of pro­duc­tion SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION.

Gen­er­al­ly, a TNC is a NA­TION­AL com­pa­ny ac­cord­ing to CAP­I­TAL it rep­re­sents (for ex­am­ple, Amer­i­can, Dutch or Jap­a­nese), which has OVER­STEPPED its na­tion­al boun­dar­ies and is act­ing on a REGIONAL and/or GLOBAL scale, bind­ing to­geth­er many pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing LINKS placed in dif­fer­ent coun­tries in­to a wellco­or­di­nat­ed CHAIN (over­all sys­tem, or network) of sup­ply, man­u­fac­tur­ing and sales.

In this man­ner, IN­TER­NA­TION­AL lines of pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing net­works come in­to be­ing, based on ad­e­quate or­gan­i­za­tion­al prin­ci­ples. Thus, a NEW va­rie­ty of pro­duc­tion emerg­es which we can call "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION". Its PROD­UCTS, aimed at IN­TER­NA­TION­AL MAR­KETS, al­so are quite dif­fer­ent in­ their es­sence from tra­di­tion­al ex­portorient­ed na­tion­al prod­ucts of the pre­vi­ous pe­ri­od. These are al­so "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PROD­UCTS" con­tain­ing parts (com­po­nents) with or­i­gin in dif­fer­ent coun­tries. It is on­ly con­di­tion­al­ly (i.e., with many res­er­va­tions) that they could be la­beled as "Made in U.S.A." or "Made in Ja­pan". Ac­tu­al­ly it would be more cor­rect to la­bel them "Made by IBM" or "Made by Mit­su­bi­shi". By the way, you can find such kind of la­beling prod­ucts ev­er more of­ten now­a­days.

For ex­am­ple, with­in its re­gion­al au­to­mo­bile pro­duc­tion sys­tem, Mit­su­bi­shi us­es ex­change of trans­mis­sions made in its plant in the Phi­lip­pines for en­gine parts and bump­ers made in Thai­land. En­gines made in Aus­tra­lia are ex­port­ed to Ja­pan, and car doors made in Ma­lay­sia are shipped to Thai­land.

Sim­i­lar ge­o­graph­i­cal­ly dis­persed pro­duc­tion sys­tem has al­so been creat­ed dec­ades ago by Ford Mo­tor (Eu­rope) for man­u­fac­tur­ing its wellknown Ford Es­cort mod­el.

Or­, still an­other ex­am­ple: man­u­fac­tur­ing lo­ca­tions, mar­ket­ing head­quar­ters and dis­tri­bu­tion cen­ters of the fa­mous North Amer­i­can heavyequip­ment man­u­fac­tur­er Cat­er­pil­lar can be found on ALL con­ti­nents and form WORLD­WIDE pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing NET­WORK.

* The emer­gence of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION, con­nect­ed with TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR, i.e., with re­la­tions of PIECEbased and OP­ER­A­TIONbased SPE­CIAL­I­SA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION of pro­duc­tion (la­bor), opened an era of OL­I­GOP­O­LY mar­ket struc­tures on a GLOBAL scale. Not on­ly with­in na­tion­al boun­dar­ies OL­I­GOP­O­LY serves now as the ma­jor form of pro­duc­tion and mar­ket or­gan­i­za­tion bring­ing about fruit­ful sym­bi­o­sis of BIG, ME­DI­UMSCALE and SMALL busi­ness. Eve­ry mod­ern TNC has de­vel­oped a ram­i­fied (widespread) NET­WORK of SUBCON­TRACTING re­la­tions with hun­dreds and thou­sands of small­er pro­duc­ers around the world. This means and ex­plains the ab­so­lute pre­dom­i­nance of OL­I­GOP­O­LY STRUC­TURES in all ma­jor sec­tors of the world econ­o­my, first of all in in­dus­try and ser­vic­es.

* It should be men­tioned that in their clas­si­cal ver­sion SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION were con­nect­ed and de­vel­oped si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly with VER­TI­CAL IN­TE­GRA­TION, thus ser­vic­ing the func­tion­al TIEUP (in­te­gra­tion) of the CON­SEC­U­TIVE STAG­ES (links) of the tech­no­log­i­cal (pro­duc­tion) pro­cess. Gen­er­al­ly, it was a ques­tion of creat­ing an IN­TE­GRAT­ED pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing sys­tem with­in a MUL­TI­SEC­TO­RAL CON­CERN, thus bind­ing to­geth­er the func­tions of its in­di­vid­u­al links act­ing in dif­fer­ent IN­DUS­TRIES and SEC­TORS of econ­o­my (and very of­ten in dif­fer­ent COUN­TRIES, for that mat­ter).

How­ev­er, let us first re­turn to HOR­I­ZON­TAL IN­TE­GRA­TION men­tioned in­ Top­ics 2 and 3. This term de­scribes the pro­cess­es of­ CEN­TRAL­I­ZA­TION (re­or­gan­i­za­tion) of CAP­I­TAL with­in a cer­tain IN­DUS­TRI­AL SEC­TOR through MER­GERS of in­di­vid­u­al firms and their TAKEOVERS (al­so called "AC­QUI­SI­TIONS") by big pro­duc­ers (mo­nop­o­lies) lead­ers of the in­dus­try in ques­tion. His­tor­i­cal­ly, HOR­I­ZON­TAL IN­TE­GRA­TION with its mer­gerandac­qui­si­tion mech­a­nism (of­ten ab­bre­vi­ated as "M&A"­) gave birth to TRUSTS a typ­i­cal or­gan­i­za­tion­al form of "rig­id" mo­nop­o­lies in­ IN­DI­VID­U­AL in­dus­tri­al sec­tors on ear­ly stag­es of IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION.

In con­trast to this, VER­TI­CAL in­te­gra­tion is de­vel­op­ing on an IN­TER­SEC­TO­RAL ba­sis, i.e., se­cures tech­no­log­i­cal ties be­tween pro­duc­tion units be­long­ing to DIF­FER­ENT in­dus­tries with­in in­di­vid­u­al BIG COM­PA­NIES (TNC, ar­ranged as mul­ti­sec­to­ral in­ter­na­tion­al CON­CERNS). This form of busi­ness or­gan­i­za­tion is based on JOINTSTOCK prop­er­ty re­la­tions and on the mech­a­nism of FI­NAN­CIAL CON­TROL over in­di­vid­u­al ele­ments which make up the sys­tem (this lat­ter in­cludes the socalled "MOTH­ER" com­pa­ny hold­ing the con­trol pack­age, the "DAUGH­TER" com­pa­nies, the "GRAND­CHIL­DREN" com­pa­nies, etc.).

* An im­por­tant NEW fea­ture char­ac­ter­iz­es fur­ther de­vel­op­ment of­ VER­TI­CAL IN­TE­GRA­TION of in­dus­tri­al pro­duc­tion: its DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION, which leads to emer­gence of ev­er more COM­PLEX pro­duc­tion struc­tures and to grow­ing va­rie­ty of OUT­PUT of such in­dus­tri­al com­plex­es.

One and the same big com­pa­ny can pro­duce, for in­stance, so­phis­ti­cat­ed mil­i­tary equip­ment (or­dered by the min­is­try of de­fense), pre­ci­sion au­to­mat­ic ma­chine tools (for use by oth­er in­dus­tri­al firms) and, let us say, trad­ing equip­ment (for use in de­part­ment stores) and house­hold ap­pli­anc­es (for in­di­vid­u­al con­su­mers). Or as an­other ex­am­ple: the pro­duc­tion of tanks for the ar­my and heavy trucks (trail­ers, lor­ries) for trans­por­ta­tion com­pa­nies can be com­bined with the out­put of small gar­den trac­tors or light air­planes for in­di­vid­u­al fam­i­lies. Or: a com­pa­ny pro­duc­es sawn lum­ber and wood com­po­nents for use in the con­struc­tion in­dus­try, and at the same time man­u­fac­tures fur­ni­ture and many kinds of pulpandpaper prod­ucts (like news­print, tis­sue paper, card­board).

It is worth­while to no­tice that the prod­uct DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION can be ef­fect­ed for dif­fer­ent rea­sons. Let us name THREE of them:

# a va­rie­ty of goods can be ob­tained by pro­cess­ing one and the same in­i­tial RAW MA­TE­RI­AL in a com­plex way (fer­rous met­als, al­u­minum, wood, as­bes­tos, etc.),

# there are firms orient­ed on fullscale ser­vic­ing of a def­i­nite type and cir­cle of PUR­CHAS­ERS (for ex­am­ple, FARMERS need har­vest­er com­bines and trac­tors, sub­sid­i­ary equip­ment to use on them, min­er­al fer­til­iz­ers and oth­er chem­i­cals, high qual­i­ty grain as seeds, ped­i­gree cat­tle, fod­der, milk­ing ma­chines, wind driv­en elec­tric­i­ty gen­er­a­tors, and what not),

# DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION can al­so be based on TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL SIM­I­LAR­I­TY of dif­fer­ent lines of pro­duc­tion which, in par­tic­u­lar, makes pos­si­ble to in­stall ELEC­TRON­IC CON­TROL over them us­ing ONE com­plex elec­tron­ic net­work (for in­stance, over the pro­duc­tion of many kinds of plas­tics and ar­ti­cles made from them).

Thus, we have named THREE sourc­es of business di­ver­si­fi­ca­tion:

# com­mon RAW MA­TE­RI­AL BASE for in­te­grat­ed and di­ver­si­fied pro­duc­tion,

# com­mon MAR­KET BASE for ar­rang­ing com­plex ser­vic­ing of a cer­tain type and cir­cle of PUR­CHAS­ERS (i.e., buy­ers, us­ers, con­su­mers)

# com­mon TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL BASE for achiev­ing high grade of pro­duc­tion co­or­di­na­tion through use of elec­tron­ic de­vic­es.

* TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAINS aris­ing in the course of VER­TI­CAL IN­TE­GRA­TION and sub­se­quent DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION of pro­duc­tion may wide­ly dif­fer in form (for some ex­am­ples see Diagram 1.4.1).

Of course, those are very sim­pli­fied cas­es which suit on­ly to il­lus­trate the PRIN­CI­PAL BUILD of mul­ti­sec­to­ral pro­duc­tion sys­tems. In real life, there are very so­phis­ti­cat­ed and re­fined pro­duc­tion struc­tures in­clud­ing VER­TI­CAL, HOR­I­ZON­TAL and DI­AG­O­NAL ele­ments and di­rec­tions of in­flu­ence (see Diagram 1.4.2).

As­ a good ex­am­ple can serve "PES­IC" sys­tems used by the wellknown Jap­a­nese "su­per­firm" Om­ron Cor­po­ra­tion in its di­ver­si­fied pro­duc­tion of mod­ern elec­tron­ic meas­ur­ing and con­trol­ling equip­ment (PES­IC means: Pro­ject Ele­ments Ser­vice In­for­ma­tion Con­struc­tion). Such sys­tems are used both in the sphere of BUSINESS MAN­AGE­MENT and in the sphere of R&D.

Thus, CORPORATE MAN­AGE­MENT (“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE” in American parlance) is high­ly de­cen­tral­ized and in­cludes:

# VERTICAL elements formed by DIVISIONS for manufacturing individual groups of prod­ucts, in­clud­ing the very new­est (sen­sors, re­lays, con­trol de­vic­es, etc.). Such DI­VI­SIONS are, in fact, act­ing as in­di­vid­u­al ME­DI­UMSIZE FIRMS (Kaz­u­ma Ta­tei­shi, the founder of Om­ron Cor­po­ra­tion: "Fi­nan­cial anx­ie­ties help teach­ing peo­ple, thus form­ing good em­ploy­ees").

# HOR­I­ZON­TAL ele­ments formed by different SERVICES within the OVERALL corporation structure (administration, R&D, marketing, accounting, production, sales, logistics, overseas operations, etc) which serve the needs of individual divisions.

# DI­AG­O­NAL ele­ments formed by spe­cial­ized FI­NANCE and PER­SON­NEL ser­vic­es and the sys­tems of STRA­TE­GIC PLAN­NING and IN­FOR­MA­TION which ser­vice BOTH the di­vi­sions and the com­pa­ny as a whole.

The deeppro­filed com­pa­ny of to­day is some­times called HO­LON­IC com­pa­ny stressing the idea of UNI­TY be­tween its PARTS ("on") and the OVERALL STRUCTURE (from "ho­los" mean­ing "whole", "uni­ver­sal"). It is aimed at achiev­ing HAR­MO­NY be­tween the COMPONENTS of the sys­tem and the SYSTEM as such.

By the way, MUL­TI­PO­LAR di­ver­si­fi­ca­tion and HO­LON­IC in­te­gra­tion have been re­gard­ed as the TWO most im­por­tant ten­den­cies of the 1990s in the field of BUSI­NESS OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION.

The FIRST of­ them means that the com­pa­ny cen­ters its busi­ness ac­tiv­i­ty around sev­er­al def­i­nite DI­REC­TIONS (i.e., around sev­er­al ba­sic IN­DUS­TRI­AL SEC­TORS, or­ oth­er SPHERES of­ econ­o­my), while the SEC­OND stress­es the need of­ CO­OR­DI­NA­TION and a cer­tain BAL­ANCE be­tween such in­di­vid­u­al spheres of com­pan­y's busi­ness ac­tiv­i­ty .

Both ten­den­cies mir­ror the fact that mod­ern BIG BUSI­NESS ev­er more of­ten dis­pers­es its ac­tiv­i­ties among many di­rect­ly (tech­no­log­i­cal­ly) un­re­lat­ed spheres thus tak­ing form of MUL­TI­SEC­TO­RAL CON­CERN (of­ten al­so known un­der the name "CON­GLOM­ER­ATE") kept to­geth­er (in­te­grat­ed) most­ly by the widespread sys­tem of FI­NAN­CIAL CON­TROL through SHARE­HOLD­ING (see Diagram 1.4.3).

Such or­gan­i­za­tion­al struc­tures are al­so called "flat­ter hier­ar­chi­es" where rath­er few MAN­AG­ERS with big op­er­a­tion­al AU­THOR­I­TY are in charge of many PEO­PLE work­ing in sev­er­al TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL SYS­TEMS with­in the COR­PO­RA­TION (CON­CERN). And the prin­ci­ple of OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE of DI­VI­SIONS, when each of them is act­ing in a man­ner of a ME­DI­UMSIZE FIRM do­ing its own busi­ness, re­ceived pic­tu­resque de­scrip­tion as "SticktoYourKnit­ting" prin­ci­ple.

*Both "CON­GLOM­ER­A­TION", as well as tech­no­log­i­cal di­vi­sion of la­bor based on VER­TI­CAL IN­TE­GRA­TION and DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION, be­come AN­TI­PODES (en­e­mies) of strict­ly CEN­TRAL­IZED or­gan­i­za­tion­al struc­tures. So, a strong ten­den­cy to­wards DE­CEN­TRAL­IZA­TION and great­er op­er­a­tion­al IN­DE­PEN­DENCE of in­di­vid­u­al pro­duc­tion di­vi­sions and oth­er ele­ments of the cor­po­ra­tion sys­tem is grow­ing. Ac­cord­ing­ly, a new par­al­lel ten­den­cy aris­es to COM­MER­CIAL­IZE the IN­TRA­FIRM turn­o­ver (i.e., re­la­tions be­tween au­ton­o­mous ele­ments of the sys­tem).

This ten­den­cy of COM­MER­CIAL­I­ZA­TION is now trace­a­ble not on­ly in the re­la­tions BETWEEN in­di­vid­u­al DIVISIONS of MUL­TI­SEC­TO­RAL CON­CERNS, but al­so deep­er – WITHIN such DIVISIONS, ­i.e., between their func­tion­al LINKS. Those links be­long­ing to the INNER STRUCTURE of the con­cern are, as a rule, forced to­ CO­EX­IST (and some­times – to COM­PETE) with in­de­pen­dent firms, al­so "builtin" in­to con­crete TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAIN ar­ranged by the con­cern through SUBCONTRACTING relations.

* All in all, THREE im­por­tant new ten­den­cies ex­ist and in­ter­act and all THREE are con­nect­ed with the deep­en­ing TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR, i.e., with spread­ing re­la­tions of SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION, and with VER­TI­CAL IN­TE­GRA­TION and DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION pro­cess­es.

# One of the tendencies is ex­pressed in DE­CEN­TRAL­IZA­TION of the cor­po­ra­tion struc­tures, i.e., their "CON­GLOM­ER­A­TION" with grow­ing au­ton­o­my of pro­duc­tion DI­VI­SIONS (the spread of "flat­ter hier­ar­chi­es" men­tioned above).

# The sec­ond ten­den­cy pro­vides for COM­MER­CIAL­I­ZA­TION of re­la­tions be­tween DI­VI­SIONS with­in the COM­PA­NY (cor­po­ra­tion, con­cern) and be­tween par­tic­u­lar ELE­MENTS (tech­no­log­i­cal links, ser­vic­es) with­in DI­VI­SIONS.

Ac­cord­ing­ly, the sphere of DI­RECT (ad­min­is­tra­tive) TIES and DIS­TRIB­U­TIVE re­la­tions tends to shrink, the FREEOFCHARGE (gra­tui­tous) TRANS­FER of re­sourc­es DECLINES, while the role of IN­DI­RECT TIES and COM­PEN­SA­TIONbased re­la­tions is GROWING.

MAR­KET with its ca­pac­i­ty for COM­PE­TI­TION in­sis­tent­ly as­serts it­self and pen­e­trates deep in­to cor­po­ra­te struc­tures.

# The third ten­den­cy is ex­pressed in grow­ing scale of stable longterm re­la­tions based on SUB­CON­TRACT­ING of IN­DE­PEN­DENT PRO­DUC­ERS from out­side own pro­duc­tion sys­tem of the CON­CERN (cor­po­ra­tion). This is clas­si­cal OUT­SOURC­ING, we can say. Such mod­ern TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL COOP­ER­A­TION, as a rule, fore­sees the use of SUBCON­TRAC­TORS on a per­ma­nent ba­sis.

Ser­vic­ing the de­vel­op­ment of COOP­ER­A­TION in the na­tion­al econ­o­my and on in­ter­na­tion­al scale, SUBCON­TRACTING im­parts more and more ele­ments of OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION to the com­mod­i­ty ex­change (trade). At the same time, how­ev­er, such SUBCON­TRACTING re­la­tions are COM­MER­CIAL (com­pen­sa­tionbased) by their na­ture and do NOT in­ter­fere with suc­cess­ful func­tion­ing of the MAR­KET mech­a­nism.

* In­ter­na­tion­al busi­ness ac­tiv­i­ty of LEAD­ING IN­DUS­TRI­AL CON­CERNS takes glo­bal di­men­sions, while by the sheer vol­umes of their sales and as­sets such GLO­BAL FIRMS be­come com­par­a­ble in­ size with whole COUN­TRIES, even with such high­ly de­vel­oped ones as some of Eu­ro­pe­an econ­o­mies, i.e., with their gross na­tion­al prod­ucts GNP .

The last sev­er­al years, and es­pe­cial­ly 1998 2008, brought with them some­thing very NEW, and at the same time some­thing ba­si­cal­ly very FA­MIL­IAR from the last cen­tu­ry's his­to­ry, i.e., an un­prec­e­dent­ed WAVE of "do­mes­tic", but most­ly in­ter­na­tion­al, MER­GERS and AC­QUI­SI­TIONS .

So, the HOR­I­ZON­TAL IN­TE­GRA­TION is back, tak­ing new form of MER­GERS AND AC­QUI­SI­TIONS among biggest, strong­est and most di­ver­si­fied CON­CERNS of the mod­ern world.

This is a con­tin­u­a­tion of "MUL­TI­PO­LAR DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION" and "CON­GLOM­ER­A­TION" pro­cess­es un­der the NEW con­di­tions of GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION of mar­kets and busi­ness re­la­tions in gen­er­al. As is well known, GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION in­ten­si­fies COM­PE­TI­TION on in­ter­na­tion­al mar­kets and makes the STRUGGLE among biggest pro­duc­ers for LEAD­ER­SHIP and CON­TROL over ol­i­gop­o­ly struc­tures the de­ci­sive fac­tor of BUSI­NESS SUC­CESS.

Now, the JOINTSTOCK form of PROP­ER­TY ev­er more of­ten ser­vic­es such "GIANTS­' WED­DINGS", be­cause prac­ti­cal­ly ALL such M&A deals in­volve sell­ingbuy­ing or mu­tu­al ex­change of SHARES rep­re­sent­ing con­sid­er­a­ble parts of cor­po­ra­tions' CAP­I­TAL and usu­al­ly trans­fer­ring CON­TROL to the more pow­er­ful of the TWO part­ners (like was the case with Ger­man Daim­lerBenz AG in its infamous al­li­ance with Amer­i­can Chrys­ler Corp. thus form­ing Daim­lerChrys­ler un­der Daim­ler's con­trol).

As an­other ex­am­ple of such giant M&A can serve the 1999 ac­qui­si­tion of con­trol over Nis­san Mo­tor Co. by French Re­nault SA the very FIRST "friend­ly take­o­ver" of a ma­jor Jap­a­nese com­pa­ny en­gaged in AU­TO­MO­BILE IN­DUS­TRY by a lead­ing Eu­ro­pe­an car pro­duc­er and the SEC­OND strong case of for­eign in­fil­tra­tion in­to this vi­tal sec­tor of Ja­pan's econ­o­my af­ter Ford Mo­tor bought con­trol over Maz­da in 1995.

* If we turn to Ja­pan, here his­tor­i­cal tran­si­tion to OL­I­GOP­O­LY con­di­tions and de­vel­op­ment of­ the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL va­rie­ty of­ the so­cial di­vi­sion of­ la­bor had their strong NATIONAL IDENTITY.

Each of many ex­ist­ing KEI­RET­SU as spe­cif­i­cally Jap­a­nese in­tra­mar­ket groups (i.e., formed around a SINGLE large in­dus­tri­al com­pa­ny that op­er­ates in a SINGLE mar­ket) aim at co­or­di­nat­ing ac­tiv­i­ties and se­cur­ing ef­fi­cien­cy with­in con­crete PRO­DUC­TION COOP­ER­A­TION sys­tem (please, re­mem­ber ma­te­ri­al of Top­ic 2). Thus, it is a MIXED sys­tem of FI­NAN­CIAL CON­TROL and SUBCONTRACTING se­cur­ing TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL co­or­di­na­tion and PRO­DUC­TION COOP­ER­A­TION links.

As for ZAI­BAT­SU, of­ten re­gard­ed as in­ter­mar­ket groups, they rep­re­sent a kind of "LOOSE CON­GLOM­ER­ATES", i.e., seem­ing­ly ran­dom clus­ters of formally in­de­pen­dent com­pa­nies, linked MORE by shared tra­di­tions than by fi­nan­cial con­trol as­ such. In prac­tice, each zai­bat­su is a kind of ram­i­fied and fierce­ly com­pet­i­tive OL­I­GOP­O­LY sys­tem dom­i­nat­ed by fam­i­lyowned HOLD­ING com­pa­ny but with much op­er­a­tion­al and fi­nan­cial in­de­pen­dence of its in­di­vid­u­al ele­ments (di­vi­sions, sub­sid­i­ar­ies).

We can al­so look at kei­ret­su and zai­bat­su from a pure­ly TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL point of view. In such a con­text, we can say that kei­ret­su usu­al­ly rep­re­sents or­gan­i­za­tional struc­ture which ser­vic­es ONE par­tic­u­lar TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAIN (or NET­WORK), like that in au­to­mo­bile pro­duc­tion. At the same time zai­bat­su col­lects "un­der one roof" SEV­ER­AL dif­fer­ent TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL SYS­TEMS, ser­vic­ing pro­duc­tion in SEV­ER­AL in­dus­tri­al sec­tors. Thus, the de­gree of DI­VER­SI­FI­CA­TION char­ac­ter­iz­ing mod­ern zai­bat­su is much HIGH­ER than that of kei­ret­su.

* Gen­er­al­ly, or­gan­i­za­tion­al struc­tures pre­vail­ing in Jap­a­nese MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING are rath­er un­u­su­al. Part­ly, it is con­nect­ed with their his­tor­i­cal gen­e­sis which start­ed way back in PRE­IN­DUS­TRI­AL era.

In Eu­rope and Amer­i­ca, it were, first, the IN­DUS­TRI­AL REV­O­LU­TION and, lat­er, mod­ern TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL PROGRESS that de­ter­mined the shap­ing of BIG BUSI­NESS and its ev­o­lu­tion from TRUSTS (as­ pre­dom­i­nat­ing form of­ MON­OP­O­LY) to­ward MUL­TI­SEC­TO­RIAL CON­CERNS (and wide spread­ing of OL­I­GOP­O­LY RE­LA­TIONS).

As for Ja­pan, some au­thors point out that here the growth of BIG BUSI­NESS and its GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION (i.e., the emer­gence of Jap­a­nbased TNC) was rather MAR­KET­INGorient­ed than TECH­NOL­O­GYorient­ed. It means that, his­tor­i­cal­ly, con­sid­er­a­tions of­ TRADE ex­pan­sion and COM­MER­CIAL ex­pe­ri­ence lay at the core of Jap­a­n's IN­DUS­TRI­AL and IN­VEST­MENT pol­i­cies.

How­ev­er, NOWADAYS al­so in­ Ja­pan, it is ex­act­ly TECH­NOL­O­GY that dic­tates new forms of busi­ness or­gan­i­za­tion and ev­o­lu­tion of ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions. We have to pay at­ten­tion to ma­jor TRENDS char­ac­ter­iz­ing mod­ern de­vel­op­ment of SCI­ENCE and TECH­NOL­O­GY and try to eval­u­ate their ec­o­nom­ic con­se­quenc­es.

There are ar­gu­ments around the ques­tion wheth­er we should re­gard Ja­pan as a POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL so­ci­e­ty or NOT. It is a com­pli­cat­ed is­sue, but ONE THING is clear: RIGHT NOW the ac­cu­mu­la­tion of "POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL" fea­tures in Ja­pan's so­cial and ec­o­nom­ic struc­ture and chal­leng­es of a POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL era are among the strong­est FACTORS shap­ing this coun­try's fu­ture. Many cru­cial is­sues, from the choice of a new IN­TER­NA­TION­AL SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION in the GLO­BAL ECON­O­MY to the re­form­ing of the whole Jap­a­nesestyle ED­U­CA­TION SYS­TEM, should be an­a­lyzed ex­act­ly in a POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL con­text.

* It is im­por­tant to men­tion here that in­di­vid­u­al ele­ments of tech­no­log­i­cal chains of the emerg­ing DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION are creat­ed also in some DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES. This un­doubt­ed­ly pro­motes their IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION, thus in­tro­duc­ing ev­er new na­tions to the ben­e­fits and trou­bles of our MA­CHINE CIV­IL­I­ZA­TION.

The DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES re­ceive, as a rule, the "low­er" ele­ments of tech­no­log­i­cal sys­tems, name­ly, the ex­tract­ing and pri­mary pro­cess­ing of RAW MA­TE­RI­ALS. Very of­ten this coun­tries al­so house the "com­plet­ing" ("as­sem­bly") links of in­ter­na­tion­al­ly or­ga­nized pro­duc­tion with a HIGH de­gree of LA­BORIN­TEN­SI­TY, but with ex­treme­ly LOW con­tent of COM­PLEX (com­pos­ite) LABOR – be­cause the work at an AS­SEM­BLY LINE (on­ CON­VEY­ERBELT) is of pure­ly ex­ec­u­tive na­ture.

The COM­PLEX (com­pos­ite) LABOR pre­cise­ly char­ac­ter­iz­es the MID­DLE ("in­ter­me­di­ate") ele­ments of the tech­no­log­i­cal chain. Usu­al­ly, these ele­ments stay in DE­VEL­OPED (in­dus­tri­al) coun­tries and are sub­ject of the SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION of the "MOTH­ER" OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION which ar­rang­es in­ter­na­tion­al PRO­DUC­TION CHAIN (i.e., spe­cial­i­za­tion of the TNC it­self).

We may, in eve­ry way, crit­i­cize the socalled "NEW in­ter­na­tion­al di­vi­sion of la­bor", un­der which the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL GAP be­tween the for­mer ME­TROP­O­LIS and the CO­LO­NI­AL pe­riph­ery con­tin­ues to ex­ist, even though at a MUCH HIGH­ER lev­el (please, re­mem­ber the "es­ca­la­tor" met­a­phor).

Yet, IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION there is un­der way, and that is one of the most im­por­tant new fea­tures of our time. More­o­ver, let us not for­get that the first doz­en states that have brok­en away from the grip of POV­ER­TY and are now in­clud­ed among the IN­DUS­TRI­AL na­tions (the NIC, men­tioned in the Top­ic 1) have made this tran­si­tion pre­cise­ly due to their be­ing TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL­LY tied to the "in­dus­tri­al North".

In some cas­es, it oc­curred through mu­tu­al use of their rich NAT­U­RAL RE­SOURC­ES (Mex­i­co, Bra­zil, Ar­gen­ti­na), and in oth­er cas­es, it­ took place through the mass in­tro­duc­tion of­ LA­BORin­ten­sive (LA­BORcon­sum­ing) TECH­NOL­O­GIES with use of rel­a­tive­ly sim­ple (ba­si­cal­ly fe­male) la­bor on the CON­VEY­ERBELT (South Ko­rea, Sin­ga­pore, Hong Kong, Tai­wan).

* Please, pay at­ten­tion to the fact that, in the last dec­ade, al­so the ma­jor­i­ty of­ the socalled "POSTSO­CIAL­IST" so­ci­e­ties are be­ing in­te­grat­ed in­to world sys­tem of the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR (gen­er­al­ly, on the same grounds as the de­vel­op­ing coun­tries).

For ex­am­ple, Rus­sia plays ma­jor role in sup­ply­ing some of its West­ern part­ners (like Ger­ma­ny and Ita­ly) with RAW MA­TE­RI­ALS and SEMIFAB­RI­CAT­ED PROD­UCTS rep­re­sent­ing LOW­ER links of in­ter­na­tion­al pro­duc­tion chains.

It is also think­a­ble that Rus­sia, Ukraine and many oth­er tran­si­tion­al econ­o­mies will routinely house dif­fer­ent LA­BORIN­TEN­SIVE sec­tors (rep­re­sent­ing UPPER links of tech­no­log­ical sys­tems) on a large scale.

As for Rus­sia with its mighty TRADITIONS in solv­ing com­pos­ite TECH­NO­LOG­ICAL prob­lems con­cern­ing mod­ern MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING sec­tor (for example, in the AEROSPACE COMPLEX), it has cer­tain CHANCES to take some IN­TER­ME­DI­ATE tech­nol­o­gyin­ten­sive (sci­encein­ten­sive) LINKS of in­ter­na­tion­al pro­duc­tion sys­tems some­time in­ the fu­ture as well.

Top­ic 5. IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION AS LEAD­ING MOD­ERN TREND

By the deep­ness and scale of in­flu­ence on ec­o­nom­ic life, in the late 20th century the phenomenon of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION can per­haps be com­pared on­ly with the spread­ing of "col­lec­tive" (group) form of pri­vate prop­er­ty (own­er­ship) in the last dec­ades of the 19th and the first half of the 20th cen­tu­ry. Then, the con­sol­i­da­tion of the JOINTSTOCK form of prop­er­ty and fi­nanc­ing, i.e., of the STOCK CAP­I­TAL (or­ SHARE CAP­I­TAL, EQUITY CAPITAL) helped in us­ing the po­ten­tial of IN­DUS­TRI­AL REV­O­LU­TION. In our time, IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of prac­ti­cal­ly all sides of ec­o­nom­ic life pro­vides for uni­ver­sal ap­pli­ca­tion of the po­ten­tial­i­ties and achieve­ments of the SCI­EN­TIF­IC and TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL progress.

The SO­CIAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR is­ tak­ing a NEW form based on longterm TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL ties and is as­sum­ing GLO­BAL char­ac­ter, thus pro­duc­ing an ev­er great­er CU­MU­LA­TIVE EF­FECT due to the op­ti­mi­za­tion and in­creased ef­fi­cien­cy of the pro­duc­tion struc­tures.

The free wind of COM­PE­TI­TION is pen­e­trat­ing through opened win­dows and doors of na­tion­al econ­o­mies blow­ing away the rub­bish of “pa­tri­ar­chal­” ways and feu­dal sur­vi­val (ves­tige). It de­stroys "RIG­ID" MON­OP­O­LY struc­tures turn­ing them in­to more dy­nam­ic and flex­i­ble ones typical for OL­I­GOP­O­LY, thus bring­ing spir­it of re­new­al and new op­por­tu­ni­ties in­to ec­o­nom­ic life on in­ter­na­tion­al scale.

As a rule, COM­PE­TI­TION on the world mar­kets is ex­pressed MORE CLEARLY and gen­er­al­ly STRONGER than on na­tion­al ones where MONOPOLIST TENDENCES are usu­al­ly act­ing in much nar­row­er ter­ri­to­ri­al lim­its, while STATE REGULATION al­so sets more strict "rules of the game" for in­di­vid­u­al en­ter­pris­es (firms).

As the "sealed na­ture" of NA­TION­AL ECON­O­MIES tends to de­cline, i.e., as they be­come more and more OPEN to for­eign busi­ness­es, a cer­tain in­crease in the COM­PET­I­TIVE prin­ci­ple has been not­ed, which is ac­com­pa­nied by a clear­ly pro­claimed weak­en­ing of mon­o­pol­i­za­tion ten­den­cies and re­stric­tive fac­tors.

To the ex­tent that the STATE REGULATION al­so be­comes INTERNATIONAL, it is ever more di­rect­ed at LIB­ER­AL­IZ­ING trade and in­vest­ment flows be­tween coun­tries, thus com­bat­ing HIGH cus­toms du­ties (customs tar­iffs) and pre­vent­ing TRADE PRO­TEC­TION­ISM, i.e., all sorts of ar­ti­fi­cial OB­STA­CLES to free in­ter­na­tion­al trade and nor­mal mar­ket re­la­tions (we shall dwell up­on these mat­ters in our next Top­ic).

In­ter­na­tion­al­ly, on world com­mod­i­ty mar­kets and in large ec­o­nom­ic re­gions, MAR­KET MECH­A­NISM of­ten proves es­pe­cial­ly ef­fec­tive. Here, the ad­van­tag­es of "OR­GA­NIZED COM­PE­TI­TION" and its fa­vor­a­ble in­flu­ence on sci­en­tif­ic and tech­no­log­i­cal progress man­i­fest them­selves rel­a­tive­ly more ful­ly. The po­ten­tial of mar­ket selfad­just­ment to­wards its OP­TI­MUM, based on "MAX­I­MUM of com­pe­ti­tion with MIN­I­MUM of or­gan­i­za­tion (re­strictions)", is more of­ten than not re­al­ized on IN­TER­NA­TION­AL scale even bet­ter than IN­SIDE na­tion­al econ­o­mies with all sorts of "au­thor­i­ta­tive", "vo­li­tion­al" in­flu­enc­es.

* Now it is time to ask: "WHAT is IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION? WHAT is it all about? WHERE can we find trac­es of this pro­cess and HOW can they be summed up?"

When we speak of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION, we have in mind CU­MU­LA­TIVE PRO­CESS of the FOR­MA­TION OF WORLD ECON­O­MY as the GLO­BAL SYS­TEM ("su­per­struc­ture") of EC­O­NOM­IC RE­LA­TIONS.

How­ev­er, to ex­plain this, we first need to name the ma­jor SPHERES of ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty where the ten­den­cy to IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION shows it­self:

# TRADE (de­vel­op­ment of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL trade leads to emer­gence of RE­GION­AL and WORLD MAR­KETS; EX­PORTled GROWTH en­a­bles ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial progress in many coun­tries)

# CAP­I­TAL (IN­TER­NA­TION­AL move­ment of IN­VEST­MENT cap­i­tal brings FI­NAN­CIAL RE­SOURC­ES where they are most­ly need­ed; on the oth­er hand, the socalled "HOT MON­EY" flows may be­come a se­ri­ous de­sta­bi­lizing fac­tor)

# PRO­DUC­TION (in its func­tion­al com­plex­i­ty, the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL PRO­CESS it­self be­comes IN­TER­NA­TION­AL; thus, a NEW va­rie­ty of pro­duc­tion aris­es the "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION" of­ TNC men­tioned in Top­ic 4)

# SCI­ENCE (to­geth­er with IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION, IN­TER­NA­TION­AL SYS­TEMS of R&D come in­to be­ing; is­sues of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TECH­NOL­O­GY TRANS­FER gain more and more pub­lic at­ten­tion)

# IN­FOR­MA­TION (tre­men­dous IN­TER­NA­TION­AL ex­change of da­ta be­comes a ma­jor NEW fea­ture of ec­o­nom­ic life, IN­FOR­MA­TION and SOFT­WARE in­dus­try comes in­to be­ing as ma­jor and most dy­nam­ic com­po­nent of GLO­BAL ECON­O­MY)

# EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CY (POL­I­CYMAK­ING gets its IN­TER­NA­TION­AL va­rie­ties as well; many NEW mech­a­nisms and in­sti­tu­tions aimed at ­ec­o­nom­ic DECISIONMAKING emerge on RE­GION­AL and WORLD scale – with IN­TER­NA­TION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS among the most im­por­tant of them)

# RE­PRO­DUC­TION and AC­CU­MU­LA­TION of CAP­I­TAL (these TWO ma­jor MAC­RO EC­O­NOM­IC pro­cess­es al­so get their IN­TER­NA­TION­AL va­rie­ties and start to in­volve nat­u­ral re­sourc­es, oth­er pro­duc­tion fac­tors, as­ well as­ mar­ket out­lets of sev­er­al COUN­TRIES – most­ly NEIGH­BORS, i.e., be­long­ing to one and the same EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GION).

It is ALL THIS TO­GETH­ER that forms the GLO­BAL in­ter­na­tion­al­i­za­tion pro­cess and im­parts to it CU­MU­LA­TIVE (over­all) char­ac­ter, thus mak­ing it the pro­cess of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF EC­O­NOM­IC LIFE in gen­er­al.

* It all start­ed in the 16th – 19th cen­tu­ries, when many new­ly emerg­ing COUN­TRIES (na­tionstates) got in­volved in FOR­EIGN TRADE with NEIGH­BORS (most­ly over LAND spac­es) and go­ing OVER­SEAS (this ten­den­cy was con­nect­ed with GREAT GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL DIS­COV­ER­IES of that pe­ri­od).

Thus, to­wards the end of the 19th cen­tu­ry, WORLD MAR­KET emerged – as a func­tion­al struc­ture of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL com­mer­cial re­la­tions – bind­ing to­geth­er the main TRAD­ING NA­TIONS of­ that relatively early pe­ri­od of IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION, as one major trend, and the ME­TROP­O­LIS with their COL­O­NIES, as another important tendency.

This func­tion­al struc­ture (or­ sys­tem) sig­ni­fied pre­cise­ly emer­gence of WORLD COM­MOD­I­TY MAR­KETS – NOT less, and NOT more. Con­nect­ed with OB­JECTbased spe­cial­i­za­tion of firms and coun­tries and rep­re­sent­ing COM­MER­CIAL TRANS­AC­TIONS be­tween them, very of­ten ACCIDENTAL by their na­ture, this sys­tem HARDLY could be re­gard­ed as WORLD ECON­O­MY yet.

As for WORLD ECON­O­MY, it rep­re­sents a much MORE de­vel­oped sys­tem. While the WORLD MAR­KET se­cured ec­o­nom­ic in­ter­ac­tion and in­ter­de­pen­dence of NA­TION­AL com­pa­nies and NA­TIONSTATES through COM­MER­CIAL TRADE, the WORLD ECON­O­MY adds to­ these in­ter­ac­tion and in­ter­de­pen­dence RAD­I­CAL­LY NEW and substantially HIGH­ER FORMS such as­ "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION" with its own mech­a­nism and "act­ing per­sons" (TNC).

Thus, glo­bal ec­o­nom­ic SU­PER­SYSTEM emerg­es, a SU­PER­STRUC­TURE em­brac­ing the whole world and mov­ing ac­cord­ing to its own nat­u­ral laws. If we look at the WORLD ECON­O­MY this way, it be­comes clear: it is, un­doubt­ed­ly, the "child" of OUR times, particularly of the late 20th cen­tu­ry.

The un­fold­ing of COM­MER­CIAL in­ter­na­tion­al trade and for­ma­tion of WORLD COM­MOD­I­TY MAR­KETS in­ the 18th – 19th cen­tu­ries rep­re­sent­ed ex­act­ly the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF­ TRADE (or­ we can say "IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF EX­CHANGE", or "IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF MAR­KETS"). From the his­tor­i­cal point of view, it laid ground for IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of oth­er ele­ments of ec­o­nom­ic life, for IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of pro­cess­es in oth­er sec­tors of econ­omy.

In mod­ern time, the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF MAR­KETS goes on. The WORLD MER­CHAN­DISE TRADE stead­i­ly leaves be­hind the ex­pan­sion of WORLD OUT­PUT, i.e., of WORLD PRO­DUC­TION. The PROD­UCT STRUC­TURE of in­ter­na­tion­al TRADE, and its GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL DIS­TRI­BU­TION de­vel­op and mod­ern­ize (ex­portim­port da­ta for 133 coun­tries and their groups we shall also discuss in Topic 10).

* How­ev­er, the de­ci­sive fac­tor in the for­ma­tion of the WORLD ECON­O­MY was the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF CAP­I­TAL –the quite NEW phe­nom­e­non of the 20th cen­tu­ry tak­ing es­pe­cial­ly large di­men­sions af­ter the World War II.

It start­ed with EX­PORT of LOAN CAP­I­TAL (in form of com­mer­cial CREDITS and in­ter­na­tion­al LOANS many of which were grant­ed by one STATE to an­other).

In contrast, now­a­days, the most im­por­tant form of the in­ter­na­tion­al CAP­I­TAL MI­GRA­TION is­ rep­re­sent­ed by FOREIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI) of the lead­ing TNC, as well as by their PORT­FO­LIO IN­VEST­MENT fa­cil­i­tat­ing emer­gence of MIXED CAP­I­TAL and JOINT VEN­TURES as ma­jor tools of ec­o­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion and in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion of the De­vel­op­ing World.

By­ the way, the ab­so­lute fig­ures of­ for­eign PRI­VATE (both di­rect and port­fo­lio) IN­VEST­MENT flow­ing to de­vel­op­ing coun­tries by far ex­ceed FOR­EIGN AID re­ceived by them.

The spe­cif­ic fea­ture of the DI­RECT in­vest­ment is that it se­cures MA­JOR for­eign in­ves­tor CON­TROL over pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing com­plex creat­ed or­ ac­quired abroad (plants, ware­hous­es, stores, etc.), while his lo­cal part­ners (and oth­er MI­NOR in­ves­tors) get on­ly some part in the PROF­ITS. In this case, MA­JOR in­ves­tor (TNC) usu­al­ly plays im­por­tant CO­OR­DI­NAT­ING role in ar­rang­ing the in­ter­na­tion­al pro­duc­tion chain.

Sta­tis­tics of FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT FDI show both IN­WARD move­ment, or its IN­FLOW (i.e., FDI com­ing to a par­tic­u­lar coun­try with­in a year), and OUT­WARD move­ment of DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT, or its OUT­FLOW (FDI made by a par­tic­u­lar coun­try abroad, i.e., in oth­er coun­tries). For example, for Ja­pan, very big cap­i­tal OUT­FLOW is typ­i­cal, while the IN­FLOW of FDI to Ja­pan re­mains very small indeed .

In con­trast, when the FOR­EIGN IN­VES­TOR plays on­ly MI­NOR role in the cap­i­tal for­ma­tion of the creat­ed MIXED com­pa­ny, and an IN­VEST­MENT PRO­JECT or­ JOINT VEN­TURE is be­ing fi­nanced most­ly LO­CAL­LY (very of­ten – out of the state bud­get of the de­vel­op­ing coun­try in ques­tion), for him, i.e., for FOR­EIGN IN­VES­TOR, such mon­ey out­lay will be a PORT­FO­LIO IN­VEST­MENT (mere­ly a source of PROF­IT).

Im­por­tant is, how­ev­er, that BOTH forms – the DI­RECT and the PORT­FO­LIO in­vest­ment – are con­nect­ed with de­vel­op­ment of PRO­DUC­TION (in in­dus­tri­al and ser­vic­e sec­tors) and rep­re­sent JOINTSTOCK CAP­I­TAL (equity cap­i­tal) on a PER­MA­NENT ba­sis. It is ex­act­ly the case of EQUITY FI­NANC­ING of EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT, with all sta­bil­i­ty and oth­er ad­van­tag­es in­her­ent in it.

