corruption_in_ukraine_2007-2009_2011_engl

Chart 5.5

Use of Personal Connections

(percent of respondents who had contacted respective state institutions)

Question: Have you or members of your family or a state official ever used personal connection, nepotism or favoritism

to obtain services?

Additional types of corrupt behavior, such as use of personal connections, nepotism and/or favoritism to obtain services, were not researched in 2007 survey . The findings of 2009 and surveys in 2001 indicate that this type of corrupt behavior occurs less frequently than extortion, however more often than offering bribes. In other words, prior to offering a bribe, citizens try to first find a useful connection in the necessary sphere.

The overall share of those who use personal connections in resolving problems has changed slightly over the last two years: 22.9% in 2011 versus 21.8% in 2009. However, if we look at different sectors, higher education appears to be the only sector in which the use of personal connections has decreased significantly, by 6.6 p.p. Obviously, this can be partially explained by the introduction of the External Independent Testing (EIT) system. Conversely, nepotism has become more widespread in such sectors as registration and ownership of real estate (+4.9 p.p.), interactions with the militsiya (without SAI) (+6 p.p.), the tax authorities (+9.2 p.p.) and applying for state employment (+10.2 p.p.).

The findings of the qualitative survey offer additional proof that voluntary bribe-givers are tolerated or even silentlyapproved.Anopinionwasvoicedthatwhenapersonchoosestoofferabribe,itmeanssuchaperson can afford to pay, and is unlikely to face negative consequences as opposed to situations when a person is forced to pay.

“Apersoncomestoahospitaltogetacertificate.Theytellhim,comeinaweek.Andthepersonwantstoget the certificate earlier, in 2-3 days.”

7 The use of personal connections was not measured for the following sectors– healthcare, schools, and the SAI.

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

31

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

32

“If he had a good salary in the first place, that would be a different thing. But I know that this doctor hardly makes ends meet and she indeed saved my life and has helped me, my family and friends, I’d rather repay her for her kindness.”

“IfIamgivingsomethingaway,Imusthavemoreinstock.Andifapersonhasnothing,theywillborrow.Such a person will take out a loan and then will have to repay it”.

“Relatively speaking, if a doctor saves life and you want to repay him for his kindness, this is your initiative. Thedoctormayrefuse,butyouwillstillwanttoshowyourgratitude.Andit’squiteadifferentstoryfromthat when a doctor abuses his or her position and demands a bribe from patients, but is not attending to them helping them recover from severe injury, for example…”

There is a clear correlation between extortion and voluntary bribe-giving. That is why participants of the discussions suggest that extortion should be eradicated first and then voluntary bribery will cease to exist:

“It would be good to overcome extortion. It’s easier to beat voluntary bribery, though...» “When there is no extortion, there will be no voluntary bribes”

“Voluntary bribes will cease to exist in due course...»

NepotisminUkrainiantraditionisapositivething,evenifusedforpersonalgains.It’sinterestingthatinfocus group discussion in Lviv, nepotism used to be associated with President Viktor Yushchenko.

“Nepotism in everyday life is nothing bad”

“It depends. Nepotism may be a good thing and may be a bad thing.

Citizen victimization by corruption

Results of the 2007 baseline survey revealed and findings of 2009 survey showed once again that the people most drawn into corruption are young citizens, people with higher levels of education and people with higher incomes. The survey results dispelled certain stereotypes that corruption persecutes the most vulnerable groups, thus leading to their even greater marginalization.

Chart 5.68

The socio-demographic profile of those who found themselves in corruption situations over the last 12 months in most cases coincides with the findings of the previous surveys (see Chart 5.6). To date, the group with greater experience in corruption includes young and middle-aged people with higher levels of education and higher incomes. Representatives of the younger age groups invariably appear most drawn to corruption.

8 Quartiles by age are: I. 18-29 years old; II. 30-44 years old; III. 45-59 years old; IV. 60 years old and older

Quartiles by education are: I. Elementary or some secondary; II. High school or vocational school; III. High specialized; IV. University undergraduate or graduate

Quartiles by income are: I. Less than 1000 UAH; II. From 1000 to 1500 UAH; III. From 1500 to 2500 UAH; IV. More than 2500 UAH

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

33

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

34

Overall corruption experience indices by region

As in our previous surveys, two indices were calculated that aggregate Ukrainians’ corruption experience across 17 institutional/sector settings. These indices were based on responses regarding actual instances of corruption within 17 different sectors. The first index, known as the Corruption Experience Index–Extortion (CEI-E), measures the degree of bribery initiated by state officials. The second – the Corruption Experience Index–Voluntary Bribes (CEI-V) –measures the degree of bribery offered by citizens to state officials. Both indices range in value from 0 to 100: the greater the number of sectors in which a respondent was a victim of extortion or proposed a voluntary bribe, the higher the value of the corresponding index.

Asreportedin2007andreplicatedby2009data,extortionoccurstwotimesmorefrequentlythanvoluntarybribegiving. This correlation somewhat increased in 2011 to 2.5:1. This change was driven by changes on both sides: an overall increase in the level of extortion and a certain reduction in instances of voluntary bribe-giving observed in this survey, which may have stemmed both from stronger perceptions of unacceptability of corruption behaviors, as well as from the economic crisis that affected the potential of voluntary corruption.

The median value for the CEI-E, which decreased from 22.1 in 2007 to 20.1 in 2009, is now 25.3, which is higher than in 2007. It means that practically every fourth contact with an official results in extortion. When we divide Ukraine into two camps: extortion prevails in southern (29.5) and eastern oblasts (29.1), but is less common in western (23.3) and central (21.3) oblasts of Ukraine.

