hobbes ii

Human Nature and the State of Nature

§1. Preliminary Remarks

Hobbes had the general thesis, very important to his view, that a state of nature tends to pass over very readily into a state of war. He often talks about a state of nature (which is a state in which there is no effective Sovereign to keep men in awe and keep their passions in check) as being essentially a state of war. It is important to note here that for Hobbes, a state of war consists “not in battle only, or the act of fighting . . . but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary” (Leviathan, p. 62). What I will call “Hobbes’s Thesis” is the thesis that a state of nature is, essentially and for all practical purposes, a state of war. Why does Hobbes think this is so?

Hobbes remarks that it may seem strange to us “that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another” (that is, it may seem strange to us that the State of Nature so readily becomes a State of War). But, he says that we can understand why this is so by what he calls an “Inference, made from the Passions” (Leviathan, p. 62). We can confirm that we make this inference from the passions by looking at actual experience in everyday life, by noting how we conduct ourselves as we do now, in civil society, when the Sovereign actually exists and there are laws and armed public officers. He says that when we travel we arm ourselves, when we go to sleep we lock the door, even in our house we lock up our chest, and so on (Leviathan, p. 62). By these actions we accuse one another and show that we accept, as it were, this inference from the passions, which says: If a state of nature obtains, then a state of war also obtains, for all practical purposes.

Thus what Hobbes says, I think, is that if we take human nature as it is, we can infer that the State of Nature becomes a State of War. What human

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nature is Hobbes takes to be demonstrated by the essential features and abilities and desires and other passions of people as we observe them now in civil society; and so he supposes, for the purposes of his political doctrine, that these essential features of human nature are more or less given or fixed. Hobbes is not denying that social institutions and education and culture can importantly change our passions and alter our aims, at least in some very important sorts of cases. But he supposes that, for the purposes of his political doctrine, that is, of what I call his secular moral system, that the main outlines and essential features of human nature are more or less fixed or given. The existence of social institutions and, in particular, of an effective Sovereign, changes our objective circumstances and hence changes what it is prudent and rational for us to do. For example, given the Sovereign we are now protected and have no reason not to honor our covenants. That is to say, supposing the Sovereign actually exists, we have reasons we did not have before to honor our covenants, to keep our promises, and so on. However, social institutions are not thought of as though they change the more essential aspects of our nature. They don’t change our most fundamental interests in self-preservation, in conjugal affections, and in the means for commodious living. So, taking those elements as more or less fixed, for the purpose of his political doctrine, what Hobbes then does is to infer what a state of nature would be like, taking people as they are, or as he thinks they are; and he describes a state of nature as a state of “continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan, p. 62), but still probably all too long under those conditions. From what features of (actual) human beings is this infer-

ence from the passions made?

§2. Main Features of Human Nature

I am going to mention and comment on four features of human nature as he characterizes them and then will go over fairly quickly the basic argument of what I earlier called “Hobbes’s Thesis.”

The first feature is the fact of human equality in natural endowments, strength of body and quickness of mind. Of course, Hobbes has not regarded these natural endowments as literally, or strictly equal; but, his point is that they are equal enough. Thus, even the weakest in bodily strength is

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still strong enough to kill the strongest, either by secret means or by plotting along with others who are similarly threatened by the strongest. Note here now that “equal enough” means, not strict equality, but sufficiently equal to support this inference from the passions, where people feel themselves threatened, and are led to attack one another. This is sufficient to give rise to the fears and the dangers of the state of nature. Note also that Hobbes thinks that in quickness of mind people are even more equally endowed, in many regards, than they are in strength of body. Here the attributes in question are wit and prudence, which Hobbes thinks to be derived from experience; and here all individuals have, he thinks, equal opportunity to acquire experience and to learn.