As for LOAN CAP­I­TAL, it means on­ly TEM­PO­RAL trans­fer of fi­nan­cial re­sourc­es, thus serv­ing CRED­IT re­la­tions be­tween firms or­ coun­tries (­though very of­ten al­so on a LONGTERM ba­sis). LOANS (as oth­er CRED­ITS) should be PAID BACK ear­li­er or lat­er, while JOINTSTOCK cap­i­tal in­vest­ment is NOT sub­ject to RE­TURN (some shares might change hands, but the SUM of in­vest­ed cap­i­tal re­mains ba­si­cal­ly the same, or might even grow to­geth­er with the STOCK MAR­KET, like it typ­i­cal­ly has been both in the U.S. and in­ Eu­rope in the sec­ond half of 1990s).

So, the MI­GRA­TION of cap­i­tal and FOREIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI) as its ma­jor form serves the de­vel­op­ment of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION in the most di­rect and mighty way.

* This is the main base of the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF PRO­DUC­TION with emer­gence of its DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL va­rie­ty. All the deep chang­es con­nect­ed with such NEW­EST phe­nom­e­na as the "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TIONAL PRO­DUC­TION" and "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PROD­UCTS", which we out­lined in the pre­vi­ous Top­ic, came in­to be­ing and ex­pand­ed world­wide thanks to the fac­tor of CAP­I­TAL MI­GRA­TION.

IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF CAP­I­TAL, es­pe­cial­ly FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI), creates quite a DIF­FER­ENT base for in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions in com­par­i­son to those formed by tra­di­tion­al COM­MER­CIAL trade. The STA­BIL­I­TY in­her­ent in TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR takes here its nat­u­ral ma­te­ri­al shape be­ing in­cor­po­rat­ed in com­plex in­ter­na­tion­al PRO­DUC­TION SYS­TEMS (the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAINS and NET­WORKS men­tioned ear­li­er).

If we turn to Ja­pan, it is worth­while to no­tice that DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION sys­tems creat­ed by its TNC through use of DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT abroad are most­ly placed in AsiaPa­cif­ic re­gion. In South­east and East Asia, they take pe­cu­liar form of the socalled OFFSHORE PRO­DUC­TION which en­a­bles Jap­a­nese firms to­ com­bine nat­u­ral and hu­man re­sourc­es of sev­er­al neigh­bor­ing coun­tries in a ge­o­graph­i­cal­ly dis­persed but func­tion­al­ly in­te­grat­ed PRO­DUC­TION SYS­TEM based on Jap­a­nese tech­nol­o­gy.

In 1995, Ja­pan man­u­fac­tured 41 tril­lion yen worth of goods at its over­seas plants – for the first time MORE than its whole EXPORT amount­ed to. In oth­er words, Jap­a­nese firms have creat­ed a ma­jor econ­o­my OUT­SIDE na­tion­al boun­dar­ies (and NOT on­ly in­ Asia, but in the U.S., Aus­tra­lia, Lat­in Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope as­ well). At the beginning of the new Millennium, there were more than 1700 Japanese firms doing business in the U.S. Their contribution to the U.S. export was estimated at about 9.5 percent (comprising about 43 percent of all exports by firms located in the U.S. but characterized as nonAmerican, i.e., controlled from abroad).

* In its turn, the con­ver­sion of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TIONAL PRO­DUC­TION in­to a TYPICAL and even PREVAILING form of in­dus­tri­al (man­u­fac­tur­ing) busi­ness leads to dras­tic chang­es in the sphere of CIR­CU­LA­TION, i.e., in WORLD TRADE and MON­E­TARY RE­LA­TIONS.

# We can as­sert that the MOD­EL of in­ter­na­tion­al di­vi­sion of la­bor with the prev­a­lence of OB­JECTbased (PROD­UCTbased) SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION, which is­ main­ly re­al­ized through COM­MER­CIAL TRADE, has been be­com­ing a thing of the past.

The de­vel­op­ment of NEW forms of­ SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION of­ PRO­DUC­TION served by­ ac­tive MI­GRA­TION of CAP­I­TAL (main­ly in­ the form of­ for­eign DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT) on a mass scale, push­es in­to fore­front an­other MOD­EL – that of the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL in­ter­na­tion­al di­vi­sion of la­bor.

Thus, with­in the WORLD TRADE we can ob­serve a rap­id in­crease in the al­ready suf­fi­cient­ly ex­tend­ed SEC­TOR formed by stable, tech­no­log­i­cal­ly con­di­tioned and wellor­ga­nized COM­MOD­I­TY FLOWS be­tween the LINKS of the same TNC. Ac­cord­ing to some es­ti­mates, such IN­TRA­FIRM ex­change of goods and ser­vic­es with wide use of TRANS­FER PRIC­ES al­ready cov­ers MORE than TWOFIFTHS of the in­ter­na­tion­al trade turn­o­ver.

And very close to this are the CON­TRACTbased long­term re­la­tions be­tween part­ners in­ in­ter­na­tion­al pro­duc­tion which stay of­fi­cial­ly INDEPENDENT from each oth­er but op­er­ate in a CO­OR­DI­NAT­ED man­ner – thanks to their TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL ties. Many ex­am­ples of this kind we find in mod­ern Jap­a­neseAus­tra­li­an re­la­tions, as well as in the OFFSHORE pro­duc­tion sys­tems creat­ed by Jap­a­nese TNC around East Asia and elsewhere.

# In the MON­E­TARY sphere, main chang­es are ex­pressed in the set­tingup of SPE­CIAL (again IN­TER­NA­TION­AL) SYS­TEMS of fi­nanc­ing and SELFfi­nanc­ing the de­vel­op­ment of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION. Ma­jor NEW fea­tures of the mod­ern MON­E­TARY MECH­A­NISM on the world­wide scale are:

emer­gence of re­gion­al and world­wide LOAN CAP­I­TAL mar­kets in­creas­ing cred­it re­sourc­es for in­ter­na­tion­al busi­ness,

TRANS­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of the bank­ing busi­ness it­self, the emer­gence of many TRANS­NA­TION­AL BANKS (TNB) and the rap­id build­up of their in­ter­na­tion­al op­er­a­tions

crea­tion of NEW – "COL­LEC­TIVE" (first of all, re­gion­al) – cred­it and pay­ment fa­cil­i­ties, like the "EU­RO­DOL­LAR" mar­kets, like the "Spe­cial Draw­ing Rights" (SDR) creat­ed by the In­ter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund (IMF), like the still NEW com­mon Eu­ro­pe­an cur­ren­cy (the eu­ro), all of which we shall dis­cuss lat­er,

the grow­ing fi­nan­cial AU­TON­O­MY of in­ter­na­tion­al firms (TNC), their rel­a­tive IN­DE­PEN­DENCE from the ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy of in­di­vid­u­al STATES as­sured by creat­ing THEIR OWN MECH­A­NISM for rais­ing substantial fi­nan­cial re­sourc­es (the socalled SELFfi­nanc­ing) to main­tain and de­vel­op IN­TER­NA­TION­AL pro­duc­tion sys­tems.

* The de­vel­op­ment of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION al­so calls for a vis­i­ble ac­cel­er­a­tion of the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of SCI­ENCE.

The well known and much dis­cussed is­sues of the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRANS­FER of TECH­NOL­O­GY be­come es­pe­cial­ly top­i­cal and po­lit­i­cal­ly acute when such trans­fer is tak­ing place be­tween TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL LINKS of par­tic­u­lar TNC placed in dif­fer­ent coun­tries. Spe­cial bod­ies and work­ing groups, creat­ed by the Unit­ed Na­tions Or­gan­i­za­tion (UNO, or UN), an­a­lyze such cas­es and work out rec­omm­en­da­tions for "prop­er be­ha­vi­or" of the TNC in ques­tion, thus try­ing to create a gen­er­al "CODE OF FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT POL­I­CIES".

The LI­CENSE TRADE is pros­per­ing tak­ing ev­er bigger part in the in­ter­na­tion­al trade turn­o­ver. The NEW TECH­NOL­O­GY and "KNOWHOW" be­come prof­it­a­ble com­mod­i­ties, while RE­SEARCH and DE­VEL­OP­MENT ac­tiv­i­ties ("R&D") al­so be­come ev­er more IN­TER­NA­TION­AL. The prob­lem of IN­TEL­LEC­TU­AL PROP­ER­TY RIGHTS emerg­es and draws pub­lic at­ten­tion.

To­geth­er with the in­ter­na­tion­al­i­za­tion of cap­i­tal and pro­duc­tion, "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL SYS­TEMS OF R&D" are be­ing formed – both un­der ae­gis (i.e., through or­gan­i­za­tion­al ef­forts) of in­di­vid­u­al TNC and as in­ter­na­tion­al CENTERS (groups) of re­search­ers fi­nanced by mem­beror­gan­i­za­tions (states).

* In the sphere of IN­FOR­MA­TION not on­ly giant IN­TER­NA­TION­AL EX­CHANGE OF DA­TA is typ­i­cal now­a­days, but al­so emer­gence of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TEL­E­COM­MU­NI­CA­TIONS SYS­TEMS (both de­vel­oped by big in­di­vid­u­al PRIVATE or STATE com­pa­nies, like CNN or BBC, and JOINTLY formed by sev­er­al in­de­pen­dent part­ners with head­quar­ters in dif­fer­ent coun­tries).

Re­gion­al and world­wide DA­TA BANKS come in­to be­ing ser­vic­ing cus­tom­ers around the world on COM­MER­CIAL ba­sis and through LONGTERM con­tract re­la­tions.

The In­ter­net and the "World Wide Web" (www) rap­id­ly change ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions and hu­man psy­chol­o­gy. For example, the development of the socalled ecommerce (electronic retail trade in CONSUMER goods and services) and ebusiness (electronic trade between companies in INVESTMENT goods, also called B2B, from businesstobusiness) reduces radically the number of MIDDLEMEN (mostly, wholesale traders) and often makes possible DIRECT delivery contracts between the PRODUCER and the CONSUMER (user). In the U.S., IN­FOR­MA­TION TECH­NOL­O­GY, in­clud­ing busi­ness on the In­ter­net, is grow­ing TWICE as fast as the over­all econ­o­my, and is rap­id­ly ex­pand­ing to oth­er re­gions of the GLO­BAL ECON­O­MY.

All this looks like a boon. However, in the future a mighty GLOBAL COMMERCIAL (COMMERCEbased) CRISIS can and probably will arise – exactly because of masscollapses of MIDDLEMEN, i.e. of wholesale and even retail trading establishments, which will lose their raison d’etre (ground for existence) as a result of the newfangled DIRECT ties between PRODUCERS and CONSUMERS (USERS). Before the recent GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS has begun and rapidly spread around the world, only few people have expected something like it, though the new sources of instability in the FINANCIAL SYSTEM have been for some time quite obvious.

* IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of the EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CY is a spe­cial is­sue which we shall dis­cuss at length lat­er. Here, it is worth­while on­ly to stress that, be­sides the in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy of in­di­vid­u­al NATIONSTATES (on the MAC­ROlev­el) and NATIONAL FIRMS (on the MI­CROlev­el), a NEW va­rie­ty of po­lit­i­cal ac­tiv­i­ty aris­es – that of­ "DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL REG­U­LA­TION", which is more and more felt in in­di­vid­u­al RE­GIONS and on­ GLO­BAL (world­wide) scale.

On the MAC­ROlev­el, new ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies and ec­o­nom­ic in­sti­tu­tions (in­stru­ments) are creat­ed in in­di­vid­u­al RE­GIONS (as ele­ments of emerg­ing IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEMS) and on a GLO­BAL scale. We speak here of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS creat­ed WITH­IN the frame­work of the UNO (like the Unit­ed Na­tions Con­fer­ence on Trade and De­vel­op­ment UNC­TAD) or OUT­SIDE this glo­bal po­lit­i­cal struc­ture (like the World Trade Or­gan­i­za­tion WTO, or the In­ter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund IMF).

On the MI­CROlev­el, the TNC rep­re­sent­ing quite NEW kind of busi­ness or­gan­i­za­tion, i.e., that of "GLO­BAL FIRM", are fol­low­ing their own ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies, which rath­er OF­TEN get in­to CONFLICT with na­tion­al in­ter­ests and na­tion­al pol­i­cies – both of the coun­tries where their pro­duc­tion (plant, in­dus­tri­al com­plex) is­ lo­cat­ed (the socalled HOST COUNTRIES), and of­ those whose cap­i­tal they main­ly rep­re­sent and where their own head­quar­ters are sit­u­at­ed (their HOME COUNTRIES).

Both the TNC and what we may call BINA­TION­AL COM­PA­NIES (BNC), rep­re­sent­ing unit­ed cap­i­tal of TWO or more firms from TWO dif­fer­ent coun­tries (like Roy­al DutchShell in the field of CRUDE OIL pro­duc­tion and re­fin­ing, like Uni­lev­er in the realm of CHEMICAL in­dus­try, like Dun­lopPir­el­li in the pro­duc­tion of TIRES) be­come new "act­ing per­sons" in the WORLD ECON­O­MY and play their special IN­DE­PEN­DENT PART in in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic (and even po­lit­i­cal) af­fairs.

TNC es­pe­cial­ly en­joy high AU­TON­O­MY in mat­ters of pol­i­cymak­ing and are rath­er IN­DE­PEN­DENT from "their" na­tionstates. It does NOT mean that these states do NOT as­sist "their" TNC (i.e., those rep­re­sent­ing na­tion­al cap­i­tal) both do­mes­ti­cal­ly and on wide in­ter­na­tion­al are­na. More­o­ver, we can speak about cer­tain COM­PE­TI­TION be­tween GOV­ERN­MENT BOD­IES of­ the lead­ing na­tion­al states in as­sist­ing "their" (i.e., Amer­i­can, Jap­a­nese, Brit­ish) TNC both in ex­port ef­fort and in­ in­vest­ment pro­jects abroad (please, re­mem­ber en­er­get­ic com­pe­ti­tion be­tween the Min­is­try of Economy, Trade and In­dus­try METI of Ja­pan and the Amer­i­can Ex­port Im­port Bank EIB)

The TNC and BNC (of­ten summedup­ un­der the name "mul­ti­na­tion­als or MNC) rep­re­sent new phe­nom­e­non of "GLO­BAL FIRM" creat­ing a kind of "mag­net­ic field" in­to which SMALL and ME­DI­UMSIZE busi­ness en­ter­pris­es in many coun­tries are drawn. They are "mighty mo­tors" in spread­ing OL­I­GOP­O­LY struc­tures around the world and serve as CO­OR­DI­NAT­ING CEN­TERS in creat­ing DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION sys­tems with their high EF­FI­CIEN­CY and COM­PET­I­TIVE­NESS.

Man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pos­ite prod­ucts for GLO­BAL MAR­KETS, such GLO­BAL FIRMS can or­ga­nize pro­duc­tion on a tru­ly MASS scale, thus en­joy­ing ad­van­tag­es of the ECON­O­MY OF SCALE (i.e., rel­a­tive­ly LOW unit costs for their prod­ucts).

Their pro­duc­tion is high­ly DI­VER­SI­FIED, they use the prin­ci­ple of clev­er­ly SEG­MEN­TAT­ING their mar­kets, their or­gan­i­za­tion­al struc­tures are mod­ern and ef­fi­cient – through high grade of DE­CEN­TRAL­IZA­TION and COM­MER­CIAL na­ture of re­la­tions with­in their in­ter­na­tion­al pro­duc­tion and mar­ket­ing com­plex­es (the socalled "qua­sitrade" re­la­tions).

* Among the strong in­flu­enc­es the ac­tiv­i­ty of TNC and the de­vel­op­ment of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION ex­ert on each in­di­vid­u­al NA­TION­AL ECON­O­MY as a whole (i.e., on the MAC­ROlev­el), we have also to men­tion two phenomena – IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of­ RE­PRO­DUC­TION and INTERNATIONALIZATION of CAP­I­TAL ACCU­MU­LA­TION.

Ac­cord­ing to clas­si­c ec­o­nom­ic the­o­ry RE­PRO­DUC­TION means con­tin­u­ous, un­in­ter­rupt­ed pro­cess of PRO­DUC­TION on the MAC­ROscale, i.e., with­in the frame­work of NA­TION­AL ECON­O­MY as a whole.

Now, the sit­u­a­tion chang­es. The BORDERS be­tween in­di­vid­u­al NA­TIONSTATES be­come VAGUE (in­dis­tinct), the NA­TION­AL ECON­O­MIES be­come OPEN ECON­O­MIES. As such, they more and more draw in­to re­pro­duc­tive pro­cess­es RE­SOURC­ES of oth­er coun­tries and, in their turn, pro­duce GOODS (com­mod­i­ties) for IN­TER­NA­TION­AL mar­kets. The IN­TER­NA­TION­AL MI­GRA­TION OF­ CAP­I­TAL ac­quires GLO­BAL di­men­sions and gains par­a­mount im­por­tance push­ing the tra­di­tion­al FOR­EIGN TRADE (es­pe­cial­ly its COM­MER­CIAL va­rie­ty) INTO BACKGROUND of­ ec­o­nom­ic life.

The pro­cess­es of RE­PRO­DUC­TION al­so take IN­TER­NA­TION­AL char­ac­ter, in par­tic­u­lar through the de­vel­op­ment of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION sys­tems. Such IN­TER­NA­TION­AL RE­PRO­DUC­TION often takes form of the socalled EX­TEND­ED RE­PRO­DUC­TION, i.e., pro­ceeds on a GROWING SCALE. Thus, the CAP­I­TAL AC­CU­MU­LA­TION (SAV­ING for IN­VEST­MENT pur­pos­es) be­comes IN­TER­NA­TION­AL as well.

Especially clear­ly we can ob­serve IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION OF RE­PRO­DUC­TION in in­di­vid­u­al REGIONS, i.e., most­ly in re­la­tions be­tween NEIGH­BOR­ING na­tionstates which ev­er more take the char­ac­ter of EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION.

This new im­por­tant phe­nom­e­non of the mod­ern world econ­o­my we shall an­a­lyze in fol­low­ing Top­ics. Here, it is worth­while to stress that at least in TWO ma­jor ec­o­nom­ic re­gions of the world in­ Eu­rope (the ar­ea of the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion – the EU) and in North Amer­i­ca (the area of the NAFTA), RE­PRO­DUC­TION and AC­CU­MU­LA­TION pro­cess­es have been al­ready tak­ing place RATHER on RE­GION­AL than on exclusively NA­TION­AL scale.

* The IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of RE­PRO­DUC­TION and emer­gence of GLO­BAL COM­PA­NIES (most­ly in the form of­ TNC) create ten­den­cy to­ward growing EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE be­tween firms and na­tionstates as a whole.

It is on this ground that the doc­trine of "AT­LAN­TI­CISM", in­cor­po­rat­ed in the wellknown Or­gan­i­za­tion of Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion and De­vel­op­ment (OECD) creat­ed in 1961, has grown.

The idea of " EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE" is nour­ish­ing al­so the con­cept of "TRI­PAR­TI­TEAL­I­TY". It con­cerns "spe­cial char­ac­ter" of re­la­tions in the "BIG TRI­AN­GLE", formed by the "GREAT POW­ERS" of the THREE ma­jor in­dus­tri­al REGIONS of the mod­ern world Eu­rope, North Amer­i­ca and AsiaPa­cif­ic (Brit­ain, Ger­ma­ny, France USA Ja­pan).

This con­cept gave birth to some im­por­tant IN­TER­NA­TION­AL IN­STI­TU­TIONS as well, like the Tri­par­tite Com­mis­sion (creat­ed in 1973), or to the by far more fa­mous GroupofSev­en Sum­mits (G7 Sum­mits). Those are reg­u­lar meet­ings of the high­est rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the lead­ing in­dus­tri­al na­tions (USA, Ja­pan, Unit­ed King­dom, Ger­ma­ny, France, Ita­ly and Can­a­da) tak­ing place at least once a year with the aim to dis­cuss top­i­cal ec­o­nom­ic is­sues of glo­bal im­por­tance. Since 1997, how­ev­er, this sys­tem of reg­u­lar con­sul­ta­tions of the G7 has been ex­pand­ing so as to in­clude new Rus­sia thus more and more form­ing a GroupofEight (with G8 Sum­mits).

In 2003, shortly after the end of the war in Iraq, French Prime Minister JeanPierre Raffarin invited Hu Jintao, newlyelected President of China, to take part in a G8 Summit meeting in Evian (France) – first time ever. It might have been the beginning of the transition to a new – G9 – summit formula.

However, under the impact of the GLOBAL CRISIS, the stress has been shifted from relatively NARROW negotiation structures to WIDER ones – in particular, to that of the GroupofTwenty (G20) which has first time gathered in Pittsburg (USA) in September 2009.

* The doc­trine of the "EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE" al­so plays its role in de­vel­op­ing IDEOLOGY of the main RE­GION­AL po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic BLOCS and MOVE­MENTS:

# in Eu­rope, it forms the back­ground for the ide­as of "PANEU­ROPE­ISM”,"EU­RO­PE­AN UNI­FI­CA­TION", "UNIT­ED EU­ROPE" and “EUROLAND” (in­cor­po­rat­ed in the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion of to­day – the sub­ject dis­cussed in Top­ic 7) and cor­re­spond­ing FED­ER­AL­IST pol­i­cies;

# in Amer­i­ca, it is con­nect­ed with the con­cepts of "PANAMER­I­CAN­ISM", with the "Mon­roe Doc­trine" (ac­cord­ing to which the whole West­ern Hem­i­sphere is still re­gard­ed by U.S. pol­i­ti­cians as the sphere of Amer­i­can in­ter­ests), with the idea of the North Amer­i­can Free Trade Agree­ment NAF­TA;

# in South­east Asia, it brings about and stim­u­lates such SUB­RE­GION­AL po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic ar­range­ments as the famous As­so­ci­a­tion of South East Asian Na­tions (AS­EAN) and the East Asia Ec­o­nom­ic Cau­cus (EAEC), which now more often figures under the name ASEAN + 3 (those 3 being Japan, China and Korea) and ASEAN + 6 (including also India, Australia and New Zealand);

# and in the vast AsiaPa­cif­ic re­gion (or superregion), in­ a par­a­dox way, it gives rise to some­thing like a rad­i­cal­ly mod­ern­ized ver­sion of­ the no­to­ri­ous prewar Jap­a­nese idea of the socalled "Greater East Asian Zone of CoProsperity" (the illfamed ideological slogan widely used by Japanese militarists during the World War II).

Nowadays, the idea of PANPACIFIC cooperation has been revived with­in the frame­work of the Asia Pa­cif­ic Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion for­um APEC, as well as in con­nec­tion with even more farreach­ing schemes aimed at es­tab­lish­ing a giant "PA­CIF­IC COM­MU­NI­TY" in the 21st cen­tu­ry (we shall discuss these issues in Topic 9).

Thus, GLO­BAL COM­PE­TI­TION on the WORLD MAR­KETS is ac­com­pa­nied by strong CEN­TRIP­E­TAL (unit­ing) TEN­DEN­CIES with­in par­tic­u­lar RE­GIONS of the WORLD ECON­O­MY and be­tween them. So, in the fu­ture APEC must con­trib­ute to en­hanc­ing ec­o­nom­ic ties be­tween West­ern and East­ern Pa­cif­ic, or­ Asia and Amer­i­ca, while the (so­ far quite vague) plans of a Trans­at­lan­tic Free Trade Ar­ea TAF­TA are aimed at fa­cil­i­tat­ing fur­ther coop­er­a­tion be­tween Eu­rope and Amer­i­ca.

* At the same time, WORLD ECON­O­MY be­comes a field for mighty strug­gle be­tween the ten­den­cy to­ward LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of in­ter­na­tion­al TRADE in goods and ser­vic­es and IN­VEST­MENT of­ cap­i­tal, on the one hand, and the ten­den­cy to the socalled PRO­TEC­TION­ISM in the for­eign pol­i­cy of IN­DI­VID­U­AL STATES and their GROUPS, on the oth­er hand.

It is well known that the TRADE PRO­TEC­TION­ISM is aimed at creat­ing SPECIAL FAVORABLE CONDITIONS for ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment and lo­cal cap­i­tal with­in cer­tain NA­TION­AL ECON­O­MIES and/or EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GIONS, thus achiev­ing ego­is­ti­c goals at the ex­pense of "ali­ens" ("out­sid­ers").

Top­ic 6. BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM (RE­GION­AL­ISM) AND MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM

(GLO­BAL­ISM) IN THE MOD­ERN WORLD

What we have dis­cussed at the end of the pre­vi­ous lec­ture (the ide­as of "IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE", "TRI­PAR­TI­TEAL­I­TY", "AT­LAN­TI­CISM", "PANEU­ROPE­ISM" or "PANAMER­I­CAN­ISM") ac­tu­al­ly rep­re­sent one of the ma­jor is­sues of mod­ern IN­TER­NA­TION­AL POL­I­TICS – that of the re­la­tion­ship be­tween the TWO ap­proach­es to in­ter­na­tion­al af­fairs (in­clud­ing EC­O­NOM­IC sphere):

# the BI­LAT­ER­AL ap­proach (i.e., "BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM") and

# the MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL ap­proach (i.e., "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM").

* What the term "BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM" means? Orig­i­nal­ly, it was in­tend­ed to de­scribe re­la­tions be­tween TWO par­tic­u­lar coun­tries (for ex­am­ple, be­tween Ger­ma­ny and France, Ja­pan and Chi­na, Amer­i­ca and In­dia, or Ken­ya and Aus­tra­lia). We have in­ten­tion­al­ly in­clud­ed two PAIRS of NEIGH­BOR­ING coun­tries, be­cause now this term is often used in its broad in­ter­pre­ta­tion, i.e., in­ RE­GION­AL con­text to ex­press some fea­tures of RE­LA­TION­SHIP with­in a cer­tain EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GION (or­ SUB­RE­GION) of the WORLD ECON­O­MY, like West­ern Eu­rope, North Amer­i­ca or South East Asia.

Of course, there re­mains some DIFFERENCE be­tween BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM in its CLASSIC sense and RE­GION­AL­ISM as a wid­er term. The re­la­tion­ship be­tween, let us say, Unit­ed King­dom and Chi­na can NOT be de­scribed oth­er­wise as BI­LAT­ER­AL. How­ev­er, in re­gard to coun­tries of the SAME re­gion, BOTH terms can be used. For ex­am­ple, we can treat the ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions be­tween France and Ita­ly as "BI­LAT­ER­AL" and/or "RE­GION­AL" (in­ BOTH cas­es, mean­ing "Eu­ro­pe­an").

Ac­cord­ing­ly, the re­la­tion­ship be­tween MORE than TWO coun­tries of the SAME re­gion (for ex­am­ple, be­tween the USA, Can­a­da and Mex­i­co) of­ten are, as a mat­ter of prac­tice, named NOT on­ly "RE­GION­AL", but al­so "BI­LAT­ER­AL" to ex­press the idea that they are DIF­FER­ENT from tru­ly "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL" re­la­tions.

* This lat­ter term "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL" usu­al­ly de­scribes re­la­tions (ne­go­ti­a­tions, ar­range­ments) be­tween several coun­tries sit­u­at­ed in DIF­FER­ENT ec­o­nom­ic re­gions. It al­so de­scribes pro­cess­es, which are ob­served on the WORLD­WIDE scale in con­trast to RE­GION­AL pro­cess­es, which are often de­scribed as "BI­LAT­ER­AL".

The same ap­plies to IN­TER­NA­TION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS. Usu­al­ly, such or­gan­i­za­tions creat­ed on RE­GION­AL ba­sis are called “REGIONAL” and/or "BI­LAT­ER­AL", while or­gan­i­za­tions in­clud­ing mem­bers from DIF­FER­ENT re­gions (i.e., coun­tries of DIF­FER­ENT con­ti­nents) are named "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL".

Thus, the As­so­ci­a­tion of South East Asian Na­tions (AS­EAN), for ex­am­ple, ex­press­es the spir­it of "BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM" (be­cause it has RE­GION­AL ba­sis), while the WORLD TRADE OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION (WTO) is typ­i­cal­ly "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL" (be­cause it in­cludes more than 150 na­tions all around the world).

* So, DIF­FER­ENT terms are used to­ de­scribe DIF­FER­ENT sit­u­a­tions and pro­cess­es in re­la­tions be­tween na­tions (coun­tries). Those de­vel­op­ing on a RE­GION­AL ba­sis are re­gard­ed as "RE­GION­AL" or "BI­LAT­ER­AL", and those de­vel­op­ing on WORLD­WIDE and IN­TER­RE­GION­AL ba­sis are treat­ed as "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL".

* Why has such a con­fus­ing sit­u­a­tion in us­age of ter­mi­nol­o­gy aris­en? Ex­act­ly be­cause tru­ly "BI­LAT­ER­AL" re­la­tions (be­tween TWO par­tic­u­lar coun­tries) play in to­day's ec­o­nom­ic life on­ly a rel­a­tive­ly MI­NOR role. At the same time, RE­GION­AL and WORLD­WIDE re­la­tions (and ec­o­nom­ic pro­cess­es) are moved to the FORE­GROUND of pub­lic at­ten­tion. It is with the aim to DI­VIDE these lat­ter from each oth­er that the two op­po­site terms – the "BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM" (the "BI­LAT­ER­AL" ap­proach) and the "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM" (the "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL" ap­proach) are used.

* And why ex­act­ly RE­GION­AL and WORLD­WIDE phe­nom­e­na (pro­cess­es) have found them­selves in the mid­dle of pub­lic at­ten­tion? Be­cause BOTH of them rep­re­sent the MA­JOR ten­den­cy in ec­o­nom­ic life – its IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION.

The mat­ter is that on a RE­GION­AL scale and on a WORLD­WIDE (or­ GLO­BAL) scale the MAN­I­FES­TA­TIONS of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION are quite dif­fer­ent, i.e., the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION it­self can take dif­fer­ent FORMS in dif­fer­ent situations and cir­cum­stanc­es. Let us look at these TWO MA­JOR FORMS of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION.

# For ONE of these TWO forms we shall keep the wellknown traditional name "IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION" and together with it al­so use a NEW term – "GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION" hav­ing in mind the pro­cess­es on the WORLD­WIDE scale (i.e., OVER­ALL in­ter­na­tion­al­i­za­tion of TRADE, CAP­I­TAL, PRO­DUC­TION, etc. – with­out re­gard to RE­GION­AL pro­cess­es). Such "GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION" has be­come a COM­MON TREND in mod­ern WORLD ECON­O­MY (GLO­BAL SYS­TEM) and forms the BACK­GROUND for ALL OTH­ER de­vel­op­ments on in­ter­na­tion­al are­na.

# As for cer­tain ec­o­nom­ic RE­GIONS (or­ SUB­RE­GIONS) of the world – like Europe and West­ern Eu­rope, North Amer­i­ca, East Asia and the whole of Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin or, let us say, West Af­ri­ca, or Lat­in Amer­i­ca, – there the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION pro­cess­es take their spe­cif­ic FORM – that of EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION. So we shall call these par­tic­u­lar RE­GION­AL pro­cess­es and sys­tems "IN­TE­GRA­TION".

If we now turn to the mat­ters of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL POL­I­CY or to IN­TER­NA­TION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC RE­LA­TIONS, than we can as­so­ciate the "GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION" of ec­o­nom­ic life (i.e., "IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION" in its broad sense, on a WORLD­WIDE scale) with the afore­men­tioned con­cept of "MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM", and the ec­o­nom­ic "IN­TE­GRA­TION" on RE­GION­AL ba­sis with "BI­LAT­ER­AL­ISM" or "RE­GION­AL­ISM".

* How­ev­er, first of all we must de­fine "IN­TE­GRA­TION" (or "INTERNATIONAL EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION"), and ex­plain WHAT exactly makes it so SPECIFIC, vis­i­bly dif­fer­ent from "GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION" ("IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION") on the WORLD­WIDE scale.

Let us no­tice that for the mod­ern world PO­LI­CEN­TRIC struc­tures are gen­er­al­ly typ­i­cal. This PO­LIC­EN­TRISM very clear­ly shows it­self al­so in the pro­cess­es of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of trade, cap­i­tal and pro­duc­tion which are de­vel­op­ing very UN­E­VEN­LY in dif­fer­ent PARTS (or "sub­sys­tems") of the WORLD ECON­O­MY. In the over­all pic­ture of the de­vel­op­ment of in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty on the MI­CROlev­el (and on­ the ME­SOlev­el where COOP­ER­A­TION be­tween PRO­DUC­ERS is tak­ing place), we find sev­er­al EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GIONS where ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions be­tween NEIGH­BOR­ING coun­tries are spread­ing with es­pe­cial­ly HIGH SPEED.

In the IN­DUS­TRI­AL part of­ the world, among such EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GIONS (some­times, rath­er SUB­RE­GIONS be­cause of rel­a­tive­ly small size) we may name West­ern Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca. Al­so with some res­er­va­tions Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin (or "Asia Pa­cif­ic"), with Ja­pan and the U.S. as the two ma­jor cen­ters of ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty, is re­gard­ed as EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GION. How­ev­er, be­cause of its sheer size, it seems to be more appropriate to call it a SU­PER­RE­GION, where a complex IN­TER­NATIONAL SYS­TEM of ec­o­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion is be­ing grad­u­al­ly formed.

In such EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GIONS, pro­cess­es of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION are de­vel­op­ing so en­er­get­i­cal­ly that a vir­tu­al QUAN­TUM LEAP takes place. It means that the very CHAR­AC­TER of in­ter­ac­tion be­tween neigh­bor­ing coun­tries CHANGES tak­ing NEW FEA­TURES. And the most im­por­tant of­ such NEW FEA­TURES is ex­act­ly the emer­gence of­ DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL mode of RE­PRO­DUC­TION typ­i­cal to them.

So, on the back­ground of UNI­VER­SAL pro­cess­es of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION (which we just named GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION), in par­tic­u­lar RE­GIONS this ten­den­cy is ex­pressed MORE STRONG­LY, thus tak­ing a HIGH­ER and very SPE­CIF­IC form of the "INTERNATIONAL (mostly REGIONAL) EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION".

# On the MI­CRO and ME­SOlev­el, such IN­TE­GRA­TION (with "RE­GION­AL­ISM" as ma­jor or­ien­ta­tion of ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy of in­di­vid­u­al FIRMS) is de­vel­op­ing spon­ta­ne­ous­ly, thus form­ing a sol­id tis­sue of in­tra­re­gion­al EC­O­NOM­IC RE­LA­TIONS which ser­vice the emerg­ing in­tra­re­gion­al RE­PRO­DUC­TION PRO­CESS­ES.

# On the MAC­ROlev­el, the STATES with their FOR­EIGN EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CIES join their ef­forts to create LEG­IS­LA­TIVE and IN­STI­TU­TION­AL FRAME­WORK for the de­vel­op­ment of RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC SYS­TEM. They sign spe­cial RE­GION­AL agree­ments aimed at se­cur­ing fa­vor­a­ble con­di­tions for the IN­TRA­RE­GION­AL ec­o­nom­ic TURN­O­VER – trade, mi­gra­tion of cap­i­tal and la­bor, fi­nan­cial pay­ments, etc.

The just men­tioned RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC SYS­TEM (or "SU­PER­STRUC­TURE") tak­ing dif­fer­ent forms in­cor­po­rates the ten­den­cy to RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION and can be called the "IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM".

* We have to un­der­stand a cer­tain dif­fer­ence be­tween the terms "IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM" and "IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES". The lat­ter ("pro­cess­es") are de­vel­op­ing in many (prac­ti­cal­ly, in ALL) ma­jor re­gions of the world. As for "sys­tems", they can be ob­served NOT eve­ry­where. Usu­al­ly, for their emer­gence a very HIGH GRADE in de­vel­op­ment of "in­te­gra­tion pro­cess­es" should be reached BE­FORE­HAND, and a cer­tain POL­I­CY AR­RANGE­MENT be­tween STATES of the re­gion in ques­tion should be­ creat­ed by their GOV­ERN­MENTS.

The for­ma­tion of the EU­RO­PE­AN COM­MU­NI­TY EC (now the EU­RO­PE­AN UN­ION EU) can serve here as a clas­si­cal ex­am­ple. It took place way back in the late 1950s through the sign­ing of­ the Trea­ty of Rome by SIX Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries (Ger­ma­ny, France, Ita­ly, Bel­gium, Neth­er­lands and Lux­em­bourg). In con­trast to this, we can men­tion Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin (Asia Pa­cif­ic re­gion) where IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES are ev­i­dent, but no IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM has tak­en def­i­nite shape yet.

As of late, another clear example of mighty INTEGRATION PROCESSES, mostly through PRODUCTION COOPERATION and OUTSOURCING on a sector basis (carmaking, electronics, electrical appliances, etc.), can be found between such powerful but socially and geographically very different countries as the United States of America, on the one side, and China, on the other side. At least, a system of COMMON METABOLISM (something like a common bloodstream) in the aforementioned INDUSTRIAL SECTORS (first of all – in CARMAKING) has been emerging, a NEW PHENOMENON which I have named “TWINNING” («сиамизация» in Russian).

* We have al­so to understand the dif­fer­ence be­tween the two oth­er terms "NEG­A­TIVE IN­TE­GRA­TION" and "POS­I­TIVE IN­TE­GRA­TION".

#"NEG­A­TIVE" in­te­gra­tion means the SUM of JOINT AC­TIONS by a group of states aimed at DE­STROY­ING OB­STA­CLES on the way to ex­pand­ed ec­o­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion with­in the re­gion. As ex­am­ple we can name grad­u­al (with­in 10 years, from 1958 to 1968) in­tro­duc­tion of con­di­tions for FREE MOVE­MENT of goods, services, cap­i­tal and la­bor be­tween the first "Eu­ro­pe­an SIX" which have signed the Trea­ty of Rome.

# The es­sence of­ "POS­I­TIVE" in­te­gra­tion can al­so be best un­der­stood on the Eu­ro­pe­an ex­am­ple. Moves, like creat­ing the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion (or­ simply Com­mis­sion) to serve as CO­OR­DI­NAT­ING CEN­TRE in pol­i­cymak­ing, like work­ing out of the COM­MON AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL POL­I­CY (CAP), or in­tro­duc­ing of the EU­RO­PE­AN MON­E­TARY SYS­TEM (EMS) some years lat­er, – all these de­vel­op­ments sig­ni­fied NOT de­struc­tion, but ac­tive CREA­TION of new in­ter­na­tion­al and su­pra­na­tion­al IN­STRU­MENTS of EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CY by the mem­ber states of the EC (EU).

So, "NEG­A­TIVE IN­TE­GRA­TION" de­stroys ob­sta­cles hold­ing back the de­vel­op­ment of in­tra­re­gion­al ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ties, and "POS­I­TIVE IN­TE­GRA­TION" creates new reg­u­la­tive in­stru­ments (in­sti­tu­tions) of ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy.

By their na­ture, such in­stru­ments can be called "IN­TER­na­tion­al" (when the pol­i­cy de­ci­sions are be­ing tak­en to­geth­er by the mem­ber states as a re­sult of ne­go­ti­a­tions be­tween their rep­re­sen­ta­tives), or "SU­PRAna­tion­al" (when decisions are met by spe­cial SU­PRA­na­tion­al or­gans (bod­ies) creat­ed with this very aim and grant­ed their own JU­RIS­DIC­TION ­by the mem­ber states – like the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion).

* To prop­er­ly un­der­stand the es­sence of "IN­TE­GRA­TION", we al­so need learn­ing the dif­fer­ence be­tween its ma­jor OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONAL FORMS. To make things eas­i­er, we shall dis­cuss on­ly THREE of them go­ing from the SIM­PLER (or­ LOW­ER) forms of­ IN­TE­GRA­TION AR­RANGE­MENTS to the MORE COM­PLEX (or HIGH­ER) forms.

# FREE TRADE AR­EA (FTA) an agree­ment to LIB­ER­AL­IZE trade in GOODS (and of­ten al­so in SER­VIC­ES) with­in cer­tain ge­o­graph­i­cal bor­ders – by elim­i­nat­ing CUS­TOMS TAR­IFFS (im­port du­ties) in the in­traar­ea turn­o­ver (i.e., in MU­TU­AL TRADE of the mem­ber states). As for the CUS­TOMS SYS­TEMS (tar­iffs, rules) con­cern­ing trade of the mem­ber states with the OUT­SIDE WORLD (with the socalled "THIRD COUN­TRIES"), they stay NA­TION­AL, i.e., are es­tab­lished by­ each mem­ber UNI­LAT­ER­AL­LY and can be changed by their in­de­pen­dent de­ci­sions on­ly.

Ar­range­ments of this kind can be found in North Amer­i­ca (the fa­mous NAF­TA), in Latin America, in South East Asia, in some oth­er re­gions and subregions.

# CUS­TOMS UN­ION (or COM­MON MAR­KET) the CUS­TOMS TAR­IFFS in the in­traun­ion (in­traar­ea) turn­o­ver are al­so ELIMINATED (the MU­TU­AL trade of the mem­ber states – LIBERALIZED), but the ar­range­ments go far­ther – as to in­clude the CREA­TION of a COM­MON CUS­TOMS SYS­TEM (in­tro­duc­tion of­ COM­MON CUS­TOMS TAR­IFFS) on the bor­der of the un­ion (com­mu­ni­ty). So, as a clas­si­cal ex­am­ple, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion (EU) rep­re­sents an AS­SO­CI­A­TION of na­tions with FREE TRADE in GOODS and SERVICES among its mem­bers and a COM­MON EX­TER­NAL TAR­IFF (fea­tures of a typ­i­cal CUS­TOMS UN­ION), as well as with FREE MO­BIL­I­TY of pro­duc­tion fac­tors, i.e., of CAP­I­TAL and LA­BOR (ex­act­ly this ad­di­tion makes it a "COM­MON MAR­KET"). When, as the next stage, ma­jor EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CIES of in­di­vid­u­al mem­ber states are be­ing har­mon­ized then such as­so­ci­a­tion be­comes an EC­O­NOM­IC UN­ION.

# EC­O­NOM­IC UN­ION pre­cise­ly rep­re­sents the third, and so­ far the HIGH­EST form of re­gion­al ec­o­nom­ic as­so­ci­a­tion (com­mu­ni­ty, un­ion). Now, with the in­tro­duc­tion of many NEW com­mon in­stru­ments of EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CY and the UNI­FI­CA­TION of EC­O­NOM­IC CON­DI­TIONS with­in in­te­grat­ed parts of Eu­rope, the for­mer Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mu­ni­ty (EC) can be, and as a mat­ter of fact is, called EU Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion (now in the process of be­coming an "EMU" "EC­O­NOM­IC AND MON­E­TARY UN­ION" through the introduction of a sin­gle Eu­ro­pe­an cur­ren­cy – the eu­ro).

Of course, the EC­O­NOM­IC in­te­gra­tion usu­al­ly goes hand in hand with PO­LIT­I­CAL rap­proche­ment (grow­ing coop­er­a­tion) of coun­tries with­in the same RE­GION­AL bor­ders. In the last two dec­ades, the EC (EU) has de­vel­oped many pure­ly PO­LIT­I­CAL in­sti­tu­tions and in­stru­ments, which im­part to it NEW QUAL­I­TY – that of a re­gion­al PO­LIT­I­CAL UN­ION. We shall NOT, how­ev­er, an­a­lyze here this (PO­LIT­I­CAL) side – im­por­tant in it­self – of EU­RO­PE­AN EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION.

Let it be no­ticed that all re­main­ing top­ics in­ cur­rent se­mes­ter will be de­vot­ed ex­act­ly to is­sues of RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION, as well as to oth­er forms of RE­GION­AL ec­o­nom­ic and po­lit­i­cal COOP­ER­A­TION. So, here our mod­est aim was on­ly to out­line the THE­O­RET­I­CAL BACK­GROUND on which in­di­vid­u­al IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES and SYS­TEMS should be an­a­lyzed (see Table 1.6.1).

* Now let us switch to MUL­TI­LAT­ER­ALISM.

It has so many MAN­I­FES­TA­TIONS in the mod­ern world that it would be im­pos­si­ble to re­gard all of them. Of spe­cial im­por­tance is, how­ev­er, the fact that prac­ti­cal­ly ALL in­ter­na­tion­al EC­O­NOM­IC OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS (with per­ma­nent char­ac­ter of ac­tiv­i­ties), as well as dif­fer­ent MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL FOR­UMS (gath­er­ing on­ly once or ep­i­sod­i­cal­ly), con­cen­trate their at­ten­tion on TWO ma­jor in­ter­na­tion­al PROBLEMS:

# on­ fur­ther LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of the in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic turn­o­ver (first of all on­ the LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of trade and in­vest­ment),

# on AS­SIST­ING na­tion­al and re­gion­al EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT in dif­fer­ent groups of coun­tries around the world (i.e., on the socalled "DEVELOPMENT AID (or ASSISTANCE)”.