Duetoincreasedextortionanddecreasedvoluntarybribe-giving,themedianvaluefortheCEI-Visone-thirdofthe

CEI-E, while in 2009 the median value for the CEI-V was half of the CEI-E. In 2011, the decreasing trend in bribeoffering continued: on average a Ukrainian offers a bribe in 8.2% of contacts with state officials, compared to 9.6% in2009and11.1%in2007,whichisastatisticallysignificantdifferenceatthelevelofp=0.05.Thismeansthatwhen an average Ukrainian initiates a bribe, he or she feels that a bribe is expected of him or that it is customary. Other motives may include: a bribe as a means of expediting the outcome of a matter or concealing violations. There wasanoppositetrendintheregionsalsoobservedin2009:theCEI-Vvaluedecreaseswhilemovingfromthewest

(12.2) to the central region (10.6), and further to the south (9.1) and to the east (8.3).

Chart 5.10

Corruption Experience Index – Extortion

Chart 5.11

Corruption Experience Index – Voluntary Bribes

Overall,theresultsofthe2011surveyconfirmtheenduringcharacteristicsofcorruptbehaviorwithintheregional divisions:morethan60%ofoblasts(districts)withhighlevelsofextortionalsohavehighlevelsofvoluntarybribes. It is evident once again that corruption develops in two ways.

The third index, developed based on 2009 and 2011 data – is the Corruption Experience Index–Use of Personal Connections, Nepotism and Favoritism when dealing with state officials (CEI-P). This index has the same characteristics as the other two. The median value for the given index in 2011 is 16.4, which is 2.6 p.p. up from 2009, meaning that it finds itself between the CEI-E and CEI-V values. Thus, the use of personal connections in Ukraine occurs more often than extortion, but less often than voluntary bribery.

In a regional breakdown, the chart for this index is similar to that of the CEI-V: the highest usage of personal connectionswasrevealedinwesternUkraine(18.8)andinthecentraloblasts(18).Thispracticeislesswidespread in the south (12.6) and in the east (12.3). It is important to note that there was no change in this index in western oblasts over the last two years, meaning that the countrywide rise in the index is driven by its growth in the rest of Ukraine. Voluntary bribes are often supplemented by the use of personal connections. With respect to individual oblasts, the Volyn (40.7) and Sumy (38.2) oblasts lead the rating, while Zaporizhzhia (1.3) and Kherson

(3.9) showed the lowest scores.

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

35

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

36

Chart 5.12

Corruption Experience Index – Use of Personal Connection

The correlation between the CEI-E, CEI-V, CEI-P and several other exponents revealed in the 2007 results and replicated by 2009 results, has been maintained in the results of the follow-up survey:

•Disregarding certain variations of values, the level of corruption within state structures is perceived by citizens as notably worse than they actually encounter during personal contacts with state officials. This meansthattheperceivedlevelofcorruptionalwaysexceedsanyindexofactualexperiencewithcorruption.

•CEI-E has the maximum and CEI-V has the minimum value among the Corruption Experience Indices. Meanwhile, according to the survey findings, CEI-P finds itself between the two abovementioned indices. Therefore, most often, a corruption situation is provoked by a state official, and in situations where there is no direct extortion, Ukrainians try to first find a useful connection, rather than offer a bribe right away.

•Urbandwellershavemoreexperiencecomingintocontactwithallthreeformsofcorruptionincomparison to rural dwellers.

•The higher the CEI-E, CEI-V, and CEI-P, the greater the likelihood that citizens feel that the government-led fight against corruption is inadequate. This pertains especially to extortion.

•Citizens who demonstrate higher CEI-E, CEI-V, and CEI-P scores are less inclined to trust the government.

•CitizenswiththehighestCEI-VandCEI-Pvaluestendtobetheoneswhojustifytheuseofcorruptionwhen it is convenient for them

Corruption within the healthcare system

As demonstrated by Charts 5.1, the state healthcare system has been and is the leader in terms of the number of citizens’contacts:almosttwothirdsofrespondentsormembersoftheirfamilyturnedtostatemedicalinstitutions for services. Over the years of the surveys, there was no significant change in corrupt practices in this sector. As earlier, more than half of the respondents indicated that they participated in corrupt transactions in order to obtain medical services:

•Over a half (55%) of respondents who visited clinics or hospitals were extorted to buy medicines or instruments to get service; 26% of respondents did so on their own initiative (in 2009 – 52% and 29%, respectively).

•52% of respondents were extorted to give “charitable” donations to healthcare facilities, while 16% contributed voluntarily (compared to 49% and 16% in 2009, respectively).

•32% of respondents were extorted for free services or were asked to make unofficial payments (that is, paymentswerenotgivendirectlytotheofficialcashier)inexchangeformedicalservices,while14%ofthe surveyed did this voluntarily (compared to 28% and 15% in 2009, respectively).

Charts 5.14 refer to those respondents who had approached state medical institutions within 12 months prior to the interview (n (2007) = 7270; n (2009) = 7122); n (2011) =7036).

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

37

5.CITIZENS’EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION

38

Corruption in schools

Questions regarding corruption in schools in the 2011 survey were answered by 23% of respondents, primarily those who had school-aged children in their families. Corruption experiences linked with school services have remained generally the same as in the earlier surveys. The most typical corrupt practices linked to education in schools are:

•Donations to the school or class fund (extorted from 55% and paid voluntarily by 32%)

•Paymentsforclassroomrepairs(separatefromtheschoolfund)(extortedfrom56%ofrespondents,while 31% gave voluntarily);

•Donations for flowers or gifts for teachers (extorted from 33%, 51% gave voluntarily).

Charts 5.16 refer to the respondents who have children of school age (n (2007) = 2497; n (2009) = 2403; n (2011) = 2355).