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great Leviathan, we must take it apart, break it down into its separate elements, or its matter—that is human beings—and view these elements as if dissolved. Doing this enables us to understand what the qualities of human nature are, and in what way they make us fit or unfit to live in civil society, and to see how men must be agreed among themselves if they are to form a well grounded state (id.). His idea is that viewing civil society as if dissolved, or broken into its elements, leads to the idea of the State of Nature. Then having the notion of a State of Nature, he then suggests the social contract as a way of conceiving of the unity of a well-grounded state. Mechanical notions and principles of causal materialism may have reinforced this train of thought in Hobbes, and it may even in some sense have prompted him to have these thoughts. But clearly such a mechanical basis is not essential, and they do not affect the content of these ideas. The ideas of the State of Nature and of the Social Contract can stand on their own feet. And numerous writers have espoused these notions who have rejected mechanism and materialism.
In conclusion, I am going to discuss Hobbes’s secular moral system as essentially self-contained, and independent of theological assumptions and principles of mechanics (materialism).
§3. Interpretations of the State of Nature and the Social Contract
Before taking up the problem of how one might interpret the social contract, let me begin first with Hobbes’s account of the State of Nature. We should not interpret the state of nature as an actual state, nor should we interpret the social contract as an agreement that actually took place. No doubt Hobbes supposes that something like the state of nature did obtain at one point, and he says that it now exists in some parts of the world, and it also exists between nation-states, princes, and kings at the present time (Leviathan, p. 63). So in that sense the State of Nature exists. But I do not think Hobbes is concerned with giving an historical account or explanation of how civil society and its government came about. His social contract doctrine is best viewed, not as explaining the origin of the Leviathan and how it came to be, but rather as an attempt to give “philosophical knowledge” of the Leviathan so that we can better understand our political obligations and the reasons for supporting an effective Sovereign when such a Sovereign exists.
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Near the end of the Leviathan, Hobbes says, “Philosophy is . . . the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the Generation of any thing to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter, and human force permit, such Effects, as human life requireth” (Leviathan, p. 367). The idea is that we would have philosophical knowledge of something when we understand how we could generate from its parts the properties of that thing as we now know it. Hobbes’s aim in the Leviathan would be to give us philosophical knowledge of civil society, in that sense.
To accomplish this Hobbes considers society as if broken apart, dissolved into its elements, that is, human beings in a state of nature. Then he examines in detail what that state of nature would be like, given the propensity and features of these human beings, the innate drives or passions that motivate their actions, and how they would behave when they are in that state. The aim is then to see how civil society with its government could be generated and come about, given the State of Nature as he has described it. If we can explain how civil society and the Sovereign could come about from a state of nature, this then gives us philosophical knowledge of civil society, in Hobbes’s sense. That is, we understand civil society when we understand a possible mode of its generation that accounts for its recognized and observable properties. On this interpretation, the idea of a Social Contract presents a way in which civil society could have been generated— not how it was actually generated, but how it could have been. There are recognized properties of society and requirements of society—for example, the necessary powers of the Sovereign, the fact that the Sovereign must have certain powers if society is to cohere; that is a property of the great Leviathan. We recognize these properties and account for them as things that rational persons in a state of nature would regard as essential if the Social Contract is to achieve its intended aim of establishing peace and concord. Thus, the Social Contract grants these necessary powers to the Sovereign. He thinks that spelled out in full, all of this provides philosophical knowledge of civil society.
So the idea again is that we should view the Social Contract as a way of thinking about how the state of nature could be transformed into civil society. We explain the present properties of the state, or the great Leviathan, and understand why the Sovereign has to have the powers that he does by seeing why rational persons in a state of nature would agree to the Sovereign’s having those powers. This is how we are to understand the properties
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of the state, from the process of its generation, and also understand why its powers are as they are. On Hobbes’s definition of philosophical knowledge that then provides philosophical knowledge of the nature of the state, or of the great Leviathan. This is a much broader definition of philosophy or of philosophical knowledge than now exists. Then it covered science, or “natural philosophy” as it was then called.