Let us now name some ma­jor MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS of ec­o­nom­ic nature and out­line main fields of their ac­tiv­i­ty.

* We shall start with OR­GANS (bod­ies) creat­ed on the ba­sis and WITHIN the over­all po­lit­i­cal struc­ture of the Unit­ed Na­tions Or­gan­i­za­tion (UNO or UN):

The Unit­ed Na­tions Con­fer­ence on Trade and De­vel­op­ment (UNC­TAD) is a per­ma­nent or­gan of the UNO in­sti­tut­ed in­ 1964 to pro­mote TRADE, es­pe­cial­ly with a view to ac­cel­er­at­ing EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT. The Con­fer­ence meets eve­ry FOUR years. UNC­TAD main func­tions in­clude the pro­mo­tion of TRADE be­tween coun­tries in dif­fer­ent stag­es of de­vel­op­ment and with dif­fer­ent ec­o­nom­ic sys­tems, in­i­ti­a­tion of ac­tion for ne­go­tiat­ing TRADE AGREE­MENTS, and for­mu­lat­ing in­ter­na­tion­al TRADE POL­I­CIES.

The Unit­ed Na­tions In­dus­tri­al De­vel­op­ment Or­gan­i­za­tion (UNI­DO), creat­ed in 1967, aims to as­sist in the IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION of de­vel­op­ing coun­tries by co­or­di­nat­ing ef­forts of oth­er UN or­gan­i­za­tions de­vot­ed to this end. It helps to for­mu­late in­dus­tri­al de­vel­op­ment POLICIES and PROGRAMS by pro­vid­ing ad­vis­ers and oth­er as­sis­tance, most­ly in terms of IN­FOR­MA­TION, ED­U­CA­TION, and RE­SEARCH.

The Unit­ed Na­tions Cap­i­tal De­vel­op­ment Fund (UNCDF) is in op­er­a­tion from 1974. It aids de­vel­op­ing coun­tries by means of GRANTS and LOANS. Avail­a­ble to any mem­ber states of the UN sys­tem, UNCDF pro­vides rap­id as­sis­tance. How­ev­er, its re­sourc­es are pri­mary used for GRANTS to the 49 leastde­vel­oped coun­tries. As­sis­tance ap­plies to ag­ri­cul­ture, ag­roin­dust­ry, drink­ing wa­ter sup­ply, health and nu­tri­tion, lowin­come hous­ing, roads, etc.

The Unit­ed Na­tions De­vel­op­ment Pro­gram (UNDP), es­tab­lished in 1965, aims to build more pro­duc­tive so­ci­e­ties and econ­o­mies in lowin­come na­tions (the "leastde­vel­oped coun­tries" men­tioned above) by help­ing them de­vel­op their NAT­U­RAL and HU­MAN RE­SOURC­ES.

The In­ter­na­tion­al Fund for Ag­ri­cul­tu­ral De­vel­op­ment (IF­AD), creat­ed in 1976, is an agen­cy for sup­port­ing FOOD PRO­DUC­TION in poor com­mu­ni­ties. Ac­cord­ing to rules of the fund, the "in­dus­tri­al­ized coun­tries" (Cat­e­go­ry 1) and "pe­tro­le­umex­port­ing de­vel­op­ing coun­tries" (Cat­e­go­ry 2) pro­vide rev­e­nue (mon­ey) for fi­nanc­ing, so that the "re­cip­i­ent de­vel­op­ing coun­tries" (Cat­e­go­ry 3) can use it for ag­ri­cul­tu­ral de­vel­op­ment pur­pos­es.

The Food and Ag­ri­cul­tu­ral Or­gan­i­za­tion (FAO) is the old­est per­ma­nent spe­cial­ized agen­cy of the Unit­ed Na­tions, es­tab­lished af­ter World War II­ with the ob­jec­tive of elim­i­nat­ing hun­ger and im­prov­ing nu­tri­tion. It seeks TO CO­OR­DI­NATE the ef­forts of gov­ern­ments and tech­ni­cal agen­cies in pro­grams for de­vel­op­ing AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, and FISHERIES.

The In­ter­na­tion­al La­bor Or­gan­i­za­tion (ILO) is al­so a spe­cial­ized agen­cy creat­ed by the Unit­ed Na­tions whose aim is to fa­cil­i­tate the im­prove­ment of LABOR CONDITIONS (hired work) and LIVING STANDARDS through­out the world, etc.

* How­ev­er, MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS es­tab­lished OUTSIDE po­lit­i­cal struc­ture of the Unit­ed Na­tions Or­gan­i­za­tion are gen­er­al­ly MORE ef­fi­cient in work­ing out ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies and/or have com­mand over MORE and BIGGER fi­nan­cial funds sup­plied by the mem­ber states. Let us name some of them too:

The Or­gan­i­za­tion for Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion and De­vel­op­ment (OECD) was es­tab­lished in 1961 by 18 Eu­ro­pe­an na­tions, the USA, and Can­a­da. Its aim was to re­place the for­mer Or­gan­i­za­tion for Eu­ro­pe­an Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion (OEEC, 1948), which played an im­por­tant role in re­al­i­za­tion of the Mar­shall Plan af­ter the World War II. Now, the OECD in­cludes over 30 mostde­vel­oped and rich­est na­tions of the world, with such "new­com­ers" as the Czech Re­pub­lic from among the "postso­cial­ist" coun­tries and the Re­pub­lic of Ko­rea (ROK) from among the NIC.

How­ev­er, this "club of the rich" is main­ly act­ing on­ly as an ad­vi­so­ry body – be­cause of the prin­ci­ple of UNA­NIM­ITY on which it is based. Still, it is a very in­fluen­tial or­gan­i­za­tion. One of its fun­da­men­tal pur­pos­es is to achieve the high­est pos­si­ble EC­O­NOM­IC GROWTH and EM­PLOY­MENT in mem­ber coun­tries. At the same time, the OECD em­pha­siz­es main­tain­ing FI­NAN­CIAL STA­BIL­I­TY. The or­gan­i­za­tion at­tempts to reach this goal by LIB­ER­AL­IZ­ING trade and in­vest­ment be­tween in­dus­tri­al coun­tries and on a world­wide scale. A fur­ther ma­jor goal of the OECD is the CO­OR­DI­NA­TION of in­ter­na­tion­al EC­O­NOM­IC AID.

Yet, in fol­low­ing its pol­i­cies, OECD of­ten gets un­der crit­i­cal fire of the DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES which do NOT want IN­VEST­MENT LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION and some oth­er pro­posed meas­ures and in­sti­tu­tions to be im­posed up­on them. Let us note that during the GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS the role of the OECD was a very MINOR one – at the best.

The World Trade Or­gan­i­za­tion (WTO) was in­tro­duced from Jan­u­ary 1, 1995 as the suc­ces­sor of­ the Gen­er­al Agree­ment on Tar­iffs and Trade (GATT). When es­tab­lished in 1948, the GATT unit­ed 50 coun­tries, while at its last ses­sion in April 1994 in Mo­roc­co, more than 120 mem­ber states took part. Now­a­days, the WTO encompasses over 150 coun­tries, including Chi­na, Taiwan and Rus­sia which since 2013 does not save ef­forts to be­come its fullsize mem­ber (the decision about China and Taiwan membership went through as early as in 2001).

The GATT agree­ment (as doc­u­ment) rep­re­sents an IN­TE­GRAT­ED SET of in­ter­na­tion­al (most­ly BI­LAT­ER­AL) trade ar­range­ments aimed at the ab­o­li­tion of QUO­TAS (quan­ti­ta­tive re­stric­tions to trade) and the re­duc­tion of IM­PORT DU­TIES (cus­toms tar­iffs) among the con­tract­ing na­tions (now, mem­bers of the WTO).

How­ev­er, the GATT al­ways was MORE than an agree­ment. It served as a reg­u­lar FOR­UM for con­duct­ing BI­LAT­ER­AL and MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL trade ne­go­ti­a­tions be­tween its mem­ber states and work­ing out GLO­BAL AR­RANGE­MENTS on this ba­sis. Ne­go­ti­a­tions took place in pro­longed "ROUNDS" which we shall dis­cuss lat­er to­day.

As an agree­ment, GATT set forth gen­er­al rules that are, in ef­fect, a CODE for com­mer­cial pol­i­cy. They pro­vide for un­con­di­tion­al MOSTFA­VOREDNA­TION treat­ment of trade part­ners (the fa­mous MFN prin­ci­ple). The MFN guar­an­tees ALL mem­bers of­ the WTO the ex­ten­sion of ANY tar­iff con­ces­sions grant­ed by­ one par­tic­u­lar coun­try to­ an­other, in­clud­ing con­ces­sions to nonWTO coun­tries.

The agree­ment al­so fore­sees the elim­i­na­tion of QUO­TAS and oth­er quan­ti­ta­tive trade re­stric­tions, the work­ingout of UNI­FORM cus­toms reg­u­la­tions, and the ob­li­ga­tion of EACH con­tract­ing na­tion to NE­GO­TIATE on tar­iff cuts up­on the re­quest of an­other. An ES­CAPE CLAUSE, how­ev­er, al­lows con­tract­ing coun­tries to al­ter agree­ments, if their do­mes­tic pro­duc­ers suf­fer "ex­ces­sive loss­es" as a re­sult of trade con­ces­sions.

Ac­cord­ing to WTO (GATT) ar­range­ments, coun­tries that are mem­bers of a CUS­TOMS UN­ION or a FREE TRADE AR­EA are per­mit­ted to grant each oth­er PREF­E­REN­TIAL tar­iff rates, or to elim­i­nate TAR­IFFS (CUS­TOMS DU­TIES) in mu­tu­al trade com­plete­ly. As for the EX­TER­NAL TAR­IFFS of such trad­ing GROUP­INGS (used in trade with the "third coun­tries"), they may NOT be high­er than the AV­ER­AGE of all the tar­iffs of those coun­tries PRIOR to the for­ma­tion of the cus­toms un­ions (free trade ar­ea). The in­tro­duc­tion of such UN­IONS, how­ev­er, must be ap­proved by WTO, i.e., they must re­ceive of­fi­cial rec­og­ni­tion.

In 1965, a his­tor­ic prin­ci­ple has been es­tab­lished: that DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries should NOT be ex­pect­ed to of­fer REC­I­PROC­ITY (i.e., coun­tercon­ces­sions) in ne­go­ti­a­tions with DE­VEL­OPED (IN­DUS­TRI­AL) coun­tries. The in­tro­duc­tion of the socalled "NONREC­I­PROC­ITY" prin­ci­ple con­trib­ut­ed to­ creat­ing more fa­vor­a­ble at­mos­phere for the socalled "NORTHSOUTH" di­a­logue.

The In­ter­na­tion­al Mon­e­tary Fund (IMF) – orig­i­nal­ly act­ed as spe­cial­ized agen­cy of the UNO (how­ev­er, now it is more in­de­pen­dent from UNO po­lit­i­cal struc­ture). It­ was found­ed at the Bret­ton Woods Con­fer­ence in 1944 to se­cure in­ter­na­tion­al MON­E­TARY COOP­ER­A­TION, sta­bi­lize EX­CHANGE RATES, and ex­pand in­ter­na­tion­al LI­QUID­I­TY (con­vert­i­bil­i­ty to cash).

Op­er­a­tion FUNDS (mon­ey) are sub­scribed by mem­ber gov­ern­ments ac­cord­ing to the lev­el of their NA­TION­AL IN­COME and size of­ their in­ter­na­tion­al RE­SERVE (cur­ren­cy) HOLD­INGS. Coun­try with tem­po­rary dif­fi­cul­ties in its in­ter­na­tion­al bal­ance of pay­ments may pur­chase from the IMF, with its own na­tion­al cur­ren­cy, for­eign re­serve (most­ly, US dol­lars) to meet its in­ter­na­tion­al ob­li­ga­tions.

First in­tro­duced in 1969, the socalled "Spe­cial Draw­ing Rights" (SDR) per­ma­nent­ly ex­pand­ed the SUP­PLY of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL LI­QUID­I­TY (in ad­di­tion to dol­lar and pound serv­ing as the "key", or "re­serve" cur­ren­cies). Now, the SDRmech­a­nism is al­so be­ing used to as­sist coun­tries go­ing through fi­nan­cial trou­bles.

When in­ter­na­tion­al FI­NAN­CIAL CRI­SIS aris­es, the IMF can pool to­geth­er real­ly big "res­cue pack­ag­es" (amounts of dol­lars) and lend them to the trou­bled coun­tries, usu­al­ly on con­di­tion that they fol­low cer­tain guide­lines in their fi­nan­cial and ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies. So it was with Mex­i­co in 1994. So it was with Asia since the au­tumn of 1997, when a "fi­nan­cial melt­down" hit In­do­ne­sia, Thai­land, and Ko­rea rep­re­sent­ing a se­ri­ous threat to the RE­GION and the WORLD (remember "ear­ly loan pro­gram" of the IMF and its flexible lend­ing pol­i­cy dur­ing the Asian crisis).So it is with the modern GLOBAL CRISIS in fighting which the IMF has been playing a substantial role and is expected to introduce major CHANGES in its mechanism to facilitate better CONTROL over CAPITAL MIGRATION of different kinds.

The In­ter­na­tion­al Bank for Re­con­struc­tion and De­vel­op­ment (IBRD, of­ten called the World Bank) was creat­ed in 1946. It is de­signed to fi­nance pro­duc­tive PRO­JECTS that as­sist ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment around the world. Quite nat­u­ral­ly, the U.S. and Ja­pan serve as the biggest sourc­es of FUNDS for such ac­tiv­i­ties.

Loans are usu­al­ly made to gov­ern­ments, or to pri­vate en­ter­pris­es with their gov­ern­ment's guar­an­tee, for SPE­CIF­IC PRO­JECTS when pri­vate cap­i­tal is­ NOT avail­a­ble on rea­son­able terms. The bank lends on­ly for the cost of im­port­ed ma­te­ri­al, equip­ment, and ser­vic­es ob­tained from abroad.

The In­ter­na­tion­al De­vel­op­ment As­so­ci­a­tion (IDA) is an af­fil­i­at­ed or­gan­i­za­tion of the World Bank (IBRD) that lends to the world's poor­est coun­tries at gen­er­ous con­di­tions, such as ZE­RO RATE of in­ter­est and LENGTHY re­pay­ment time. Many IDA loans are NOT ex­pect­ed to be re­paid.

The In­ter­na­tion­al Fi­nance Cor­po­ra­tion (IFC) is an­other arm of the World Bank. It al­so makes loans and in­vests in pri­vate com­pa­nies in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries.

Be­fore the end of 1999, one more in­ter­na­tion­al fi­nan­cial for­um – the so­called Group of 20 (G20) held its first meet­ing in Ber­lin. Along with G7 fi­nance min­is­ters and cen­tral bank gov­ern­ors, the G20 brings to­geth­er rep­re­sen­ta­tives of 12 of the "emerg­ing econ­o­mies" in­clud­ing Russia, Chi­na, South Ko­rea, In­dia, In­do­ne­sia, and Bra­zil. In 2010, the G20 Summit in Seoul has been devoted to the issues of global financial crisis, to how to avoid “currency wars” and, in particular, how to make China give up its too low rate of exchange of the yuan.

* There al­so ex­ist very pe­cu­liar IN­TER­NA­TION­AL OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS, which are creat­ed and FINANCED on a wide in­ter­na­tion­al (MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL) ba­sis, but are aimed at ACTING with­in cer­tain EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GIONS (i.e., on BI­LAT­ER­AL ground).

Here we may name the UNIT­ED NA­TIONS EC­O­NOM­IC COM­MIS­SIONS:

# for Asia and Far East – ECAFE (UN),

# for Af­ri­ca – ECAf (UN),

# for Lat­in Amer­i­ca – ECLA (UN),

# for Eu­rope – ECE (UN).

Cor­re­spond­ing­ly, there are RE­GION­AL DE­VEL­OP­MENT BANKS, which are fund­ed by large cap­i­tal com­mit­ments (sub­scrip­tions) and loans from rich coun­tries, such as the Unit­ed States, Ja­pan, and Swit­zer­land. These funds are then lent at a low rate of in­ter­est and fa­vor­a­ble re­pay­ment con­di­tions to needy coun­tries.

The biggest of the re­gion­al de­vel­op­ment banks is the IN­TERAMER­I­CAN DE­VEL­OP­MENT BANK (IADB), fund­ed pri­mary by coun­tries of the West­ern Hem­i­sphere and pro­vid­ing loans to poor coun­tries of Lat­in Amer­i­ca.

The ASIAN DE­VEL­OP­MENT BANK (ADB), based in the Phi­lip­pines, was set up in 1966 to fos­ter ec­o­nom­ic growth in Asia and the Pa­cif­ic re­gion (most­ly in the ag­ri­cul­ture). It is worth­while to no­tice that, to­geth­er with Amer­i­ca and Ja­pan, over a doz­en of EUcoun­tries make con­sid­er­a­ble con­tri­bu­tions to the ADB re­gard­ing it as a use­ful tool for en­hanc­ing Eu­ropeAsia ties.

The AF­RI­CAN DE­VEL­OP­MENT BANK (AfDB), the small­est of such banks, is based in Ab­i­jan (Ivo­ry Coast). Its loans are used main­ly for pub­lic util­i­ties, trans­por­ta­tion, and ag­ri­cul­tu­ral pro­jects in the socalled SubSa­ha­ran Af­ri­ca.

Fol­low­ing the de­ci­sion of East­ern (Mid­dle) Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries to en­ter the mar­ket econ­o­my, the EU­RO­PE­AN BANK FOR RE­CON­STRUC­TION AND DE­VEL­OP­MENT (EBRD) was set up in Lon­don in 1990 to pro­vide mas­sive amounts of DE­VEL­OP­MENT AID to coun­tries such as Po­land, Hun­gary, Czech Re­pub­lic, Slo­vak­ia, Es­to­nia, Lat­via, and Lith­u­a­nia (and for oth­er new na­tionstates which are emerg­ing af­ter the dis­in­te­gra­tion of the So­viet Un­ion)

* Now, to il­lus­trate the PO­TEN­TIAL of the ma­jor MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS, we shall touch up­on the GATT (WTO) his­to­ry and out­line some prac­ti­cal re­sults achieved by this or­gan­i­za­tion in the course of the last THREE rounds of MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL trade ne­go­ti­a­tions (all in all, since the 1940s, EIGHT such rounds have tak­en place).

* "KEN­NE­DY ROUND" (196567), named af­ter the Amer­i­can pres­i­dent, who put for­ward the con­cept of the "At­lan­tic part­ner­ship".

The main pos­i­tive re­sult of the Ken­ne­dy Round were very sub­stan­tial re­duc­tions of CUS­TOMS TAR­IFFS (im­port du­ties) grant­ed by main trad­ing part­ners to each oth­er. These con­ces­sions con­cerned, first of all, IN­DUS­TRI­AL PROD­UCTS (av­er­age re­duc­tion of du­ties by 35%, to be im­ple­ment­ed over a fiveyear pe­ri­od). They rep­re­sent­ed the first big step in fight­ing TARIFF PRO­TEC­TION­ISM of ma­jor DE­VEL­OPED COUN­TRIES and in lib­er­al­iz­ing their mu­tu­al TRADE turn­o­ver.

In gen­er­al terms, they al­so rep­re­sent­ed the first MA­JOR BLOW to the TAR­IFF PRO­TEC­TION­ISM as such, and es­pe­cial­ly – to the PRO­TEC­TION­IST IN­DUS­TRI­AL POL­I­CIES flour­ish­ing in Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca.

For the FIRST TIME in the GATT his­to­ry, the ne­go­ti­a­tions al­so touched up­on the is­sues of the so called NONTAR­IFF PRO­TEC­TION­ISM. The main re­sult in this field was the adop­tion of a uni­form AN­TI­DUMP­ING CODE.

In re­la­tions be­tween the "IN­DUS­TRI­AL NORTH" and the "AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL SOUTH", the prin­ci­ple of NONREC­I­PROC­ITY of­ con­ces­sions has been in­tro­duced.

The U.S. rep­re­sen­ta­tives al­so in­sist­ed on put­ting on the agen­da the is­sue of the AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL PRO­TEC­TION­ISM of the then Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mu­ni­ty. The re­sults of dis­cus­sion were, how­ev­er, very mod­est (in­ the end, both sides – i.e., Eu­rope and Amer­i­ca – man­aged to keep their ag­ri­cul­tu­ral sys­tems un­changed).

* "TO­KYO ROUND" (197379). It brought new re­duc­tions of TAR­IFFS (most­ly in the field of IN­DUS­TRI­AL PROD­UCTS), but its ma­jor re­sult was the in­tro­duc­tion of sev­er­al "CODES of be­ha­vi­or” – con­cern­ing the GOV­ERN­MENT PRO­CURE­MENT prac­tic­es, use of TECH­NI­CAL STAN­DARDS, SUB­SI­DIES for na­tion­al ex­port­ers, etc.

The most im­por­tant of them the "CODE ON SUB­SI­DIES AND COUN­TER­VAIL­ING DU­TIES" had TWO main fea­tures:

# it list­ed a num­ber of un­ac­cept­a­ble SUBSIDY prac­tic­es, and

# in­tro­duced a re­quire­ment that FORMAL PROCEDURES should be fol­lowed be­fore the im­po­si­tion of COUN­TER­VAIL­ING DU­TIES (i.e., ad­di­tion­al pro­hib­i­tive tar­iffs) on im­ports sub­si­dized by for­eign na­tions.

How­ev­er, the Code has NOT been signed by ALL of the mem­bers, and the sign­ing na­tions agreed to fol­low the pre­scribed rules be­fore ap­ply­ing COUN­TER­VAIL­ING DU­TIES on­ly to the ex­ports of oth­er sig­na­to­ries. Thus, while the code rep­re­sent­ed PROGRESS in deal­ing with new top­ic of nontar­iff bar­riers, it al­so rep­re­sent­ed a DE­PAR­TURE from the mostfa­voredna­tion (MNF) prin­ci­ple.

In ec­o­nom­ic his­to­ry, the To­kyo Round is re­gard­ed as a MAJOR STEP in fight­ing the NONTAR­IFF PRO­TEC­TION­ISM.

* "URU­GUAY ROUND" (198794) opened in Pun­tadelEs­ta at the end of 1986. It was the most pro­longed and heavygo­ing, but may­be al­so the most im­por­tant of the GATT ne­go­ti­a­tions cam­paign. At the sign­ing cer­e­mo­ny in Mar­ra­kech (Mo­roc­co), it was praised as "the world's biggest ev­er trade ac­cord to smash bar­riers to ex­ports and boost glo­bal pros­per­i­ty".

The main new fea­tures of this round of the GATT ne­go­ti­a­tions can be summed up as fol­lows:

# tar­iffs on AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL prod­ucts are be­ing sub­stan­tial­ly REDUCED,

# for the FIRST TIME in his­to­ry, the LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of turn­o­ver has touched up­on the field of SER­VIC­ES,

# the FIRST meas­ures ev­er are be­ing ap­plied to the se­cur­ing of IN­TEL­LEC­TU­AL PROP­ER­TY RIGHTS,

# the GATT it­self had to be ex­pand­ed and reor­ga­nized as the WORLD TRADE OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION (WTO), with in­ter­na­tion­al stat­us equal to the WORLD BANK and the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL MON­E­TARY FUND (IMF).

Dur­ing the last sev­er­al years and up­ to now, all these ar­range­ments are be­ing im­ple­ment­ed, al­beit in the same “heavygo­ing" way which char­ac­ter­ized Uru­guay Round from its very be­gin­ning.

* The World Trade Or­gan­i­za­tion (WTO) be­came a re­al­i­ty as from Jan­u­ary 1, 1995. Since then, several min­i­ste­ri­al con­fer­enc­es (ses­sions) of the WTO have tak­en place.

The FIRST con­fer­ence of the WTO gath­ered in Sin­ga­pore in De­cem­ber 1996. There, in particular, an agree­ment to as­sist the world's 48 POOR­EST COUN­TRIES has been reached – in­clud­ing an AC­TION PLAN to boost TRADE with them; ac­cord­ing to it, the LEASTDE­VEL­OPED COUN­TRIES should be grant­ed DU­TYFREE AC­CESS to mar­kets of ALL de­vel­oped coun­tries and some of­ MORE AD­VANCED de­vel­op­ing econ­o­mies.

* Ac­cord­ing to the ex­pec­ta­tions at that time, a NEW ROUND of mul­ti­lat­er­al trade ne­go­ti­a­tions should have be­gun by the year 2000. How­ev­er, it actually did NOT happen.

Especially, things have gone wrong af­ter the scan­dal fail­ure of the SEC­OND con­fer­ence of the WTO held in Seat­tle (U.S.) for four days in No­vem­berDe­cem­ber 1999.

Some im­por­tant or­gan­i­za­tion­al ques­tions con­cern­ing the then ex­pect­ed "Mil­len­ni­um Round" of the WTO ne­go­ti­a­tions have been agreed up­on be­fore­hand (for ex­am­ple, that the round should take NOT MORE than THREE years to be con­clud­ed) but NOT the round's AGEN­DA which creat­ed ma­jor ten­sions of­ dif­fer­ent kind: be­tween the U.S. and Eu­rope, be­tween the U.S. and Ja­pan, be­tween RICH and POOR na­tions, etc.

* Social clashes in Seattle in December 1999 manifested the true beginning of the militant ANTIGLOBALIZATION movement in the modern world headed by ecological and other NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS. However, the terrorist attack against America on September 11, 2001 and the following U.S.headed wars in Afghanistan (against Taliban and alQaeda forces) and in Iraq have brought worldwide deep changes of their own, including generally more moderate public attitudes towards MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES and further TRADE LIBERALIZATION.

* In November 2001, at the THIRD meeting in Doha (Qatar) ministers from 142 member nation of the WTO adopted a document – dubbed the Doha Development Agenda – which provided ground for a new, originally THREEYEARS long ROUND of multilateral TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (the infamous “Doha Round).

It looks like the U.S. has been ful­ly re­solved to use the new round to put an end to Eu­ro­pe­an AGRAR­I­AN PRO­TEC­TION­ISM, and first of all – to EU prac­tice of heav­i­ly SUB­SI­DIZ­ING the local ag­ri­cul­ture. Earlier, the dead­lock in Seat­tle was creat­ed ex­act­ly by the lack of com­pro­mise re­gard­ing FARM EX­PORT SUB­SI­DIES. While Amer­i­ca (together with Australia and other members of an alliance of AGRICULTURAL EXPORTING countries known as Cairns Group) in­sist­ed that all forms of­ such ag­ri­cul­tu­ral ex­port sup­port should be "scrapped" com­plete­ly, Eu­rope was will­ing to dis­cuss on­ly their "re­duc­tion". As for Ja­pan, it in­sist­ed on the ne­ces­si­ty to keep in mind the socalled "MUL­TI­FUNC­TION­AL­I­TY" of AG­RI­CUL­TURE while dis­cuss­ing is­sues of­ TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION.

Some is­sues have been pushed by IN­DUS­TRI­AL na­tions, but strong­ly op­posed by DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries. Among them we can name such top­ics as­ work­ing out in­ter­na­tion­al LABOR and ENVIRONMENTAL STAN­DARDS. Many in Asia, Af­ri­ca and Lat­in Amer­i­ca be­lieve that any de­ci­sions re­gard­ing these is­sues would be di­rect­ed against them. For ex­am­ple, should the WTO ac­cept UNI­FORM STAN­DARDS of la­bor re­la­tions it would turn against poor coun­tries (which with their ex­treme­ly CHEAP LA­BOR most prob­ably could NOT meet such STAN­DARDS).

* In September 2003, ministers from 146 countries gathered again in Cancun (Mexico) to make a midterm review of the Doha Round proceedings. However, the Cancun meeting ended in a failure to reach understanding both concerning the TIME framework for the negotiations (i.e., when exactly the round should end) as well as their final AGENDA. The collapse of talks in Cancun resulted from the crying lack of understanding between the DEVELOPING COUNTRIES headed by what has received the name of the Group 21, on the one side, and the RICH INDUSTRIAL NATIONS headed by the U.S. and the EU, on the other side. The main DISPUTE which led to a DEADLOCK has been connected with the question of FARM SUBSIDIES still used by the rich countries to the tune of $300 billion a year.

Generally, it was expected that after such misfortune in MULTILATERAL negotiations governments would switch their attention to BILATERAL and REGIONAL deals (mostly of the FTA type) and away from the WTO initiatives, and exactly that happened in the months following the Cancun disaster.

* The next session of the WTO gathered in Hong Kong more than two years later – in December 2005, when the deadline for the Doha Round has been overstepped by almost a year. However, this long expected tour of negotiations did not bring final result as well. The RICH countries opened the way to an eventual COMPROMISE by having agreed to CUT farm trade export SUBSIDIES in eight years and to provide special BREAKS for the poorest nations.

And since a GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS has begun in 2008, any hopes for a near successful outcome of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations evaporated completely.

* Now, to fin­ish with the anal­y­sis of the BI­LAT­ER­AL and MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL ap­proach­es to world pol­i­tics and in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions, we may no­tice that EC­O­NOM­IC POL­I­CIES of EVE­RY mod­ern state are un­der­go­ing deep CHANGES too.

> Its FOR­EIGN EC­O­NOM­IC COMPONENT grows in im­por­tance. On the over­all background of LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of in­ter­na­tion­al trans­ac­tions, trac­es of PRO­TEC­TION­ISM still re­main. The STATES try to con­trol their IMPORTS, so as to re­strict de­liv­er­ies of for­eign goods to their home mar­kets. They ren­der as­sis­tance to na­tion­al EXPORTING FIRMS and INVESTORS abroad. They are in­volved in­to various in­ter­na­tion­al NEGOTIATIONS and take part in the ac­tiv­i­ties of in­ter­na­tion­al ORGANIZATIONS.

> The sphere of pre­dom­i­nant­ly UNI­LAT­ER­AL (in­de­pen­dent) ac­tions, how­ev­er, is rap­id­ly shrink­ing. The new sit­u­a­tion asks for MORE con­sid­er­a­tion to­ward for­eign part­ners. Ev­er MORE is­sues are be­com­ing sub­ject to in­ter­na­tion­al NE­GO­TI­A­TIONS and CON­SUL­TA­TIONS. The Unit­ed States and some oth­er coun­tries which are in­clined to­ use UNI­LAT­ER­AL meas­ures against their part­ners in­stead of­ go­ing through pro­cess of­ ne­go­ti­a­tions are be­ing crit­i­cized.

> Such ne­go­ti­a­tions can be BI­LAT­ER­AL (on twopar­tite or re­gion­al ba­sis). Very of­ten they serve to pre­pare new steps in RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION. They can al­so con­trib­ute to es­tab­lish­ing a kind of "spe­cial re­la­tion­ship" with a cer­tain part­ner OUT­SIDE the re­gion­al bor­ders (like "spe­cial re­la­tions" be­tween the U.S. and the Unit­ed King­dom, or be­tween the U.S. and Is­rael).

Some­times BI­LAT­ER­AL NE­GO­TI­A­TIONS take pro­longed and rath­er reg­u­lar char­ac­ter, like the Si­noAmer­i­can ­or Amer­i­canJap­a­nese trade di­a­logues. It­ is be­cause ec­o­nom­ic is­sues wor­ry­ing both par­ties are often com­plex and longterm in na­ture (like the Amer­i­can TRADE DEF­I­CIT). About the place which BILATERAL ap­proach to ne­go­ti­a­tions and regional FTA arrangements takes in­ Jap­a­nese trad­ing prac­tice we shall speak in Topics 9 and 10.

> As we have seen, in­ter­na­tion­al con­tacts and ar­range­ments of a giv­en coun­try can al­so be (and, very of­ten, are) MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL – through mem­ber­ship in IN­TER­NA­TION­AL OR­GAN­I­ZA­TIONS, through par­tic­i­pa­tion in dif­fer­ent CON­FER­ENC­ES, FOR­UMS, etc.

Now­a­days, with the ex­is­tence of WTO, some DIS­PUTES be­tween in­di­vid­u­al TRADE PART­NERS (coun­tries) are be­ing ne­go­tiat­ed BI­LAT­ER­AL­LY, but in the frame­work of this MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL in­ter­na­tion­al body.

So, EVE­RY coun­try finds its field of UNI­LAT­ER­AL ac­tions MORE and MORE re­strict­ed, but it has a RICH CHOICE of con­tacts on BI­LAT­ER­AL and MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL ba­sis. One kind of con­tacts, how­ev­er, does NOT ex­clude an­other. More, they have the ten­den­cy to de­vel­op si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly, to be­come close­ly in­ter­wov­en, and even to over­grow in­to each ­other.

As a result, EACH coun­try has at its dis­po­sal a WHOLE SET of UNI­LAT­ER­AL, BI­LAT­ER­AL and MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL pol­i­cies.

* Some top­i­cal ISSUES in the de­vel­op­ment of ANY na­tion, how­ev­er, CANNOT be solved oth­er­wise as through JOINT EF­FORT with oth­er coun­tries like ECOILOGICAL prob­lems (of air and/or water POL­LU­TION, etc.), like the permanent threat of HUN­GER (FA­MINE) in many leastde­vel­oped re­gions of the world, like SPACE EX­PLO­RA­TION or use of OCEAN RE­SOURC­ES, etc. Thus, in many cas­es, the coun­try's par­tic­i­pa­tion in IN­TER­NA­TION­AL COOP­ER­A­TION on re­gion­al and/or world­wide scale be­comes AB­SO­LUTE­LY NEC­ES­SARY.

Be­ing summedup, such NA­TION­AL is­sues are over­grow­ing in­to RE­GION­AL and even GLO­BAL EC­O­NOM­IC AND SO­CIAL PROB­LEMS, which be­come the con­cern of the MAN­KIND as a whole. They ask for MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL, tru­ly GLO­BAL in­sti­tu­tions and ac­tions.

To global POLITICAL PROBLEMS, usually clearly STRATEGIC in character, also belong such international tasks as the FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, as PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS in many dangerous spots, as international efforts to secure the NONPROLIFERATION of nuclear arms, etc.

Topic 7. BASIC TRENDS AND TOPICAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Eu­rope is the SEC­OND SMALL­EST of the world's con­ti­nents oc­cu­py­ing an ar­ea of about 10,5 mil­lion square km, i.e., on­ly ONEFIF­TEENTH of the world's to­tal land ar­ea. Its pop­u­la­tion comes close to 800 mil­lion peo­ple and is char­ac­ter­ized by­ HIGH, in some plac­es (like Ruhr in Ger­ma­ny, like Par­is ag­glom­er­a­tion in France, like ur­ban Hol­land and North­ern Ita­ly) VERY HIGH, den­si­ty.

Ge­o­graph­i­cal­ly and so­cial­ly Eu­rope can be di­vid­ed in­to TWO ma­jor parts:

# West­ern (pe­nin­su­lar) Eu­rope, and

# East­ern (con­ti­nen­tal) Eu­rope.

The West­ern part is high­ly in­dus­tri­al­ized, with de­vel­oped mar­ket econ­o­mies and HIGH lev­el of PER CAP­I­TA pro­duc­tion and in­come. The East­ern part (in­clud­ing some coun­tries be­long­ing to­ the socalled Mid­dle Eu­rope) is al­so rath­er in­dus­tri­al­ized, but in a pe­cu­liar, we may even say, unnatural way typ­i­cal for "so­cial­ist" or­ien­ta­tion of de­vel­op­ment. It is now in the final stage of tran­si­tion to mar­ket econ­o­my, and the in­comes of roughly HALF of Eu­ro­pe­an pop­u­la­tion liv­ing there are sub­stan­tial­ly LOW­ER than in the West.

Rough­ly ONETHIRD of Eu­rope is con­sid­ered ar­a­ble – a much larg­er pro­por­tion, than the world's av­er­age of 11%. It part­ly ex­plains why ag­ri­cul­tu­ral is­sues of ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment re­main so im­por­tant in par­tic­u­lar na­tionstates, in the EU and in­ Eu­rope as­ a whole.

The Eu­ro­pe­an con­ti­nent, ex­clud­ing Rus­sia, is very POOR in MIN­ER­AL RE­SOURC­ES – the poor­est of the world's con­ti­nents ac­tu­al­ly. Rus­sia, on the oth­er hand, is the most fa­vor­a­bly en­dowed na­tion in the world in terms of re­serves in NEAR­LY ALL min­er­als (ex­cept baux­ite).

WEST­ERN EU­ROPE has NOT very sub­stan­tial re­serves of pe­tro­le­um (about 3% of the world's to­tal) and nat­u­ral gas (about 6%) most of which is BE­NEATH the North Sea. In­ com­par­i­son, Rus­sia has FOUR TIMES as much pe­tro­le­um and SIX TIMES as much nat­u­ral gas. The coal re­serves are EVEN­LY DI­VID­ED be­tween the two parts of EU­ROPE and to­geth­er rep­re­sent about ONETHIRD of the world's re­serves.

The WestEu­ro­pe­an MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING IN­DUS­TRIES are high­ly de­vel­oped, but al­so high­ly de­pen­dent on the out­side world – be­cause they are most­ly based on IM­PORT­ED raw ma­te­ri­als, and especially on IMPORTED energy. From the ba­sic in­dus­tries, on­ly FER­ROUS MET­AL­LUR­GY has lo­cal raw ma­te­ri­al base (coal and iron ore, the main de­pos­its of which are lo­cat­ed in Ger­ma­ny and France re­spec­tive­ly).

It part­ly ex­plains many WARS be­tween the two coun­tries in the past. It al­so helps to­ un­der­stand why the EU­RO­PE­AN EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION, with its re­gion­al SU­PRA­NA­TION­AL in­sti­tu­tions, has be­gun ex­act­ly in the field of coal and iron pro­duc­tion – with the for­ma­tion of the Eu­ro­pe­an Coal and Steel Com­mu­ni­ty (ECSC) way back in 1952.

* Historically, West­ern Eu­rope was ac­tu­al­ly the FIRST of the big ec­o­nom­ic RE­GIONS of the world where in­te­gra­tion PRO­CESS­ES have quick­ly over­grown in­to in­te­gra­tion SYS­TEM. We may ask "WHY?"

Be­cause many FAC­TORS (pre­req­ui­sites) for ex­act­ly that pat­tern of de­vel­op­ment did ex­ist there.

# EC­O­NOM­IC and NAT­U­RAL fac­tors:

ge­o­graph­i­cal PROX­IM­I­TY,

high grade of COM­PLE­MEN­TAR­I­TY of na­tion­al econ­o­mies (di­verse ag­ri­cul­tu­ral bas­es, various in­dus­tries, dif­fer­ent nat­u­ral re­sourc­es),

high­ly de­vel­oped MU­TU­AL TRADE ask­ing for elim­i­na­tion of trade bar­riers on IN­TRAre­gion­al ba­sis,

strong Amer­i­can COM­PE­TI­TION forc­ing Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries to unite their ef­forts in creat­ing mighty "EU­RO­PE­AN COM­PA­NIES" which could en­joy ad­van­tag­es of the econ­o­my of scale and thus achieve high com­pet­i­tive­ness of their prod­ucts.

# PO­LIT­I­CAL and SO­CIAL fac­tors:

po­lit­i­cal AMEN­A­BIL­I­TY be­tween West­ern Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries, their COM­MON his­to­ry, COM­MON po­lit­i­cal tra­di­tions (de­moc­ra­cy), COM­MON cul­ture based on JUDEOCHRIS­TIAN tra­di­tion, COM­MON aware­ness of be­ing EU­RO­PE­AN, good knowl­edge of FOR­EIGN LAN­GUAG­ES,

COM­MON threat of "COM­MU­NISM", COM­MON dan­ger of a So­viet mil­i­tary IN­VA­SION,

strong BACK­ING by the Unit­ed States, and at the same time – the NE­CES­SI­TY of EU­RO­PE­AN UNI­TY to be able to keep back the Amer­i­can ec­o­nom­ic and po­lit­i­cal in­flu­ence in Eu­rope.

* Of­fi­cial­ly, the FIRST ele­ment in EU­RO­PE­AN IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM was the im­ple­men­ta­tion (in the ear­ly 1950s) of the Eu­ro­pe­an Coal and Steel Com­mu­ni­ty (ECSC) by SIX Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries France, West Ger­ma­ny, Ita­ly, Bel­gium, The Neth­er­lands, and Lux­em­bourg (the last three are al­so mem­bers of­ the socalled "Bene­lux", clas­si­cal cus­toms un­ion dat­ing back to 1920s). It al­lowed to unite the MET­AL­LUR­GI­CAL in­dus­tries of the neigh­bor­ing coun­tries and to create a COM­MON MAR­KET for coal, coke, iron ore, steel, etc.

How­ev­er, the first MA­JOR step in creat­ing a RE­GION­AL IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM has been made in 1957 when the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mu­ni­ty (or EC, orig­i­nal­ly called the Eu­ro­pe­an Ec­o­nom­ic Com­mu­ni­ty EEC) was es­tab­lished by the same SIX Eu­ro­pe­an na­tions through sign­ing of­ the Trea­ty of Rome (by­ the way, si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly with the in­tro­duc­tion of the Eu­ro­pe­an Atom­ic En­er­gy Com­mu­ni­ty "Eu­ra­tom")

Until May 2004, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion (or EU­, for­mer EC­ which was re­named so as from Jan­u­ary 1, 1994) in­cluded FIF­TEEN Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries the original "SIX" founding members (France, Ger­ma­ny, Ita­ly, Bel­gium, The Neth­er­lands, and Lux­em­bourg), plus Unit­ed King­dom, Ire­land and Den­mark (which joined the EC in 1973), Greece (since 1981), Por­tu­gal and Spain (since 1986), as well as Aus­tria, Fin­land and Swe­den (since 1995).

Thus, ever more in­te­grat­ed and steadily expanding RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC SYS­TEM emerged, with a pop­u­la­tion visibly ex­ceed­ing that of the Unit­ed States and Ja­pan, and with a cumulative GNP which comprised – in 1995, for FIFTEEN then membercountries – over 29 percent of the world’s total (as against 25 percent for the U.S. and about 18 percent for Japan).

The EU (former EC) has been of­ten char­ac­ter­ized as "the world's larg­est mul­ti­na­tion­al mar­ket" or as a "ma­jor mul­ti­na­tion­al mar­ket group" unit­ing "in­ter­de­pen­dent na­tions of su­pra­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty".

Sev­er­al oth­er na­tions ap­plied for EC­mem­ber­ship in different years (Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, even Switzerland and Norway). Since the 1990s, sev­er­al NEW­LY IN­DE­PEN­DENT "postso­cial­ist" states in­ Mid­dle Eu­rope, in­clud­ing Po­land, Czech Re­pub­lic, Slo­vak­ia, Hun­gary, Slovenia, Bul­gar­ia and Ro­ma­nia, as­ well as­ the so­called Bal­tic states – Es­to­nia, Lat­via, and Lith­u­a­nia, – all ex­pressed their wish to­ join the EU­ as soon­ as possible.

So, as from May 2004, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion em­braced TWENTY FIVE countries with a population over 450 million con­sid­er­a­bly MORE than previous FIF­TEEN (we shall turn to this question later). In 2005, American GNP reached almost 13 trillion dollars, while the aggregate GNP of the European TWENTY FIVE exceeded 14 trillion dollars. Since then, first Bulgaria and Romania, and in 2013 Croatia have also gained the EU membership.

* The basic LEG­IS­LA­TIVE FRAMEWORK of the original European Economic Community or "Com­mon Mar­ket" was creat­ed by the Trea­ty of Rome. It was aimed at fa­cil­i­tat­ing:

# re­mov­al of BAR­RIERS TO TRADE among the mem­berna­tions (a sign of "neg­a­tive in­te­gra­tion"),

# es­tab­lish­ment of a COM­MON CUS­TOMS SYS­TEM on the Com­mu­ni­ty bor­der (the crea­tion of a "cus­toms un­ion” – a "pos­i­tive in­te­gra­tion" meas­ure),

# in­tro­duc­tion of COM­MON COM­MER­CIAL POL­I­CY to­wards nonmem­ber states,

# even­tu­al CO­OR­DI­NA­TION of trans­por­ta­tion sys­tems, ag­ri­cul­tu­ral pol­i­cies, and gen­er­al ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies (all of this – ele­ments of "pos­i­tive in­te­gra­tion"),

# re­mov­al of pri­vate and pub­lic pol­i­cies re­strict­ing FREE COM­PE­TI­TION (the AN­TIPRO­TEC­TION­IST meas­ures, im­por­tant ele­ments of "neg­a­tive in­te­gra­tion"),

# in ad­di­tion to free mu­tu­al trade in GOODS, al­so full mobility of LABOR, CAPITAL and SERVICES had to be as­sured with­in the Com­mu­ni­ty (the socalled "FOUR FREE­DOMS", i.e., a set of "neg­a­tive in­te­gra­tion" meas­ures aimed at­ crea­tion of­ a tru­ly COM­MON MAR­KET). This goal, how­ev­er, was achieved on­ly IN PART.

