1. Prenegotiation phase

“Abilitv to negotiate” refers to the conditions required if a negotiation is to take place.

^WHitn^ftfes"to"negot^^</9escribes the desirable conditions, those which help to guarantee

that a negotiation will take place.

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Any negotiation requires that there be two or more actors, although one o f the actors may

’V^etftMmate. In unilateral diplomacy one actor undertakes all or most o f the activities involved

actors) is the target for

____ ____ _______ _ ___i , refers to the ia c r that potentiСaуl\'/p artic^ipants perceive

and evaluate benlMTancfnsks that'will aCtrue?rom%e negotiation^ If they сой^Лйё that their

goals can be obtained more cheaply by negotiation than by other means - or more efficiently,

more fully, more quickly, or more legitimately - their goals are those achievable by

negotiation. Not only must the issue be negotiable, but it must also encompass to some degree

the goals o f the actors who might participate, so that the acceptance o f negotiation seems likely

to confer gains.

secondary, though the resources in each group may be similar or dissimilar. Primary resources

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friendship.

A mutually compatible value system and the ability to communicate values with respect to

resources possessed or desired help to promote the occurrence of negotiation, since actors are

made aware that they may be better off if they negotiate. Mutual trust lltows potential actors to

believe that the information they get from others about resources is correct and that the others

will keep the commitments resulting from negotiation.

Having time to negotiate influences the type of negotiation which ensues. In a crisis, the

urgency o f the problem may compel informal and unilateral or bi lateral negotiation rather than

formal parliamentary negotiation as in the UN.

".W,, iulluinurgnves»s two negotiate ‘’ iis related to the nature o f the goals sought by the potential parties

wfncli thdse‘g<Ms arel5efie\€tt fobe 7>1тШпаВ1е by negotiation. Parties with a

direct interest in the disposition of the issue and who have given a pledge to negotiate are more

likely to be willing to negotiate than are parties with goals only tangentially related to the issue

or parties without negotiating commitments.

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Willingness to negotiate is also a function o f the degree o f certainty o f obtaining goals and the

ability to enhance this certainty. Higher certainty is related to ability to define the issue an to

“size” it; ability to choose the parties and to limit the number to the optimal range; and ability

to choose the setting for the negotiation.

2. Negotiation phase

The first item in this phase o f the model expresses the point made above under “the problem of

singular and plural positions”, namely, that higher goal satisfaction,-is likelv when parties

• • • j- - j i participate as individual s rat,her1 th an as a roup membi ersn . S everali consideratii o еnиs и aяre i. nv1olved

here. y ) T h e k re a te i^ eM fe h h o o d that the parties can wm their positions, the more thev will

seek to parffclpate^W in d iv id u a f^ (2 ) If individual parties form a group, othgr parties are

impelled to seek group support to counter the power of the group position. (3) Tne greater the

as a group.

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These considerations are related to the second item, “symmetrical negotiations”. For a great

power, symmetrical negotiations offer less certainty o f winning goals than do hegemonic

negotiations. Thus symmetrical negotiations invoke pressures favoring group positions, while

hegemonic negotiations are likely to involve individual participation by the great power(s) and

pressures for a group position for the small power(s). There is a tendency, therefore, for

hegemonic negotiations to become symmetrical.

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The model shows that bilateral negotiations, and multilateral negotiations where positions are or

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can be polarized, are more likely to result in an agreement which is enforced than are unilateral

negotiations or multilateral ones where the positions are not polarized. Unilateral negotiations

often involve a coerced settlement and the possibility o f reprisals.

Proposals based on long-term goals &re more adaptable to compromise than are those based on

short-term ones, because parties can accept a compromise involving losses in the hope of making

up the loss in later negotiation s / WTien goals are lon'g-tcfm. moreover, proposals can "begin

"small” - moderate change irTtKe status quo. small gains from the negotiation - in the hope of

winning a series o f small gains over a protracted period. The fewer the number o f units in a

proposal, the easier is overall agreement on the units. Proposals calling for moderate changes in

the status quo transfer the certainty o f the present into the future.

A compromise involving a trade o f similar goods is an easier basis for agreement than one

involving a trade o f dissimilar goods, and it is more certain o f implementation because the

complexities o f a two-step compromise are avoided. When dissimilar goods (such as friendship

and economic aid) are to be traded, the parties must agree on equivalent values as well as on the

overall “volume” o f trading.

A compromise^with a future rather than a present focus is easier to reach and easier to enforce.

Deferring щ me future gives greater choice about the settlement, including a settlement on the

merits o f the issue, and parties may be more willing to accept obligations when these are not

immediate. On the other hand, it is easier to withdraw from future commitments; this means that

attention must be given to ways of making withdrawal more difficult - for instance, by inserting

“irrevocable commitment” terms in the agreement itself.

Negotiations which are capable o f legitimation to various constituencies - in terms o f the reason

for the negotiation, the proposals advanced, and the resolution- are more likely to result in an

agreement which is enforced. Capacity for legitimation implies that the proposals and outcomes

are moderate and the constituency desires were influential, so that there will be greater support in

the enforcement phase.