Now consider a second way to think of Hobbes’s social contract. In Chapter 13 of Leviathan (p. 63), Hobbes recognizes the possible objection, that there never was a state of nature. (“There never was such a time, nor condition of war as this.”) To this he replies that at least Kings and Sovereigns are in a State of Nature with respect to one another: the State of Nature obtains between nation-states. Moreover, he indicates that it is sufficient for his argument that the State of Nature be a state that would come about now if there were no sovereign authority to keep people in awe.6 In this way, the state of nature is a condition that always would exist if effective exercise of sovereignty were to break down. So conceived, the State of Nature is an ever present possibility of degeneration into discord and civil war, although in a “well-grounded” society it is very unlikely (improbable). Now because the State of Nature is in effect a state of war, the constant possibility of a State of Nature provides for all sufficient reason for wanting an effective Sovereign to continue to exist. We all have strong grounds for fearing the collapse of our current arrangements, Hobbes thinks, and this yields a sufficient reason for everyone to support them. Thus, on this interpretation, the State of Nature is not some past state of affairs, or indeed any actual condition, but an ever present possibility to be avoided.
The second interpretation of the social contract is this: Suppose all are fully rational and understand the human condition as Hobbes describes it. Let’s suppose also that an effective Sovereign now exists with the requisite powers to maintain current arrangements. Then Hobbes thinks that all have a sufficient reason based on their own self-preservation and fundamental interests to enter into a covenant with all to authorize the Sovereign to continue to exercise his powers in perpetuity. Entering into such a covenant
6. “It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. . . . Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civil War.” Leviathan, p. 63.
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is rational for all to do; it is (let’s say) collectively rational since rational for each and all.
Looked at in this way, we don’t need to see the social contract as made in the State of Nature. So we don’t need to consider whether a social contract is enough to transform the state of nature into civil society. (For example, how can we be sure that people’s promises will be honored?) Rather, we can think of the social contract as a covenant that serves to secure and renders secure an already existing stable government. Hobbes’s point is that given the normal conditions of human life, and given the ever present danger of civil conflict and collapse into the State of Nature, every rational person has a sufficient and fundamental interest in supporting an effective Sovereign. And given this interest, every rational person would enter into the Social Contract, should the occasion arise.
Here we should ask, must there be an actual social contract on Hobbes’s view? Isn’t it enough to think of the social contract in this hypothetical way, that all members of an existing society with an effective Sovereign would have sufficient reason for entering into a covenant to authorize this Sovereign, etc.? This suggestion regards the Social Contract itself, as well as the State of Nature, as purely hypothetical: that is, as a covenant we would have sufficient reason to enter into if this were possible, etc. Now certainly Hobbes doesn’t explicitly express his Social Contract doctrine in this way. And we should be cautious in putting words into his mouth. Nevertheless, you might consider the question whether this hypothetical interpretation of the Social Contract suffices to express what is essential to Hobbes’s view. After all, the Social Contract, when understood in this way, does give a conception of social unity and explains how civil society could hang together and why once an effective Sovereign exists, citizens might support current arrangements etc. While it may not explain how civil society could be generated from its parts, it might explain why it doesn’t degenerate back into its parts. The Social Contract provides a point of view for showing why everyone has an overriding and fundamental interest in supporting an effective Sovereign. Why isn’t this enough for Hobbes’s aims, seeing the social contract in this way?
This depends, of course, on what Hobbes’s aims were. I think he meant to present a convincing philosophical argument to the conclusion that a strong and effective Sovereign—with all the powers Hobbes thinks a Sovereign should have—is the only remedy for the great evil of civil war which all persons must want to avoid as contrary to their fundamental interests. Hobbes
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wants to convince us that the existence of such a Sovereign provides the only way to civil peace and concord. And given this conclusion, and given that the Fundamental Law of Nature is “to seek Peace, and follow it” (Leviathan, p. 64) and that the second Law of Nature is to “be contented with so much liberty against other men, as [we] would allow other men against [us]” we all have an obligation (not based on the Social Contract) to comply with the Sovereign’s laws. The focus of Hobbes’s thought is the turmoil and civil strife of his day; this is what immediately concerns him. He thinks an understanding of the Sovereign’s necessary powers and a clear view of the Laws of Nature as based on our fundamental interests can help to address this situation. The Social Contract, interpreted purely hypothetically, enables Hobbes to make his argument. For this purpose, the hypothetical interpretation does seem to suffice.