* The Trea­ty of Rome creat­ed sev­er­al important ec­o­nom­ic and po­lit­i­cal bod­ies (or­gans) of SU­PRA­na­tion­al na­ture (i.e., hav­ing le­gal stat­us and ex­ten­sive pow­ers in fields cov­ered by com­mon pol­i­cies). Some of them are:

# EC­O­NOM­IC or­gans:

The Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion (or sim­ply "Com­mis­sion"), which is charged principal­ly with im­ple­men­ta­tion of var­i­ous trea­ties is­sued by the Coun­cil of Min­is­ters (so, it is a typ­i­cal EXECUTIVE BODY of SU­PRA­na­tion­al char­ac­ter). The now 18 Com­mis­sion mem­bers are in­de­pen­dent from their na­tion­al states and act on­ly in the in­ter­est of the EU (there have been 20 Commissioners until May 2004 and 27 in the period since that date and until the Treaty of Lisbon has been adopted in 2007). They can both pro­pose leg­is­la­tion and im­ple­ment EU pol­i­cies.

It is im­por­tant to no­tice that the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion is en­ti­tled TO REP­RE­SENT the EU in in­ter­na­tion­al ne­go­ti­a­tions. This means that in many prac­ti­cal cas­es the EU can take part in ne­go­ti­a­tions (can ne­go­tiate) AS A SIN­GLE EN­TI­TY.

The Coun­cil of Min­is­ters in­clud­es one rep­re­sen­ta­tive, or "min­is­ter", from each mem­ber state, although with QUITE DIFFERENT number of VOTES (from overall number of 345 votes, Germany and France have 29 votes each, while the UK and Spain, for example, have 27, etc.). The Council of Ministers has the real pow­er of de­ci­sion, and thus is­ the main LEGISLATIVE BODY of the EU. It al­so de­ter­mines HOW trea­ties are to be car­ried out and HOW sep­ar­ate ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies of the mem­ber na­tions are to be co­or­di­nat­ed to achieve goals set in these trea­ties. Un­der new pro­vi­sions, the Coun­cil can en­act pro­po­sals in­to law by­ ma­jor­i­ty vote in­stead of­ una­nim­ity for­mer­ly re­quired (ex­cept for few ques­tions, such as­ tax­a­tion) a VERY IM­POR­TANT change of rules.

Late­ly, the Council of Ministers is more and more of­ten called the Coun­cil of the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion. How­ev­er, we should dis­tin­guish it from the Eu­ro­pe­an Coun­cil the SUM­MIT MEET­INGS of the Heads of State or Gov­ern­ment, since 1974 tak­ing place twice a year and based on consensus. And, of course, it should be also clear that the Council of Europe (CoE), of which the Russian federation is a member, is something else again.

# PO­LIT­I­CAL or­gans:

The Eu­ro­pe­an Par­lia­ment is the QUASY LEGISLATURE of the Un­ion. It can in­flu­ence leg­is­la­tion, but un­til 1993 it did NOT have the pow­er to in­i­tiate leg­is­la­tion (tra­di­tion­al­ly, this right lies with the Com­mis­sion, and the Coun­cil takes ac­tu­al de­ci­sions). The 750 mem­bers of the Par­lia­ment (there is also a President – to avoid deadlocks during the votes) are ap­por­tioned among the mem­ber states and elect­ed eve­ry 5 years by di­rect uni­ver­sal suf­frage (the principle is called “degressively proportional representation” – minimum 9 sits for a country, maximum – 90 sits). Within the Parliament, several main POLITICAL FACTIONS are formed which unite MP elected from different countries but espousing similar political views. Many stand­ing com­mit­tees with the task of pre­par­ing new leg­is­la­tive acts (on budget, etc.) are work­ing with­in the Par­lia­ment's frame­work. It is ex­pect­ed that the po­lit­i­cal role of the Par­lia­ment will visibly grow and it will be­come a fullfledged leg­is­la­tive body. An important function of the Parliament consists also in electing the President of the Commission.

The Court of Jus­tice is the SUPREME COURT of the EU. Its first re­spon­si­bil­i­ty is chal­leng­ing any meas­ures in­com­pat­i­ble with the Trea­ty of Rome when they are adopt­ed by the Com­mis­sion, Coun­cil, or na­tion­al gov­ern­ments. Its sec­ond re­spon­si­bil­i­ty is­ pass­ing judgment, at­ a re­quest of­ a na­tion­al court, on the in­ter­pre­ta­tion or va­lid­i­ty of­ points of­ EU law. The court's de­ci­sions are FINAL and can NOT be ap­pealed in na­tion­al courts. They are BINDING on EU mem­bers and OVERRULE those of na­tion­al court. So, it is a strong SU­PRA­na­tion­al le­gal body.

* On the base of the Trea­ty of Rome and lat­er agree­ments, sev­er­al COM­MON POL­I­CIES of the mem­berstates have been de­vel­oped. The main of them are:

# COM­PE­TI­TION RULES. Spe­cial reg­u­la­tions on com­pe­ti­tion prac­tic­es have been adopt­ed which have prec­e­dence over na­tion­al leg­is­la­tion, but do NOT re­place it. This leg­is­la­tion for­bids re­stric­tive agree­ments and prac­tic­es which af­fect trade be­tween mem­ber states, as well as gov­ern­ment aid to busi­ness aimed at achiev­ing dom­i­nant po­si­tion on the Eu­ro­pe­an mar­ket. So, this leg­is­la­tion is main­ly in­tend­ed to­ se­cure enough COM­PE­TI­TION.

# The COM­MON AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL POL­I­CY (CAP) is a very im­por­tant ele­ment of the Eu­ro­pe­an in­te­gra­tion sys­tem. It is re­spon­si­ble for al­most THREEQUAR­TERS of the EU bud­get ex­pen­di­tures. Ag­ri­cul­ture is heav­i­ly sub­sid­ized and high­ly pro­tected with­in the EU – main­ly by set­ting MINIMUM PRICES for pro­duc­ers and levy­ing high TARIFFS on food im­ports.

The CAP forms ma­jor an­noy­ing fac­tor in­ in­ter­na­tion­al pol­i­tics creat­ed by the EU. For ex­am­ple, it is­ strong­ly in­flu­enc­ing the Eu­ro­pe­anAmer­i­can re­la­tions. At the GATT (WTO) ne­go­ti­a­tions (To­kyo Round and Uru­guay Round, as well as the current Doha Round) the CAP was strong­ly crit­i­cized be­cause of its in­ter­ven­tion­ist and protectionist ap­proach which caus­es high pric­es for Eu­ro­pe­an con­su­mers and has dis­crim­i­nat­ing ef­fect on nonEU sup­pli­ers.

# TRANS­POR­TA­TION POL­I­CY. For in­ter­na­tion­al trade, trans­por­ta­tion costs are of vi­tal im­por­tance; they are in fact part of pro­duc­tion costs. So, with­out COM­MON POL­I­CY in the field of trans­por­ta­tion, pro­duc­tion costs in the Com­mu­ni­ty's in­dus­tries could be dis­tort­ed by dif­fer­enc­es in NA­TION­AL trans­por­ta­tion con­di­tions and rules.

# IN­DUS­TRI­AL POL­I­CY can be de­fined as gov­ern­ment ac­tions aimed at in­flu­enc­ing in­dus­try (first of all – its struc­tu­ral de­vel­op­ment). So, it is a kind of ac­tive in­ter­ven­tion­ist ("dir­ig­ist") pol­i­cy, and as such caus­es de­bates with­in the EU and around it. Still, some ele­ments of COM­MON in­dus­tri­al pol­i­cy were and are used in re­struc­tur­ing DE­CLIN­ING in­dus­tries – like coal and steel pro­duc­tion, ship­build­ing, tex­tile and cloth­ing. In NEW doc­u­ments reg­u­lat­ing ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cies of the EU, coop­er­a­tion be­tween Eu­ro­pe­an com­pa­nies in the ar­ea of R&D and their sup­port by the na­tion­al gov­ern­ments are le­gal­ly ap­proved and en­cour­aged. All this is be­cause Eu­rope is afraid to lose the TECH­NOL­O­GY RACE to Ja­pan and to the USA.

# RE­GION­AL POL­I­CY. Like ag­ri­cul­tu­ral pol­i­cy, COM­MON re­gion­al pol­i­cy is NOT quite in line with freemar­ket or­ien­ta­tion of the Union. Still, it is used for SE­LEC­TIVE sup­port of the weak­est countries and re­gions – like Por­tu­gal, Greece, Bulgaria, or South­ern Ita­ly,

# TAX­A­TION, SO­CIAL AND EN­VI­RON­MEN­TAL POL­I­CIES. Some COM­MON ele­ments in these pol­i­cies are adopt­ed with the aim of UNI­FY­ING ec­o­nom­ic con­di­tions with­in the Com­mu­ni­ty and se­cur­ing fair com­pe­ti­tion. By the way, it ex­plains the rea­son why the "Eu­ro­pe­an IN­TE­GRA­TION" is of­ten called "Eu­ro­pe­an UNI­FI­CA­TION".

It is well known that such fac­tors as­ tax­es, so­cial se­cur­i­ty con­tri­bu­tions or pol­lu­tion stan­dards af­fect costs of pro­duc­tion. So, the EU un­der­takes meas­ures to achieve a cer­tain HAR­MON­I­ZA­TION and STAN­DARD­I­ZA­TION of­ tax rates, pol­lu­tion norms, health re­quire­ments, etc. The re­sults, how­ev­er, are rath­er MODEST, es­pe­cial­ly in the field of TAXATION, where the de­ci­sionmak­ing pro­cess, now as be­fore, in­volves UNA­NIM­ITY in the Coun­cil of Min­is­ters.

# MON­E­TARY POL­I­CY. This is "last, but not least" di­rec­tion in work­ing out COM­MON pol­i­cies of the EU (for­mer EC).

The call for a Eu­ro­pe­an mon­e­tary pol­i­cy arose af­ter the col­lapse of the Bret­ton Woods sys­tem of fixed ex­change rates in 1971. Af­ter a se­ries of ne­go­ti­a­tion, the Eu­ro­pe­an Mon­e­tary Sys­tem (EMS) came in­to force in 1979 in­tro­duc­ing the prin­ci­ple of "mon­e­tary snake" in reg­u­lat­ing the ex­change rates of in­di­vid­u­al cur­ren­cies. Ac­cord­ing to EMS ar­range­ments, cur­ren­cies of the mem­ber states were al­lowed to­ fluc­tu­ate (the socalled re­gime of float­ing ex­change rates), but on­ly in a cer­tain nar­row in­ter­val (from 2,25 to +2,25% around the "cen­tral rate").

MON­E­TARY STA­BIL­I­TY is­ of­ vi­tal im­por­tance for the Un­ion, so the EMS has be­come a ma­jor tool of se­cur­ing fa­vor­a­ble CON­DI­TIONS for EC­O­NOM­IC GROWTH.

* How­ev­er, fur­ther MON­E­TARY IN­TE­GRA­TION could NOT be en­vis­aged with­out clos­er ec­o­nom­ic and po­lit­i­cal RAP­PROCHE­MENT (coop­er­a­tion) be­tween the mem­ber states. Thus, mon­e­tary is­sues played ma­jor role in prep­ar­ing such NEW big steps in EU­RO­PE­AN EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION as the adop­tion of the Sin­gle Eu­ro­pe­an Act (1985) and the sign­ing of the Trea­ty of Maas­tricht (1992).

Ac­cord­ing to these TWO doc­u­ments of par­a­mount im­por­tance, by the end of the 20th cen­tu­ry the Ec­o­nom­ic and Mon­e­tary Un­ion (EMU) has been es­tab­lished – with im­proved and de­vel­oped EMS as one of its ma­jor ele­ments.

The tran­si­tion from a "Com­mon Mar­ket" and the EMS to a "Sin­gle Mar­ket" and the EMU was ef­fect­ed in THREE stag­es:

1. com­ple­tion of SIN­GLE (or IN­TER­NAL) MAR­KET with­in the EU (we shall dis­cuss it a bit lat­er) and se­cur­ing tru­ly FREE MOVE­MENT of cap­i­tal,

2. crea­tion of the Eu­ro­pe­an Cen­tral Bank (Eur­ofed) and clos­er coop­er­a­tion in mat­ters con­cern­ing MON­E­TARY POL­I­CIES,

3. in­tro­duc­tion of a SIN­GLE Eu­ro­pe­an cur­ren­cy (which lat­er re­ceived the name of the "eu­ro") not lat­er than by1999, with the aim of re­plac­ing na­tion­al cur­ren­cies of the mem­ber states as from 2002.

* Now, we have to re­turn for a while to HIS­TO­RY in or­der to fol­low the course of Eu­ro­pe­an in­te­gra­tion.

Progress to­ward the achieve­ment of the "FOUR FREE­DOMS" (con­di­tions mak­ing pos­si­ble for goods, peo­ple, cap­i­tal and ser­vic­es to move un­hin­dered through­out the Com­mu­ni­ty) has NOT been spread even­ly over the 40 years since 1958.

Events moved rap­id­ly in the first 10 years. The SIX orig­i­nal mem­ber states re­moved ALL tar­iffs and quo­tas on their in­ter­nal trade in Ju­ly 1968, 18 months ahead of sched­ule. By this time, they had al­so fi­nal­ized their CUS­TOMS UN­ION by creat­ing a sin­gle set of tar­iffs on im­ports from the out­side world (from the "third" coun­tries).

IN­TER­NAL TRADE (i.e. the ex­change of goods among the mem­ber coun­tries) was and is of ma­jor im­por­tance to the EU. Af­ter the in­tro­duc­tion of re­gion­al free trade ar­range­ment and the com­mon cus­toms tar­iff, the IN­TER­NAL trade turn­o­ver has grown rap­id­ly and, since the early 1990s, amounted to about 60 per­cent of the over­all trade fig­ures of the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion. How­ev­er, sev­er­al NONTAR­IFF BAR­RIERS to its IN­TER­NAL trade still re­mained pre­vent­ing com­plete­ly free move­ment of goods and ser­vic­es with­in the COMMON MARKET. That is why the next goal has been to­ create much more free SINGLE MARKET con­di­tions.

Tak­en as a whole, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion is by far the BIGGEST world trad­er. It is re­spon­si­ble for al­most TWOFIFTHS of world mer­chan­dise EXPORTS, against about 12 per­cent share of the USA and just over 9 per­cent of Ja­pan. How­ev­er, if we EXCLUDE from the world fig­ures the IN­TER­NAL TRADE within the EU, the whole pic­ture would CHANGE: the rel­a­tive im­por­tance of the EU ex­ports would be re­duced to 20 per­cent, while the Amer­i­can and Jap­a­nese share would rise to 16 and 12 per­cent, re­spec­tive­ly.

Still, the EU in­volve­ment in trade with the socalled THIRD coun­tries is big by any stan­dards. To bet­ter un­der­stand the patterns of EU IN­TER­NAL and EU EX­TER­NAL trade, both in­ re­spect to their GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL DIS­TRI­BU­TION and PROD­UC STRUC­TURE, please, look for the latest respective statistics which can be easily found in the Internet.

* How­ev­er, re­turn­ing to HISTORY, we have to­ no­tice that PROGRESS to­wards fur­ther in­te­gra­tion SLOWED DOWN dur­ing the 1970s and ear­ly 1980s. One rea­son was the need to ab­sorb THREE new­com­ers Brit­ain, Ire­land and Den­mark who joined the EC in 1973. The sec­ond, and more im­por­tant ob­sta­cle was an ec­o­nom­ic RECESSION which fol­lowed TWO in­ter­na­tion­al OIL SHOCKS in 1973 and again in 1979.

Gen­er­al­ly, there were al­ways strong CONTRADICTIONS among ma­jor part­ners con­cern­ing the de­vel­op­ment of the Com­mu­ni­ty, i.e., CONTRADICTIONS be­tween:

# DEEP­EN­ING of in­te­gra­tion – and its WID­EN­ING,

# be­tween ad­vo­cates of­ SLOW and GRAD­U­AL ("stepbystep") mo­tion – and those who pre­ferred QUICK and RAD­I­CAL chang­es (in "big moves").

These con­tra­dic­tions de­vel­oped most­ly be­tween France and Ger­ma­ny, on the one side, and the Unit­ed King­dom (Brit­ain), on the oth­er side. The con­ti­nen­tal pow­ers were, and still are, mainly in fa­vor of a QUICK de­vel­op­ment to­ward DEEP­EN­ING of in­te­gra­tion, and Brit­ain with some of its al­lies – for SLOW move­ment for­ward on a WID­EST pos­si­ble ge­o­graph­i­cal ba­sis.

It was Jaques De­lors who in­ject­ed a NEW DY­NA­MISM in­to the achieve­ment of "four free­doms" when he be­came Pres­i­dent of the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion in 1985. He launched the SIN­GLE MAR­KET in­i­tia­tive (to­geth­er with Lord Cock­field who pre­pared a White Paper fix­ing the time­ta­ble of tran­si­tion).

* So, on this ba­sis the Sin­gle Eu­ro­pe­an Act (SEA) was draft­ed and agreed in­ De­cem­ber 1985 – with an aim to in­tro­duce SIN­GLE MAR­KET con­di­tions as from Jan­u­ary 1993.

The dif­fer­ence be­tween "COM­MON MAR­KET" and "SIN­GLE MAR­KET" is ex­act­ly in the DEEP­NESS of the mar­ket in­te­gra­tion. The SEC­OND means de­stroy­ing the re­main­ing ob­sta­cles to trade and form­ing a mar­ket sys­tem which is in many ways sim­i­lar in­ qual­i­ty to "IN­TER­NAL MAR­KET" of a coun­try but em­brac­es the whole of the EU. The main aim of­ the SEA was for­mu­lat­ed as­ fol­lows: "to create a large, free in­ter­nal mar­ket char­ac­ter­ized by­ strong and free com­pe­ti­tion".

One of the key in­no­va­tions of the SEA was to ex­tend the use of MA­JOR­I­TY VOT­ING in place of UNA­NIM­ITY in the Coun­cil of Min­is­ters. It al­so brought the Eu­ro­pe­an Par­lia­ment more close­ly and more ac­tive­ly in­to de­ci­sionmak­ing pro­cess. With­out MA­JOR­I­TY VOT­ING, it would have been IMPOSSIBLE to have the SIN­GLE MAR­KET ready by the end of 1992.

* It was the aware­ness of grow­ing GAP be­tween Eu­rope and its ri­vals (Amer­i­ca and Ja­pan) in the field of fastgrow­ing HIGHTECH in­dus­tries that be­came ma­jor driv­ing force be­hind the SPEED­INGUP and DEEP­EN­ING of the in­te­gra­tion pro­cess­es with­in the Com­mu­ni­ty at the end of the 1980s.

Ac­cord­ing­ly, it was the dy­na­mism creat­ed by the in­tro­duc­tion of SIN­GLE MAR­KET that has in­spired the EU to ex­tend in­te­gra­tion in­to crit­i­cal, but sen­si­tive ar­e­as of PO­LIT­I­CAL UN­ION and EC­O­NOM­IC AND MON­E­TARY UN­ION (EMU).

* The Trea­ty of­ Maas­tricht (or­ the Maas­tricht Trea­ty, or – officiallythe Treaty on European Union), signed in Feb­ru­ary 1992, has set am­bi­tious timeta­ble for the at­tain­ment of both an EMU and something like a real po­lit­i­cal un­ion. The Trea­ty rep­re­sents the BIGGEST CHANGE in the EC­ char­ter (rules) since its crea­tion, i.e., since the Trea­ty of Rome, for which it serves as an im­por­tant ad­di­tion (or amend­ment).

On the way to a PO­LIT­I­CAL UN­ION, the Maas­tricht Trea­ty aimed at creat­ing the socalled "THREE PIL­LARS" of the EU com­mon pol­i­cies:

PIL­LAR ONE in­volv­ing com­mon meas­ures in such sensitive ar­e­as as TAX­A­TION, IN­DUS­TRI­AL POL­I­CY, CUL­TURE, use of RE­GION­AL and SO­CIAL FUNDS, etc. It is im­por­tant to no­tice that in such vi­tal ar­e­as DE­CI­SIONS in­ work­ing out COM­MON POL­I­CIES re­main sub­ject to UNA­NIM­ITY vot­ing of all mem­ber coun­tries.

PIL­LAR TWO in­volv­ing the "Com­mon For­eign and Se­cur­i­ty Pol­i­cy" (please, note the mech­a­nism of DE­CI­SIONMAK­ING in these vi­tal spheres has to be creat­ed yet, while con­tra­dic­tions around it are very strong). In June 1999, at­ the EU­SUM­MIT in Co­logne, Ger­ma­ny, 15 lead­ers se­lect­ed Ja­vi­er So­la­na, then NATO Sec­re­tary Gen­er­al, to be the first EU for­eign pol­i­cy chief a new po­si­tion de­signed to give the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion more clout and rec­og­ni­tion on the in­ter­na­tion­al are­na. Also, in 1998 at a EU summit in St. Malo, a "“Euro Defense” project has been adopted providing for the creation of a special European Rapid Reaction Force – ERRF, to be used (independently from NATO) for peacekeeping, disasterrelief and humanitarian operations. However, later a compromise decision has been taken – to establish a “EU PLANNING CELL” at the NATO’s high command headquarters, instead of original plans for an own EU headquarters separate from the NATO.

PIL­LAR THREE pro­vid­ing for COOP­ER­A­TION in the fields of "Jus­tice and Home Af­fairs" (al­so rath­er sen­si­tive ar­e­as where any prac­ti­cal POL­I­CY UNI­FI­CA­TION is rath­er dif­fi­cult to at­tain, es­pe­cial­ly with grow­ing num­ber of the mem­ber states in the next few years).

* How­ev­er, those were NOT the po­lit­i­cal as­pects of the Maas­tricht Trea­ty that made it­ such a wide­lydis­cussed and con­tro­ver­sial doc­u­ment. Rath­er, the public at­ten­tion fo­cused around the gran­di­ose pro­ject of creat­ing the Ec­o­nom­ic and Mon­e­tary Un­ion (EMU), in­clud­ing the idea of the eu­ro as a SIN­GLE CUR­REN­CY.

In 1996, the EU lead­ers gath­ered in Ma­drid to open the In­terGov­ernment Con­fer­ence (IGC) which had to per­form an im­por­tant and pro­longed work of­ eval­u­at­ing progress in im­ple­men­ta­tion of the Maas­tricht Trea­ty and of­ pre­par­ing the EU­ for ac­cep­tance of­ new mem­bers be­fore the end of the cen­tu­ry.

Dur­ing this work which has tak­en more than a year (the IGC ses­sion last­ed from March 1996 to June 1997), it turned out that by far NOT all EU mem­bers were ready to adopt a SIN­GLE CUR­REN­CY ac­cord­ing to the Maas­tricht plan, i.e., as from 1999. In oth­er words, some coun­tries hard­ly could meet the main FI­NAN­CIAL CRI­TE­RIA ap­plied to those who were go­ing to in­tro­duce the eu­ro as "found­ing mem­bers" of the SIN­GLE CUR­REN­CY sys­tem – the year­ly BUDGET DEFICIT not ex­ceed­ing 3 per­cent of their Gross Do­mes­tic Prod­uct (GDP) and the to­tal out­stand­ing GOVERNMENT DEBT be­low 60 per­cent of the GDP.

How­ev­er, by the spring 1998, it be­came clear that fi­nal­ly on­ly ONE coun­try Greece, was un­able to meet the justmen­tioned "Maas­tricht cri­te­ria" on time to be­come one of the "found­ing mem­bers" of the EMU. And THREE coun­tries Brit­ain (the U.K.), Den­mark and Swe­den have cho­sen NOT to join, at least in­ the "first wave", on PO­LIT­I­CAL grounds.

Thus, in May 1998, dur­ing the EUsum­mit in Brus­sels, those were 11 coun­tries that joined the new sin­glecur­ren­cy sys­tem and agreed on fixed EX­CHANGE RATES at which their na­tion­al cur­ren­cies had to be locked on Jan­u­ary 1, 1999.

So, while 11 EUmem­bers, with to­tal pop­u­la­tion of about 300 mil­lion peo­ple, were ready and will­ing to go ahead ac­cord­ing to the sched­ule adopt­ed in Maas­tricht, FOUR coun­tries "lagged be­hind", thus form­ing a kind of "SLOW LANE" in the Eu­ro­pe­an "IN­TE­GRA­TION TRAF­FIC" (and ONE MORE, even “SLOWER LANE” has emerged after NEW MEMBERS joined the EU in 2004).

The SINGLE CUR­REN­CY has been first in­tro­duced in 1999 (dur­ing the socalled Phase A), and af­ter threeyear TRAN­SI­TION­AL PE­RI­OD (Phase B), i.e., since January­ 2002, the 11 original mem­ber coun­tries plus Greece, which managed to considerably improve the position of its drahma, said good­bye to their traditional means of exchange to the Aus­tri­an schil­ling, Bel­gian and French francs, to the Dutch guild­er and, above all, good­bye to the Deuts­che Mark one of the great­est "suc­cess cur­ren­cies" of all time, matched on­ly by the Swiss franc and the Jap­a­nese yen for sheer hard­ness and sound­ness.

Of course, there was NO guar­an­tee whatsoever that the eu­ro as the SIN­GLE CUR­REN­CY of the emerg­ing "Eu­ro­land" would be as good and as strong as hoped. However, after a shirt dive at the very beginning, the euro has been enjoying rather high exchange rates to the US dollar. Anyway, as of mid2014, the euro has been already introduced in 18 countries, including Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and, finally, Latvia. Lithuania is going to use the euro from 2015

* The rath­er mod­est SET of DOC­U­MENTS signed in Am­ster­dam in June 1997, which is of­ten summed up un­der the name the Am­ster­dam Trea­ty, pro­vid­ed LEGAL BASIS for fur­ther work aimed at bring­ing nec­es­sary chang­es in­to the EU char­ter so that the ne­go­tiat­ing pro­cess with po­ten­tial NEW MEM­BERS could have started.

Pub­lic at­ten­tion was ob­vi­ous­ly switched from the is­sues of DEEP­EN­ING the in­te­gra­tion (like the in­tro­duc­tion of the eu­ro or im­ple­ment­ing the idea of Com­mon For­eign and Se­cur­i­ty Pol­i­cy "PIL­LAR TWO" of the Maas­tricht Trea­ty) to the in­sti­tu­tion­al prep­ar­a­tions for its WID­EN­ING through NEW MEM­BER­SHIP.

All in all, 13 coun­tries have lined up to ap­ply for the EU mem­ber­ship Cy­prus, Mal­ta and Tur­key, and 10 TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TIES ("postso­cial­ist" coun­tries) of East­ern Eu­rope.

At the historic EU summit in Athens, in April 2003, TEN countries have been chosen to join the EU as from May 2004 (EIGHT former Soviet bloc countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, and also Cyprus and Malta). Bulgaria and Romania were still engaged in their entrance negotiations, while the question with the membership of Turkey has been “put on the back burner.”

* This NEW sit­u­a­tion de­manded some MA­JOR AL­TER­A­TIONS in the IN­STI­TU­TION­AL STRUC­TURE of the EU­. Un­for­tu­nate­ly, NO­ such or­gan­i­za­tion­al CHANG­ES could have been agreed up­on in Am­ster­dam. This created a rather unstable situation in the EU dangerous for its future and the prospects of expansion.

At last, minimal necessary CHANGES have been agreed upon in December 2000 at Nice (France) by the EU summit chaired by French President Jacques Chirac. The NEGOTIATIONS were extremely difficult, but the achieved RESULTS can be evaluated as quite satisfactory.

The Treaty of Nice contains about TEN important points concerning future institutional structure and decisionmaking mechanism of the EU. For ex­am­ple, the EU lead­ers agreed on NEW VOT­ING PRO­CE­DURES in the Council of Ministers to give the most pop­u­lous coun­tries Ger­ma­ny, France, Britain, Ita­ly and Spain great­er say (i.e., strong­er rep­re­sen­ta­tion) in de­cid­ing pol­i­cy. In many new fields MAJORITY VOTING has been introduced, although the most contradictory issues, such as TAXATION, SOCIAL SECURITY, IMMIGRATION POLICY, will demand UNANIMITY as before (i.e., countries keep the right to use VETO against the decisions unacceptable to them). The number of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION members has risen from 20 to 27. The “big” countries have stopped having TWO commissioners each and are since represented by ONE, while “small” countries and potential new members are NOT guaranteed permanent representation and will depend on ROTATION procedures.

In February 2002, the 105member Convention on the Future of Europe held its inaugural meeting in Brussels. It was established in December 2001, during the EU summit in Laeken, Belgium, and received a mandate for one year to prepare the Intergovernmental Conference of 2004. The Laeken Declaration instructed the Convention to deal with FOUR broad areas:

  • better division and definition of jurisdiction within the EU (basically: who does what?),

  • simplification of the union’s working instruments (regulations, directives, etc.),

  • increase in the EU democracy and efficiency (the role of the Commission, the way its president would be elected, etc.),

  • preparation of a “Constitution for European Citizens.”

In May 2003, the Convention head, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, introduced the first draft of the future EU Constitution, which was both much praised (first of all, for the PRIMACY of NATION STATES incorporated in it) and much criticized (for example, for the idea of a longterm elected chairperson of the Council serving as a kind of “EU President” and thus competing with the existing post of the European Commission President).

Towards the end of 2003, stormy highlevel negotiations discussing the draft of the EU Constitution collapsed and have been postponed as a result of a deadlock over VOTING RIGHTS. The draft has proposed controversial changes in the NUMBER of VOTES stipulated for some countries, namely for Spain and Poland, by the Treaty of Nice, and for some time NO COMPROMISE seemed to be possible. Although later this deadlock has been resolved, the overall prospects concerning the introduction of the Constitution remained uncertain – until mid2005, when first the French and then the Dutch said “no” to the whole project in their national referenda, thus delivering two hard blows to the Constitution idea.

* Facing the collapse of the constitutional project, the EU lingered for a while and in the end, on December 13, 2007, signed in Lisbon a new treaty aimed at rethinking some of the ground rules for working together. Thus, the Treaty of Lisbon was regarded as “the next best thing beside the Constitution”. It defined “what the EU can and cannot do, and what means it can use.”

Prominent changes introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon include more qualified MAJORITY VOTING in the EU Council, increased involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process through expanded codecision with the EU Council, reduction of the number of Commissioners from 27 to 18, eliminating the aforementioned “pillar system”, and the creation of the new post – of the President of the European Council and High Representative for Foreign Affairs to present a united position of the EU whenever and wherever necessary.

The Treaty could NOT be applied until and unless it has been ratified by each of the EU 27 members. It was up to each country to choose the procedure for ratification, in line with its own national constitution. The target date for ratification set by member governments has been 1 January 2009 – some months before the election of the European parliament. The rejection of the Treaty on June 12, 2008 by the Irish electorate and the repeated postponement of its ratification by the Czech Republic meant that it could not be put into force yet. However, since then, the ratification process has been successfully concluded by all the countries including Ireland.

In October 2010, facing serious financial difficulties in several member countries, the EU and its ruling body – the Commission have worked out some AMENDMENTS to the Lisbon Treaty, providing for a stabilizing mechanism to prevent further financial troubles. They include the introduction of a permanent fund which can be used for the stabilization of the euro, a new common mechanism for economic monitoring in individual countries, and even the possibility to use sanctions against countries which would break the financial discipline. All those measures have been subject to a further discussion and an approval at the next EU Summit in December 2010. In 2011, the financial resources at the disposal of the European stabilization fund have been enhanced – with an aim of saving such hopeless debtors as official Greece and, eventually Portugal and Italy.

* A­sides of mainly successful, but rather con­tro­ver­sial de­vel­op­ments with­in the EU, one more institutional CHANGE (very im­por­tant and use­ful!) has tak­en place in Eu­rope dur­ing the 1990s. It was the in­tro­duc­tion of IN­DUS­TRI­AL FREE TRADE AREA ar­range­ments be­tween the then Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mu­ni­ty (EC) and Eu­ro­pe­an Free Trade As­so­ci­a­tion (EF­TA), reached in 1992 and set in­to force as from Jan­u­ary 1993.

It rep­re­sent­ed a strong man­i­fes­ta­tion of the ten­den­cy to­wards WID­EN­ING in­te­gra­tion pro­cess­es on the Eu­ro­pe­an con­ti­nent.

The Eu­ro­pe­an Free Trade As­so­ci­a­tion (EF­TA) was formed in 1959 as a kind of COUN­TER­BAL­ANCE to the EC. It was a typ­i­cal FREE TRADE AR­EA ar­range­ment, which lib­er­al­ized trade in IN­DUS­TRI­AL goods be­tween its mem­bers, but did NOT touch up­on their trad­ing pol­i­cies to­wards the coun­tries out­side the group.

The ar­range­ment was orig­i­nal­ly signed by the "OUT­ER SEV­EN” – Aus­tria, Den­mark, Nor­way, Swe­den, Por­tu­gal, Swit­zer­land (with Liech­ten­stein), and the Unit­ed King­dom. Fin­land be­came an as­so­ciate mem­ber of EF­TA in 1961, Ice­land was ad­mit­ted as full mem­ber in 1970. In 1973, how­ev­er, the Unit­ed King­dom and Den­mark be­came mem­bers of the EC (EU) and left EF­TA. So­ did Por­tu­gal in­ 1986, and Aus­tria, Fin­land and Swe­den in 1995.

As COUN­TER­BAL­ANC­ING force in re­la­tions with the EC, this MUL­TI­NA­TION­AL mar­ket (trad­ing) group was NOT strong enough. How­ev­er, the EF­TA man­aged to create a beau­ti­ful and ef­fec­tive ar­range­ment of IN­DUS­TRI­AL FREE TRADE AREA – a welcome addition to the EU own freetrade arrangements of the first COMMON MARKET and later the SINGLE MARKET type.

It is very im­por­tant to notice that nowadays this ar­range­ment in­cludes ALL 28 mem­bers of the EU (for­mer EC) and THREE of the FOUR members of the EF­TA (Norway, Lichtenstein and Iceland, but NOT Swit­zer­land, which has concluded with the EU a special bilateral free trade agreement), thus em­brac­ing 30 Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries. It re­ceived a new name the Eu­ro­pe­an Ec­o­nom­ic Ar­ea (EEA). Its emer­gence sig­ni­fies the fact that the spread­ing of IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES in Eu­rope is go­ing on and can take very DIFFERENT or­gan­i­za­tion­al FORMS. Nowadays, practically all the EFTA members enjoy the benefits of the SINGLE MARKET created by the EU without participating in other policies and institutions of the Union.

So, we can sum up that the Sin­gle Eu­ro­pe­an Act, the Trea­ty of Maas­tricht and the Treaty of Lisbon rep­re­sent the DEEP­EN­ING of the in­te­gra­tion pro­cess­es on the Eu­ro­pe­an con­ti­nent, while the new mem­ber­ship in the EU, as­ well as the re­or­gan­i­za­tion of the EF­TA and the development of the EEA man­i­fest their WID­EN­ING.

* Speak­ing about Amer­i­can AT­TI­TUDE to for­mer EC and now EU, we must note that this at­ti­tude al­ways had at least TWO sides to it:

# on the one side, the Unit­ed States se­cured the Eu­ro­pe­an in­te­gra­tion, and EC in par­tic­u­lar, their strong POLITICAL BACKING, and dur­ing all these dec­ades Eu­rope and Amer­i­ca have been act­ing as the clos­est ALLIES to each oth­er,

# on the oth­er side, how­ev­er, Amer­i­can cap­i­tal re­gard­ed the cus­toms un­ion ar­range­ments and the com­mon pol­i­cies of the EC (es­pe­cial­ly the CAP) as a BIG NUISANCE (an­noy­ance) in the field of in­ter­na­tion­al trade. The Amer­i­can an­swer to this nui­sance was, how­ev­er, very sim­ple and prac­ti­cal: "to jump" over the UNI­FIED (COMMON) trad­ing bar­riers sur­round­ing the EU by ar­rang­ing MAS­SIVE CAP­I­TAL MI­GRA­TION to Eu­rope, most­ly in form of FOREIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI).

* For Ja­pan, the "Unit­ed Eu­rope" al­ways was in­ter­est­ing enough through its large MAR­KET CA­PAC­I­TY, high IN­COMES and mod­ern STRUC­TURE OF CON­SUMP­TION. So, many Jap­a­nese firms pen­e­trat­ed the Com­mu­ni­ty mar­ket us­ing their rel­a­tive­ly LOW pro­duc­tion costs, HIGHTECH char­ac­ter­is­tics of prod­ucts and SO­PHIS­TI­CAT­ED sell­ing prac­tic­es. And po­lit­i­cal­ly both sides stay al­lies as­ well.

In trade re­la­tions with Ja­pan where the EU­ po­si­tion is char­ac­ter­ized by a per­ma­nent, al­beit di­min­ish­ing DEF­I­CIT, the OPEN­ING of the Jap­a­nese mar­ket is re­gard­ed as the main longterm is­sue.

* Over­all, it looks like Asia and Eu­rope have de­cid­ed it is time to be­come bet­ter ac­quaint­ed.

The FIRST ev­er AsiaEu­rope Meet­ing on the HIGH­EST lev­el (ASEM summit) took place in Bang­kok in March, 1996.

Many par­tic­i­pants spoke about the need for an IN­STI­TU­TION­AL FRAME­WORK to gov­ern re­la­tions be­tween Asia and Eu­rope, com­ple­ment­ing those al­ready in place across the Pa­cif­ic and At­lan­tic. It was stat­ed that while links be­tween Asia and North Amer­i­ca were STRONG, the Eu­ro East Asia link­age was very WEAK.

Eu­rope sent to Bang­kok 16 rep­re­sen­ta­tives: ONE from EACH mem­ber coun­try, and Pres­i­dent of the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion speak­ing for the EU as a whole.

On the Asia side of the ta­ble, at­ten­dance at the sum­mit was lim­it­ed to TEN coun­tries: the then sev­en states of AS­EAN (In­do­ne­sia, Ma­lay­sia, Thai­land, the Phi­lip­pines, Sin­ga­pore, Bru­nei, and Viet­nam) plus Chi­na, Ja­pan and South Ko­rea. Thus, Rus­sia was NOT in­vit­ed, and In­dia, sec­ond on­ly to Chi­na in terms of pop­u­la­tion, has ex­pressed its deep dis­ap­point­ment with the state of­ mat­ters around the Bang­kok sum­mit too.

The SECOND ASEM summit gath­ered in Lon­don in April 1998. It was more busi­nesslike in na­ture, and es­tab­lished ASEM Trust Fund at the World Bank and a Cen­ter for Fi­nan­cial Re­struc­tur­ing pro­vid­ing Eu­ro­pe­an ex­per­tise to Asian coun­tries.

The THIRD AsiaEu­rope summit has tak­en place in Seoul in October 2000. It adopted the socalled Chairman’s Statement in which the participants’ common view on major political issues has been expressed. Also, “a blueprint for ASEM future” has been approved – the document called AsiaEurope Cooperation Framework – AECF 2000.

The FOURTH ASEM summit has been held in Copenhagen, in September 2002. It confirmed the necessity of further cooperation in the areas of TRADE, INVESTMENT and FINANCE (to promote the use of EURO as a RESERVE CURRENCY among other aims).

* Thus, such “Eurasian” SUM­MITS and MIN­I­STE­RI­AL MEET­INGS have ob­vi­ous­ly be­come an ESTABLISHED PRACTICE in the re­la­tions be­tween the two re­gions. However, lately they have been ever more often criticized for LACK of concrete INITIATIVES and for having deteriorated into something amounting to “not much more than a talk shop.”

In January 2004, ministers of the ASEAN countries met with Pascal Lamy, the then European Union Trade Commissioner, to discuss the recent EU initiative for enhanced ECONOMIC COOPERATION with ASEAN, dubbed the TransRegional EUASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI). Maybe, these negotiations manifested the beginning of a new wave of activity in an INTERREGIONAL framework.

In October 2008, in Beijing, the SEVENTH ASEM summit gathered high representatives of 27 European and 13 Asian states in a rather tense economic situation very much resembling an early stage in a GLOBAL CRISIS – a fact that placed its obvious imprint on the discussions.

In October 2010, a really important breakthrough has taken place in TRADE RELATIONS between the European Union and the Republic of Korea. During the regular ECAsia Summit, a FREETRADE AGREEMENT between the EC and Korea has been concluded. To be enforced since July 2011, it abolishes all tariff and nontariff barriers in trade between the two sides – a considerable gain for Europe, which has paid about $1,6 billion in duties in 2009, when its trade with Korea amounted to $53 billion, accompanied by a considerable TRADE DEFICIT.

* The DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES are some­how di­vid­ed in their AT­TI­TUDE to the EU. A big part of them, about 70 na­tionstates around the world – in­ Af­ri­ca, in­ the Caribb­ean, and in­ the Pa­cif­ic (the socalled ACPcoun­tries) were IN­CLUD­ED in­to "Com­mon Mar­ket" ar­range­ments through mech­a­nism of AS­SO­CI­A­TION ("spe­cial re­la­tions") with the EC (EU). This PREF­E­REN­TIAL TRADE RE­GIME, very fa­vor­a­ble for them, was first in­tro­duced and de­vel­oped through sev­er­al Lome Con­ven­tions (called so af­ter Lome – the cap­i­tal of Af­ri­can coun­try To­go, where ne­go­ti­a­tions tra­di­tion­al­ly take place).

In 1996, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion en­list­ed 12 Med­i­ter­ra­nean neigh­bors – Al­ge­ria, Cy­prus, Egypt, Is­rael, Jor­dan, Leb­a­non, Mal­ta, Mo­roc­co, Syr­ia, Tu­ni­sia, Tur­key and the Pal­es­tin­ian Au­thor­i­ty – in a farreach­ing coop­er­a­tion pact de­signed to im­prove sub­re­gion­al sta­bil­i­ty by lift­ing TRADE BAR­RIERS and pump­ing CASH in­to their strug­gling econ­o­mies.

Oth­er de­vel­op­ing na­tions, how­ev­er, feel DIS­CRIM­I­NAT­ED, be­cause their ap­proach to the Eu­ro­pe­an mar­ket has NOT been made eas­i­er by spe­cial ar­range­ments. This dif­fer­ence in at­ti­tude to­ward EU can be felt in UNC­TAD and WTO ne­go­ti­a­tions.

In March 1999, a his­tor­ic TRADE DEAL with South Af­ri­ca has been ap­proved by the EU sum­mit in Ber­lin – the bloc­'s FIRST agree­ment of this kind with a DEVELOPING coun­try. Un­der the ac­cord, EU mar­kets will be opened to some 95 per­cent of South Af­ri­can ex­ports over a 10year pe­ri­od. Prob­ably, this ac­cord will serve as a mod­el for EU fu­ture trade re­la­tions with Af­ri­ca, the Car­ib­be­an and the Pa­cif­ic (i.e., with the socalled ACPcoun­tries).

* While prac­ti­cal­ly ALL newborn po­lit­i­cal en­ti­ties in­ "postso­cial­ist" Eu­rope were "look­ing West", ex­pect­ing to be­come mem­bers of the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion soon­er or lat­er and dream­ing of join­ing the NATO, Rus­sia fac­ed GROW­ING ISO­LA­TION and had to think hard about find­ing her own place in the emerg­ing ALLEU­RO­PE­AN sys­tem and se­cur­ing her EC­O­NOM­IC and PO­LIT­I­CAL IN­TER­ESTS in the re­gion.

How­ev­er, Rus­sia's ec­o­nom­ic ties with the EU are for par­a­mount im­por­tance for BOTH par­ties. For many years, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion has been IM­PORT­ING from Rus­sia 27 times as much, as the USA, and 8 times as much, as Ja­pan. Rus­sian EX­PORTS to the EU, with NAT­U­RAL GAS and CRUDE OIL as ma­jor com­mod­i­ties, rep­re­sent an im­por­tant con­tri­bu­tion to the Eu­ro­pe­an en­er­gy and raw ma­te­ri­als sup­ply.