Again, Hobbes doesn’t think that all people have equal quickness of mind. But the differences arise, on Hobbes’s view, from differences in custom and education and in bodily constitution, which in turn cause differences in the passions, that is, in the desire for riches, glory, honor, knowledge, and so on. Hobbes has a tendency in the political doctrine to reduce all these desires that cause difference of wit to one: namely, the desire for “power after power,” where power in this case stands for the means for attaining our good or the object of our desires (Leviathan, pp. 35, 41). Many different kinds of things, the things that we think will make us happy, are forms of power for Hobbes, in the sense that they enable us to attain our good. It is the different strengths of people’s desires for power that determine, Hobbes thinks, their quickness of mind. Since these differences are equal enough, so is their quickness of mind. Here again, equal enough means equal enough to make the state of nature into a state of war.

A final observation concerning equality of endowments is that Hobbes assumes that if there were, in fact, substantial natural inequality, so that one person or a few persons could dominate the rest, then that person would simply rule. He says that they would rule by natural right. Or, if this seems unrealistic, then a dominant group of persons, provided they could stay united and be of one mind, could also rule. Hobbes says as much in discussing the rights whereby God reigns over us. God does not have this right by virtue of the Right of Creation, which Locke, whom we will be discussing later, assumes is a moral principle. That is, if God created us, as Locke believes, then, being created by God, we have a moral obligation to obey, which obligation depends on the principle that if A creates B then B has an obligation to A. In Hobbes we don’t find such a Right of Creation.

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We don’t find an obligation to God based on either God’s creation or our gratitude, but simply on God’s irresistible power. Hobbes says, “Whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled . . . according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdom over men . . . belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent” (Leviathan, p. 187).

Now what Hobbes has to show, then, is that given the state of equality, among other things, in the state of nature, the tendency is to lead to a state of war; and to avoid that happening, the great Leviathan with its effective common power or sovereign is necessary.

The second feature or element of human nature has to do with the fact that the scarcity of resources and the nature of our needs introduces competition. We could put it this way: Given the nature of people’s needs and desires, and given the tendency of needs and desires to change and to expand (although not necessarily to expand without limit), there is a permanent tendency for these needs and desires to require more for their fulfillment than is available in nature. This makes for a scarcity of natural resources, which is, of course, a relation wherein the amount, or total aggregate of needs and desires is larger than the amount of resources available. This scarcity, Hobbes believes, leads to competition between people. If we wait until others have taken all they want, there will be nothing left for us. So, in a state of nature we must be ready to stake out and to defend our claims.

Civil society, on Hobbes’s view, does not eliminate this relation of scarcity. He believes, or at least assumes, that scarcity is a permanent feature of human life. Scarcity is relative and it may be more or less urgent, so that the wants and needs that remain unsatisfied in civil society are less pressing, less urgent than those that remain unsatisfied in a state of nature. Thus, the civil state wherein an effective Sovereign exists is more agreeable.

Hobbes says at the end of Chapter XIII that “The Passions that incline men to Peace, are Fear of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them” (Leviathan, p. 63). The existence of an effective Sovereign removes the fear of violent death; and through the establishment of the conditions wherein indus-

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try is rewarded and is secure, the Sovereign’s existence encourages the means for a commodious life. On this Hobbes says at the beginning of Chapter XXX that the end, or purpose, for which the office of the Sovereign is entrusted with sovereign power, is the “procuration of the safety of the people; to which he [the Sovereign] is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawful Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himself ” (Leviathan, p. 175).

Therefore, one thing that civil society does, and one thing that makes it collectively rational, is that it introduces conditions that make it much easier to produce the fruits of labor, or the means of a commodious living. This does alter, or render less urgent, the scarcity of natural resources. Scarcity does still exist. The Sovereign does not eliminate scarcity, but does produce the objective conditions, on Hobbes’s view, for lawful industry and for the holding of property and making it secure, and so forth.