To sum up, there are three possible interpretations of the social contract. First, it is an account of what actually happened and of how the state actually was formed. This is not Hobbes’s intention as I interpret him. A second, more plausible interpretation, for which there is a good deal of evidence in the text, is that he was attempting to give a philosophical account of how the state could arise. I say “could arise,” or how it might have come about, and not how it actually did. He wanted to give us philosophical knowledge of the state, by dissolving it into its parts and depicting human beings as they are psychologically constituted, and then showing how the state of nature could be transformed into the great Leviathan, or into a society of people under a state. Finally, a third possible interpretation I suggested is the following: Suppose that the great Leviathan actually exists already. Then we should think of the state of nature as an ever-present possibility that might come about if the effective Sovereign should cease to be effective. Given that possibility, and in view of what he takes to be everyone’s fundamental interests in self-preservation, their “conjugal affections,” and their desire for the means of a commodious life, Hobbes is explaining why everyone has a sufficient and overriding reason to want the great Leviathan to continue to exist and to be effective. On this interpretation, Hobbes is trying to urge us into accepting an existing effective Sovereign. We can understand this intention in light of the climate of the times and the English Civil War.
These two interpretations are suggestions as to how to understand the social contract. I suggest these interpretations somewhat hesitantly. I am never altogether satisfied that what I say about these books is correct. This
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is a very large and complicated view, and there are various ways it can be read. We ought to be suspicious of any pat account of how it is supposed to be taken.
Hobbes Lecture I: Appendix A
Handout: Features of Human Nature Which
Make the State of Nature Unstable
A.Two Introductory Remarks:
1.I shall discuss only The Leviathan and no other works of Hobbes; and
Iassume that Hobbes’s Social Contract doctrine as presented in this work can be fully understood apart from any theological or religious view. Neither the formal structure nor the material content of Hobbes’s doctrine is affected by these background notions. This is, of course, debatable; and I don’t argue the point. You should consider carefully Chapters 12, 31.
2.I shall also leave aside Hobbes’s materialism and his other metaphysical theses except insofar as occasional remarks may help to clarify his Social Contract and how it is put together.
B.Two Ways of Regarding the State of Nature in Hobbes:
1.First, as the state of affairs that would come about if there were no effective political authority, or Sovereign, with all the powers which on Hobbes’s view, it is necessary for an effective Sovereign to have.
2.As a point of view which persons in society may assume and from which each can understand why it would be rational to covenant with every other person to set up an effective Sovereign (as Hobbes describes this Sovereign). In this sense the Social Contract is collectively rational; from the point of view of the State of Nature, the conditions which reflect permanent (and so present) features of human nature, each member of society now has a sufficient reason to want the effective Sovereign to continue to exist, and thereby to ensure the stability and viability of existing institutions.
C.Destabilizing Features of Human Nature (when taken together in a State of Nature):
1.Human beings are sufficiently equal in natural endowments and mental powers (including prudence), and also sufficiently vulnerable to one another’s hostility, to give rise to fear and insecurity. 13: 60–62.
2.Human desires and needs are such that together with the scarcity of
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the means of satisfying them, people must find themselves in competition with one another. 13: 60–62.
3.Human psychology is in various ways self-centered and self-focused, and when people take careful thought all tend to give priority to their own preservation and security, and to gaining the means to a commodious life.
4.Human beings are in several ways unfit for peaceable association in society:
i.They have a liability to pride and vainglory which association with others arouses and which is irrational. That is, this liability often prompts them to act contrary to the principles of right reason (the Laws of Nature), and these passions tempt them to actions highly dangerous both to themselves and to others.
ii.They have, it seems, no original or natural desires for association, or natural forms of fellow-feeling. What appears to be such feelings derive from our self-concern. On the other hand, Hobbes does not think we’re malicious, that is, enjoy the suffering of others for its own sake.