* The new Millennium found Russia with a new President – Vladimir Putin, who has been devoting much time to establishing personal contacts with the EU leaders. However, Russia’s relations with Europe had some troubling aspects, like the HUMAN RIGHTS’ issue in regard to the protracted military operation in Chechnya, like delays in the repayments of DEBTS of the former Soviet Union (in this field, a breakthrough has been achieved in 2005), etc.

This state of affairs remained intact with the next Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev at the head of the RF and with some new issues troubling the EuropeRussia relations (such as the short war with Georgia in August 2008 and the following recognition by the RF of the independence of the two Georgia’s major ethnic areas – South Ossetiya and Abkhasia).

Since 2012, the presidency returned to Vladimir Putin who may eventually keep this position until 2024. In 2014, unprecedented tension around stormy political events in Ukraine and actual warfare in its territory has led to visible worsening of relations between Russia, on the one side, and the European Union, the U.S. and the majority of other democracies, on the other side.

Top­ic 8. PE­CU­LIAR­I­TIES OF RE­GION­AL ECONOMIC IN­TE­GRA­TION IN NORTH AMER­I­CA

North Amer­i­ca is THIRD in size among the world's con­ti­nents, ly­ing for the most part be­tween the Arc­tic Cir­cle and the Trop­ic of Can­cer, ex­tend­ing more than 8000 km to with­in 800 km of both the North Pole and the Equa­tor, cov­er­ing an ar­ea of 24,2 mil­lion sq. km.

The AR­A­BLE land ac­counts for about ONEEIGHTH of the con­ti­nents to­tal land ar­ea. Fa­vored with ex­cel­lent soils and rel­a­tive­ly stable weath­er pat­terns, much of the con­ti­nent's crop­land is among the world's most pro­duc­tive.

The con­ti­nent's FO­RESTS, great­ly di­min­ished since the ear­ly set­tle­ment, have re­mained fair­ly con­stant in re­cent years and cov­er about ONETHIRD of the to­tal land ar­ea. One of the world's larg­est ar­e­as of ex­ten­sive fo­rests stretch­es across north­ern Can­a­da from New­found­land to Alas­ka.

The con­ti­nent has ad­e­quate re­serves of most ME­TAL­LIC re­sourc­es and the world's larg­est re­serves of cad­mi­um (about TWOFIFTH), cop­per (ONETHIRD), lead (more than TWOFIFTH), mo­lyb­de­num (more than HALF) and zinc (about HALF) and a sub­stan­tial pro­por­tion of its gold, plat­i­num and oth­er pre­cious met­als. How­ev­er, the con­ti­nent has VERY LIT­TLE of­ man­ga­nese, and vir­tu­al­ly NO chro­mi­um – the fact ex­plain­ing why these prod­uct were im­port­ed from the for­mer So­viet Un­ion even un­der the ColdWar con­di­tions.

North Amer­i­can pe­tro­le­um (crude oil) re­serves and nat­u­ral gas re­serves EACH rep­re­sent more than ONESEV­ENTH of glo­bal re­serves. The con­ti­nent al­so pos­sess­es up to ONETHIRD of the world's re­serves of the ec­o­nom­i­cal­ly re­cov­er­a­ble coal and a sub­stan­tial pro­por­tion of world's ura­ni­um. The in­stalled hy­dro­e­lec­tric ca­pac­i­ty of the con­ti­nent rep­re­sents about ONEFIFTH of the world's to­tal.

From the con­ti­nents POP­U­LA­TION of about 400 mil­lion peo­ple, up to 60% live in the Unit­ed States, rough­ly ONETHIRD live in Mex­i­co, the Car­ib­be­an and Cen­tral Amer­i­ca (ONEFOURTH in Mex­i­co alone), and on­ly 6% in Can­a­da.

North Amer­i­ca has a MIX­TURE of high­ly de­vel­oped econ­o­mies (Can­a­da and the Unit­ed States), de­vel­oped econ­o­mies (Mex­i­co, be­long­ing to NIC), more or less de­vel­oped econ­o­mies (some parts of Cen­tral Amer­i­ca and larg­er Car­ibb­ean is­lands) and de­vel­op­ing econ­o­mies in dif­fer­ent stag­es of in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion (the re­main­ing na­tions).

The con­ti­nent's Gross Na­tion­al Prod­uct (GNP) amounts to around $20 tril­lion, but is dis­trib­ut­ed be­tween the na­tions very UN­E­VEN­LY, with PER CAP­I­TA pro­duc­tion rang­ing from $50 thou­sand in the Unit­ed States and $43 thou­sand in­ Can­a­da to LESS than $7 thousand in Mexico and LESS than $400 in Hai­ti.

In the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da, the GNP stems most­ly from MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING and SER­VIC­ES (or RATH­ER from ser­vic­es AND man­u­fac­tur­ing), while in the rest of na­tions MIN­ING and AG­RI­CUL­TURE are its prin­ci­pal com­po­nents.

MIN­ING is im­por­tant through­out most of the con­ti­nent. EN­ER­GY min­er­al pro­duc­tion in­cludes coal, nat­u­ral gas and pe­tro­le­um, and is con­cen­trat­ed in Can­a­da, the Unit­ed States and Mex­i­co.

Mod­ern MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING re­mains of ma­jor im­por­tance in the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da where the HEAVY and TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL­LY COM­PLEX in­dus­tries are con­cen­trat­ed. More or­ less tra­di­tion­al EN­GI­NEER­ING (MA­CHIN­ERY in­dus­tries) and PE­TRO­LE­UMbased in­dus­tries are char­ac­ter­is­tic for Mex­i­co, while LIGHT­ER in­dus­tries and AG­RI­CUL­TUREbased in­dus­tries pre­dom­i­nate in small­er coun­tries.

The AU­TO­MO­BILE in­dus­try is of par­a­mount im­por­tance for both Amer­i­can and Ca­na­di­an in­dus­tri­al struc­tures, and is grow­ing rap­id­ly in Mex­i­co form­ing NEW cen­ter of world's CARMAKING.

The share of the North Amer­i­can coun­tries in IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRADE is es­ti­mat­ed at about ONEFIFTH, while the BI­LAT­ER­AL TURN­O­VER in goods and ser­vic­es be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da is by far the BIGGEST in the world.

* Each of the world­'s RE­GIONS in­volved in IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES has a set of gen­er­al and spe­cif­ic FAC­TORS de­ter­min­ing the ten­den­cy to­ward in­te­gra­tion and con­crete his­tor­i­cal con­di­tions in which it is de­vel­op­ing.

This is WHY there are dif­fer­enc­es in the rise of IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM in var­i­ous re­gions, spe­cif­i­cal­ly di­ver­gent re­la­tion­ships be­tween its ELE­MENTS and par­tic­u­lar­ities in the IN­TE­GRA­TION MECH­A­NISMS.

In North Amer­i­ca, the IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES em­brace all THREE ma­jor coun­tries of the con­ti­nent the Unit­ed States, Can­a­da and Mex­i­co. As for the IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM in form of a RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC COM­PLEX, its emer­gence spread­ through­out the whole 20th cen­tu­ry and in­volved na­tion­al econ­o­mies of the TWO most­ly de­vel­oped coun­tries – the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da. Mex­i­co is now join­ing this com­plex and be­ing func­tion­al­ly in­te­grat­ed in­to it – a pro­cess that will take the next onetwo dec­ades.

* So, when we speak about RE­GION­AL IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM in North Amer­i­ca (or about NORTH AMER­I­CAN EC­O­NOM­IC COM­PLEX) in­ his­tor­i­cal terms, i.e., as­ about some­thing which has al­ready been formed and ac­tu­al­ly ex­ists, than we have in mind ex­act­ly the de­vel­op­ments of ec­o­nom­ic and po­lit­i­cal re­la­tions be­tween the TWO part­ners the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da.

The emer­gence of the U.S.CAN­A­DA re­gion­al ec­o­nom­ic com­plex has tak­en place in a very dis­tinc­tive man­ner, quite dif­fer­ent from that char­ac­ter­iz­ing the Eu­ro­pe­an in­te­gra­tion. This his­tor­i­cal de­vel­op­ment was (and still is) strong­ly in­flu­enced by a num­ber of LONGTERM FAC­TORS hav­ing to do with na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic char­ac­ter­is­tics, con­di­tions of com­mod­i­ty and cap­i­tal FLOW be­tween the two coun­tries, and the like.

* Let us name some MAJOR FACTORS in­flu­enc­ing IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da and pre­des­tin­ing spe­cif­ic char­ac­ter­is­tics of the emerg­ing IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM em­brac­ing these two coun­tries:

# near­ly TENFOLD gap be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da in POPULATION (which sets nat­u­ral lim­its to mar­ket ca­pac­i­ty and ec­o­nom­ic po­ten­tial)

# same re­la­tion­ship ( 10:1 ) is val­id for the OVER­ALL SCALE of ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty as re­flect­ed in the size of the GNP and oth­er ag­gre­gat­ed in­di­ca­tors ex­pressed in val­ue and phys­i­cal terms (pow­er gen­er­a­tion, steel pro­duc­tion, in­dus­tri­al and ag­ri­cul­tu­ral out­put, the scale of the ser­vice sec­tor, and so on)

# his­tor­i­cal­lyroot­ed rel­a­tive fi­nan­cial WEAKNESS and LOW INITIATIVE shown by Ca­na­di­an PRI­VATE CAP­I­TAL whose de­vel­op­ment was in­i­tial­ly over­shad­owed by the Brit­ish in­flu­ence and sub­se­quent­ly re­strict­ed by the role of jun­ior part­ner im­posed on it by Amer­i­can Big Busi­ness

# wealth of Ca­na­di­an NAT­U­RAL RE­SOURC­ES and their com­ple­men­tary na­ture in re­spect to raw ma­te­ri­als found in the Unit­ed States (in this vital field the relationship between the U.S. and Canada is NOT 10:1 but around 2:3)

# vir­tu­al­ly to­tal ABSENCE of re­stric­tions on MOVE­MENT of shortterm and even of in­vest­ment CAP­I­TAL be­tween the two coun­tries, free con­vert­i­bil­i­ty (con­ver­sion) of na­tion­al cur­ren­cies (the U.S. dol­lar and the Ca­na­di­an dol­lar), no ob­sta­cles to deals with part­nercoun­try's se­cur­i­ties (shares and ob­li­ga­tions), free trans­fer of prof­its, etc.

# very lib­er­al rules of MI­GRA­TION of LA­BOUR (peo­ple) and trans­fer of per­son­al in­come abroad.

Thus, a whole scope of in­cen­tives for di­rect in­ter­twin­ing of CAP­I­TAL MAR­KETS and RE­PRO­DUC­TIVE PRO­CESS­ES of the TWO coun­tries did ex­ist for dec­ades and is still fa­vor­ing fur­ther in­te­gra­tion.

And "last but not least", there are GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL and HIS­TOR­I­CAL fac­tors:

# ter­ri­to­ri­al PROX­IM­I­TY

# sim­i­lar HIS­TOR­I­CAL back­ground with­out long record of WARS

# ETH­NIC like­ness ("melt­ing pots" with strong An­gloSax­on com­po­nent), a com­mon LAN­GUAGE and many ele­ments of CUL­TU­RAL tra­di­tion

# very sim­i­lar EC­O­NOM­IC MOD­ELS based on the mar­ket mech­a­nism

# same (or­ very like) MAN­AGE­MENT prin­ci­ples and BUSI­NESS prac­tic­es

# ap­prox­i­mate­ly same TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL lev­el, same at­ti­tude to sci­ence and ed­u­ca­tion.

* In his­tor­i­cal ret­ro­spect, the IM­PACT of all these FACTORS gen­er­al­ly stim­u­lat­ed:

en­er­get­ic INTRODUCTION (in­fil­tra­tion) of Amer­i­can cap­i­tal in­to Ca­na­di­an econ­o­my (most­ly in the form of DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT into­ in­dus­tri­al pro­duc­tion)

strong GRAVITATION of the rel­a­tive­ly SMALL in­dus­tri­al sys­tem of Can­a­da to­ward POW­ER­FUL ec­o­nom­ic po­ten­tial of the Amer­i­can neigh­bor

very spe­cif­ic FORMS of North Amer­i­can in­te­gra­tion, its pe­cu­liar MECH­A­NISM

"lop­sid­ed" CHARACTER of ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tion­ship be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da, some ele­ments of IN­E­QUAL­I­TY be­tween the in­te­gra­tion part­ners.

* The SUM of these FACTORS al­so pro­vides the KEY to un­der­stand­ing:

# or­i­gin of the OPEN­NESS of the Ca­na­di­an econ­o­my, its strong OR­IEN­TA­TION to­wards for­eign mar­kets,

# a very spe­cif­ic PRODUCTION STRUC­TURE large­ly sub­or­di­nat­ed to the needs of Amer­i­can TNC (here we have in­ mind the socalled "trunk­at­ed" char­ac­ter of in­dus­tri­al pro­duc­tion when MIN­ING and PRI­MARY MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING, i.e., in­i­tial pro­cess­ing of raw ma­te­ri­als rep­re­sent­ing LOW­ER links of TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAINS, are overde­vel­oped, while SEC­ON­DARY MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING con­nect­ed with fin­ished prod­ucts and UPPER links of TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL CHAINS re­mains ne­glect­ed and un­derde­vel­oped),

# rel­a­tive­ly SMALL EXTENT of Ca­na­di­an econ­o­my's IN­TER­NAL in­te­gra­tion; the na­tion­al econ­o­my tends to fall in­to ec­o­nom­ic SUB­STRUC­TURES of in­di­vid­u­al PROV­INC­ES – like On­ta­rio and Que­bec in the east, or Brit­ish Co­lum­bia in the west – which are MORE IN­VOLVED in ec­o­nom­ic ex­change with the ad­ja­cent (neigh­bor­ing) AMER­I­CAN STATES, than with each oth­er.

# roots of Ca­na­di­an NA­TION­AL­ISM (the so called "PROCAN­AD­ISM") which has emerged as a nat­u­ral re­sponse by a na­tion that has aris­en, strength­ened its state­hood, be­came aware of its dis­tinct his­tor­i­cal path – and once again fac­es the dan­ger of los­ing these gains and be­ing ab­sorbed in­to Amer­i­can sys­tem.

* By EX­PORT­ING CAP­I­TAL in the form of DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT on a large scale, the Amer­i­can TNC creat­ed in Can­a­da TWO groups of in­dus­tries:

ONE GROUP was in­tend­ed to pro­vide stable and largescale DE­LIV­ER­IES (SUPPLY) of IN­DUS­TRI­AL MA­TE­RI­ALS, i.e., of raw ma­te­ri­als and semifab­ri­cat­ed prod­ucts (met­al ores, as­bes­tos, steel and nonfer­rous met­als, oil and gas, lum­ber, pulp and news­print) to Amer­i­ca,

AN­OTHER GROUP was aimed at se­cur­ing strong po­si­tion on Ca­na­di­an do­mes­tic CON­SU­MER MAR­KETS.

At the same time, foun­da­tions were laid for reg­u­lar and ex­treme­ly largescale Amer­i­can EX­PORT ­to Can­a­da of MA­CHIN­ERY AND EQUIP­MENT (en­gi­neer­ing prod­ucts) used in MIN­ING, CON­STRUC­TION and MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING.

Thus, un­der­ly­ing the enor­mous scale and stable ex­pan­sion of TRADE TURN­O­VER be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da is a deep, TECH­NOL­O­GYbased DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR be­tween their in­dus­tri­al com­pa­nies, with a DECISIVE ROLE played by the mi­gra­tion of Amer­i­can pri­vate cap­i­tal (DI­RECT in­vest­ments) in­to Can­a­da.

Na­tion­al CUS­TOMS TAR­IFFS of­ the two coun­tries con­trib­ut­ed much to the ex­ist­ing PAT­TERN of re­cip­ro­cal (mu­tu­al) com­mod­i­ty ex­change, while the over­all de­gree of TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION in the re­gion re­mained re­mote (far) from the CUS­TOMS UN­ION con­di­tions creat­ed with­in the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mu­ni­ty.

So, from the 1930s, when the Amer­i­can and Ca­na­di­an CUS­TOMS SYS­TEMS have tak­en shape, a "STAT­US QUO" emerged whose BA­SIC FEA­TURES have been:

# pre­dom­i­nance of IN­DUS­TRI­AL MA­TE­RI­ALS in Can­a­da's ex­ports to the U.S, and

# re­cip­ro­cal Amer­i­can supply of FIN­ISHED PROD­UCTS in­tend­ed pri­mary to sat­is­fy Canadian IN­VEST­MENT DE­MAND (i.e., imports of ma­chin­ery and equip­ment).

As­ for the goods in­tend­ed for Ca­na­di­an CON­SU­MER mar­ket, Amer­i­can TNC pro­duced them most­ly LOCALLY, i.e. in Can­a­da it­self, es­tab­lish­ing there "MINIREP­LI­CAS" of their Amer­i­can plants – the fact ex­plain­ing LOW ef­fi­cien­cy and HIGH costs of Ca­na­di­an SEC­ON­DARY MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING pro­duc­tion (FEW plants of­ op­ti­mal size, NO econ­o­my of scale ad­van­tag­es, NO or LIT­TLE new tech­nol­o­gy, etc.).

* Thus, the CRU­CIAL FEA­TURE of North Amer­i­can in­te­gra­tion, as com­pared with Eu­rope, lies in the fact that the mech­a­nism of the rise and op­er­a­tion of the U.S.Can­a­da re­gion­al ec­o­nom­ic com­plex is marked by clear­ly ap­par­ent "IN­I­TIA­TIVE FROM BE­LOW", while "IN­I­TIA­TIVE FROM ABOVE", i.e., spe­cial BI­LAT­ER­AL (intergov­ern­ment) reg­u­lat­ing and stim­u­lat­ing MEAS­URES were al­most to­tal­ly ABSENT.

# In oth­er words, the PRI­VATE CAP­I­TAL ELE­MENT ab­so­lute­ly pre­vailed in North Amer­i­can in­te­gra­tion, so that IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES de­vel­oped ac­tive­ly at the MI­CRO and ME­SOlev­el form­ing close TIES be­tween Amer­i­can and Ca­na­di­an cap­i­tal and thus serv­ing re­la­tions of SPE­CIAL­I­ZA­TION and COOP­ER­A­TION.

For dec­ades, the in­i­tia­tive was firm­ly in the hands of Amer­i­can TNC, while the Ca­na­di­an cap­i­tal ex­port to the USA was tri­fling (in­sig­nif­i­cant) in­ size. Since the mid­dle of the 1970s, how­ev­er, the sit­u­a­tion changed rad­i­cal­ly, and now the Ca­na­di­an DI­RECT and PORT­FO­LIO in­vest­ment in Amer­i­can econ­o­my is count­ed in doz­ens of bil­lions of dol­lars.

So, the fab­ric of U.S.Ca­na­di­an re­la­tions is close­ly knit be­low GOV­ERN­MEN­TAL LEV­EL, and those have been "PRI­VATE AC­TORS" (most­ly Amer­i­can firms), who have played ma­jor role in form­ing NORTH AMER­I­CAN IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM with high­ly in­ter­laced pro­cess­es of RE­PRO­DUC­TION and CAP­I­TAL AC­CU­MU­LA­TION.

# As for the MAC­ROlev­el, the role of na­tion­al state bod­ies was large­ly re­duced to UNI­LAT­ER­AL­LY creat­ing cer­tain fa­vor­a­ble pre­con­di­tions for in­te­gra­tion on the MI­CRO and ME­SOlev­el in the shape of ex­treme­ly spe­cif­ic cli­mate (or back­ground) for ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ties across the bor­der.

Such fac­tors as FREE FLOW of cap­i­tal be­tween the two coun­tries, un­re­strict­ed cur­ren­cy CONVERTABILITY and FREE MIGRATION of pop­u­la­tion in search for jobs, meant the so­lu­tion of many prob­lems of NEG­A­TIVE IN­TE­GRA­TION – be­fore­hand and with­out any for­mal le­gal in­stru­ments on BI­LAT­ER­AL (RE­GION­AL) scale.

That is WHY the in­te­gra­tion meas­ures on the MAC­ROlev­el have been for a long time al­most TO­TAL­LY AB­SENT in North Amer­i­ca. There are very FEW bi­lat­er­al (in­ter­gov­ern­ment) TRADE and EC­O­NOM­IC ar­range­ments in the prac­tice of Amer­i­canCa­na­di­an re­la­tions and NO joint in­sti­tu­tions such as the fa­mous SU­PRAna­tion­al agen­cies of the EU.

It al­so ex­plains WHY in the last dec­ade the em­pha­sis has been made ex­act­ly on FREE TRADE agree­ments which have been di­rect­ed at OVER­COM­ING ma­jor ob­sta­cles on the way to fur­ther in­te­gra­tion – the re­main­ing TAR­IFF and NONTAR­IFF BAR­RIERS hold­ing back the growth of the IN­TRA­re­gion­al turn­o­ver.

* For dec­ades, the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da re­main ma­jor trad­ing part­ners for each oth­er (now, their year­ly BI­LAT­ER­AL trade turn­o­ver exceeds $500 bil­lion). With less than ONEFIFTEENS of the pop­u­la­tion of Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion, Can­a­da im­ports MORE Amer­i­can goods than the EU. It is TWO TIMES more than Amer­i­can sales to Ja­pan with its pop­u­la­tion ex­ceed­ing 120 mil­lion peo­ple, and FOURFIVE TIMES more than Amer­i­can de­liv­er­ies to the Unit­ed King­dom.

Can­a­da's share in U.S. ex­port and im­port has been be­tween 16 and 20 per­cent, and in a whole range of goods it is the CHIEF SOURCE of sup­ply for Amer­i­can in­dus­try. Thus, Ca­na­di­an de­liv­er­ies prac­ti­cal­ly FUL­LY meet the im­port re­quire­ments of the Unit­ed States in nat­u­ral gas, po­tas­sium salt, ura­ni­um, pulp and paper, news­print and as­bes­tos, about FOURFIFTH of U.S. needs in lum­ber, about TWOTHIRDS in al­u­min­um, nick­el, mo­lyb­de­num, and HALF in zinc and cop­per.

For its part, over ONEQUARTER of the Ca­na­di­an GNP orig­i­nates in one way or an­other from its trade with the Unit­ed States. By some es­ti­mates, eve­ry SEC­OND job in the pro­duc­tion of goods is di­rect­ly or in­di­rect­ly re­lat­ed to ser­vic­ing Amer­i­can mar­ket. Amer­i­canCa­na­di­an turn­o­ver in ONE com­mod­i­ty group "au­to­mo­biles and parts" ex­ceeds Can­a­da's en­tire trade with West­ern Eu­rope AND Ja­pan com­bined. Dur­ing the 1990s, Amer­i­ca's SHARE in Ca­na­di­an ex­ports and im­ports have risen from 7578 per­cent to over 80 per­cent and generally remain there.

Cal­cu­la­tions show that the MU­TU­AL AT­TRAC­TION be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da as TRAD­ING PART­NERS tra­di­tion­al­ly was (and may­be al­so remains) strong­er than that be­tween Eu­ro­pe­an coun­tries be­long­ing to the EU.

* His­tor­i­cal­ly, the CUS­TOMS SYS­TEMS of the two coun­tries con­tained many RE­STRIC­TIONS which were hold­ing back the IN­TRA­re­gion­al move­ment of goods (es­pe­cial­ly FIN­ISHED GOODS – prod­ucts of the SEC­ON­DARY MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING in­dus­tries). Still, we can name at least THREE big com­mod­i­ty groups which for dec­ades have been char­ac­ter­ized by a very LIB­ER­AL re­gime of MU­TU­AL (Amer­i­canCa­na­di­an) ex­change of­ goods board­ing at FREE TRADE con­di­tions:

# FARM MA­CHIN­ERY. This com­mod­i­ty group in­cludes broad range of prod­ucts ser­vic­ing the ag­ri­cul­tu­ral ac­tiv­i­ty (har­vest­ers of dif­fer­ent kind, trac­tors, etc.). How­ev­er, con­trary to wide­spread con­vic­tion, there is NO in­ter­state agree­ment on du­tyfree re­cip­ro­cal trade in farm ma­chin­ery. In the in­ter­ests of lo­cal farmers, EACH of the sides has in­tro­duced LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of rel­e­vant im­port UNI­LAT­ER­AL­LY: the Unit­ed States back in 1913 and Can­a­da in 1944.

This ex­am­ple shows that some­times IN­TE­GRA­TION on SEC­TO­RAL ba­sis can go on WITH­OUT spe­cial TRADE AGREE­MENTS (stim­u­lat­ed by UNI­LAT­ER­AL pol­i­cies on­ly).

# MIL­I­TARY HARD­WARE. Arms and mu­ni­tions sup­ply of dif­fer­ent kind form the SEC­OND large com­mod­i­ty group en­joy­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty to­ cross the Amer­i­canCa­na­di­an bor­der in­ BOTH di­rec­tions DU­TYFREE.

Since the 1960s, a com­plete ARM­S' PRO­DUC­TION SHAR­ING PRO­GRAM of the two coun­tries is in­ force guar­an­tee­ing Ca­na­di­an in­dus­try prof­it­a­ble CON­TRACTS with Amer­i­can gov­ern­ment and SUB­CON­TRACTING re­la­tions with lead­ing Amer­i­can pro­duc­ers in­ this stra­te­gic field.

How­ev­er, all these op­por­tu­ni­ties con­cern most­ly AMER­I­CA'S OWN mil­i­tary pro­duc­tion lo­cat­ed BOTH in the USA and Can­a­da. May­be, on­ly in COM­MU­NI­CA­TION field there are NA­TION­AL Ca­na­di­an firms ca­pa­ble of mak­ing prac­ti­cal use of this ar­range­ment. As for the EM­PLOY­MENT for the Ca­na­di­an work­ers, here the ef­fect of the ARMS' PRO­DUC­TION SHAR­ING PRO­GRAM is rath­er sub­stan­tial.

# AU­TO­MO­TIVE PROD­UCTS. For many years since 1965, up to ONETHIRD (and MORE!) of com­mod­i­ty trade be­tween the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da is con­sist­ed of "au­to­mo­tive prod­ucts" new mo­tor cars and trucks, components and parts for the au­to­mo­bile pro­duc­tion, tires and oth­er rub­ber com­po­nents, etc.

The Au­to­mo­bile Agree­ment (al­so called the "Au­toPact") is a per­ma­nent BI­LAT­ER­AL in­ter­state SEC­TO­RAL ar­range­ment pro­vid­ing FREE TRADE con­di­tions for ma­te­ri­al sup­ply and gen­er­al func­tion­ing of­ the NORTH AMER­I­CAN AU­TO­MO­TIVE IN­DUS­TRY (in­clud­ing SALES of FIN­ISHED PROD­UCTS mo­tor cars and trucks with­in North Amer­i­ca).

There does NOT ex­ist any­thing like "Amer­i­can au­to­mo­bile in­dus­try" or "Ca­na­di­an au­to­mo­bile in­dus­try". There is on­ly IN­TE­GRAT­ED AU­TO­MO­BILE (AU­TO­MO­TIVE) IN­DUS­TRY of the TWO coun­tries which be­fore long will FUL­LY IN­TE­GRATE al­so the THIRD com­po­nent "Mex­i­can au­to­mo­bile in­dus­try".

This is a classical and colorful ex­am­ple of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION. For a long time, the THREE lead­ing au­to­mo­tive firms of North Amer­i­can con­ti­nent (in fact – THREE Amer­i­can TNC) have con­trolled over 90% of com­bined au­to­mo­bile out­put of the TWO coun­tries. All three have creat­ed GIANT NET­WORKS of ma­te­ri­al sup­ply se­cur­ing the pro­duc­tion of their COM­PLEX FIN­ISHED PROD­UCTS – mo­tor cars. These net­works in­clude MANY THOU­SANDS of in­di­vid­u­al pro­duc­ers and sup­pli­ers (con­trac­tors and sub­con­trac­tors) in dif­fer­ent coun­tries of the world (but most­ly in North Amer­i­ca it­self).

# TWO of­ them Gen­er­al Mo­tors and Ford Mo­tor have AS­SEM­BLY PLANTS in the Unit­ed States and mas­sive­ly im­port as­sem­blies, parts and ac­ces­so­ries from Can­a­da (and Mex­i­co)

# The THIRD Chrys­ler Cor­po­ra­tion pro­duc­es fin­ished cars in Can­a­da in its plants sit­u­at­ed across the Mich­i­gan Lake and al­so has a widespread ge­og­ra­phy of sup­ply. Since 1998, as­ a re­sult of­ the biggest IN­TER­NA­TION­AL MER­GER in the his­to­ry of­ the AU­TO­MO­BILE IN­DUS­TRY, the con­trol over Chrys­ler passed (as it turned out, only for a while) in­to the hands of the Eu­ro­pe­an au­to­mo­tive giant Daim­lerBenz (accordingly, a new name has been chosen Daim­ler­Chrys­ler).

There are close TECH­NOL­O­GYbased TIES be­tween AMER­I­CAN and CA­NA­DI­AN links of each of the ma­jor pro­duc­ers. These IN­TRA­firm sys­tems of TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of la­bor, with ad­di­tion of THOU­SANDS of in­de­pen­dent sup­pli­ers work­ing on the SUBCON­TRACTING ba­sis, se­cure rel­a­tive­ly HIGH EF­FI­CIEN­CY and ECON­O­MY OF SCALE. Prac­ti­cal­ly, on­ly in this way Amer­i­can au­to­mo­bile man­u­fac­turers could pre­vent loss of North Amer­i­can mar­ket to Jap­a­nese and Eu­ro­pe­an firms.

How­ev­er, in re­cent dec­ades, the North Amer­i­can au­to­mo­bile in­dus­try has been rep­re­sent­ed NOT on­ly by­ the afore­men­tioned Amer­i­can "BIG THREE" but by­ some "for­eign new­com­ers" in­clud­ing Toyota and Honda (which have as­sem­bly plants in the Unit­ed States) as well as Nis­san (with pro­duc­tion fa­cil­i­ties in Mex­i­co). One of­ the bestsell­ing mod­els on North Amer­i­can mar­ket was de­vel­oped and pro­duced by the Amer­i­can plants of­ Hon­da. Ac­cord­ing­ly, the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR in­ North Amer­i­can carmaking more and more of­ten ex­ceeds the lim­its of the CON­TI­NENT and takes GLO­BAL char­ac­ter.

Fi­nal­ly, let us men­tion one more, vir­tu­al­ly quite UN­U­SU­AL, even UNIQUE, fea­ture of the Au­to­mo­bile Agree­ment (Au­toPact). As a mat­ter of fact, dur­ing more than 30 years of its func­tion­ing NO spe­cial in­ter­gov­ern­ment body to su­per­vise the im­ple­men­ta­tion of the agree­ment has been creat­ed!

* Generally, the Au­toPact was VERY suc­cess­ful for BOTH sides. Can­a­da de­vel­oped a steady sur­plus in its au­to­mo­tive trade, the Amer­i­can "Big Three" man­aged to im­prove their ef­fi­cien­cy and to­ se­cure rea­son­able com­pet­i­tive­ness.

On this ba­sis, in the mid1980s, fur­ther lib­er­al­i­za­tion in­i­tia­tives con­cern­ing dif­fer­ent NEW in­dus­tri­al SEC­TORS have been de­vel­oped. A se­ries of Ca­na­di­anAmer­i­can NE­GO­TI­A­TIONS have tak­en place con­cern­ing in­tro­duc­tion of DU­TYFREE ar­range­ments for BI­LAT­ER­AL trade in pet­ro­chem­i­cals, fur­ni­ture, nonfer­rous met­als, al­co­hol­ic bev­er­ag­es, etc.

But the time was ripe for some­thing BIGGER. Both the R. Rea­gan ad­min­is­tra­tion in Amer­i­ca and the gov­ern­ment of B. Mul­ron­ey in Can­a­da (which was in pow­er since 1984) were ready and will­ing to work out a COM­PRE­HEN­SIVE (allem­brac­ing) FREE TRADE AR­RANGE­MENT to be signed by the TWO coun­tries, with pos­si­bil­i­ty of WID­EN­ING its mem­ber­ship in the fu­ture. The spread­ing of idea of "North Amer­i­can CON­TI­NEN­TAL­ISM" in the pub­lic opin­ion of both coun­tries at that time al­so was of much help.

* Strong "CON­TI­NEN­TAL­IST" feel­ings in­ North Amer­i­ca were con­nect­ed with strength­en­ing of po­si­tions BOTH of Eu­rope and Ja­pan in GLO­BAL COM­PE­TI­TION.

In the mid1980s, over THREEQUARTERS of all Ca­na­di­an trade was di­rect­ed to the U.S. Not to lose this fat­ty share in the com­ing years was a dif­fi­cult task for Can­a­da, ask­ing for res­o­lute meas­ures in se­cur­ing FREE AP­PROACH to Amer­i­can mar­ket.

So, af­ter a brief pe­ri­od of ac­tive BI­LAT­ER­AL ne­go­ti­a­tions, a FREE TRADE AR­RANGE­MENT was worked out in­ 1986, and set in­to force as from 1989.

It has re­ceived of­fi­cial name of the "Can­a­da U.S. Free Trade Agree­ment" (CUF­TA) and was aimed at:

# grad­u­al AB­O­LI­TION of ALL cus­toms tar­iffs (du­ties) in the BI­LAT­ER­AL trade with­in 10 years, i.e., not lat­er than by 1999, with THREE dif­fer­ent re­gimes for the THREE groups of prod­ucts: 1) at once and ful­ly, 2) 5 cuts in the lev­el of­ du­ties of 20% each, 3) 10 cuts of 10% each,

# AB­O­LI­TION of ma­jor NONTAR­IFF BAR­RIERS to the re­cip­ro­cal trade, like im­port quo­tas and ex­port sub­si­dies, and CREA­TION of con­di­tions for tru­ly FREE MOVE­MENT of goods and cap­i­tal,

# IN­TRO­DUC­TION of a FREE in­vest­ment and trade RE­GIME in the SER­VICE SEC­TOR of the two coun­tries (FIRST ar­range­ment of this kind in the WORLD),

# CREA­TION of a DIS­PUTE SET­TLE­MENT mech­a­nism be­tween them,

# GUAR­AN­TEED AP­PROACH to the Ca­na­di­an oil and oth­er en­er­gy and raw ma­te­ri­al re­sourc­es for the Amer­i­can side (es­pe­cial­ly im­por­tant point for the Unit­ed States, which had much trou­ble with "Na­tion­al En­er­gy Pro­gram" of Can­a­da and oth­er man­i­fes­ta­tions of the DIR­IG­IST and NA­TION­AL­IST ("PROCA­NAD­IST") ten­den­cies in Can­a­da's ec­o­nom­ic pol­i­cy, like in­tro­duc­tion in 1974 of the For­eign In­vest­ment Re­vi­sion Agen­cy FI­RA).

So, the CUF­TA was set in­to force with HIGH ex­pec­ta­tions for the ex­pan­sion of BI­LAT­ER­AL (re­cip­ro­cal, mu­tu­al) trade and crea­tion of NEW JOBS both in the Unit­ed States and in Can­a­da. It ac­tu­al­ly has made a considerable con­tri­bu­tion to the de­vel­op­ment of re­gion­al trade and the fight against un­em­ploy­ment.

* In 1990, the then new Mex­i­can pres­i­dent C. Sa­li­nas (elect­ed 1988, now in ex­ile) ex­pressed the coun­try's wish to start ne­go­ti­a­tions about its par­tic­i­pa­tion in the re­gion­al FREE TRADE ar­range­ments. It meant a strong move away from the tra­di­tion­al Mex­i­can "EC­O­NOM­IC NA­TION­AL­ISM", and a log­i­cal de­vel­op­ment of the re­form­ing pro­cess which start­ed un­der Sa­li­nas and brought some suc­cess in fight­ing the gal­lop­ing in­fla­tion and in the repri­vat­i­za­tion of the huge state sec­tor.

As an im­por­tant his­tor­i­cal pre­con­di­tion for the Mex­i­co's fur­ther in­volve­ment in­to the North Amer­i­can IN­TE­GRA­TION, we can re­gard the widespread phe­nom­e­non of the socalled "MA­QUI­LA­DO­RAS" (or "MA­QUI­LAS") which first ap­peared in 1965 and un­der­went strong de­vel­op­ment af­ter 1980.

In the ec­o­nom­ic the­o­ry, "MA­QUI­LA­DO­RA" means a Mex­i­can plant (firm), which works on the SUBCON­TRACTING ba­sis to sup­ply an Amer­i­can com­pa­ny with au­to­mo­tive (au­to­mo­bile) components and parts and en­joys the re­gime of a "free trade zone", i.e., may im­port ma­te­ri­als and com­po­nents from the Unit­ed States and ex­port its own prod­ucts to U.S. mar­ket on a DU­TYFREE ba­sis.

This ar­range­ment be­came pos­si­ble be­cause of the chang­es in the Amer­i­can and Mex­i­can leg­is­la­tion back in 1965 aimed at ser­vic­ing the de­vel­op­ment of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION CHAINS on the ba­sis of the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL di­vi­sion of la­bor (the DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION men­tioned ear­li­er).

Since 1980, the ma­jor­i­ty of ma­qui­las were trans­formed in­to PER­MA­NENT IN­DUS­TRI­AL BAS­ES manufacturing cap­i­talin­ten­sive and la­borin­ten­sive pro­duc­ts (CAP­I­TAL came from the Unit­ed States and LA­BOR was made very CHEAP by de­val­u­at­ing the Mex­i­can pe­so). In the 1990s, the LA­BOR COST of pro­duc­tion in Mex­i­co has been es­ti­mat­ed at $2,30 PER HOUR, as against more than $14 in Can­a­da (even in Tai­wan it has been high­er $3,50).

The Mex­i­can gov­ern­ment de­cree of 1989 en­cour­aged the process of fur­ther "MA­QUIL­A­DOR­I­ZA­TION" of the coun­try. It rec­og­nized ma­qui­la­do­ra in­vest­ment as "the prin­ci­pal means of in­sert­ing the Mex­i­can econ­o­my in­to the glo­bal world econ­o­my". The North­ern part of the coun­try was trans­formed to a big "FREE TRADE ZONE".

So, it is on­ly log­i­cal that af­ter such a mas­sive prep­ar­a­tion Mex­i­co was ready to en­ter ne­go­ti­a­tions with the Unit­ed States and Can­a­da about North Amer­i­can FREE TRADE AR­EA. It is al­so worth­while to men­tion that over 70% of the Mex­i­can ex­ports are di­rect­ed to Amer­i­ca (al­most the same pro­por­tion as in Ca­na­di­an case).

* As a re­sult of all these de­vel­op­ments, in Oc­to­ber 1992 the THREE coun­tries – the USA, Can­a­da and Mex­i­co – signed the North Amer­i­can Free Trade Agree­ment (NAF­TA). It has been successfully RAT­I­FIED by Ca­na­di­an and Mex­i­can par­lia­ments, and by the House of­ Rep­re­sen­ta­tives of­ Amer­i­can Con­gress.

Ac­tu­al­ly, ma­jor CHANGES brought by NAFTA (in com­par­i­son with CUFTA) con­cern most­ly Mex­i­can side, i.e., the Amer­i­can and Ca­na­di­an re­la­tions with this coun­try.

The NAF­TA pro­vides for TWO ma­jor IN­TE­GRA­TION steps:

AB­O­LI­TION of ALL tradeandin­vest­ment BAR­RIERS be­tween the THREE coun­tries with­in the next 15 years,

IN­TRO­DUC­TION by all THREE coun­tries of anal­o­gous (sim­i­lar) LEG­IS­LA­TION reg­u­lat­ing ECOL­O­GY STAN­DARDS and LA­BOR RE­LA­TIONS.

In par­tic­u­lar spheres, the LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of TRADE and CAP­I­TAL move­ment should take place ac­cord­ing to a "com­mon timeta­ble":

# AG­RI­CUL­TURE. The ma­jor­i­ty of tar­iffs are abol­ished at once; on­ly for corn, sug­ar, some fruits and veg­e­ta­bles the du­ties must be put away in 15 years,

# AU­TO­MO­TIVE PROD­UCTS. Tar­iffs had to dis­ap­pear GRAD­U­AL­LY with­in 10 years,

# TEX­TILES. The bar­riers had to go GRAD­U­AL­LY with­in 10 years (this con­ces­sion ap­plies to the tex­tiles "made in North Amer­i­ca" ON­LY so, it can NOT help Chi­na or Tai­wan to pen­e­trate re­gion­al mar­ket through dif­fer­ent "tricks"),

# FI­NAN­CIAL SEC­TOR. Mex­i­co had to ful­ly open this sphere for the Amer­i­can and Ca­na­di­an in­vest­ment not lat­er than by 2007 (un­for­tu­nate­ly, af­ter deep mon­e­tary cri­sis in Mex­i­co in­ 1995, which end­ed in­ nearcol­lapse of the pe­so as a sound in­ter­na­tion­al cur­ren­cy, the pros­pects have NOT looked so good any more),

# TRANS­POR­TA­TION. The con­di­tions of FREE CAR­GO TRAN­SIT should have been achieved by the year 2000 (an­other in­te­gra­tion is­sue creat­ing strong fric­tion be­tween the coun­tries, be­cause Mex­i­can longdis­tance trucks are now re­gard­ed both in the Unit­ed States and in Can­a­da as a dead­ly threat to the nat­u­ral en­vi­ron­ment, i.e., as strong ec­o­log­i­cal haz­ard).

In­ prin­ci­ple, the in­tro­duc­tion of the NAF­TA gave im­pe­tus to IN­TRA­re­gion­al TRADE and EM­PLOY­MENT. Thus, the TRADE among the THREE mem­bers of NAF­TA reached $435 bil­lion in 1996. Since spring 1997, Mex­i­co has be­come Amer­i­ca's ex­port mar­ket No. 2, im­me­di­ate­ly af­ter Can­a­da (No. 1) and be­fore Ja­pan (which fig­ured as No. 3 on­ly, and as of late has been even pushed into the slot No. 4 by China). Trade with Canada and Mexico accounts for ONETHIRD of the U.S. total, up from ONEQUARTER in 1989. Nowadays, Canada sells more to the state of California alone than to the European Union, Norway, South Korea, China and Hong Kong combined. In­ all sec­tors, during the 1990s, the U.S. econ­o­my add­ed 8.9 mil­lion jobs – an achieve­ment hard­ly pos­si­ble with­out NAF­TA.

As for Mex­i­co, it was ex­pect­ed to in­crease its world­wide EX­PORTS to a record $110 bil­lion in 1997. Since the 1995 pe­so cri­sis, 1.5 mil­lion JOBS have been creat­ed. Mex­i­co has be­come more at­trac­tive place for FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT, which to­taled $31.5 bil­lion in 199496, an amount sec­ond on­ly to Chi­na among de­vel­op­ing coun­tries. In the past, ex­ports orig­i­nat­ed from the bor­der re­gion and the larg­est cit­ies, while to­day, most ex­portorient­ed plants are open­ing out­side the bor­der ar­ea and through­out Mex­i­co.

Ob­vi­ous­ly, the NAF­TA mar­ket­place in­creas­es op­por­tu­ni­ties for stra­te­gic al­li­anc­es in pro­duc­tion, dis­tri­bu­tion and tech­nol­o­gy. It creates FRIENDLY CLIMATE for in­ter­na­tion­al (re­gion­al) busi­ness of small and me­di­umsize com­pa­nies which get bet­ter ac­cess to ad­vanced tech­nol­o­gy and pro­duc­tion pro­cess­es.

Still, many be­lieve that NAF­TA did NOT quite live up to the ex­pec­ta­tions, es­pe­cial­ly in the Unit­ed States. There are es­ti­mates show­ing that the U.S. has ac­tu­al­ly LOST some WORK­ING PLAC­ES in its man­u­fac­tur­ing to "south­ern com­pet­i­tor” – Mex­i­co. In­ the Amer­i­can Con­gress, since 1996 there has been a strong MOVE­MENT head­ed by­ the Re­pub­li­cans de­mand­ing a thor­ough in­ves­ti­ga­tion of the con­se­quenc­es of NAF­TA and a re­vi­sion of Amer­i­can po­si­tion, should the results turn out negatively.

* Yet, since the 1990s, a quite NEW PE­RI­OD in the his­to­ry of North Amer­i­can IN­TE­GRA­TION has be­gun – the period of ALLRE­GION­AL FREE TRADE AR­RANGE­MENTS.

Ac­cord­ing­ly, the "IN­TE­GRA­TION MOD­EL" of the North Amer­i­can ec­o­nom­ic re­gion is un­der­go­ing some chang­es.

