3. Agreement phase

There are four possible outcomes negotiation: compromise, unilateral solution,

nonsolution with a petlis^ng desire for compromise, and failure.

A compromise implies that several or all parties influenced the terms o f the outcome; it is

thus the only outcome which produces satisfaction for the largest number o f parties. Where

limited benefits are involved, every agreement carries risks because o f dissatisfied third

parties who receive no benefits^ the enduring agreement is one which confers maximum

benefits while avoiding reprisals from third parties, since reprisals can preclude enforcement.

Agreement can be designed so as to minimize the possibility o f reprisals. If the agreement is

conditionally open to future signatories, the parties can guarantee their benefits, grant

accession later to partiers who may claim an interest, and control the identity and number of

parties who benefit by accession. If the agreement is closed to future signatories, the present

participants have a maximal guarantee of their own benefits, but third parties may be

compensated if there are terms specifying a later conference or establishing an institution for

future negotiations.

Any agreement, if it is to endure, must continue to confer greater gains than obligations or

• costs for each participant. Terms which specify task- and issue-expansion allow the

possibility o f increased benefits in the future to counterbalance the acceptance of present

obligations. W’hen the obligations seem onerous, the ability to take on new tasks may

encourage continued support from the participants.

4. Implementation phase

Voluntary enforcement implies that the agreement confers benefits and risks that are

favourably balanced for all or nearly all the parties. Coercion is costly and may provoke

reprisals. Thus parties may prefer lesser benefits in an agreement enforced voluntarily to

greater benefits enforced by coercion.

In an agreement reached by symmetrical negotiations, each party can grant the others no

better or worse concessions than they grant him; all may therefore perceive themselves as

gaining equal benefits, though none may be entirely satisfied.

Casuistry is a means by which parties who receive benefits create perceptions o f benefits for

nonreceivers.

Expanding the benefits, as by task- and issue-expansion, may win the voluntary compliance

of parties who are now dissatisfied with their gains. It may also aid enforcement by holding

out the possibility o f gains to third parties.

When an agreement is only one of a series, the long-term satisfactions of the parties are

potentially greater. Each agreement can be moderate and confer small gains, but the longterm

effect may be great gains for the parties. Each successive agreement allows the parties

to insert terms favourable to enforcement. If the initial agreement was not well designed for

enforcement, a subsequent agreement could correct these defects.

Similar in effect are agreements which inspire later agreements by “spillover”. The parties

and the nature o f the later agreements may be the same or different from the original

agreement, but when ‘spillover’ happens, the initial agreement was usually a successful one

in terms o f the benefits for the signatories and the endurance o f its implementation. One such

success improves the chances for future agreements.

Positive benefits confer gains in resources; negative benefits confer avoidance of

punishment. An agreement conferring positive benefits is an easier one both to reach and to

enforce, because all parties want to make and keep gains in resources; the problem is how to

distribute the gains in a way that satisfies the parties. When an agreement confers negative

benefits, all parties want to avoid all the choices; the problem is how to distribute the

punishments in a way that is least unsatisfactory to the parties.

The endurance o f an agreement depends partly on its ability to maintain optimal pressure on

all the signatories. Optimal pressure means that each partly feels he is better off with the

agreement than without it, despite the obligations involved. Optimal pressure reduces the

likelihood that any party will threaten withdrawal from the agreement in order to obtain

further concessions from parties with a greater interest in enforcement.

Implementation also depends on the absence o f third-party reprisals to preclude enforcement.

Open agreements conferring limited benefits typically involve less-than-maximum gains for

the signatories, in order to avoid such reprisals from strong third parties. Greater benefits can

therefore be conferred if the agreement is kept secret from third parties.

Finally successful implementation also depends on the absence o f those outside events which

could prevent enforcement by making enforcement unnecessary, undesirable, impossible, or

ineffective. Such an event may remove the problem to which the agreement applies; it may

impose considerations unforeseen at the time o f the agreement; or it may show up

deficiencies in the agreement.

The present model o f international negotiation takes a broad view o f bargaining, since

attention was given to each phase of the process and to finding elements helpful in reaching

an enforceable agreement.