5.Defects and Liabilities of human reasoning:
i.Those arising from lack of a proper philosophical (scientific) method: 5: 20–21. Note here Hobbes’s attack on the Schools (Aristotle via scholasticism).
ii.Liability of human reasoning, presumably even when a proper philosophy is known, to be distorted and undermined by our proneness to pride and vainglory: 17: 86–87.
iii.Fragile nature of practical reason when it concerns the conduct of human beings in groups and the appropriate social institutions. This form of practical reason is fragile because Hobbes thinks it must be given a conventionalist basis. That is, everyone must agree who is to decide what is for the common good and everyone must abide by this person’s judgments. There is no possibility of all freely recognizing by the exercise of reason what is right and wrong, or for the common good, and abiding by this knowledge. Social cooperation for the common good requires an effective Sovereign.
Hobbes Lecture I: Appendix B
[Rawls’s 1978 version of this lecture contained the following discussion, which supplements section 2, “Hobbes’s Secular Moralism,” above from the 1983 lecture. —Ed.]
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Simplifications: I propose to make two simplifications in my discussion of Hobbes:
1. First, I shall assume that the essential formal structure and content of Hobbes’s political philosophy (as a Social Contract conception) can be understood as addressed to rational human beings who can grasp its sense and interpretation by the correct use of their natural reason. Thus, I suppose that Hobbes’s view is fully intelligible, as regards its structure and content within a secular as opposed to a theological or religious view.
Thus for the most part I shall leave aside the disputed question of the interpretation of Hobbes which is raised by the Taylor-Warrender thesis that Hobbes’s account of political authority and obligation is tied at bottom to natural laws as the laws of God, who has rightful authority over us.7
Now by the secular character of Hobbes’s political philosophy I mean roughly the following.
(a)The formal structure of concepts and definitions of Hobbes’s account of the Sovereign, etc., of right and liberty, etc., is independent from theological presuppositions. This structure can stand on its own. For example, as a definition of natural right, we can say:
αhas a natural right to do x = df α’s doing x is in accordance (initially, i.e. prior to events or actions that limit the right) with right reason.8
(b)The material content of Hobbes’s political conception and of his supporting moral philosophy is likewise independent from theological presuppositions. This content can also stand on its own and be understood by natural reason given Hobbes’s psychological account of human nature. For example, consider the material definition of natural right:
αhas a natural right to do x = (material df ) α’s doing x is (conscientiously believed by α to be) advantageous or necessary for α’s preservation.
There is no reason offhand, however, why Hobbes’s view cannot be supplemented by theological doctrines. But if such assumptions are introduced, there are two possibilities:
7.A. E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” Philosophy 53 (1938); reprinted in Hobbes Studies, ed. Keith Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). The point of view I follow is roughly that of David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
8.[“= df ” is standardly used to introduce definitional equivalences; it should be understood as “is defined to mean.” Rawls’s sentence above should thus be read as: “‘α has a natural right to do x’ is defined to mean: ‘α’s doing x is in accordance . . . with right reason.’” —Ed.]
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(i)The first case is this: the conclusions drawn when these doctrines are adjoined to the system of formal structure and material content are not fully compatible with the conclusions drawn from the secular system alone. (Should this happen, the material conditions of the system would not be independent (in a suitably strong sense) from theological doctrine. Thesis (b) above although not (a) would need revision.)
(ii)The second case is this: the conclusions drawn when theological doctrines are adjoined are the same as those of the purely secular system (without theological presuppositions). Should this happen, both (a) and (b) hold. (cf. what Hobbes says: Leviathan, Book I: Ch. 12, 96–97; I: 15, last paragraph, pp. 57, 80.)
Now the important point is that Hobbes accepts case (ii). In the secular system the conclusions drawn depend upon what institutions, etc., are required for the peace and concord of people living in society. In the theological system the conclusions depend upon not only what is required for peace and concord but also upon what is necessary for human salvation. The first case
(i)would hold, then, only if what is necessary for peace and concord in society is different from what is necessary for salvation.