# Dur­ing the FIRST pe­ri­od, end­ing in 1989, the "NORTH AMER­I­CAN IN­TE­GRA­TION MOD­EL" had fol­low­ing spe­cif­ic fea­tures:

in the ab­sence of bar­riers to cap­i­tal mi­gra­tion, the IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES de­vel­oped most­ly on the MI­CRO and ME­SOlev­el, i.e., through the ac­tiv­i­ties of PRI­VATE FIRMS and their for­eign di­rect in­vest­ment ("in­i­tia­tive from be­low"),

very LIT­TLE in­i­tia­tive and ac­tiv­i­ty on the IN­TER­GOV­ERN­MENT lev­el (MAC­ROlev­el), prac­ti­cal­ly NO re­gion­al or­gans or in­sti­tu­tions (NO signs of POS­I­TIVE in­te­gra­tion)

MANY re­main­ing ob­sta­cles to­ TRADE; c­on­di­tions of­ FREE TRADE AR­EA type con­cern­ing on­ly THREE (al­beit im­por­tant) groups of in­dus­tri­al prod­ucts.

# Since then, with the CUF­TA and NAF­TA, ma­jor CHANG­ES to this MOD­EL have been tak­ing place:

now, the in­i­tia­tive al­so comes "from above",

how­ev­er, the im­pe­tus in the IN­TER­GOV­ERN­MENT ac­tiv­i­ty of the THREE coun­tries is be­ing made on NEG­A­TIVE in­te­gra­tion, i.e., on the ab­o­li­tion of var­i­ous TRADE BAR­RIERS and the crea­tion of FREE TRADE con­di­tions, as well as on fur­ther LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION of CAP­I­TAL mi­gra­tion (most­ly in­to Mex­i­co).

* For com­par­i­son, the "EU­RO­PE­AN IN­TE­GRA­TION MOD­EL" (based on­ the ex­pe­ri­ence of the EU) is char­ac­ter­ized by:

LEAD­ING ROLE of the ac­tiv­i­ty on the MAC­ROlev­el, i.e., IN­TER­GOV­ERN­MENT de­ci­sions and agree­ments ("in­i­tia­tive from above" pre­vailed from the very be­gin­ning),

pro­cess­es on the MI­CRO and ME­SOlev­el fol­lowed the chang­es in the sit­u­a­tion brought about by the de­ci­sions on­ the MAC­ROlev­el, i.e., by JOINT in­ter­gov­ern­ment ac­tions (from the Trea­ty of Rome to the Trea­ty of Lisbon),

strong im­pe­tus on POS­I­TIVE in­te­gra­tion (crea­tion of joint SU­PRA­na­tion­al in­stru­ments of reg­u­la­tion, like the Eu­ro­pe­an Com­mis­sion or the CAP, EMS, etc.),

forc­es in­ fa­vor of­ fur­ther DEEP­EN­ING the IN­TE­GRA­TION are very strong, the de­vel­op­ment goes to­ward ev­er HIGH­ER forms of the IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM – with the EC­O­NOM­IC AND MON­E­TARY UN­ION as the current ma­jor step – a big dif­fer­ence in com­par­i­son with FREE TRADE AR­EA con­di­tions be­ing creat­ed now with­in North Amer­i­ca.

How­ev­er, both "MOD­ELS" of RE­GION­AL EC­O­NOM­IC IN­TE­GRA­TION lead to rath­er SIMILAR RESULTS. For ex­am­ple, ac­cord­ing to MA­JOR CRI­TER­I­ON of suc­cess of the IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES – the GRADE of the IN­TER­LAC­ING (IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE) of the na­tion­al econ­o­mies WITH­IN the re­gion – both Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca clear­ly stand out against the BACK­GROUND of the rest of the world.

*An­other im­por­tant FEA­TURE that Eu­ro­pe­an in­te­gra­tion and (North and South) Amer­i­can in­te­gra­tion have IN COM­MON is the pros­pect of their WID­EN­ING:

by now, the European Union has become the "EU­RO­PE­AN TWENTYEIGHT" instead of “EUROPEAN FIFTEEN” with a prospect of further expansion in the future,

in the Western Hemisphere, the North American re­gion­al TRADE ar­range­ment (NAF­TA) has been already expanded on Chile for all practical purposes, and some oth­er Latin American coun­tries have good chances to join it sooner or later.

Thus, there are grounds to ex­pect that NAF­TA sig­ni­fies not the END, but rath­er the BE­GIN­NING of the for­ma­tion of a vast IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM on the scale of the whole of­ West­ern Hem­i­sphere.

We can men­tion a se­ries of BI­LAT­ER­AL agreements be­tween the Unit­ed States and Lat­in Amer­i­can and Car­ibb­ean na­tions ar­ranged more than a decade ago by­ Pres­i­dent George Bush and rep­re­sent­ing the so­called "En­ter­prise for the Amer­i­cas In­i­tia­tive" (EAI), which has been aimed at creat­ing sometime in the 21st century a kind of "AMER­I­CAN COM­MU­NI­TY" some­thing along the lines of the Brit­ish "Com­mon­wealth of Na­tions".

In De­cem­ber 1994, Pres­i­dent Clin­ton host­ed the FIRST in his­to­ry Sum­mit of the Amer­i­cas in Mi­a­mi where high rep­re­sen­ta­tives of more than doz­en states pledged (ex­pressed their will­ing­ness) to achieve a Free Trade Ar­ea of the Amer­i­cas (FTAA) by the year 2005.

In March 1998, the SEC­OND Sum­mit of the Amer­i­cas gath­ered in San­tia­go, Chile. This time, 34 coun­tries with pop­u­la­tion of about 750 mil­lion peo­ple have been rep­re­sent­ed by their HEADS OF STATE and adopt­ed a con­crete TIME­TA­BLE which is de­signed to put the FTAA in place by 2005 as agreed in Mi­a­mi.

* How­ev­er, there was a FAC­TOR that made the goal of prac­ti­cal­ly im­ple­ment­ing the allAmer­i­can FREE TRADE idea on time rather prob­le­mat­ic. The mat­ter was that, since 1995, Pres­i­dent Clin­ton found him­self in a dif­fi­cult and un­pleas­ant sit­u­a­tion when he­ did NOT pos­sess the socalled "FASTTRACK NE­GO­TIAT­ING AU­THOR­I­TY" (i.e., Amer­i­can Con­gress did NOT re­new his right to take PER­SON­AL IN­I­TIA­TIVE in sign­ing in­ter­na­tion­al agree­ments which could be lat­er con­firmed by­ a sim­ple Con­gres­sion­al rat­i­fi­ca­tion pro­ce­dure).

Two re­cent ex­am­ples show clear­ly what it means. For some years, the ques­tion of Chile's mem­ber­ship in NAF­TA could NOT be re­solved ex­act­ly be­cause Amer­i­can pres­i­dent did NOT pos­sess "fasttrack au­thor­i­ty". Al­so, it was a great dis­ap­point­ment for Clin­ton, and – even more im­por­tant – for his part­ners from Lat­in Amer­i­ca, when, in April 1998, he came to the HEM­I­SPHER­IC SUM­MIT in San­tia­go WITHOUT real ne­go­tiat­ing pow­er.

It was in view of this sit­u­a­tion that Can­a­da, which has a big IN­VEST­MENT STAKE in Chile and grow­ing TRADE with this coun­try, has tak­en the lib­er­ty of sign­ing, in No­vem­ber 1996, a bi­lat­er­al FREE TRADE AGREE­MENT with Chile with­out wait­ing for a gen­er­al so­lu­tion in a NAF­TA con­text. Soon, Mex­i­co fol­lowed suit, while the U.S. made its own free trade arrangement with Chile in 2003 only.

Since 2001 in power, U.S. President George W. Bush at once proclaimed his strong backing to the idea of the FTAA. However, just like his predecessor, he was feeling RESTRAINTS because of the ABSENCE of the fasttrack trade negotiations power and repeatedly urged Congress to grant it him.

Finally, in December 2001, the House of Representatives passed the bill restoring to U.S. President broad authority to negotiate and sign international trade agreements, now renamed trade promotion authority or TPA. Unfortunately for the U.S. and its new Democratic President, this authority has expired on July 1, 2007.

However, before the TPA has been introduced, in April 2001, the THIRD Summit of the Americas has gathered in Quebec, Canada. The leaders of 34 Western Hemisphere nations confirmed their ambitious plan to create the world’s largest free trade area by 2005. The Quebec summit added to the FTAA plan a democracy clause that could strip a country of membership if it ceased to be a democracy (and become something like Cuba), for example – as a result of a military coup.

To finish with this question, it is worthwhile to notice that President Obama will face the same problem of obtaining and keeping the TPA sooner or later.

* By the winter 2003/2004, in the Western Hemisphere the mood prevailed that the FTAA plan would not be realized according to the schedule, i.e., before January 1, 2005. So, some bilateral (intersubregional) initiatives have been developing, mostly with the participation of the U.S. trade representatives.

For example, in December 2003 – January 2004, in Washington, negotiations between the United States, on the one side, and some Central American nations (Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and The Dominican Republic), on the other side, have been arranged with an aim of signing their own subregional FREE TRADE agreement. Actually the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has been signed in May 2004. At approximately same time, also FREE TRADE negotiations between the United States and a group of South American countries (including Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) have been launched with the same aim – to introduce more narrow FREE TRADE arrangements in the absence of the allembracing hemispherical FTAA.

* The bilateral free trade arrangements have gained even more importance after “singularly unproductive” FOURTH Summit of the Americas which has gathered in Mar de Plata, Argentina in November 2005. Leaders from around the Americas failed again to resolve key differences over how to create a hemispherewide FTA and could not even have agreed on the date of the next tour of negotiations.

In this connection, TWO important new factors should be considered.

FIRST – there is a strong LEFTIST political movement with pronounced AntiAmerican flavor on the scale of all of Latin America – headed by Cuba and Venezuela and including such different players as Brazil, on the “rich” side, and Bolivia and Nicaragua, on the “poor” side.

SECOND – since late 2008, the world entered a period of overwhelming FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS, which has radically changed the current political agenda in the majority of countries. On this unfavorable background the plans of further trade liberalization have been “put on the back burner” both in global framework (represented by the WTO) and on the scale of individual regions (like Central and South America).

* Generally, the ex­am­ples of Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca al­low an­ im­por­tant THE­O­RET­I­CAL con­clu­sion: that RE­GION­AL frame­work is now­a­days OP­TI­MAL for the ec­o­nom­ic dev­e­lop­ment.

Ac­tu­al­ly:

NA­TION­AL frame­work (na­tion­al econ­o­my) is obviously by far TOO NAR­ROW for ef­fi­cient pro­duc­tion sys­tems and econ­o­my of scale to emerge,

GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION has been taking place, yet in many cas­es the WORLDWIDE scale is NOT very suit­a­ble ei­ther (our PLANET is sim­ply TOO BIG for ma­jor­i­ty of PRI­VATE FIRMS to practically master business operations on a truly GLOBAL scale),

so, ob­vi­ous­ly it­ is­ the RE­GION­AL frame­work that of­fers OP­TI­MAL con­di­tions for achiev­ing both HIGH ef­fi­cien­cy and HIGH tech­no­log­i­cal lev­el of mod­ern MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING (this ob­ser­va­tion is al­so val­id for the SER­VICE SEC­TOR).

* How­ev­er, re­la­tions be­tween EC­O­NOM­IC RE­GIONS of the world, even be­tween the re­mot­est from each oth­er, like EU­ROPE and LAT­IN AMER­I­CA, or EU­ROPE and EAST ASIA, are rap­id­ly de­vel­op­ing tak­ing dif­fer­ent OR­GAN­I­ZA­TION­AL FORMS, in­clud­ing those of a FREE TRADE AR­EA (FTA) type.

In June 1999, in Rio de Ja­nei­ro, at­ the FIRST ev­er Lat­in Amer­i­ca Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion Sum­mit, 46 heads of state agreed to be­gin prep­ar­a­tive work on a wide RE­GIONTORE­GION trade lib­er­al­i­za­tion agree­ment (as the last stage of their ec­o­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion pro­ject adopt­ed in Ma­drid in De­cem­ber 1995).

In late1999, ne­go­ti­a­tions be­tween the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion and Mer­co­sur (about this economic bloc we shall speak more in Topic 10) have be­gun. They have been aimed at preparing a transAt­lan­tic deal by introducing a vast Europe Latin America free trade zone. Al­so, Mex­i­co was in the pro­cess of mu­tu­al prep­ar­a­tions for sign­ing its own FREE TRADE agree­ments with the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion and with Japan, to name but TWO bilateral trade liberalization initiatives the country has been involved in.

As for Asia Pa­cif­ic superre­gion, INTEGRATION PROCESSES in its West­ern part (i.e., in East Asia, South East Asia and Ocea­nia) and in its East­ern part (i.e., in North Amer­i­ca, the Car­ib­be­an and South Amer­i­ca) do "in­creas­ing­ly in­ter­sect and con­verge in mem­ber­ship", thus prom­is­ing to create "an im­mense com­mon ec­o­nom­ic space" in the next couple of dec­ades (about this vast ar­ea the ar­ea of the APEC see more in Top­ic 9).

Here, it is worthwhile to mention the BILATERAL free trade negotiations between the U.S. and Australia, which developed simultaneously with the aforementioned U.S. trade liberalization initiatives in the Western Hemisphere and ended in May 2004 with the signing of a comprehensive agreement – the AUSFTA promising new opportunities for mutual trade in FACTORY GOODS (MANUFACTURES) but excluding SUGAR (a major Australian export commodity).

Top­ic 9. IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES IN ASIAPA­CIF­IC RE­GION

In the 1990s, as nev­er be­fore, very MUCH has been writ­ten about the com­ing of a "PA­CIF­IC CEN­TU­RY" ("Pa­cif­ic Age"). Po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic an­a­lysts coined this met­a­phor­ic name for our 21st century, i.e. for the FIRST cen­tu­ry of the NEW Mil­len­ni­um which start­ed with the year 2001.

This name was cho­sen by anal­o­gy with the "AMER­I­CAN CEN­TU­RY" ("Amer­i­can Age") or, some­times, "AT­LAN­TIC CEN­TU­RY” – names of­ten used to de­scribe the 20th cen­tu­ry (while the 19th cen­tu­ry was called the "BRIT­ISH CEN­TU­RY").

* But what is the "Pa­cif­ic", or "Asia Pa­cif­ic", or "AsiaPa­cif­ic re­gion" ("Pa­cif­icAsian re­gion"), or the "Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin"? Or what, for that mat­ter, are the "Pa­cif­ic Rim coun­tries"?

Ev­er more of­ten, ALL these names (ge­o­graph­i­cal terms) are used as SYN­ON­IMS – to de­scribe a very wide and het­er­o­ge­ne­ous RE­GION (or, rath­er, SU­PER­RE­GION) of the world washed by the Pa­cif­ic Ocean and stretch­ing from Chuk­ot­ka and Alas­ka in the north to Tier­ra del Fue­go and New Zea­land in the south, from Ma­laya in the west to Cal­i­for­nia in the east.

It may be di­vid­ed in­to TWO ma­jor parts:

# West­ern Pa­cif­ic Rim ("West­ern Pa­cif­ic") to which be­long Pa­cif­ic Asia (South East Asia plus East Asia), and Ocea­nia,

# East­ern Pa­cif­ic Rim ("East­ern Pa­cif­ic") in­clud­ing North Amer­i­ca, Central America and South Amer­i­ca.

So, to the West­ern Pa­cif­ic Rim coun­tries be­long:

Ma­lay­sia, In­do­ne­sia, Bru­nei, Thai­land, Sin­ga­pore, the Phi­lip­pines (the ­socalled found­ing mem­bers of­ the As­so­ci­a­tion of South East Asian Na­tions AS­EAN), and Viet­nam, Laos, Myan­mar and Cam­bo­dia – its new mem­bers (all – in SOUTH EAST ASIA),

Chi­na, Tai­wan, Ja­pan, Dem­o­crat­ic Peo­ple's Re­pub­lic of Ko­rea (DPRK, or "North Ko­rea"), Re­pub­lic of Ko­rea (ROK, or "South Ko­rea"), the Rus­sian East­ern Si­be­ria and the Rus­sian Far East (in EAST ASIA).

Aus­tra­lia, New Zea­land, and many is­lands of the West­ern Pa­cif­ic (in OCEA­NIA).

To the East­ern Pa­cif­ic Rim coun­tries be­long:

the Unit­ed States (di­rect­ly – Ha­waii, Alas­ka and Cal­i­for­nia), Can­a­da (di­rect­ly – Brit­ish Co­lum­bia), Mex­i­co, Gua­te­ma­la, El Sal­va­dor, Nic­a­ra­gua, Hon­du­ras and Pan­a­ma (in NORTH AMER­I­CA, in­clud­ing Cen­tral Amer­i­ca).

Co­lom­bia, Ecua­dor, Pe­ru, Chile, (di­rect­ly), and oth­er Lat­in Amer­i­can coun­tries (in­di­rect­ly) – in SOUTH AMER­I­CA.

* Thus, to the "AsiaPa­cif­ic re­gion" ("Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin") be­long – di­rect­ly or in­di­rect­ly – DOZ­ENS of­ na­tions with various ge­o­graph­i­cal and cli­mat­ic con­di­tions, with very DIF­FER­ENT pop­u­la­tion (in­ size, or­i­gin, den­si­ty, cul­tu­ral tra­di­tions), very RICH and very POOR, with GIANT and POW­ER­FUL mod­ern ec­o­nom­ic com­plex­es, and with WEAK un­der­de­vel­oped agrar­i­an econ­o­mies.

How­ev­er, very im­por­tant is the fact of their GROW­ING IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE on the base of COM­PLE­MEN­TAR­I­TY of nat­u­ral re­sourc­es and hu­man ca­pac­i­ties, as well as in ac­cor­dance with the UNI­VER­SAL ten­den­cy to IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION of ec­o­nom­ic life (GLO­BAL­I­ZA­TION) and with rap­id RE­GION­AL­I­ZA­TION of the world econ­o­my.

Here, in this vast re­gion, we still do NOT find a com­plete RE­GION­AL IN­TE­GRA­TION SYS­TEM, but its emerg­ing ELE­MENTS are quite ev­i­dent, as well as IN­TE­GRA­TION PRO­CESS­ES in dif­fer­ent forms and be­tween dif­fer­ent re­gion­al part­ners.

* We shall start this time with pro­cess­es on the MAC­ROlev­el, i.e., with man­i­fes­ta­tions of PO­LIT­I­CAL WILL of the coun­tries board­ing the Pa­cif­ic from west­ern and east­ern side to achieve a kind of RE­GION­AL AC­CORD con­cern­ing the is­sues of creat­ing some­thing like an "PACIFIC COM­MU­NI­TY" in the fu­ture.

First cau­tious pro­po­sal for an IN­STI­TU­TION­AL COUN­TER­WEIGHT to EC (EU) in­ the Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin was made by Ja­pan in the 1960s, when Eu­rope be­gan to build ec­o­nom­ic strength. How­ev­er, the idea of a SPE­CIAL TRAD­ING RE­GIME for the Pa­cif­ic held at that time LITTLE APPEAL for the rest of the re­gion, in­clud­ing the U.S. So, the idea of a Japanese economics professor (Kiyoshi Kojima) had to wait for more appropriate times.

It had long been rec­og­nized that Asia's po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic dif­fer­enc­es would, most prob­ably, pre­vent the crea­tion of an EC­O­NOM­IC BLOC sim­i­lar to the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion. Asian na­tions had grown ac­cus­tomed to re­solve their trade fric­tion with the West BI­LAT­ER­AL­LY (countrytocountry), in a lowkey and in­con­spic­u­ous way.

By the late 1980s, how­ev­er, con­di­tions had changed. In­ Eu­rope, the "Com­mon Mar­ket" (EC, EU) had dem­on­strat­ed the po­ten­cy of re­gion­al coop­er­a­tion in both TRADECREAT­ING and TRADERE­STRICT­ING as­pects.

An­other fac­tor con­duc­tive to PA­CIF­IC RE­GION­AL­ISM was the grow­ing CONFIDENCE of Asian na­tions in their own ECONOMIC VALIDITY (im­por­tance). The mount­ing size of the to­tal AsiaPa­cif­ic econ­o­my, its in­creas­ing IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE, the low­er­ing of po­lit­i­cal ten­sion fol­low­ing the U.S. with­draw­al from Viet­nam, and the nor­mal­i­za­tion of Si­noAmer­i­can dip­lo­mat­ic re­la­tions since 1972 – all served to create a more fa­vor­a­ble at­mos­phere for coop­er­a­tion in the 1980s.

In 1980, a pathbrak­ing in­i­tia­tive be­gan with the crea­tion of a gov­ern­mentsup­port­ed PRI­VATE body, the Pa­cif­ic Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion Con­fer­ence (PECC). How­ev­er, the LOW lev­el of en­thu­siasm in AS­EAN for a more for­mal IN­STI­TU­TION­AL FRAME­WORK re­mained a ma­jor im­ped­i­ment (ob­sta­cle) to fruit­ful in­ter­gov­ern­ment di­a­logues.

* In ear­ly 1989, when the world pub­lic opin­ion was fo­cused on the idea of the Sin­gle Eu­ro­pe­an Act (SEA) aimed at creat­ing a Sin­gle Eu­ro­pe­an Mar­ket (SEM), the then Aus­tra­li­an Prime Min­is­ter, Bob Haw­ke, striv­ing to avoid ec­o­nom­ic iso­la­tion and to find coun­ter­bal­ance for the de­vel­op­ments in Eu­rope, pro­posed re­gion­al (Asia Pa­cif­ic) ne­go­ti­a­tions with an aim of in­tro­duc­ing an IN­TERGOV­ERN­MENT FOR­UM and coined the now wellknown name for it – the "Asia Pa­cif­ic Ec­o­nom­ic Coop­er­a­tion"(APEC).

The Unit­ed States and Can­a­da showed their in­ter­est in the con­cept, and that, com­bined with sup­port from sev­er­al Asian na­tions, led to the even­tu­al for­ma­tion of a 12na­tion group com­pris­ing the then SIX coun­tries of AS­EAN (with­out Viet­nam) plus Aus­tra­lia, Can­a­da, Ja­pan, South Ko­rea, New Zea­land, and the U.S.

Up­ to now, APEC main­ly re­mains an AN­NU­AL FOR­UM – and NOT some­thing like AS­SO­CI­A­TION, COUN­CIL or even COM­MIS­SION (jokers say about APEC that it represents merely “four adjectives looking for a noun”). It is MORE a place to­ TALK (to­ ex­press opin­ion) than to NE­GO­TIATE or to­ DE­CIDE. How­ev­er, its min­i­ste­ri­allev­el di­a­logues and the meet­ings of its low­erlev­el work­ing groups have been sug­gesting the be­gin­ning of a NEW PHASE in­ re­gion­al ec­o­nom­ic in­te­gra­tion and in­sti­tu­tionbuild­ing.

In 1991, the for­um was en­larged as to in­clude Chi­na, Hong Kong and Tai­wan. At the Bo­gor SUM­MIT (In­do­ne­sia, No­vem­ber 1994), 18 mem­ber na­tions took part, in­clud­ing Chile, Mex­i­co, and Pa­pua New Guin­ea (PNG), and a threeyear MOR­A­TOR­I­UM on fur­ther ex­pan­sion in­tro­duced.

Af­ter it ex­pired, the last wave of APEC ex­pan­sion took place in 1998, when THREE new mem­bers Rus­sia, Pe­ru and Viet­nam – have been ac­cept­ed, and a NEW tenyear MOR­A­TOR­I­UM on wid­en­ing of the mem­ber­ship in­tro­duced.

* It hap­pened soon af­ter the To­kyo SUM­MIT of the "GREAT SEV­EN" in­ Ju­ly 1993, that a cou­ra­geous IN­I­TIA­TIVE of Bill Clin­ton helped to solve in ONE BIG MOVE (Oc­to­berDe­cem­ber 1993) many com­plex ques­tions of in­ter­na­tion­al re­la­tions both on BI­LAT­ER­AL (re­gion­al) and MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL ba­sis.

In Oc­to­ber, the Amer­i­can Con­gress rat­i­fied the NAF­TA agree­ment (should it have failed – and oth­er im­por­tant events would NOT have tak­en place ei­ther).

In No­vem­ber, the APECfor­um gath­ered in Seat­tle (USA). It was the FIRST TIME ev­er that the FOR­UM gath­ered at the HIGH­EST lev­el, i.e., as a SUM­MIT meet­ing. In­ Seat­tle, the heads of the 14 Pa­cif­ic coun­tries (with­out Ma­lay­sia) out­lined pros­pects for the fu­ture clos­er coop­er­a­tion. Clin­ton used the op­por­tu­ni­ty to speak of "Tri­po­lar World" and "Triple Play", hav­ing in­ mind UN­DER­STAND­ING and COOP­ER­A­TION be­tween the THREE main re­gions of the world.

And in De­cem­ber, un­der im­pres­sion of BOTH these great events, the rep­re­sen­ta­tives of more than hun­dred na­tions reached FI­NAL AC­CORD in the "Uru­guay Round" of the GATT ne­go­ti­a­tions (please, re­mem­ber Top­ic 6).

* The HIGHLEV­EL Amer­i­canAsian di­a­logue opened in Seat­tle (No­vem­ber 1993) prom­ised new de­vel­op­ments in U.S. coop­er­a­tion with Pa­cif­ic Asia. At that his­tor­ic FIRST gath­er­ing of the APEC lead­ers, Pres­i­dent Clin­ton did NOT push Asian part­ners in the di­rec­tion of a "Pa­cif­ic Com­mon Mar­ket" or even "Pa­cif­ic Free Trade Ar­ea" (and many Asians were afraid, he would). It was clear that at that time Pa­cif­ic Asian coun­tries were NOT ready to open their mar­kets on the ba­sis of­ a com­pre­hen­sive RE­GION­AL AR­RANGE­MENT.

Gen­er­al­ly, Asian na­tions are more in­clined to de­cide con­di­tions in TRADE with dif­fer­ent West­ern part­ners UNI­LAT­ER­AL­LY, or BI­LAT­ER­AL­LY – through ne­go­ti­a­tions with each par­tic­u­lar coun­try (in­clud­ing the Unit­ed States). They al­so want to decide FOR THEM­SELVES such is­sues as "Hu­man Rights" ("Po­lit­i­cal Free­doms") or "Ecol­o­gy Stan­dards".

In­ prin­ci­ple, they fa­vor a kind of "OPEN RE­GION­AL­ISM" which would pro­vide for clos­er ties with­in the re­gion, but would NOT ex­clude nor­mal, and even "spe­cial", re­la­tions with the states out­side Pa­cif­ic Ba­sin.

In Seat­tle, it was sole­ly de­cid­ed that the an­a­lyt­ic and prep­ar­a­tive work should go on, and that in 1996 a new for­um meet­ing should out­line some GEN­ER­AL tar­gets for in­sti­tut­ing some kind of "PA­CIF­IC COM­MU­NI­TY" in the fu­ture. Still, the first APEC sum­mit "gave the LOOSE or­gan­i­za­tion a BACK­BONE".

* Af­ter Seat­tle, the pro­cess sud­den­ly ac­cel­er­at­ed. In­stead of 1996, the next, SEC­OND, gath­er­ing of the APEC lead­ers took place in No­vem­ber 1994, in Bo­gor (Indo­ne­sia).

The 18 coun­tries adopt­ed a joint dec­lar­a­tion in which they (quite un­ex­pect­ed for many po­lit­i­cal ob­serv­ers) agreed to an­nounce their com­mit­ment "to com­plete the achieve­ment of our goal of FREE and OPENED TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT in Asia Pa­cif­ic not lat­er than the year 2020". The dec­lar­a­tion stat­ed that this date con­cerns DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries on­ly, while DE­VEL­OPED and "NEW­LY IN­DUS­TRI­AL­IZED" coun­tries (NIC) should lib­er­al­ize their ec­o­nom­ic turn­o­ver (i.e., FOR­EIGN TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT) ten years ear­li­er, by 2010.

Thus, the TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION scheme in AsiaPa­cif­ic ar­ea pro­vides for a kind of "TWOLANE TRAF­FIC" based on dif­fer­ent speeds with which the APEC na­tions be­long­ing to TWO groups will move toward the FREE TRADE con­di­tions.

The de­ci­sions adopt­ed in Bo­gor can be re­gard­ed as a ma­jor BREAKTHROUGH in the field of TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION en­deav­or. The idea of a re­gion­al FREE TRADE AR­EA gained prin­ci­pal en­dorse­ment. Al­though NO ac­cel­er­at­ed TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION was ex­pect­ed, some "of­fi­cial timeta­ble" had been set.

Since Bo­gor, the "buzz word" (mod­ern slo­gan) char­ac­ter­iz­ing ac­tions aimed at boost­ing AsiaPa­cif­ic coop­er­a­tion is­ "FA­CIL­I­TA­TION" of com­merce and in­vest­ment through such joint meas­ures as HAR­MON­I­ZA­TION of cus­toms clear­ance pro­ce­dures and rules for en­try of goods, as well as CON­SUL­TA­TIONS be­fore de­cid­ing where exactly new high­ways, ports and tel­e­com­mu­ni­ca­tion links could best go.

* In No­vem­ber 1995, in Osa­ka, the THIRD session of the APEC SUM­MIT took place and adopt­ed an Ac­tion Agen­da – a doc­u­ment fre­quent­ly called "a BLUE­PRINT for TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION", which should have served as a CON­CRETE PRO­GRAM aimed at im­ple­ment­ing the Bo­gor de­ci­sions.

The "THREE PIL­LARS" (main ele­ments) of the fu­ture re­gion­al FREE TRADE ar­range­ment in­clude:

# trade and in­vest­ment LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION (grad­u­al ab­o­li­tion of all TAR­IFF and NONTAR­IFF bar­riers to in­ter­na­tion­al ec­o­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty),

# trade and in­vest­ment FA­CIL­I­TA­TION (crea­tion of fa­vor­a­ble con­di­tions for the de­vel­op­ment of trade and in­vest­ment among AsiaPa­cif­ic na­tions),

# ec­o­nom­ic and tech­ni­cal COOP­ER­A­TION (al­so called "DE­VEL­OP­MENT COOP­ER­A­TION") in 13 "tar­get ar­e­as" in­clud­ing TRAIN­ING hu­man re­sourc­es, IN­DUS­TRI­AL sci­ence and tech­nol­o­gy, small and me­di­umsize EN­TER­PRIS­ES, IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE, TRANS­POR­TA­TION, TEL­E­COM­MU­NI­CA­TIONS, TOUR­ISM, FISH­ER­IES, AG­RI­CUL­TURE.

And here are THREE high­ly orig­i­nal PRIN­CI­PLES of the IN­TE­GRA­TION MECH­A­NISM:

> VOL­UN­TAR­Y­ISM. The TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION should take place on the ba­sis of the socalled "CON­CERT­ED UNI­LAT­ER­ AP­PROACH", when EACH na­tion un­der­takes ITS OWN lib­er­al­i­za­tion meas­ures VOL­UN­TAR­I­LY and at a pace (with a speed) cor­re­spond­ing to its abil­i­ties and cur­rent ec­o­nom­ic sit­u­a­tion (i.e., WITH­OUT firm ob­li­ga­tions which should be ful­filled at any price).

> FLEX­I­BIL­I­TY. The LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION should be COM­PRE­HEN­SIVE (i.e., should em­brace ALL kinds of GOODS and SER­VIC­ES trad­ed among the AsiaPa­cif­ic na­tions), but its in­tro­duc­tion should be FLEX­I­BLE (i.e., some coun­tries MAY ex­empt some goods from the lib­er­al­i­za­tion pro­cess for some time).

> OPEN­NESS. In ac­cor­dance with the con­cept of­ "OPEN RE­GION­AL­ISM", the LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION should be based on the prin­ci­ple of "NONDIS­CRIM­I­NA­TION" (it means that ALL con­ces­sions the mem­ber coun­tries will grant each oth­er can al­so ap­ply to part­ners out­side AsiaPa­cif­ic ar­ea).

Al­most all de­ci­sions worked out in Bo­gor and Osa­ka have a com­mon fea­ture: a cer­tain AM­BI­GU­I­TY, cer­tain VAGUE­NESS, al­low­ing for FLEX­I­BIL­I­TY of the whole sys­tem and VOL­UN­TARY char­ac­ter of na­tion­al lib­er­al­i­za­tion meas­ures.

It was expected that the unique mech­a­nism of re­gion­al TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION creat­ed by APEC through its de­ci­sions at the Osa­ka sum­mit would in fact re­veal TOL­ER­ANCE to­ward rel­a­tive­ly small con­tri­bu­tions and la­zy path of lib­er­al­i­za­tion meas­ures in the WEAK­EST coun­tries of this het­er­o­ge­ne­ous re­gion for the sake of HAR­MO­NY and CER­TAIN BAL­ANCE of trad­ing pow­er be­tween the TWO groups. In this light, the aforementioned VAGUE­NESS and AM­BI­GU­I­TY of the whole ar­range­ment could be re­gard­ed as its mer­it, and NOT weak­ness or flaw.

* The next, FOURTH, sum­mit meet­ing of the APEC gath­ered in No­vem­ber 1996 in Sub­ic Bay, a sub­urb of Ma­ni­la, the Phi­lip­pines' cap­i­tal. It was LESS pathbreak­ing than Bo­gor, more in the na­ture of Osa­ka, with its stress on cur­rent goals of EC­O­NOM­IC COOP­ER­A­TION and vol­un­tary and un­bind­ing con­tri­bu­tions to the pre­par­ing com­pre­hen­sive TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION in the next cen­tu­ry.

In line with the Ac­tion Agen­da adopt­ed in Osa­ka, in Ma­ni­la the mem­ber coun­tries pre­sent­ed their in­di­vid­u­al AC­TION PLANS for re­duc­ing TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT BAR­RIERS and der­e­gu­la­tion of their na­tion­al econ­o­mies as pre­par­a­to­ry meas­ures. All na­tion­al plans were then in­te­grat­ed in Ma­ni­la Ac­tion Plans for APEC (MA­PA), a fourvol­ume doc­u­ment sum­mingup in­di­vid­u­al and col­lec­tive meas­ures aimed at TRADE and IN­VEST­MENT LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION.

*The FIFTH sum­mit of APEC took place in No­vem­ber 1997, in Van­cou­ver, Brit­ish Co­lum­bia (Can­a­da). In the way of prep­ar­a­tion, al­most all mem­bers sub­mit­ted their LISTS of in­dus­tri­al SECTORS which should be put on the sum­mit's agen­da. Dur­ing the meet­ing, NINE ar­e­as were cho­sen for the socalled Ear­ly Vol­un­tary Sec­to­rial Lib­er­al­i­za­tion (EVSL): en­vi­ron­men­tal goods and ser­vic­es, med­i­cal equip­ment, chem­i­cal prod­ucts, en­er­gy goods and ser­vic­es, for­est prod­ucts, fish, toys, gems and jew­el­ry, tel­e­com­mu­ni­ca­tions. The idea of the EVSL is that such "sec­torbysec­tor" ap­proach would make it EAS­I­ER to achieve progress in OPEN­ING MAR­KETS in the APEC ar­ea be­fore the year 2010.

How­ev­er, for Ja­pan at least TWO of the cho­sen NINE sec­tors can be re­gard­ed as high­ly "sen­si­tive". Fac­ing the Asian cri­sis and a very prob­able new round of MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL TRADE NE­GO­TI­A­TIONS un­der the ae­gis of the WTO, Ja­pan was re­luc­tant to hur­ry with open­ing its mar­kets, es­pe­cial­ly those of FISH and FOREST PRODUCTS.

We have al­ready men­tioned that in Van­cou­ver THREE new coun­tries were grant­ed the APEC mem­ber­ship: Rus­sia, Pe­ru and Viet­nam. Thus, since 1998 the APEC has 21 mem­bers, and a tenyear MOR­A­TOR­I­UM on fur­ther ex­pan­sion of­ the or­gan­i­za­tion has been in­tro­duced.

* In No­vem­ber 1998, high states­men from these 21 na­tions (how­ev­er, with Vice Pres­i­dent Al Gore in­stead of­ Bill Clin­ton, and with then Prime Min­is­ter Yev­ge­ny Prim­a­kov in­stead of ail­ing Bor­is Yelt­sin) came to Kua­la Lum­pur for the SIXTH sum­mit of APEC. At this time the sit­u­a­tion in the HOST COUN­TRY (Ma­lay­sia) has been very tense be­cause of ec­o­nom­ic hard­ships and a deep split in coun­try's po­lit­i­cal es­tab­lish­ment which cul­mi­nat­ed in the ar­rest and trial of Vice Prime Min­is­ter An­war Ib­ra­him (he was released from jail only in 2004). Al­so, dur­ing sev­er­al months be­fore the Kua­la Lum­pur meet­ing the U.S. tried to per­suade Ja­pan to par­tic­i­pate in the EVSL meas­ures in all NINE sec­tors, in­clud­ing fish and fo­rest­ry prod­ucts. Ja­pan did NOT agree, and the MIN­I­STE­RI­AL MEET­ING which gath­ered on the eve of the SUM­MIT de­cid­ed to trans­fer the TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION ne­go­ti­a­tions to the WTO. All in all, NO se­ri­ous steps in Pa­cif­ic coop­er­a­tion have been made this time, be­sides adopt­ing a mod­est set of pro­po­sals to bat­tle Asian ec­o­nom­ic cri­sis.

* In Sep­tem­ber 1999, the heads of APEC states gath­ered, for the SEVENTH time, in Auck­land (New Zea­land). This time, the month of­ No­vem­ber was kept free for the WTO ses­sion due in Seattle, which was ex­pect­ed to be­come real­ly his­tor­ic by open­ing a NEW ROUND of mul­ti­lat­eral ne­go­ti­a­tions about fur­ther trade lib­er­al­i­za­tion (if necessary, return to Top­ic 6).

All in all, the Auck­land sum­mit did lit­tle to push for­ward APEC own agen­da of trade lib­er­al­i­za­tion, while con­cen­trat­ing at­ten­tion on work­ing out com­mon grounds for the expected No­vem­ber WTO ne­go­ti­a­tions (which, as we know, have ended in a deadlock).

* The next, already EIGHTH, summit meeting of the APEC gathered in November 2000 in the capital of BRUNEI Bandar Seri Begwan.

Obviously lacking new initiatives in enhancing regional cooperation, the 21 member countries focused their attention on promoting a NEW ROUND of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO framework (which has been later opened in Doha). However, while the DEVELOPED countries headed by the U.S. advocated an immediate opening of a new round, the DEVELOPING countries led by Malaysia insisted on first seeing and discussing the AGENDA for an eventual round, and only after that setting the opening date or a definite deadline.

The BRUNEI summit ended in COMPROMISE by acknowledging the CONCERNS of the poor nations, while also giving the rich countries the DEADLINE (until the end of 2001) they wanted. The APEC statement also urged early WTO entry for China, which has already negotiated the conditions of its joining the WTO with the U.S, the EU and all other major countries except Mexico. Also the issue of eventual APEC membership for North Korea has been discussed in favorable terms (albeit earlier APEC introduced a MORATORIUM on new membership until the year 2007), as well as the prospects of Taiwan’s and Russia’s WTO entry in a near future .

* The next APEC summit (No. 9), in November 2001 in SHANGHAI, gathered in a very unusual international situation which developed in the aftermath of the horrible TERRORIST ATTACK on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The U.S. Air Force, with some British backing, was dropping bombs on Taliban positions and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. The ANTITERRORIST COALITION was a vast and representative one, but its members had many worries and reservations concerning the U.S. military operation.

So, the attention of the summit switched to the issues of INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. First time in the APEC history, a FINAL DECLARATION containing a JOINT FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT has been signed by the high representatives who were present.

In the ECONOMIC field, the summit reaffirmed the members’ commitment to FREE and OPEN trade and investment, and thus to Bogor goals and Osaka timetable. Also, partners expressed their determination to REVERSE the economic DOWNTURN by fighting protectionism and launching the NEW ROUND of the WTO negotiations at its ministerial conference in November 2001.

* In 2002, the regular TENTH summit has gathered in lateOctober, in LOS CABOS, Mexico. Unfortunately, it took place immediately after several unusually severe TERRORIST ATTACKS, including the bombing of dancing facilities in Bali, Indonesia, and the hostage drama in Moscow. So, for the second consecutive year, POLITICAL QUESTIONS dominated the summit’s agenda. The summit issued two STATEMENTS on TERRORISM and another urging North Korea to abandon its nuclear arms development. Economic documents (rather general and vague in phrasing) confirmed APEC members’ intentions to promote sustainable economic growth in the AsiaPacific region through liberalization and facilitation of TRADE and INVESTMENT, as well as economic and technical COOPERATION. The summit agreed that the new Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations should be concluded by January 1, 2005.

* In 2003, the ELEVENTH summit of the APEC has gathered in October in BANGKOK, Thailand. Again, POLITICAL ISSUES and GOALS dominated the Summit’s agenda. In the joint communique the 21 APEC leaders called for a REVIVAL of the stalled TRADE TALKS in the WTO and for new efforts to accelerate the FIGHT against TERRORISM.

* Next year (2004), the current TWELVE summit has taken place in Santiago, Chile. Before the session, The APEC Business Advisory Council issued a report urging the leaders of the 21 countries to display “strong political commitment” to successfully negotiate a regionwide FREE TRADE ARRANGEMENT (along the lines of the Bogor goals but with some adjustments). Instead, the heads of the APEC states preferred to pay their main attention to the ongoing Doha Round of the WTO and to ignore the necessity to concentrate on the regional free trade agenda.

* In major features, this situation has repeated itself in Busan, Korea, where the APEC leaders gathered in November 2005 on their THIRTEENTH session. Again, the necessity to somehow finalize the Doha Round as soon as possible dominated the discussions preventing any concrete decisions in the regional framework. Also, the “spaghetti bowl” of bilateral FTA AGREEMENTS with widely differing rules and standards made it even MORE difficult for the APEC members to move toward an effective regional arrangement. Besides, topical political issues like fighting CORRUPRION and working out necessary COUNTERTERRORISM measures took a big place on the sessions’ agenda.

* Judging by almost all APEC meetings after the 9/11 2001 events, including the recent ones – in Vietnam, 2006, in Australia, 2007, in Perui, 2008, in Singapore (2009) and Yokohama (2010), it looked like the FOCUS on SECURITY ISSUES began to steadily distract APEC from the regional TRADE LIBERALIZATION and ECONOMIC REFORMS that are so essential for the region’s future.

As for the very last summits they have been, quite expectedly, devoted mostly to the issues of the current GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS. The proclaimed goals include such farreaching and ambitious ideas as “designing a new economic model” for the world and “rising the quality of growth” in the region.

So, the current problem for APEC is how to become and stay more POLITICALLY and ECONOMICALLY RELEVANT (i.e., to be of real IMPORTANCE in the world affairs) without too strongly POLITICIZING the AGENDA of its annual SUMMITS.

* Let us see now what was go­ing on in the last few dec­ades on the MI­CRO and ME­SOlev­els of RE­GION­AL ECON­O­MY. We shall an­a­lyze THREE ma­jor is­sues con­cern­ing IN­TER­NA­TION­AL­I­ZA­TION pro­cess­es on the re­gion­al (AsianPa­cif­ic) scale:

MOVE­MENT OF CAP­I­TAL,

TECH­NOL­O­GY TRANS­FER,

MU­TU­AL (IN­TRA­RE­GION­AL) TRADE.

# CAP­I­TAL. In the mid­dle of the 1980s, Amer­i­can dol­lar lost over HALF of its VAL­UE against the yen as a re­sult of spe­cial mon­e­tary pol­i­cy de­vel­oped by the in­dus­tri­al coun­tries – PART­NERS and RI­VALS of Ja­pan on the world mar­kets (the socalled "Pla­za Ac­cord" among the "Group of Sev­en"). This pol­i­cy was aimed at fight­ing the giant Jap­a­nese TRADE SUR­PLUS, but in prac­tice it stim­u­lat­ed FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT of­ Ja­pan more, than it re­strict­ed its EX­PORTS.

With a strong yen, Jap­a­nese com­pa­nies sud­den­ly found them­selves con­front­ing PRO­DUC­TION COSTS at home that were FAR HIGH­ER than those in the NIC. So, in­ or­der to re­main com­pet­i­tive, the Japanese producers moved rap­id­ly to lo­cate NEW PRO­DUC­TION offshore (in neigh­bor­ing coun­tries with rel­a­tive­ly LOW la­bor costs). In FIVE years, Jap­a­nese DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT in the NIC and South­east Asia in­creased SIX fold – with the ob­jec­tive NOT just to en­large MAR­KET SHARE with­in each hostcoun­try, but to use the lo­ca­tion as an EX­PORT PLAT­FORM in trade with the socalled "THIRD COUN­TRIES", such as the Unit­ed States, which ab­sorbed about 30 per­cent of the Jap­a­nese OFFSHORE pro­duc­tion.