The third feature of human nature supporting the inference from the passions, in Hobbes’s view, is that the psychological makeup of human beings is largely, or predominantly, self-centered. In particular, when people deliberate about basic political and social matters, they tend to give priority in their thought and action to their own preservation and security, to that of their families, and, to use his phrase again, to “the means of a commodious life.” It can be hard to get this point straight in Hobbes, and it’s worth spending some time on. Hobbes does not say in the Leviathan that people are psychological egoists, or that they pursue or care only about their own good. He does say in Chapter VI that we are capable of benevolence; of desire of good to another, or goodwill; and of charity (Leviathan, p. 26). He says that we are capable of loving people, and in Chapter XXX, he ranks conjugal affections as second in importance after our own self-preservation and before the means of a commodious life (Leviathan, p. 179). He therefore does think that people are capable of benevolence and of genuine affection for other people, or concern for their good. He also says that some persons are virtuous, or that we are capable of virtue—that people do what is just or noble or honorable because they want to be, and to be recognized as, someone who acts in that way. An important example of this is in Chapter XV, where Hobbes writes about the virtue of justice and of acting in accordance with it. He equates justice with keeping our promises, honoring

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our covenants, and he says, “That which gives to human Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Nobleness or Gallantness of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise” (Leviathan, p. 74).

That is an important statement. There are several others in the Leviathan, where Hobbes clearly asserts that we have the capacity to act justly for its own sake. He does not, then, deny that capacity, nor does he deny that we have capacities of benevolence or affection. Often, however, he appears to do so. One might say, perhaps, that his views are inconsistent when strictly read. But, I think that it is better to say that he is emphasizing certain aspects of human nature in ways that are suitable for his purposes, that is, for his political doctrine. He wants to give an account of what holds civil society together and to explain why an effective Sovereign is necessary for peace and concord. He is concerned, that is, primarily with politics, with political questions, and with basic sorts of institutional structures of government.

Politics is, of course, only part of human conduct; and Hobbes need not deny that we can be, and often are, benevolent, and that we are capable of the virtues of justice and fidelity, and so forth. His point is that one should not rely on these human capacities in an account of civil society and in the basis of social unity. That is, there are other fundamental interests upon which one ought, if one can, to base the unity of civil society. His view would then be that political institutions must be rooted in, and congenial to certain fundamental interests: our interest first in preserving our life, then our interest in securing the good of those who are close to us (what Hobbes calls “conjugal affection”), and finally, our interest in acquiring the means of a commodious life (Leviathan, p. 179). He lists these three things I am calling “fundamental interests” in that order of importance. It is those three fundamental interests to which he appeals. To say that we give great weight to these interests in political matters, and that the account of civil society should focus on these interests, is not to deny that we are capable of other desires and often act on them in other circumstances. Perhaps, in those other circumstances they may be extremely strong.

Thus, I am assuming that Hobbes’s largely self-centered, or self-focused, account of human nature serves, in effect, as an emphasis for the purposes of a political conception. It is an emphasis that goes with his stress on the desire for power, where a person’s power is defined as a person’s present

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means to obtain some future apparent good (Leviathan, p. 41). These means include all sorts of things. They include natural faculties of body or mind, or things that are acquired by those faculties. The latter include riches, reputations; they even include “Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck” (Leviathan, p. 41). It is small wonder then, with this broad definition of “power,” that we should desire to have it.

The weight that Hobbes assigns to our self-preservation in his political theory is used by him to explain why certain rights, in his sense, are inalienable. He says that no one can be understood deliberately and intentionally to do anything contrary to their self-preservation. Contracts (the transferring or renouncing of rights in consideration of some other right or good) are deliberate, voluntary acts, and as such, Hobbes says, they must have as their object, some good to the agent. He then continues, “Therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred.” He gives as an example, the right of resisting those who actually assault us. And he says, “And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signs, seem(s) to despoil himself of the End, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted” (Leviathan, p. 66).

Here, Hobbes is more or less regarding it as a principle of legal interpretation within his political doctrine that persons must be presumed to intend their own good and so to preserve their own lives. However, at least from things he says elsewhere, he knows perfectly well that people sometimes do irrational things; and he believes that some persons, with full knowledge, prefer death rather than disgrace or dishonor. He says that most men would rather lose their lives than suffer slander; and that a son would rather die than obey an order to kill his father, on the grounds that if he were to do obey such an order, he would look infamous and would be hated by all the world; and that, from shame or dishonor, he cannot bear (this is in the earlier work, De Cive).

Perhaps what Hobbes is saying is that the desire for self-preservation is the strongest of all natural desires, but that while this will explain the primacy that he gives to it in his political theory, this doesn’t imply that it is al-

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