I believe that Hobbes would deny the truth of any theological doctrine that made the prerequisites of salvation incompatible with conditions of the preservation of people in groups. A religious view that declares them incompatible is (on Hobbes’s view) a superstition and as such irrational. It is based on an unreasoning fear springing from a lack of true knowledge of the natural causes of things. (See his whole discussion of the natural seeds of religion in I: 12—“Of Religion.”)
In Chapter 12 of Book I Hobbes discusses how “the first Founders, and Legislators of Commonwealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace” took care “to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Laws” (Leviathan, p. 57). There is every reason to suppose that Hobbes approves of this policy of the ancient world (Greeks and Romans) of using religion to strengthen the conditions necessary to preserve social peace and concord. In this sense, Hobbes’s doctrine is secular. (See also II: 31, 528f re obedience to Laws of Nature as worship) [1st edition, 192f].
One must be careful, however, not to question that Hobbes is (so far as one can tell) a sincere and believing Christian. We must interpret
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his Christianity so that it is not incompatible with the secular structure and content of his moral and political conception. In conclusion, the whole order of Hobbes’s exposition seems to imply that the secular structure and content of his doctrine is regarded by him as basic. If theological presuppositions were fundamental, he would, it seems, have started with them.
So much then, for why it seems correct to focus on Hobbes’s view as addressed to rational human beings, etc.
2. The second simplification (about which I shall be brief ) is that one can (perhaps) interpret Hobbes’s method in the Leviathan (and in his other political works) as the application to a moral and political conception of a general mechanistic doctrine of the workings of nature. Hobbes is often seen as trying to work out a unified science (unified not only in general methodology but also in its first principles).
Thus we might interpret him as beginning with the study of bodies and their motions in general (explained in some mechanistic fashion) and then taking up the study of that particular kind of body—that of individual human beings—and finally coming to the study of artificial bodies, namely civil governments which are human-made. They are the result of human artifice. The Leviathan is the commonwealth, a human artifice.
In studying artificial bodies—commonwealths and civic governments, etc.—Hobbes’s method is to look at the parts of these bodies which he takes to be human beings (individuals with their faculties and desires, etc.). He says in De Cive that everything is best understood by its constitutive causes, and he illustrates this remark by noting that we understand a watch by grasping how its various parts are put together and work mechanically. Similarly, to understand a commonwealth, it is not necessary actually to take it apart (for that is hardly possible, or can be done at too great a cost), but we are to consider it as if it were dissolved: State of Nature.
That is, we want to understand what the features of human beings are and in what ways these features (qualities, etc.) render people either fit or unfit for civil government. We want to understand also how people must be agreed among themselves if their intention and aim to become a wellgrounded state is to be realized (EW, p. xiv; ed. Lamprecht, pp. 10f ).
I shall more or less leave aside the rest of Hobbes’s philosophy and how far his moral and political philosophy fits into his overall metaphysics.
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Hobbes Lecture I: Appendix C
Passages Relevant to the Ideal of Generous Natures
[References to Head ed.]
A. Possibility of Affections:
Hobbes asserts the possibility of benevolence and it seems to man generally; when to men generally, it is “good nature” (26).
Recognizes various passions of love, including love for particular persons (26).
Recognizes conjugal affections, as of second in order of importance after self-preservation and before riches and means of living: 179.
B.Related to above: it is not to take pleasure in the misfortunes of others: (said re cruelty): 28.
Curiosity as a delight in the continual generation of knowledge; distinguishes man from animals: 26, cf. 51, 52.
C.Generous Attitude Expressed in the Virtues:
1.On the “relish” of justice: when a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud and breach of promise: 74.
2.For great minds one of the proper works is to help people, and free them from the scorn of others; such minds compare themselves only with the most able: 27.
3.Two ways to secure that men honor their covenant: fear of consequences of breaking them; or: “a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it.” But “this latter is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on . . .” (70).
4.Honor of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aids they give to persons of inferior ranks; or not at all. Greatness makes our violences, oppressions worse, as we have less need to commit them: Ch. 30 (180).
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