Through­out the re­gion, the tide of in­vest­ment be­came vis­i­ble in the form of new Jap­a­nese of­fic­es, ho­tels and man­u­fac­tur­ing plants. Con­su­mer prod­ucts from So­ny, Pan­a­son­ic and Can­on be­gan to ap­pear in Ko­rea and Thai­land NOT as im­port­ed items, but as lo­cal­ly pro­duced goods.

In Ja­pan it­self, pub­lic wor­ry emerged about its DEIN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION, or the socalled "HOL­LOW­INGOUT" of Jap­a­nese MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING al­leg­ed­ly gain­ing mo­men­tum and un­der­min­ing do­mes­tic growth po­ten­tial and em­ploy­ment op­por­tu­ni­ties in the com­ing dec­ades. In our view, there is NOT enough ground for such pes­si­mis­tic al­le­ga­tions (judge­ment) which can be even mis­lead­ing, be­cause the rise of Jap­a­nese OFFSHORE PRO­DUC­TION brings about an ab­so­lute en­large­ment, and NOT a shrink­ing, of Jap­a­nesecon­trolled MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING AC­TIV­I­TIES at­ home and around East Asia.

The most farreach­ing change has been taking place in the REGIONAL PRO­DUC­TION BASE it­self: Jap­a­nese com­pa­nies be­gan to man­u­fac­ture COM­PO­NENTS in dif­fer­ent parts of Pa­cif­ic Asia ac­cord­ing to each coun­try's COM­PAR­A­TIVE AD­VAN­TAG­ES in RE­SOURC­ES, IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE and LA­BOR – a quite new stage in the for­ma­tion of DI­RECT­LY IN­TER­NA­TION­AL PRO­DUC­TION un­der Jap­a­nese guid­ance which ac­quired MASSSCALE char­ac­ter.

How­ev­er, so far it is NOT Asia that rep­re­sents the MAIN out­let (di­rec­tion) for the Jap­a­nese in­vest­ment abroad in terms of AC­CU­MU­LAT­ED cap­i­tal: for ex­am­ple, in­ the mid90s, about THREEFIFTH (60 per­cent) of all CU­MU­LA­TIVE di­rect in­vest­ments have been still placed in North Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope as com­pared to mere­ly 23.6 per­cent in Asia (please, no­tice that in 1985 this share amount­ed to 11.8 per­cent on­ly). Among rea­sons for such a state of af­fairs we can point out that dur­ing the last TWOTHREE DEC­ADES the crea­tion of Jap­a­nese AU­TO­MO­BILE and ELEC­TRON­ICS pro­duc­tion in the Unit­ed States and ac­qui­si­tion of­ big stakes in­ Amer­i­can REAL ES­TATE were un­der way.

At the same time, Ja­pan it­self re­mains rath­er CLOSED for for­eign cap­i­tal. There is a scan­dal­ous IMBALANCE in the sphere of FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT (FDI) be­tween Ja­pan and the rest of the in­dus­tri­al world. For ex­am­ple, at the turn of the century/millennium, Thai­land re­ceived 34 times MORE in­ward in­vest­ment than Ja­pan. The FDI in Ja­pan has been on­ly 1/1.000th of that in the U.S., and 1/500th of that in Chi­na or Brit­ain. For­eign­ers on­ly ac­count for 0.1 per­cent of TO­TAL di­rect in­vest­ment in Ja­pan, com­pared with 4 per­cent in France, 7 per­cent in the U.S. and 13 per­cent in Brit­ain .

Over­com­ing ISO­LA­TION of Jap­an­'s fi­nan­cial mar­kets and se­cur­ing their OPEN­ING for for­eign in­vest­ment have been the two main ob­jec­tive ne­ces­si­ties be­hind the gov­ern­ment's "BIG BANG" der­e­gu­la­tion plan in­tro­duced in 1997 and aimed at lib­er­al­iz­ing Ja­pan's fi­nan­cial sphere by 2001 (an ambitious goal achieved only in part).

As for American capital, its main destinations in East Asia included China (by far the biggest share), Taiwan, Korea and the ASEAN. The scale of American FDI in China was such that a new quality of interaction between the two world’s industrial leaders has emerged – that of “economic twinning”, a new form of international economic integration. China, in its turn, has been investing a lot in the U.S., as well as in South East Asia (according to ASEAN Plus Three model).

# TECH­NOL­O­GY. The Jap­a­nese DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT in Pa­cif­ic Asia served as a ma­jor chan­nel of its TECH­NOL­O­GY TRANS­FER with­in the re­gion. "In­vest­ments NOT aid" was the mot­to (slo­gan).

How­ev­er, the NIC, while ben­e­fit­ing from the surge of Jap­a­nese in­vest­ment, could en­hance their COM­PET­I­TIVE po­si­tion against JA­PANBASED pro­duc­tion ON­LY in the LOW­ER tech­nol­o­gy ar­e­as of con­su­mer mar­kets. Ja­pan con­tin­ues to re­serve the MOST AD­VANCED tech­nol­o­gies for its HOMEBASED in­dus­tries.

In our view, there is MUCH MORE ground to speak about fur­ther TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL MOD­ERN­I­ZA­TION of Jap­a­n's MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING than of its "HOL­LOW­INGOUT".

The MOST SO­PHIS­TI­CAT­ED com­put­er sem­i­con­duc­tor chips are pro­duced at JAP­A­NESE fac­to­ries (at­ home) about a year EAR­LI­ER, than their ap­pear­ance in the Jap­a­nese plants ABROAD (in­clud­ing the Unit­ed States and Ger­ma­ny). This STRAT­E­GY sug­gests that the Jap­a­nese firms will be care­ful NEV­ER to al­low its FOR­EIGN man­u­fac­tur­ing to un­der­mine the tech­nol­o­gy lead of their HOMEBASED pro­duc­tion. Ko­rea has gained a share of the sem­i­con­duc­tor mar­ket, for ex­am­ple, but IM­MENSE SCALE of Jap­a­nese in­vest­ment in new prod­uct de­vel­op­ment and R&D has been dwarfing that of Ko­rea or ANY oth­er Asian country. Thus, the TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL GAP be­tween Ja­pan and the states which are go­ing through mod­ern­i­za­tion of their econ­o­mies with Jap­a­nese and Amer­i­can help will most prob­ably stay for dec­ades to come.

It would be wrong to­ say presume the Jap­a­nese (or Amer­i­can) fi­nan­cial and tech­ni­cal AS­SIS­TANCE to Asian coun­tries is of NO use to them. How­ev­er, it has by far LESS in­flu­ence on Asia's in­dus­tri­al de­vel­op­ment than the in­flow of FDI which is ex­pressed in fig­ures ex­ceed­ing those for the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL AID as 10 : 1.

Let us al­so no­tice that the OVER­ALL SCALE on which BOTH Jap­a­n' DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT in­ Asia and its BI­LAT­ER­AL AID to the Asian coun­tries take place vis­i­bly EX­CEEDS that of the Unit­ed States (in the lat­ter case by about TWO­FOLD). Ja­pan has al­ready be­come the dom­i­nant FOR­EIGN EC­O­NOM­IC POW­ER in three of the AS­EAN coun­tries (In­do­ne­sia, Ma­lay­sia and Thai­land), and is ap­prox­i­mate­ly on a par with the U.S. TRADE, AID and IN­VEST­MENT pres­ence in the Phi­lip­pines.

# TRADE. The to­day's WEALTH of many coun­tries in­ PA­CIF­IC ASIA emerged thanks to rel­a­tive OPEN­NESS of West­ern mar­kets af­ter "To­kyo Round" of the GATT ne­go­ti­a­tions. That ex­plains WHY, in their OVER­ALL trade, the turn­o­ver with part­ners OUT­SIDE this group (i.e., with IN­DUS­TRI­AL part­ners in Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope) has his­tor­i­cal­ly played a very BIG role (about 70 to 60 per­cent).

How­ev­er, dur­ing the last dec­ades, a sub­stan­tial switch (change) has tak­en place. The MOD­ERN­I­ZA­TION of Asian econ­o­my ac­com­pa­nied by vis­i­ble growth of PRO­DUC­TION COOP­ER­A­TION ties, on the one hand, and grow­ing WEALTH fa­vor­ing mod­ern CON­SUMP­TION and DE­MAND pat­terns, on the oth­er hand, brought about a sharp RISE in IN­TRA­re­gional (Asian) trade and some DECLINE of the OUT­SIDE (West­ern) part­ners' share in TO­TAL Asian trade.

In 1994, JA­PAN al­ready placed with­in ASIA (prac­ti­cal­ly – with­in East Asia) up to 38 per­cent of its IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRADE (against 27 per­cent in 1985) – almost as much as in the U.S. and Eu­rope com­bined. And over­all, in 1996, "Pa­cif­ic trade" ac­count­ed for 74 per­cent of Ja­pan's ex­ports (305 bil­lion) and about 68 per­cent of its im­ports (al­most 236 bil­lion); it con­sist­ed most­ly of man­u­fac­tured prod­ucts and re­sult­ed in vis­i­ble TRADE SURPLUS (about $70 bil­lion, and HALF of it in trade with the US). This trend is still intact.

For the UNIT­ED STATES, in­ the mid1990s, the share of "Pa­cif­ic part­ners" in its over­all ex­portim­port ac­tiv­i­ties amount­ed to 66 per­cent ($884 bil­lion), and with­out Can­a­da – about 46 per­cent (al­so a rath­er HIGH in­di­ca­tor in­deed). Nowadays, China and Japan are the main trading partners of the U.S. outside North America.

As for AS­EAN coun­tries, Hong Kong, Tai­wan or South Ko­rea, ALL of them were ac­tive­ly de­vel­op­ing their neigh­bor­ly Asian ties. As­ a re­sult, the REL­A­TIVE IM­POR­TANCE of part­ners in Asia was GROW­ING, and the ROLE of trade with North Amer­i­ca was DE­CLIN­ING. The IN­TRAAsian trade, as a pro­por­tion of TO­TAL Asian trade, has ris­en from an al­ready HIGH mark of 47 per­cent in 1990 to 53 per­cent in 1995. It be­came by far great­er than Asia's turn­o­ver with ei­ther the U.S., or the EU, or North Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope com­bined.

Any­way, MU­TU­AL TRADE in AsiaPa­cif­ic re­gion is BIG by ANY stan­dards, and there is MUCH to ex­pect of it in the fu­ture. Un­for­tu­nate­ly, some­times such ex­pec­ta­tions based on­ MU­TU­AL IN­TER­DE­PEN­DENCE of­ Asian na­tions can al­so promise TROU­BLE, like it­ has been in 1998 when FI­NAN­CIAL and EC­O­NOM­IC cri­sis in Ko­rea, In­do­ne­sia, Thai­land, etc., to­geth­er with CHRON­IC STAG­NA­TION in Ja­pan it­self, un­der­mined the DE­MAND on Asian mar­kets.

How­ev­er, in the long run, is­sues of TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION (on­ the glo­bal scale – through the WTO, ­ on­ a re­gion­al ba­sis – through the APEC, on sub­re­gion­al lev­el – through the AS­EAN, or be­tween Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land (within CER), and on a narrow bilateral basis – through a “spaghetti bowl” of FTA) will draw spe­cial at­ten­tion of the coun­tries of this vast and dy­nam­ic ar­ea.

* Now it’s time to stress the GIANT SCALE on which the 21 econ­o­mies of to­day­'s APEC mem­bers around the Pa­cif­ic Rim are rep­re­sent­ed in the world econ­o­my. Al­to­geth­er, the APEC coun­tries have over 2.2 bil­lion peo­ple (over ONETHIRD of world's pop­u­la­tion). They ac­count for about 45 percent of all IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRADE and for HALF of­ the to­tal WORLD PRO­DUC­TION of goods and ser­vic­es.

So, there is pret­ty much EC­O­NOM­IC POW­ER col­lect­ed in­ the Asia Pa­cif­ic re­gion.

We can make a conclusion of historic importance:

Eu­rope, and even At­lan­tic re­gion as a whole, CANNOT be re­gard­ed as the DOM­I­NAT­ING FORCE in the world af­fairs any more.

# CHI­NA alone has more than 1.3 bil­lion peo­ple. It is re­gard­ed as "world's biggest na­tion and fast­est grow­ing econ­o­my". By 1995, Chi­na prob­ably QUAD­RU­PLED its 1978lev­el EC­O­NOM­IC OUT­PUT. For TWO DECADES, the average ANNUAL growth of the Chinese ECONOMY (GDP) has been around 10 percent. According to some estimates, China has already become SECOND in the world by the size of its GDP and may build the AB­SO­LUTE­LY BIGGEST ECON­O­MY with­in 20 years.

As from Ju­ly 1997, Chi­na has tak­en over from un­der the Brit­ish co­lo­ni­al rule the "Pearl of the Or­i­ent” – Hong Kong, which has been for over two decades moving up­ward and man­aged to create a percap­i­ta in­come of­ more than $25 thou­sand for each of its 6 mil­lion peo­ple. The world has won­dered if the "ONE COUN­TRY, TWO SYS­TEMS" prin­ci­ple will work. So far, it does. In the meantime, Hong Kong shares with Singapore the FIRSTSECOND position in the world as the country (territory) with the FREEST market conditions and the BEST investment climate.

At the end of the 20th century, the 15th con­gress of the rul­ing Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty in­te­grat­ed the ide­as of its late par­a­mount lead­er Deng Xiaop­ing in­to par­ty doc­u­ments. It was de­clared that the ec­o­nom­ic REFORMING and MODERNIZATION will go on, bring­ing about fur­ther AD­VAN­TAG­ES of­ mar­ket econ­o­my in­clud­ing high­er ef­fi­cien­cy of­ pro­duc­tion through the spread of­ PRIVATIZATION. As for 1000 1500 plants which are ex­pect­ed to re­main in the hands and un­der con­trol of the state organs (the socalled “stateowned enterprises”, or SOE), they should un­der­go deep re­struc­tur­ing and re­or­gan­i­za­tion.

Thus, it has been expected that the EC­O­NOM­IC REFORMING and RE­STRUC­TUR­ING would prob­ably go on – first un­der in­ter­est­ed su­per­vi­sion of the then Prime Minister Zhu Rong­ji, and from spring 2003, under the current “China’s No. 2” – Wen Jiabao, a person standing close to the NEW political leader – Hu Jintao.

As for PO­LIT­I­CAL RE­FORM­ING, hard­ly much could (and still can) be ex­pect­ed from the very spe­cif­ic var­i­ant of Chinese political evolution, which prom­is­es lit­tle be­sides COSMETIC CHANGES and a smooth PASSAGE OF POWER from one generation of Communist rulers to the other (which in itself is NOT SO LITTLE an achievement indeed!). It is worthwhile to remember that Hu Jintao had been elected the CCP General Secretary at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 and later has become also the official head of state (President) at the national People’s Congress in March 2003, while the previous “great leader” Jiang Zemin stepped down keeping – albeit for a while only – the last of his three previous posts – that of the chairman of the state Central Military Commission CMC).

It is ad­vis­a­ble to keep in mind that – at least, until lately the MAIN FORC­ES with­in APEC, its "lo­co­mo­tives" (or "mo­tors") which brought the re­gion (and the whole of world economy, actually!) in­to mo­tion, have been the UNIT­ED STATES and JA­PAN not Chi­na or In­dia (or Ko­rea, for that mat­ter).

However, since 2003, it has been exactly China that accounted not less than for 16 percent of growth in the world economy, giving it an impact second only to that of the United States (while the impact of Japan has been truly negligible, i.e., very small indeed). So, maybe it is already possible to state that during the last decades modern China has been rapidly becoming something like a NEW global economic “motor”.

On the other side, since 2008, the visible deterioration in the state of the REAL SECTOR of American ECONOMY, as well as an obvious deep CRISIS in its FINANCIAL SYSTEM, have been giving ground to describe the U.S. as a “sick giant” of the world and the main source of the coming MAJOR DIFFICULTIES in the system of international economic relations.

# Despite all the signs of growing weakness, JA­PAN until lately remained the world's SEC­OND BIGGEST econ­o­my in ab­so­lute terms and one of the MOST PRO­DUC­TIVE if we take in­to ac­count the size of its pop­u­la­tion. In the second half of the 20th century, for many decades it has had the HIGH­EST growth rate, the LOW­EST rates of in­fla­tion and un­em­ploy­ment and the LARG­EST ex­ter­nal trade sur­plus from ALL de­vel­oped na­tions.

How­ev­er, it is uni­ver­sal­ly ac­knowl­edged that the coun­try has entered the new Millennium in a state of a deep EC­O­NOM­IC STAG­NA­TION threat­en­ing to de­gen­er­ate in­to a SLUMP, and bad­ly needed EC­O­NOM­IC REFORMING. Its main directions should be ECONOMIC DER­E­GU­LA­TION, and (internationally) rad­i­cal dis­man­tling of IN­VIS­I­BLE TRADE BAR­RIERS through mod­ern­iz­ing its very pe­cu­liar DIS­TRI­BU­TION SYS­TEM and eas­ing GOV­ERN­MENT PRO­CURE­MENT pol­i­cies dis­crim­i­nat­ing against for­eign sup­pli­ers (the afore­men­tioned "BIG BANG" pro­gram in the FINANCIAL sphere has been in­tend­ed as­ the FIRST se­ries of­ rad­i­cal steps toward BUSINESS LIBERALIZATION).

In the last three dec­ades, Ja­pan has been rap­id­ly build­ing up its OFFSHORE pro­duc­tion base. Tra­di­tion­al­ly, Japan is HIGH­LY de­pen­dent on the RAW MA­TE­RI­ALS SUP­PLY from all around the world, but most­ly from West­ern Pa­cif­ic coun­tries. It al­so has "so­phis­ti­cat­ed de­mand" pat­tern – thus po­ten­tial­ly rep­re­sent­ing GOOD MAR­KET for oth­er ad­vanced na­tions (if­ on­ly the mar­ket it­self would be more OPEN!).

Ja­pan's re­la­tions with the "FIRST GEN­ER­A­TION" of­ the New In­dus­tri­al Coun­tries (Ko­rea, Tai­wan, Hong Kong and Sin­ga­pore) have been de­vel­op­ing un­der strong in­flu­ence of GROW­ING COM­PE­TI­TION be­tween them in the HIGHTECH sec­tor. How­ev­er, this group of coun­tries al­so rep­re­sents Ja­pan's ma­jor IN­DUS­TRI­AL BASE out­side Ja­pan, and the re­la­tions are gen­er­al­ly FRIEND­LY, with strong ele­ment of COOP­ER­A­TION. It has been clear­ly shown in the course of Asian cri­sis. AS­EAN forms the SEC­OND (still emerg­ing) OFFSHORE IN­DUS­TRI­AL BASE of Ja­pan skill­ful­ly co­or­di­nat­ed with its DO­MES­TIC MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING. How­ev­er, there have been PO­LIT­I­CAL TEN­SIONS in Jap­a­n’s re­la­tions with ASEAN mem­ber states, because the "PANASIAN" feel­ings there (es­pe­cial­ly in­ Ma­lay­sia) have been so far much strong­er than the "PANPA­CIF­IC", and at times it created dif­fi­cul­ties. However, as of late, we can observe a NEW trend toward signing bilateral FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS between Japan and several individual members of the ASEAN (which we shall discuss later).

Of ma­jor im­por­tance for Ja­pan are, of course, its re­la­tions with Chi­na. This giant na­tion, form­ing a world for it­self, is quite rich in NAT­U­RAL RE­SOURC­ES. It has plen­ty of CHEAP but very EFFICIENT LA­BOR and rep­re­sents a very po­tent MAR­KET with rath­er mod­ern STRUC­TURE of­ DE­MAND (in com­par­i­son with AS­EAN, for ex­am­ple). Since 1978, Ja­pan has been IN­VEST­ING in Chi­nese econ­o­my on a reg­u­lar ba­sis.

Generally good (or at least normal) po­lit­i­cal re­la­tions have been al­so of par­a­mount im­por­tance for BOTH sides – a benefit practically LOST during the last decade characterized by growing tension in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea and by mounting territorial disputes with each of them.

The most crit­i­cal PO­LIT­I­CAL IS­SUES in the Si­noJap­a­nese re­la­tions re­main: a) the ques­tion of Tai­wan's of­fi­cial rec­og­ni­tion (the PRC still nour­ish­es the idea of "One Chi­na" and de­mands from its po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic part­ners to join this ap­proach); b) the up­dat­ed U.S.Ja­pan se­cur­i­ty al­li­ance; c) the idea of­ Ja­pan's par­tic­i­pa­tion in the socalled "the­a­ter mis­sile de­fense" (TMD) de­vel­oped by the U.S., d) the ter­ri­to­ri­al dis­pute around the Sen­ka­ku Is­lands, and – last but not least! – e) radically different attitudes of both countries to HISTORICAL issues, especially those concerning the origin and events of the WW II.

Ja­pan is al­so in­ter­est­ed in creat­ing a NEW IN­DUS­TRI­AL BASE in Lat­in Amer­i­ca us­ing HIGH GRADE ec­o­nom­ic com­ple­men­tar­i­ty of their natural resources and rich re­serves of CHEAP LA­BOR there. AS of late, more than ONESEV­ENTH of Ja­pan's FOR­EIGN DI­RECT IN­VEST­MENT has been al­ready placed in South Amer­i­ca.

Ja­pan's re­la­tions with the Unit­ed States re­main of par­a­mount im­por­tance. There are plen­ty of CON­TRA­DIC­TIONS be­tween the two Great Pow­ers, most­ly in the EC­O­NOM­IC field – con­cern­ing the ne­ces­si­ty "TO OPEN" the Jap­a­nese mar­ket, the giant U.S. TRADE DEFICIT in commerce with Japan, etc. However, the PO­LIT­I­CAL AL­LI­ANCE be­tween them stays FIRM, and this is very im­por­tant when Chi­na is­ rap­id­ly build­ing up its economic and mil­i­tary potential while the "wild card" of North Ko­rea is still in play.

# The United States of America re­mains the MAIN IN­DUS­TRI­AL POW­ER of the world (about ONEQUAR­TER of world's GNP), and for the last two decades there have been signs that it is go­ing through a kind of a POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL REV­O­LU­TION (ac­tive de­vel­op­ment of TEL­E­COM­MU­NI­CA­TIONS NET­WORKS, splen­did state of its R&D, rap­id PRO­DUC­TIV­I­TY growth, emer­gence of NEW worldclass prod­ucts, in­clud­ing mo­tor cars, STOCK MAR­KET typically rid­ing high, etc.). We can say about the U.S. in­dus­tri­als: "Good teach­ers good stu­dents!" And, of course, the United States looks nowadays like the one and on­ly SU­PER­POW­ER, ac­tu­al­ly. It plays the role of a major PEACEKEEP­ING force in Asia and the world, while after the events of 9/11 it has also become the main ANTITERRORIST watchdog worldwide.

A re­port pre­pared by the Ja­pan­'s Min­is­try of In­ter­na­tion­al Trade and In­dus­try (MI­TI, now METI, from Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) stat­ed that in 1995 the Unit­ed States OUT­PER­FORMED Japan (was AHEAD of it) in PRO­DUC­TIV­I­TY characterizing 13 of 19 ma­jor SEC­TORS of ECON­O­MY. Those 13 sec­tors with high­er U.S. pro­duc­tiv­ity were: TEL­E­COM­MU­NI­CA­TIONS (where Amer­i­can pro­duc­tiv­i­ty was more than TWICE as high as in Ja­pan), MET­AL SMELT­ING, TRANS­POR­TA­TION, FOOD, MA­CHIN­ERY, CLOTH­ING, PRE­CI­SION IN­STRU­MENTS, AG­RI­CUL­TUREFO­REST­RYFISH­ERY, MET­AL PROD­UCTS, POW­ER SUP­PLY, PULP AND PAPER, ELEC­TRIC MA­CHIN­ERY and SER­VIC­ES. Ac­cord­ing to the re­port, Ja­pan has been AHEAD of the U.S. on­ly in FOUR sec­tors – most of all in AU­TOS and CHEM­I­CALS.

The "Pa­cif­ic State" of the U.S. – Cal­i­for­nia – alone rep­re­sents an ec­o­nom­ic pow­er com­par­a­ble with whole na­tionstates and even re­gions (unofficially, as of 20002001, it has been the “world's No. 6” economy). In the last TWO dec­ades, California creat­ed MORE new jobs than ALL of West­ern Eu­rope com­bined.

Ob­vi­ous­ly, re­la­tions WITH­IN Amer­i­ca and the West­ern Hem­i­sphere still have the HIGH­EST PRI­OR­I­TY for the Unit­ed States. We have al­ready dis­cussed the events in North Amer­i­ca con­nect­ed with IN­TE­GRA­TION and the NAF­TA. Here, it is worth­while to stress once more the ob­vi­ous in­ten­tion of the Unit­ed States to MOVE SOUTH, spread­ing NEW AR­RANGE­MENTS on Lat­in Amer­i­ca (please, remember the material of Top­ic 8).

Main ec­o­nom­ic ex­pec­ta­tions and con­cerns in Amer­i­can re­la­tions with Chi­na are con­nect­ed with fur­ther de­vel­op­ment of BI­LAT­ER­AL TRADE (though aggravated­ by a giant Amer­i­can DEF­I­CI T – which goes into hundreds of billions), as well as with op­por­tu­ni­ties of­fered by­ the re­gime of FREE EC­O­NOM­IC ZONES es­tab­lished by Chi­nese gov­ern­ment in the coast­al re­gions of the coun­try.

And one of the big fi­nan­cial prob­lems on the cur­rent agen­da, aside of the chronic problem of the dollartoyuan exchange rate (the yuan is believed to be scandalously undervalued), is created by the very LOOSE in­ter­pre­ta­tion in China of IN­TEL­LEC­TU­AL PROP­ER­TY RIGHTS. It breads the socalled "PI­RATE PRO­DUC­TION" of soft­ware, CD's, vid­eo cas­settes, etc., en­tail­ing big LOSS­ES for Amer­i­can busi­nesses in ROY­AL­TIES and FEES and bring­ing FRIC­TION in­to bi­lat­er­al re­la­tions.

In the last dec­ade, Amer­i­can "ec­o­nom­ic stake" in Asia has grown dra­mat­i­cal­ly. The pub­lic (and gov­ern­ment) opin­ion in the U.S. is in fa­vor of grant­ing Asia a much "HIGH­ER PRO­FILE" than ev­er be­fore. Gen­er­al­ly, the Amer­i­can pol­i­cy in the South East Asia is CON­STRUC­TIVE and has a strong FI­NAN­CIAL BACK­ING. In its turn, AS­EAN needs Amer­i­can pres­ence in the re­gion – as a kind of coun­ter­weight to pow­er­ful pol­i­cies of Ja­pan and especially of Chi­na.

# AS­EAN. With Singapore and the FOUR "ASIAN DRAG­ONS" be­long­ing to the "SEC­OND GEN­ER­A­TION" of NIC as its CORE, the AS­EAN em­brac­es now all TEN na­tionstates of South East Asia. The SIX found­ing mem­bers of the AS­EAN (In­do­ne­sia, Ma­lay­sia, Thai­land, Phi­lip­pines, Sin­ga­pore and Bru­nei) are bring­ing fur­ther their IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION/MOD­ERN­I­ZA­TION with strong tech­no­log­i­cal and fi­nan­cial BACK­ING from Ja­pan and the U.S, and in their turn ren­der as­sis­tance to the ASEAN­ new mem­bers – Viet­nam, Laos, Myan­mar (Bur­ma) and Cam­bo­dia. They have some com­mon IN­TER­ESTS, and are grad­u­al­ly work­ing out their own col­lec­tive IDEN­TI­TY, as well as gath­er­ing EX­PE­RI­ENCE in sub­re­gion­al po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic COOP­ER­A­TION.

Al­though MU­TU­AL TRADE in­side AS­EAN takes on­ly about 5% of the over­all trade turn­o­ver of the group, the mem­ber coun­tries have been working on a subre­gion­al FREE TRADE AR­RANGE­MENT of their own the AS­EAN Free Trade Ar­ea (AF­TA) since 1993. The fi­nal aim of the AF­TA was the ab­o­li­tion of ALL cus­toms tar­iffs in MU­TU­AL trade by the year 2010 for the SIX orig­i­nal mem­bers, and by the year 2015 – by the FOUR new mem­bers. Such have been the current dead­lines adopt­ed by the AS­EAN Ma­ni­la sum­mit in No­vem­ber 1999. By now, the AFTA is more or less in place, though the GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS created many aggravating factors on the path to its implementation.

* It is al­so worth­while to no­tice that the AS­EAN serves as a "grav­i­ta­tion cen­ter" for a much wid­er cir­cle of na­tions in Asia and the West­ern Pa­cif­ic (and in the APEC ar­ea as a whole).

For ex­am­ple, Ma­lay­sia, backed by some oth­er AS­EAN na­tions, has been for sev­er­al years prop­a­gat­ing crea­tion of the socalled East Asia Ec­o­nom­ic Cau­cus (EAEC), an­other subre­gion­al or­gan­i­za­tion aimed at­ pro­mot­ing mu­tu­al ec­o­nom­ic coop­er­a­tion in this part of the world. It is worthwhile to notice that, from the very be­gin­ning, the EAEC was in­tend­ed to be "For Asians On­ly", i.e., NOT to in­clude such close neigh­bors as Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land.

In March 1996, the EAEC prac­ti­cal­ly made its "TAKEOFF" dur­ing the AsiaEu­rope Meet­ing (ASEM) in Bang­kok. However, since the year 2000, the EAEC more often than not figures in the press under a NEW name ASEAN + 3 (or: ASEAN Plus Three), a practically NEW group which emerged on the side­lines of the aforementioned AS­EAN Ma­ni­la sum­mit and in­cludes high of­fi­cials of the same TEN mem­bers of AS­EAN plus Ja­pan, Chi­na and South Ko­rea. In the years to follow, China in particular has taken major steps to establish “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS” with individual ASEAN countries, starting with Indonesia.

As a political establishment, the ASEAN + 3 has ob­vi­ous­ly to com­pete with the AS­EAN Re­gion­al For­um (ARF), which has been orig­i­nal­ly es­tab­lished in 1994 to serve as a kind of­ OPEN TRIBUNE for wide in­ter­na­tion­al dis­cus­sions of­ even­tu­al MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL se­cur­i­ty ar­range­ments in Asia Pa­cif­ic.

Not on­ly does the ARF em­brace all coun­tries of South East Asia and In­do­chi­na (like the AS­EAN) as well as Chi­na, Ja­pan and Ko­rea (like the EAEC or the ASEAN Plus Three) but it al­so in­cludes Rus­sia and the U.S., Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land, In­dia and Can­a­da; even the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion is­ rep­re­sent­ed in its po­lit­i­cal talks which more and more out­grow the re­gion­al frame­work.

The ASEAN + 3 summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, very important in itself, can also be regarded as a new beginning in relationship between East Asia and its immediate neighbors – South Asia and Oceania. Although dubbed the East Asia Summit, the meeting practically defined “East Asia” in POLITICAL rather than in GEOGRAPHICAL terms – a big step forward, actually. India in particular played a major role in the discussions pushing for INTEGRATION – with an aim of eventually creating the world’s biggest FREE TRADE AREA of nearly 3 billion people – an East Asia Community of sorts (though something quite different from the European Union, for example). The meeting adopted in principle the CONCEPT of the East Asia Community and even took the decision to draft the new group’s first CONSTITUTION, a document that could enshrine HUMAN RIGHTS and DEMOCRACY in a region where both have traditionally come under critical scrutiny.

So, nowadays a concept of ASEAN + 6 (ASEAN Plus Six), embracing also India, Australia and New Zealand, has been coined and gains popularity parallel with more traditional concept of ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN Plus Three).

# VIET­NAM now al­so be­longs to AS­EAN (since 1995), and is, in­ ge­o­graph­i­cal terms, a typ­i­cal­ly "Asia Pa­cif­ic" coun­try. It­ rep­re­sents a TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TY with good pros­pects of­ be­com­ing a welldeveloped MAR­KET ECON­O­MY in the same league with "ASIAN TI­GERS". Some­thing like the "Viet­na­mese mir­a­cle" on the base of the socalled "DOI MOI" re­form pro­gram is in the mak­ing – the fact that can NOT be ig­nored by part­ners in the Pa­cif­ic coop­er­a­tion.

# TAI­WAN, with its GIANT for­eign ex­change re­serves, is one of the world's fi­nan­cial cen­ters and a ma­jor in­dus­tri­al fi­nan­cier in the Pa­cif­ic re­gion. It has be­come one of the most im­por­tant links in Jap­a­nese OFFSHORE PRO­DUC­TION sys­tem char­ac­ter­ized by HIGH ef­fi­cien­cy and LOW pro­duc­tion costs. How­ev­er, its life "in the shad­ow" of mighty Chi­na is bur­dened by the ne­ces­si­ty to build up mil­i­tary pow­er and to look for re­li­a­ble al­lies against even­tu­al in­va­sion.

# SOUTH KOREA (the RE­PUB­LIC OF KO­REA) has grown ac­cus­tomed to be re­gard­ed as an ex­treme­ly COM­PET­I­TIVE and DY­NAM­IC econ­o­my with a MOD­ERN in­dus­tri­al struc­ture. Al­though or­gan­i­za­tion­al prin­ci­ples on­ which Ko­re­an "Big Busi­ness", the socalled "CHAE­BOL", is built can be re­gard­ed as­ rath­er ob­so­lete (old­fash­ioned) and too strong­ly in­flu­enced by the STATE, it ren­dered ef­fec­tive as far as COSTS and QUAL­I­TY are con­cerned.

How­ev­er, between mid1997 and mid1999, Ko­rea has been living in the grip of a strong EC­O­NOM­IC and MON­E­TARY CRI­SIS rely­ing on IMF "RES­CUE PACK­AG­ES" and Ja­pan's fi­nan­cial back­ing (while Ja­pan has been strug­gling against EC­O­NOM­IC SLUMP of her own). Of course, this pain­ful pe­ri­od in the ec­o­nom­ic his­to­ry of South Ko­rea has long passed. And still and yet, we may ask, what lies in store for the country?

In our opinion, TWO even­tu­al SCENARIOS con­cern­ing the Ko­re­an Pe­nin­su­la can be ­con­sid­ered.

FIRST: Should, soon­er or­ lat­er, a kind of UNI­FI­CA­TION (amal­ga­ma­tion) process between South Korea (ROK) and North Ko­rea (DPRK) begin and successfully develop, a new eco­nom­ic SU­PER­POW­ER could emerge in the re­gion (an­a­lysts speak of some­thing like "Ger­ma­ny of the East").

SECOND: In the opposite case, i.e., if Ko­re­an pe­nin­su­la would re­main DI­VID­ED and if the DPRK would fol­low its aggressive and per­i­lous path as before, the mat­ters of­ re­gion­al SE­CUR­I­TY would grow in importance and become a NEW fo­cal point of the world at­ten­tion giv­ing im­pe­tus to re­gion­al PO­LIT­I­CAL and MIL­I­TARY COOP­ER­A­TION in view of the dead­ly DANGER for the whole man­kind.

During the first years of the new MILLENNIUM, however, some NEW signs have been appearing that the preferable FIRST alternative (from the TWO aforementioned) still has BETTER chances to become a reality, albeit not very soon indeed.

# RUS­SIA as­sumed APEC mem­ber­ship at this for­um's Van­cou­ver ses­sion in No­vem­ber 1997. Hence, Rus­sia is of­fi­cial­ly rec­og­nized as a "Pa­cif­ic Rim coun­try" and its NAT­U­RAL RE­SOURC­ES base (the BIGGEST and RICH­EST in the world) as well as SCI­ENCE and TECH­NOL­O­GY ex­pe­ri­ence, HU­MAN po­ten­tial and grow­ing MAR­KET should be re­gard­ed as im­por­tant fac­tors in fur­ther de­vel­op­ment of Pa­cif­ic re­la­tions. Al­though, by the year 1999, Rus­sia's share in world's GNP has fal­len to mis­er­a­ble 1.5 per­cent, since then economic growth has resumed and its average annual rate for a decade has amounted to something around 7 percent (unfortunately, nowadays it has been falling again).

In Ja­pan's re­la­tions with Rus­sia, the is­sue of the "North­ern Ter­ri­to­ries" still rep­re­sents ma­jor OB­STA­CLE. Yet, both coun­tries are "DOOMED TO COOP­ER­A­TION” –be­cause of unique COM­PLE­MEN­TAR­I­TY of their nat­u­ral and hu­man re­sourc­es, pro­duc­tion and mar­ket STRUC­TURES. There is much ground for de­vel­op­ing a widespread sys­tem of TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR in­volv­ing Rus­sian Si­be­ria and the Far East, on the one side, and Ja­pan, on the oth­er side, in the next fu­ture. Russian OIL and GAS resources, in particular, can and should play a major role in securing Japan’s needs in ENERGY and FUEL imports in the 21st century.

As of late, Russia has been playing a growing role in energy supply of other Pacific Rim countries – China, Korea, Japan and partly – also of the Pacific U.S. states. However, so far this phenomenon can be described in terms of conventional TRADE only (albeit in many cases proceeding on the base of longterm contracts) and NOT as real OUTSOURCING (or mature INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION).

# CAN­A­DA and AUS­TRA­LIA are among the most rich­ly en­dowed coun­tries of the world in re­gard to NAT­U­RAL RE­SOURC­ES (most of all – MIN­ER­AL de­pos­its), and they man­aged to col­lect big fi­nan­cial strength and pur­chas­ing pow­er.

Ja­pan's ec­o­nom­ic re­la­tions with these socalled "white do­min­ions" are de­vel­op­ing on the ba­sis of TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL DI­VI­SION OF LA­BOR. There is clear­ly ex­pressed COM­PLE­MEN­TAR­I­TY be­tween in­dus­tri­al struc­tures of Ja­pan and its over­seas part­ners. Both coun­tries form and im­por­tant out­side RAW MA­TE­RI­AL BASE for the Jap­a­nese IN­DUS­TRY, and rep­re­sent in­ter­est­ing MAR­KETS with a con­sump­tion struc­ture ca­pa­ble to ab­sorb many Jap­a­nese HIGHTECH prod­ucts (the socalled "so­phis­ti­cat­ed de­mand").

* To make the pic­ture of de­vel­op­ments in the Pa­cif­ic re­gion more com­plete, we should men­tion the Aus­tra­liaNew Zea­land FREE TRAD­E AR­RANGE­MENT based on a se­ries of BI­LAT­ER­AL agree­ments, which can be summed up un­der an of­fi­cial com­mon ti­tle "Clos­er Ec­o­nom­ic Re­la­tions" (CER).

For over 40 years, these two coun­tries have been en­joy­ing FREE RE­GIME in their BI­LAT­ER­AL TRADE. There is already some­thing like a SIN­GLE LA­BOR MAR­KET which em­brac­es both Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land, and a SIN­GLE CAP­I­TAL MAR­KET has been emerg­ing rapidly. There do al­so ex­ist pro­jects (al­beit hard­ly for the near­est fu­ture) of har­mon­iz­ing their LEGISLATIVE BASE in such vi­tal fields as BUSI­NESS RE­LA­TIONS and TAX­A­TION, and even of in­tro­duc­ing a COM­MON CUR­REN­CY.

Thus, a kind of nar­row EC­O­NOM­IC BLOC (actually, of the EU type) does ex­ist here on a sub­re­gion­al ba­sis, close to Asia, but NOT quite Asian (in political spir­it, this ar­range­ment re­sem­bles more the Com­mon­wealth of Na­tions than the AS­EAN). As a mat­ter of fact, Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land are very close to­ each oth­er, so that even some kind of PO­LIT­I­CAL AMAL­GA­MA­TION of the two coun­tries some­time in the new cen­tu­ry cannot prin­ci­pal­ly be ex­clud­ed.

Both these coun­tries do NOT be­long to Asia, but are feel­ing close­ly re­lat­ed to it. So, one of the big is­sues in the fu­ture will con­sist in find­ing an op­ti­mal "mo­dus vi­ven­di" (a sys­tem of co­ex­is­tence and coop­er­a­tion) be­tween the AS­EAN, on the one hand, and the CER (i.e., Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land), on the oth­er hand. In 2005, major breakthroughs in Australia’s relations with Asia have taken place during the Prime Minister John Howard’s visits to Japan and China and during aforementioned East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur.

* In the Eastern Pacific, in the subregion of Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico is of major importance (as a full member of the NAFTA) and Chile stands out as a new “economic powerhouse”. Today, they both are firstrate industrial partners both for the U.S. and Canada in North America and for Japan and China in East Asia. On the other hand, Venezuela and Nicaragua have been demonstrating strong antiAmerican and antiWestern attitudes and can hardly be regarded as reliable and muchpromising economic partners.

* It so hap­pened that East Asia stays prac­ti­cal­ly the ON­LY ONE ma­jor ec­o­nom­ic re­gion of­ the world which lives WITHOUT its own FREE TRADE AR­EA or any oth­er RE­GION­AL in­te­gra­tion ar­range­ment (as dis­tinct from world­wide MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL trade and in­vest­ment LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION system in the frame­work of the WTO, or the Asia Pacific FTA pro­ject adopt­ed by the APEC sum­mit in Bog­or in 1994).

"Along with Chi­na, South Ko­rea and Tai­wan, Ja­pan is the on­ly ma­jor econ­o­my left be­hind to­day," N. Hat­a­key­ama, chair­man of the Ja­pan Ex­ter­nal Trade Or­gan­i­za­tion, for­mer­ly the na­tion's top trade ne­go­tia­tor, noted as early as 1999. So, since then, sev­er­al pro­po­sals for FREER TRADE and TIGHT­ER COOP­ER­A­TION in­ East Asian re­gion (and/or in­ North­east Asian sub­re­gion) have been float­ed by­ dif­fer­ent or­gan­i­za­tion and dis­cussed in the press. For ex­am­ple, in Feb­ru­ary 1999, a sen­ior Jap­a­nese trade of­fi­cial has in­formed the press that Ja­pan was stud­y­ing the idea of­ a FREETRADE agree­ment with South Ko­rea.

In De­cem­ber 1999, Ja­pan agreed with Sin­ga­pore to launch a joint study on a bi­lat­er­al free trade pact – the very FIRST prac­ti­cal move of this kind by Ja­pan, which has long ad­vo­cat­ed a MUL­TI­LAT­ER­AL ap­proach to TRADE LIB­ER­AL­I­ZA­TION. The prolonged FTA negotiations between Japan and Singapore have been successfully completed at the end of 2001. Under the agreement, about 94 percent of bilateral trade between the new FTA partners would be freed from tariffs, covering more than 3,800 items (with the exception of some AGRICULTURAL products, TEXTILES and PETROCHEMICALS). On top of tariff reductions, the FTA includes the LIBERALIZATION of INVESTMENT and SERVICES, the HARMONIZATION of COMPETITION POLICY and a MUTUAL RECOGNITION agreement.

Let us also not for­get about the FIRST EV­ER tri­par­tite Ko­re­anChi­neseJap­a­nese sum­mit meet­ing tak­en place on the side­lines of the afore­men­tioned AS­EAN sum­mit in Ma­ni­la (No­vem­ber 1999). There, the heads of the THREE North­east Asian Na­tions dis­cussed such top­i­cal is­sues as an even­tu­al es­tab­lish­ment of an Asian Mon­e­tary Fund (an­ idea first float­ed dur­ing Asian cri­sis in 1997, al­beit with­out suc­cess) or of a North­east Asia Re­gion­al Se­cur­i­ty Di­a­logue which may en­tail a larg­er group­ing – in­clud­ing the Unit­ed States and Australia.

And exactly one year later, on the sidelines of a meeting in Singapore of the “ASEAN PlusThree” group, the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea agreed that their countries should hold toplevel TRILATERAL meetings on regular basis.

By the end of 2000, a new wordcombination – “MINILATERAL PACTS” – emerged in the political lexicon to describe subregional arrangements of different kind existing or being negotiated between small groups of AsiaPacific countries. Such “MINILATERALISM” is regarded as an ALTERNATIVE to the aforementioned APEC “OPEN REGIONALISM” policies (which are acceptable in “good times” but hardly work in not so favorable situations, like the current GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS, as the most striking example).

In November 2001, the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and Southeast Asian leaders agreed in principle to set up between them what they called “the world’s largest free trade zone” – a bold FTA project which would take over 10 years. At the same meeting in Brunei, leaders of China, Japan and South Korea held a separate “key dialog” on closer mutual integration, as well as on enhancing economic cooperation between them, on the one side, and their ASEAN partners, on the other side. At the same time, the China ASEAN FTA initiative represented a strong move in the keen rivalry between the Asia’s two great economic powers – China and Japan, giving the latter an impetus to act likewise.

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Japan has been simultaneously engaged in FTA talks with a lot of countries and their groups (for example, with the ASEAN as a whole its diplomatic answer to the Chinese ASEAN initiative). It has successfully finalized its FTA negotiations with the Philippines (in 2004), and Malaysia (in 2005), and has been going on with negotiations with Thailand and Indonesia, as well as with South Korea (since 2003), with Australia (since 2005) and even with faraway “lonely wolf” of Europe Switzerland (since 2005).

In its turn, Singapore signed an FTA accord with Australia (in February 2003), has opened FTA negotiations with India, and concluded an agreement with the United States (resembling those between the U.S. and Jordan and Israel). And South Korea has been engaged in FREE TRADE PACT negotiations with the U.S. (since 2006). New current information on different TRADE and INVESTMENT liberalization initiatives encompassing East Asian nations appears almost weekly, not to say daily.

*However, the analysis of the current trend toward TRADE and INVESTMENT LOBERALIZATION in the Asia Pacific superregion would be incomplete without mentioning one more important initiative.

The TransPacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed regional FREE TRADE AGREEMENT that is currently being negotiated by twelve countries throughout the Asia Pacific (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam). The agreement began in 2005 as the TransPacific Strategic Partnership Agreement (TPSEP or P4). Member countries set the goal of wrapping up negotiations in 2012, but contentious issues such as agriculture, intellectual property, services and investments have caused negotiations to continue into the present, with the last round set to meet in Ottawa from July 3 to July 12, 2014. Passage of the TPP is one of the primary goals of the Obama administration’s trade agenda.

The TPP intends to enhance trade and investment among the partner countries, promote innovation, economic growth and development, and support the creation and retention of jobs. Global health professionals, internet freedom activists, environmentalists, organized labor, advocacy groups, and elected officials have criticized and protested the negotiations, in large part because of the proceedings' secrecy, the agreement's expansive scope, and controversial clauses in drafts leaked publicly.

According to some observers, PPT has a hidden antiChinese and antiRussian coloring and aims at consolidating the westernstyle democracies for eventual ideological and political confrontations concerning the future of the AsiaPacific region.

Top­ic 10. TRAN­SI­TION­AL SO­CI­E­TIES I: DE­VEL­OP­ING WORLD

* It is worth­while to­ re­mind you that, FOR­TY years ago, what we are now call­ing "DE­VEL­OP­ING WORLD" was known un­der the name "OVER­SEAS TER­RI­TO­RIES", or "CO­LO­NI­AL PE­RIPH­ERY", or sim­ply "COL­O­NIES" (be­long­ing to and con­trolled by Eu­ro­pe­an "ME­TROP­O­LIS").

How­ev­er, THIRTY, even TWENTY, years ago, the term "THIRD WORLD" was very much in fash­ion. For over HALF a cen­tu­ry, the GLO­BAL po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic DI­VI­SION was based on the his­tor­ic CON­FRON­TA­TION of the TWO so­cial SYS­TEMS "CAP­I­TAL­ISM" vs. "SO­CIAL­ISM". They formed the "FIRST WORLD" and the "SEC­OND WORLD", re­spec­tive­ly, while the REST of the world, an ec­lec­tic con­glom­er­ate of ec­o­nom­i­cal­ly UN­DER­DE­VEL­OPED coun­tries, was put to­geth­er un­der the head­ing ­the "THIRD WORLD". Of­ course, this term can be used now as well, but re­cent rad­i­cal chang­es in GLO­BAL SIT­U­A­TION rob it of real mean­ing.

So, the terms "DE­VEL­OP­ING WORLD" and "DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES" can be rec­om­mend­ed be­fore all oth­ers. They fair­ly well de­scribe the group of most­ly very YOUNG na­tionstates in­ Asia, Af­ri­ca and Lat­in Amer­i­ca which emerged as a re­sult of the DE­COL­O­NI­ZA­TION pro­cess ac­tive­ly un­fold­ing af­ter the World War II.

* His­tor­i­cal­ly and log­i­cal­ly, it­ was CO­LO­NI­AL­ISM that pre­ced­ed DE­COL­O­NI­ZA­TION. As po­lit­i­cal and ec­o­nom­ic phe­nom­e­non, CO­LO­NI­AL­ISM is dat­ed from about 1500, where­by var­i­ous emerg­ing Eu­ro­pe­an na­tions dis­cov­ered, con­quered, set­tled and ex­ploit­ed large ar­e­as of the world.

It was Por­tu­gal that led the way of dis­cov­ery and COL­O­NI­ZA­TION (for ex­am­ple, Vas­co da Ga­ma was first who brought to Eu­rope spic­es from In­dia). Spain fol­lowed suit, and such peo­ple as Co­lum­bus and Ma­gel­lan brought the NEW WORLD (both Amer­i­cas) with­in Eu­ro­pe­an reach (but Spain it­self, par­a­dox­i­cal­ly, man­aged to keep very lit­tle of its over­seas gains). In the ear­ly 16th cen­tu­ry, Hol­land be­came the lead­ing Eu­ro­pe­an na­val and com­mer­cial pow­er, with an Orien­tal em­pire that de­vel­oped rap­id­ly af­ter char­ter­ing the Dutch East In­dia Com­pa­ny in 1602 and the found­ing of Ba­ta­via (now Ja­kar­ta) on Ja­va.

France set­tled in many plac­es around the world, most­ly across the Med­i­ter­ra­ne­an Sea, in Af­ri­ca. How­ev­er, the most rich and widespread em­pire was built up by the Great Brit­ain ("The sun nev­er sets on the Brit­ish Em­pire", as the say­ing goes). Its rem­nants ex­ist till now in pe­cu­liar po­lit­i­cal form of the Com­mon­wealth of Na­tions.

The 19th and ear­ly 20th cen­tu­ries saw NEW ex­pan­sion­ist pow­ers emerge: Ger­ma­ny, the Unit­ed States, Bel­gium, Ita­ly, Rus­sia and Ja­pan. Co­lo­ni­al wars were fought, and the WHOLE WORLD was di­vid­ed be­tween small num­ber of lead­ing co­lo­ni­al pow­ers. Re­sourc­es from over­seas played ma­jor role in IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION and fur­ther de­vel­op­ment of their econ­o­mies (re­mem­ber Top­ic 2 of the course).

Af­ter the World War II, the CO­LO­NI­AL EM­PIRES be­gan to rap­id­ly col­lapse (tum­ble down), and by the 1960s the DE­COL­O­NI­ZA­TION be­came a world­wide and high­ly ac­cel­er­at­ed move­ment. Co­lo­ni­al In­dia was the FIRST to get PO­LIT­I­CAL IN­DE­PEN­DENCE – way back in 1947, and to im­me­di­ate­ly DIS­IN­TE­GRATE in­to Hin­du­ist In­dia and Mos­lem Pa­ki­stan.

Great Brit­ain, in par­tic­u­lar, set about dis­as­sem­bling its em­pire. France's decol­o­ni­za­tion pro­cess was less peace­ful at the start, but lat­er an ac­cept­a­ble "mo­dus vi­ven­di" ("way of­ life") with for­mer col­o­nies has been found. Ger­ma­ny, Ita­ly and Ja­pan lost their co­lo­ni­al po­si­tions in­ the world war. In the 1950s70s, Bel­gium, Por­tu­gal and the Neth­er­lands all di­vest­ed them­selves from their over­seas pos­ses­sions. The Unit­ed States in­te­grat­ed Ha­waii and as­so­ciat­ed Puer­to Ri­co. Rus­sia lost its co­lo­ni­al pe­riph­ery in the 1980s and 1990s, when the for­mer So­viet Un­ion disintegrated in­to 15 more or less in­de­pen­dent na­tionstates.

The DE­COL­O­NI­ZA­TION took place most­ly un­der the ae­gis of the Unit­ed Na­tions Or­gan­i­za­tion (UNO, or UN). The an­ti­co­lo­ni­al move­ment reached the high point in 1960 when UN Gen­er­al As­sem­bly adopt­ed the Dec­lar­a­tion on the Grant­ing of In­de­pen­dence to Co­lo­ni­al Coun­tries and Peo­ples. 1964 was called the "Af­ri­ca Year" when about 20 col­o­nies on the Black Con­ti­nent cast off the co­lo­ni­al yoke.

Thus, the pe­ri­od of COL­O­NI­ZA­TION and CO­LO­NI­AL EM­PIRES was over. Prac­ti­cal­ly ALL co­lo­ni­al na­tions used their new­ly ac­quired right of SELFDE­TER­MI­NA­TION to pro­claim PO­LIT­I­CAL IN­DE­PEN­DENCE and their own STATE­HOOD.

From the 1960s, the MOVE­MENT for EC­O­NOM­IC IN­DE­PEN­DENCE set the pro­cess of EC­O­NOM­IC DE­COL­O­NI­ZA­TION in­to mo­tion. And in about TWO dec­ades, the phe­nom­e­non of the socalled "NEOCO­LO­NI­AL­ISM" (un­der­stood as a SET OF POL­I­CIES used by the for­mer ME­TROP­O­LIS and aimed at keep­ing its, at least EC­O­NOM­IC, po­si­tions in for­mer COL­O­NIES in­tact) has al­so be­come a thing of the past.

A giant De­vel­op­ing World emerged – with its POV­ER­TY and OVER­POP­U­LA­TION, with its want of IN­DUS­TRI­AL GROWTH, and with acute SO­CIAL and EC­O­NOM­IC PROB­LEMS.

*However, WHAT ex­act­ly is De­vel­op­ing World? To un­der­stand this, let us­ get ac­quaint­ed with some GROUP­INGS of­ coun­tries used by in­ter­na­tion­al or­gan­i­za­tions.

For ex­am­ple, the IMF ex­perts di­vid­ed the world in­to FOUR ma­jor GROUPS:

# DE­VEL­OPED na­tions – about ONEFIFTH of world's pop­u­la­tion and far over 70% of world's ec­o­nom­ic out­put, i.e., of the sum of all coun­tries' GNI (GDP) put to­geth­er; this group in­cludes the Unit­ed States, Can­a­da, the Eu­ro­pe­an Un­ion, Aus­tra­lia and New Zea­land, Ja­pan, and some oth­ers;

# TRAN­SI­TION­ING so­ci­e­ties – the for­mer So­viet Un­ion plus oth­er Eu­ro­pe­an "So­cial­ist" coun­tries, with 7 per­cent of world's pop­u­la­tion and about 8 per­cent of world's out­put (a sharp fall in com­par­i­son with the 1988 when their share in­ the output was es­ti­mat­ed at around 16 per­cent);

# DE­VEL­OP­ING coun­tries – with PER CAP­I­TA pro­duc­tion ABOVE $500 and up to $3,000 – 4,000, rep­re­sent­ing rough­ly TWOFIFTH of world's pop­u­la­tion, but less than ONEFIFTH of world's out­put; here we find, among over a hun­dred and fif­ty oth­ers, such pop­u­lous na­tions as Chi­na and In­do­ne­sia;

# UN­DE­VEL­OPED coun­tries – with PER CAP­I­TA pro­duc­tion in the last decades of the XX century LESS than $500 rep­re­sent­ing roughly ONETHIRD of world's pop­u­la­tion, but on­ly 2 per­cent of its out­put; in this group are over 50 coun­tries, in­clud­ing In­dia, Pa­ki­stan, Ban­gla­desh, and most of Af­ri­ca.

So, in this top­ic, un­der the term "DE­VEL­OP­ING WORLD", we shall place the last TWO groups the socalled "DE­VEL­OP­ING" (also "lessde­vel­oped" or “underdeveloped”) coun­tries, and the "UN­DE­VEL­OPED" (or "leastde­vel­oped") coun­tries.

Be­cause the ma­jor­i­ty of the afore­men­tioned TRAN­SI­TION­ING SO­CI­E­TIES are al­so economically UNDERDEVELOPED and thus in acute need of further INDUSTRIALIZATION, we can make the fol­low­ing sad con­clu­sion: if we di­vide all the coun­tries in­to TWO large groups the “POOR” and the “RICH” than rough­ly 80 per­cent of the world pop­u­la­tion turn out to­ live in coun­tries which can be char­ac­ter­ized as POOR (all to­geth­er they pro­duce about 20 per­cent of world's OUT­PUT), and on­ly 20 per­cent are cit­i­zens of real­ly RICH coun­tries which ac­count for 80 per­cent of world's pro­duc­tion and wealth!

* The mod­ern world is very HET­ER­O­GE­NE­OUS, i.e., it con­sists of na­tions with VERY DI­VERSE ec­o­nom­ic and so­cial char­ac­ter­is­tics. For ex­am­ple, the achieved lev­els of EC­O­NOM­IC OUT­PUT meas­ured in terms of PER CAP­I­TA Gross Na­tion­al INCOME (GNI) and PER CAPITA Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dif­fer strong­ly as we move from RE­GION to RE­GION, from one GROUP of COUN­TRIES to an­other. Please, pay full at­ten­tion to PER CAP­I­TA GNI fig­ures calculated by the World Bank using the TWO modern methods – the socalled Atlas method and the PPP method (we shall speak about PPP a little later) – which you will find in the Table 1.10.1, be­cause these IN­DI­CA­TORS form the MAIN CRI­TER­I­ON in eval­u­at­ing a coun­try's DE­VEL­OP­MENT LEV­EL.

* The GROUP­ING of 208 coun­tries of the MOD­ERN WORLD according to their PER CAP­I­TA GNI was un­der­tak­en by spe­cial re­search pan­el at the World Bank and pub­lished in World De­vel­op­ment In­di­ca­tors 2005, the latest full edi­tion of the World Bank's flag­ship sta­tis­ti­cal pub­li­ca­tion.

To di­vide the coun­tries in­to THREE main GROUPS the fol­low­ing "cut­off" prin­ci­ple has been used:

LOWIN­COME econ­o­mies, with PER CAP­I­TA GNP $825 or less in 2004 (59 econ­o­mies),

MID­DLEIN­COME econ­o­mies, with 2004 PER CAP­I­TA GNP from $826 to $10,065 (94 econ­o­mies with an average PER CAPITA GNI of $2,190),

HIGHIN­COME econ­o­mies, with 2004 PER CAP­I­TA GNP of $10,066 or more (79 econ­o­mies).

How­ev­er, among MID­DLEIN­COME econ­o­mies, a fur­ther di­vi­sion, at PER CAP­I­TA GNP $3,255, was made be­tween:

LOW­ERmid­dlein­come econ­o­mies ($826 $3,255) – 54 econ­o­mies, and

UPPERmid­dlein­come econ­o­mies ($3,256 $10,065) – 40 econ­o­mies.

As for the av­er­age PER CAP­I­TA GNI of the whole world in 2004, it was es­ti­mat­ed at $6,280 by the Atlas method and at $8,760 by the PPP method

* Now, let us re­turn to­ the Table 1.10.1 and also attentively look at the LIST of COUNTRIES belonging to each of the INCOME GROUPS (List 1.10.2), be­gin­ning with the world­'s POOR­EST, as well as at the LIST of DEVELOPING COUNTRIES grouped by REGION (List 1.10.3).

# LOWIN­COME econ­o­mies. So, the 59 world's POOR­EST and ec­o­nom­i­cal­ly WEAK­EST coun­tries with pop­u­la­tion over 2.3 bil­lion and PER CAP­I­TA GNI of less than $826 form this group. The average PER CAPITA income in this group has been estimated at $510 – or at about 8 percent of the world average. The ma­jor­i­ty of these coun­tries are so far BE­LOW the lev­el of even typ­i­cal DE­VEL­OP­ING COUN­TRIES that their abil­i­ty to de­vel­op at all is in doubt.

While more Asian PEOPLE live in UN­DE­VEL­OPED ("leastde­vel­oped") econ­o­mies than peo­ple from any oth­er con­ti­nent (in particular, because India, Pakistan and Bangladesh belong to this group), 36 of the 59 such COUNTRIES are in Af­ri­ca.

The SubSa­ha­ran Af­ri­ca (48 countries with av­er­age PER CAP­I­TA in­come of about $600 for each of its al­most 720 mil­lion peo­ple) is so POOR in re­sourc­es of ANY kind and so UN­FA­VOUR­A­BLY placed in the world that its to­day's sit­u­a­tion and pros­pects are hard­ly any­thing but GLOOMY (many coun­tries here – like Chad or Su­dan – have NO min­er­al re­sourc­es, BAD soil, LIT­TLE wa­ter, NO ex­it to the sea, DIS­EASED and UN­ED­U­CAT­ED pop­u­la­tion, etc.).

There are not few coun­tries in this group where over HALF of the adult pop­u­la­tion are IL­LIT­ER­ATE (i.e., cannot even read!), and where on av­er­age peo­ple can hard­ly ex­pect to reach the age of 50 (very low LIFE EX­PEC­TAN­CY in­deed!).

# LOW­ERMID­DLEIN­COME econ­o­mies. ALL 54 econ­o­mies of this group with 2.4 billion people and an average PER CAP­I­TA GNI of less than $1,600 are far BE­LOW the world's av­er­age lev­el. IL­LIT­ER­A­CY re­mains a prob­lem in some of these coun­tries (like Mo­roc­co, Al­ge­ria or Gua­te­ma­la), while LIFE EX­PEC­TAN­CY at birth typ­i­cal­ly comes under 70 years. Many countries of this group represent the POSTSOCIALIST MODEL (according to the grouping discussed in Topic 1), including Bulgaria, China and Romania, while some of them have emerged as independent states only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and/or Yugoslavia (like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkmenistan and Ukraine).

# UPPERMID­DLEIN­COME econ­o­mies. There are 40 of such coun­tries with not so big a population of 576 million and with an average PER CAPITA GNI of about $4,770, i.e., still BE­LOW the world's av­er­age. Typ­i­cal for this group are LIFE EX­PEC­TAN­CY fig­ures ABOVE 70 years, while IL­LIT­ER­A­CY usu­al­ly ceas­es to be re­gard­ed as a na­tion­al PROB­LEM (ex­cept in some African countries like Gab­on and Botswana). Here we find not only many “typical” developing countries, mostly in Latin America and Africa, but also some NIC, like Argentina, Chile and Malaysia, as well as many POSTSOCIALIST nationstates (the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Slovakia).

# HIGHIN­COME econ­o­mies. Those are 79 such coun­tries (roughly 1 billion people), including 30 members of OECD, often nicknamed the “club of the rich”. How­ev­er, this group also in­cludes THREE na­tions of the "first gen­er­a­tion" of­ NIC – South Ko­rea, Hong Kong, and Sin­ga­pore (ac­tu­al­ly, ALL FOUR "Asian Ti­gers", if we add Tai­wan which is NOT in­clud­ed in the Re­port). Here we can al­so find Brunei, Ku­wait, Saudi Arabia and the Unit­ed Ar­ab Emi­rates – i.e., ma­jor OIL pro­duc­ers, mem­bers of the Or­gan­i­za­tion of­ Pe­tro­le­um Ex­port­ing Coun­tries (OPEC).

In this group, also labeled the “Golden Billion, the fig­ures for average PER CAP­I­TA GNI have been estimated at $32,040, with a slightly lower average of $27,630 applied to the area of the European Monetary Union (the Euroland –the area of the EURO, with a population slightly over 300 million).

* If we use PER CAP­I­TA GNI da­ta to make com­par­i­son be­tween in­di­vid­u­al GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL RE­GIONS with­in De­vel­op­ing World, strik­ing DIF­FER­ENC­ES and some interesting and sometimes UN­EX­PECT­ED FACTS can be dis­cov­ered (please, return to List 1.10.3).

For ex­am­ple, it turns out that the LOW­EST av­er­age lev­el of PER CAP­I­TA GNI of all such RE­GIONS was found in South Asia ($590) where In­dia, Pa­ki­stan and Ban­gla­desh are ma­jor and most pop­u­lous coun­tries (among the EIGHT developing members of that group with an aggregate population over 1.4 billion).

The vast SubSa­ha­ran Af­ri­ca (SSA) with its 48 countries (720 million people) was placed slight­ly HIGH­ER – with $600 (but may­be the real figures are even lower – un­der $500 if we ex­clude rel­a­tive­ly more de­vel­oped South Af­ri­ca).

The re­gion for­mu­lat­ed as East Asia and Pacific (24 developing countries with 1.87 billion people)) had an av­er­age PER CAP­I­TA GNI of $1,280 – almost exactly the level estimated for China ($1,290).

In com­par­i­son, Mid­dle East and North Af­ri­ca, a re­gion with a population around 290 million, which in­cludes ma­jor OILPRO­DUC­ING ar­ea of the world and is al­so char­ac­ter­ized by gen­er­al­ly very fa­vor­a­ble NAT­U­RAL CON­DI­TIONS around the Med­i­ter­ra­nean Sea, had an av­er­age PER CAP­I­TA GNI of about $2,000.

Sev­er­al coun­tries in Eu­rope and Cen­tral Asia, in­clud­ing several for­mer re­pub­lics of the So­viet Un­ion and some oth­er "postso­cial­ist" na­tionstates in East­ern Eu­rope, which are rough­ly in­dus­tri­al­ized but still in bad need of RE­STRUC­TUR­ING and MOD­ERN­I­ZA­TION, have an aggregate population of 470 million people and pro­duce around $3,290 GNI per per­son.

And Lat­in Amer­i­ca and Car­ibb­ean, the most RICH re­gion of the De­vel­op­ing World, home to about 540 million people, has an av­er­age PER Cap­i­ta GNI of $3600 (with $6,670 for Mexico, $3,950 for Uru­guay, but on­ly $960 for Bo­liv­ia or mere $390 for Haiti).

Please, no­tice the fact that ALL these RE­GION­AL av­er­age in­di­ca­tors lie con­sid­er­a­bly BE­LOW the world's av­er­age of $6,280

* If you look at­ten­tive­ly at the Table 1.10.1, you will see that it in­cludes not on­ly usu­al in­di­ca­tor "GNI per cap­i­ta, Atlas method" (based on of­fi­cial ex­change rates be­tween na­tion­al cur­ren­cies and U.S. dol­lar), but al­so considerably different fig­ures un­der the head­ing "Purchasing power parity (international dollars)". This concept "pur­chas­ing pow­er par­i­ty", or PPP – is now ev­er more of­ten used in hope to achieve BET­TER COM­PAR­I­SON of av­er­age IN­COME or CON­SUMP­TION lev­els in in­di­vid­u­al coun­tries. It takes into account differences in RELATIVE PRICES of goods and services and is measured in INTERNATIONAL DOLLARS which, in principle, have the SAME purchasing power as a dollar spent on GNI in the U.S. economy. Please, no­tice that for prac­ti­cal­ly ALL de­vel­op­ing countries this new indicator shows MUCH HIGH­ER lev­els of PER CAP­I­TA GNI than tra­di­tion­al meth­od (some ex­am­ples: In­dia – $3,100 and $620, Chi­na – $5,530 and $1,290, Chile – $10,500 and $4,910).

In mod­ern sta­tis­ti­cal pub­li­ca­tions, a wide­ly used meas­ure of POV­ER­TY is the "PER­CENT­AGE OF PEO­PLE LIV­ING ON LESS THAN $1 A DAY(or recently more often – “…ON LESS THAN $2 A DAY) es­ti­mat­ed on the "PPP" ba­sis. For some "lowin­come" econ­o­mies, like Lesotho, Ni­ger, Mad­a­gas­car, Guin­eaBis­sau or Zam­bia, this in­di­ca­tor gives fig­ures well over 50 and sometimes up to 90 per­cent, while in "low­ermid­dlein­come" group the max­i­mum lev­el of POV­ER­TY (in Gua­te­ma­la and Pe­ru) is also around 50 per­cent, and in "uppermid­dlein­come" econ­o­mies it lies be­tween 30 and 20 per­cent (Chile and South Af­ri­ca). At the end of the 1990s, world's POOR­EST 20 per­cent con­sumed on­ly 1.3 per­cent of avail­a­ble goods and ser­vic­es.

In an ar­ti­cle de­vot­ed to some top­i­cal as­pects of the fi­nan­cial and ec­o­nom­ic cri­sis in Asia, the au­thor crit­i­ciz­ed Asian lead­ers for mis­takes in their coun­tries' fi­nan­cial and mon­e­tary pol­i­cies, but still hailed (ap­proved) them for achiev­ing "the fast­est re­duc­tion in pov­er­ty for the great­est num­ber of peo­ples in his­to­ry".

Ac­cord­ing to the World Bank, POV­ER­TY fell by 27 per­cent in South­east Asia dur­ing the decade 197585, and by an­other 35 per­cent in 198595. At the same time, ac­cord­ing to In­terAmer­i­can De­vel­op­ment Bank study, South Amer­i­can POV­ER­TY rates shot up by 33 per­cent dur­ing 198095. The num­ber of DES­TI­TUTE POOR (those liv­ing on no more than $1 a day) rose to near­ly 20 per­cent of the pop­u­la­tion. Even in such relatively welloff coun­tries like Bra­zil, bot­tom 20 per­cent of peo­ple disposed of just 2 per­cent of NA­TION­AL IN­COME.

* In­ter­est­ing anal­y­sis of the De­vel­op­ing World sit­u­a­tion can be per­formed on the STRUC­TU­RAL ba­sis. The LEV­EL OF DE­VEL­OP­MENT ex­press­es it­self NOT ON­LY in ab­so­lute terms (i.e., in the LEV­ELS of GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT and PER CAP­I­TA INCOME), BUT AL­SO in STRUC­TU­RAL COM­PO­SI­TION of the GDP and GNI.

The DE­VEL­OPED (highin­come) econ­o­mies have most­ly IN­DUS­TRI­AL struc­ture char­ac­ter­ized by HIGH share of MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING and mod­ern SER­VIC­ES in GNP (and some of­ them are even POSTIN­DUS­TRI­AL in char­ac­ter – with SER­VICE SEC­TOR re­spon­si­ble for over 70 per­cent of GNI and the share of­ MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING – af­ter a PEAK achieved some­time in the 1980s – re­duced to under 20 per­cent).

In­ the DE­VEL­OP­ING (mid­dlein­come) econ­o­mies, typ­i­cal­ly LESS than HALF of the GDP (GNI) out­put comes from IN­DUS­TRY (about 35 per­cent on the av­er­age) while the share of­ MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING is around 20 per­cent (while almost ALL these coun­tries want to­ be­come still MORE in­dus­tri­al­ized, not LESS). Here, AG­RI­CUL­TURE still plays MUCH BIGGER role in the econ­o­my, than in the first group (slightly over 10 per­cent against under 2 per­cent). And SER­VIC­ES are most­ly TRADITIONAL in­ char­ac­ter rep­re­sent­ing smallscale RE­TAIL TRADE, old­fash­ioned FI­NAN­CIAL SEC­TOR (part­ly of SPEC­U­LA­TIVE na­ture) and TOUR­IST FA­CIL­I­TIES.

And if we turn to UN­DE­VEL­OPED (lowin­come) econ­o­mies, we find that AG­RI­CUL­TURE still is of ma­jor im­por­tance (it ex­plains WHY the "leastde­vel­oped" coun­tries are of­ten al­so called "AG­RI­CUL­TU­RAL", "AGRAR­I­AN" or "RU­RAL” – words which all mean the same). As for the IN­DUS­TRI­AL sec­tor, it is strong­ly UN­DER­DE­VEL­OPED (seldom over 25 per­cent of GNP out­put).

Look­ing at the fig­ures you can dis­cov­er that al­most ALL coun­tries of the de­vel­op­ing world are (or­ at least be­lieve to be) in need of fur­ther IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION.

On­ly a small num­ber of­ New In­dus­tri­al Coun­tries (NICs) represents a rare exception. This group ( in pub­li­ca­tions con­tain­ing EC­O­NOM­IC DA­TA about them of­ten al­so called New In­dus­tri­al Econ­o­mies or New­ly In­dus­tri­al­ized Econ­o­mies in both cas­es "NIEs") in­cludes EIGHT coun­tries and ter­ri­to­ries in Asia the "FOUR TI­GERS" and the "FOUR DRAG­ONS" which by now you should well know by names, and FIVE Lat­in Amer­i­can states (Ar­gen­ti­na, Bra­zil and Mex­i­co – from the "first gen­er­a­tion" of NIEs, which by the way still ac­count for about 70 per­cent of Lat­in Amer­i­ca's GNI, and Chile and Co­lom­bia – from their "sec­ond gen­er­a­tion").

Another modern and interesting grouping of countries you can find in the Article 1.10.4.

* One fre­quent­ly used MOD­EL for clas­si­fy­ing coun­tries by STAGE of DE­VEL­OP­MENT is that pre­sent­ed by Amer­i­can sci­en­tist Walt Ros­tow. He iden­ti­fied FIVE stag­es of ec­o­nom­ic dev­e­lop­ment and noted that, with time, ALL the so­ci­e­ties were MOV­ING from ONE stage to AN­OTHER – and ex­act­ly this MOVE­MENT is DE­VEL­OP­MENT (ec­o­nom­ic growth).

Stage 1: The tra­di­tion­al so­ci­e­ty. Coun­tries in this stage LACK the ca­pa­bil­ity of sig­nif­i­cant­ly in­creas­ing the lev­el of PRO­DUC­TIV­I­TY. MAN­U­AL WORK, most­ly on LAND or in ar­ti­san WORK­SHOPS, pre­vails. On­ly most PRIM­I­TIVE TOOLS are be­ing used. There is marked ab­sence of ap­pli­ca­tion of mod­ern SCI­ENCE and TECH­NOL­O­GY. LIT­ER­A­CY is low, etc.

Stage 2: The pre­con­di­tions for takeoff. Dur­ing this pe­ri­od, the ad­vanc­es of MA­CHINE TECH­NOL­O­GY are be­gin­ning to be ap­plied in AG­RI­CUL­TURE and MIN­ING. Food and raw ma­te­ri­als' PRO­CESS­ING emerg­es. The DEVELOPMENT of trans­por­ta­tion, com­mu­ni­ca­tions, pow­er gen­er­a­tion, ed­u­ca­tion, health (what can be summed up­ as ele­ments of "EC­O­NOM­IC IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE") be­gins in a SMALL but IM­POR­TANT way.

Stage 3: The takeoff. Gen­er­al­ly speak­ing, IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION gets un­der way. Growth pat­tern and struc­tu­ral chang­es be­come a NOR­MAL con­di­tion. Both HU­MAN re­sourc­es and IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE reach a lev­el ena­bling EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT. Mod­ern­i­za­tion BOTH of RU­RAL and CITY life raises PRO­DUC­TIV­I­TY.

Stage 4: The drive to ma­tur­i­ty. Af­ter TAKEOFF, sus­tained IN­DUS­TRI­AL GROWTH is main­tained and the so­ci­e­ty seeks to EX­TEND mod­ern TECH­NOL­O­GY to all fronts of local busi­ness ac­tiv­i­ty. Na­tion­al MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING takes on IN­TER­NA­TION­AL IN­VOLVE­MENT, finds its PLACE in the in­ter­na­tion­al di­vi­sion of la­bor (it already has enough TECH­NO­LOG­I­CAL and EN­TRE­PRE­NEU­RI­AL skills to pro­duce not EVERYTHING, but ANYTHING the country choos­es to pro­duce).

Stage 5: The age of high mass con­sump­tion. In econ­o­my as a whole, strong STRUC­TU­RAL SHIFTS are ob­served: to­ward DUR­A­BLE con­su­mer goods (hous­es, cars, re­frig­er­a­tors, TV sets, etc.), and to­ward mod­ern SER­VICE SEC­TOR – away from AG­RI­CUL­TURE, tra­di­tion­al SER­VICE SEC­TOR and NONDUR­A­BLE con­su­mer goods (food, ap­pa­rel, foot­wear, etc.). MID­DLE CLASS emerg­es and grows. PER CAP­I­TA GNI and fam­i­ly IN­COME rise to the point where a VERY LARGE num­ber of peo­ple have sig­nif­i­cant amounts of mon­ey ABOVE min­i­mum (sub­sis­tence) lev­el.

Stage 6: The PostIn­dus­tri­al So­ci­e­ty. We add this stage to­ Walt Ros­tow's clas­si­fi­ca­tion for bet­ter un­der­stand­ing what has been al­ready achieved, at­ least IN PART, by some coun­tries (the U.S., Can­a­da, Swit­zer­land, Swe­den, Ger­ma­ny, may­be al­so Brit­ain) and what the CUR­RENT TRENDS are (most­ly in oth­er OECD coun­tries, in­clud­ing Ja­pan, Ko­rea, Aus­tra­lia).

Rough­ly, the con­cept of the De­vel­op­ing World em­brac­es the first FOUR stag­es out­lined above. The "un­de­vel­oped" or the "leastde­vel­oped" coun­tries (al­so called above "lowin­come econ­o­mies") fall in the first TWO cat­e­go­ries. The most typ­i­cal "de­vel­op­ing" or­ "lessde­vel­oped" coun­tries (the ma­jor­i­ty of­ the "mid­dlein­come econ­o­mies" with nor­mal de­vel­op­ment po­ten­tial, but still NOT rich) fit in­to the THIRD or­ FOURTH cat­e­go­ry. On­ly the "New In­dus­tri­al Coun­tries" (NIC), which do NOT fit the tra­di­tion­al mould of de­vel­op­ing coun­tries any more, are ei­ther BE­TWEEN the FOURTH and the FIFTH stag­es, or have al­ready reached the FIFTH stage.

* For the last threefour dec­ades, the De­vel­op­ing World has been go­ing through giant POP­U­LA­TION EX­PLO­SION, and it­ is­ still un­der way. That is­ WHY high rates of EC­O­NOM­IC GROWTH have be­come ma­jor na­tion­al goal for the ma­jor­i­ty of­ de­vel­op­ing coun­tries (in most cas­es – an un­at­tain­a­ble goal). The POP­U­LA­TION GROWTH and the EC­O­NOM­IC GROWTH are en­gaged in a gen­u­ine RACE, and the historic out­come of this race some­times rep­re­sents an is­sue of life or death for mil­lions of peo­ple.

It part­ly ex­plains WHY the IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION pro­cess­es keep their ex­traor­di­nary im­por­tance for the De­vel­op­ing World now­a­days. The de­ter­mi­nant (de­ci­sive) fac­tors in se­cur­ing IN­DUS­TRI­AL DE­VEL­OP­MENT are:

# FI­NAN­CIAL RE­SOURC­ES (de­vel­op­ment funds) avail­a­ble for AC­CU­MU­LA­TION and IN­VEST­MENT pur­pos­es, and

# MAR­KETS for emerg­ing MAN­U­FAC­TUR­ING (in­ter­me­di­ate and fin­ished prod­ucts).

How­ev­er, the De­vel­op­ing World suf­fers ex­act­ly from CHRON­IC LACK of both NA­TION­AL IN­VEST­MENT FUNDS and DO­MES­TIC MAR­KETS.

The CA­PAC­I­TY of the MAR­KETS here is far from suf­fi­cient for pro­duc­tion on a MASSSCALE se­cur­ing LOW unit costs and HIGH ef­fi­cien­cy. The STRUC­TURE of DE­MAND usu­al­ly does NOT cor­re­spond to emerg­ing in­dus­tri­al SUP­PLY as well.

So, the IN­TER­NA­TION­AL fac­tors con­cern­ing the for­ma­tion of IN­VEST­MENT FUNDS and se­cur­ing suf­fi­cient MAR­KET CA­PAC­I­TIES able to ab­sorb do­mes­ti­cal­ly man­u­fac­tured IN­DUS­TRI­AL PROD­UCTS (i.e., ap­proach to EX­PORT MAR­KETS in de­vel­oped coun­tries) gain par­a­mount im­por­tance.

* Ad­di­tion­al hard­ships are con­nect­ed with the LACK of the socalled "EC­O­NOM­IC IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE" which rep­re­sents those types of­ cap­i­tal goods and so­cialec­o­nom­ic in­sti­tu­tions that SERVE the emer­gence and cur­rent ac­tiv­i­ties of­ dif­fer­ent IN­DUS­TRIES, as well as the EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT as­ a whole.

There are dif­fer­ent clas­si­fi­ca­tions of WHAT the term "EC­O­NOM­IC IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE" should in­clude. In my view, it con­sists of THREE com­po­nents:

IN­DUS­TRI­AL in­fra­struc­ture, in­clud­ing paved ROADS, RAIL­ROADS, SEA­PORTS and AIR­PORTS, COM­MU­NI­CA­TION net­works, EN­ER­GY and WA­TER sup­ply, and the like; to create such ob­jects, es­pe­cial­ly BIG in­vest­ment mon­ey are nec­es­sary, while PROF­IT from such in­vest­ments is usu­al­ly LOW and ar­rives AF­TER MANY YEARS on­ly, if ev­er; it ex­em­pli­fies "CAP­I­TALIN­TEN­SIVE but LOWRE­TURN pro­jects" for which the FI­NANC­ING comes, as a rule, from the national STATE BUD­GET),

FI­NAN­CIAL and COM­MER­CIAL in­fra­struc­ture (or "ser­vice in­fra­struc­ture"), in­clud­ing BANK­ING sys­tems and oth­er CRED­IT fa­cil­i­ties, MAR­KET net­works (stores, ware­hous­ing stor­age fa­cil­i­ties, dis­tri­bu­tion cen­ters), AD­VER­TIS­ING agen­cies, MAR­KET­ING re­search in­sti­tu­tions, qual­i­tylev­el spe­cial­ized MID­DLE­MEN, etc.),

SO­CIAL in­fra­struc­ture (al­so called "so­cial over­head"), in­clud­ing ED­U­CA­TION (schools and uni­ver­si­ties), HEALTH CARE (hos­pi­tals and clin­ics), SCI­ENCE (re­search fa­cil­i­ties), LIFE IN­SU­RANCE, PUB­LIC UTIL­I­TIES ("mu­nic­i­pal econ­o­my"), and many CUL­TU­RAL and AR­TIS­TIC es­tab­lish­ments.

The pres­ence of a GOOD IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE is a mighty DE­VEL­OP­MENT fac­tor, while its ab­sence rep­re­sents a se­ri­ous OB­STA­CLE (hin­drance, hand­i­cap) to suc­cess­ful IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION and EC­O­NOM­IC GROWTH in gen­er­al.

Re­gret­ful­ly, the LESS de­vel­oped a coun­try is, the LESS ad­e­quate its IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE is for con­duct­ing busi­ness and fa­cil­i­tat­ing in­vest­ment ac­tiv­i­ties.

WITH­OUT suf­fi­cient trans­por­ta­tion fa­cil­i­ties, for ex­am­ple, the dis­tri­bu­tion costs of­ in­dus­tri­al firms can IN­CREASE sub­stan­tial­ly. WITH­OUT ad­e­quate ware­hous­ing, a sig­nif­i­cant part of all kinds of har­vest can get LOST. And WITH­OUT elec­tric­i­ty gen­er­at­ing ca­pac­i­ties, largescale in­vest­ments are vir­tu­al­ly IM­POS­SI­BLE.

As econ­o­my de­vel­ops, a coun­try's IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE usu­al­ly ex­pands to meet the needs of grow­ing PRO­DUC­TION and MAR­KETS. How­ev­er, when the IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE lags be­hind, the coun­try be­gins TO LOSE ec­o­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment ground. For ex­am­ple, con­di­tions can arise, where a coun­try pro­duc­es COM­MOD­I­TIES for ex­port, but CANNOT ex­port them be­cause of in­ad­e­qua­cies of the IN­FRA­STRUC­TURE (re­mem­ber Zim­bab­we, which ac­tu­al­ly ex­ports on­ly about ONETHIRD of ag­ri­cul­tu­ral prod­ucts avail­a­ble for for­eign trade). Even NIC, like Mex­i­co, must strug­gle with in­ad­e­quate tradesup­port­ing ser­vic­es.

* EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT is gen­er­al­ly un­der­stood to mean EC­O­NOM­IC GROWTH, i.e., an IN­CREASE in na­tion­al pro­duc­tion and, as a re­sult, in the lev­el of PER CAP­I­TA indicators. But this def­i­ni­tion is NOT per­fect. Aside from QUAN­TI­TA­TIVE growth, we have al­so to con­sid­er QUAL­I­TA­TIVE de­vel­op­ment – STRUC­TU­RAL CHANG­ES in the econ­o­my and in so­cial com­po­si­tion of the pop­u­la­tion, as well as the character of INCOME DIS­TRI­BU­TION in the so­ci­e­ty (is it wide­spread one, or do the FEW rich peo­ple coex­ist with MANY very poor fam­i­lies, is the socalled "MID­DLE CLASS" big enough and grow­ing, etc.).

Cer­tain­ly, most coun­tries as­so­ciate with EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT the achieve­ment of SO­CIAL as well as EC­O­NOM­IC goals. Bet­ter ed­u­ca­tion, bet­ter hous­ing, bet­ter and more ef­fec­tive gov­ern­ment, more de­moc­ra­cy, elim­i­na­tion of many so­cial in­eq­ui­ties, and im­prove­ment of mo­ral and eth­i­cal re­spon­si­bil­i­ties – those are some of the EX­PEC­TA­TIONS con­nect­ed with in­dus­tri­al­i­za­tion and ec­o­nom­ic growth. Thus, EC­O­NOM­IC DE­VEL­OP­MENT is NOT meas­ured sole­ly in EC­O­NOM­IC in­di­ca­tors, but al­so in SO­CIAL achieve­ments.

Par­a­dox­i­cal­ly enough, be­cause FOR­EIGN FIRMS do­ing busi­ness in a de­vel­op­ing coun­try are ALI­ENS (out­sid­ers), it is of­ten WRONG­LY as­sumed that their pres­ence is LIM­IT­ING the at­tain­ment (achieve­ment) of na­tion­al goals, rath­er than AS­SIST­ING and FA­CIL­I­TAT­ING progress in de­vel­op­ing so­ci­e­ties. The wide­spread FEAR and RE­SENT­MENT of for­eign con­trol over na­tion­al econ­o­my com­mon­ly lead to the ad­ap­ta­tion of pol­i­cies and ac­tions that RE­TARD, rath­er than FA­CIL­I­TATE, econom­ic and so­cial PROGRESS. Yet, though cru­cial role of for­eign en­ter­prise and mar­ket­ing ac­tiv­i­ties is of­ten NOT ap­pre­ciat­ed, they CAN play (and are ac­tu­al­ly play­ing) SIG­NIF­I­CANT ROLE in help­ing coun­tries to achieve their ob­jec­tives.

* EC­O­NOM­IC DU­AL­ISM, i.e., co­ex­is­tence of MOD­ERN and TRA­DI­TION­AL sec­tors with­in the econ­o­my, is generally very typical for a developing country.

The MOD­ERN sec­tor is cen­tered in BIG CIT­IES with jet air­ports, in­ter­na­tion­al ho­tels and su­per­mar­kets, new fac­to­ries, and a small West­ern­ized mid­dle class.

Along with this very spe­cial en­vi­ron­ment, there ex­ists TRA­DI­TION­AL sec­tor con­tain­ing the ma­jor­i­ty of pop­u­la­tion, most­ly in ru­ral ar­e­as. Al­though these TWO sec­tors may be very close GE­O­GRAPH­I­CAL­LY, they usu­al­ly are CEN­TU­RIES AWAY from each oth­er in modes of­ PRO­DUC­TION and CON­SU­MER­ISM.

The DU­AL econ­o­my af­fects the SIZE of the mar­ket and, in many coun­tries (like In­dia or In­do­ne­sia), creates TWO dis­tinct LEV­ELS of mar­ket­ing ac­tiv­i­ty.

The MOD­ERN sec­tor de­mands prod­ucts and ser­vic­es SIM­I­LAR to those found in any West­ern coun­try (or in Ja­pan, for that mat­ter), while the TRA­DI­TION­AL sec­tor de­mands items MORE in­dig­e­nous (nat­u­ral, prim­i­tive) and ba­sic to sub­sis­tence.

* Ac­tu­al­ly, we al­ready be­gan speak­ing about IN­TER­NA­TION­AL FAC­TORS in­flu­enc­ing IN­DUS­TRI­AL­I­ZA­TION and SO­CIAL DE­VEL­OP­MENT in re­tard­ed re­gions of Asia, Af­ri­ca and Lat­in Amer­i­ca. Now, let us do it more thor­ough­ly start­ing with the is­sues of IN­TER­NA­TION­AL TRADE and then switch­ing to FI­NAN­CIAL mat­ters.

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