hobbes iii

Hobbes’s Account of Practical Reasoning

§1. The Reasonable and the Rational

Today I will discuss Hobbes’s account of practical reasoning as it arises within what I call his secular moral system, or within his political doctrine. He views practical reason as a kind of rationality and has a view, which I will attribute to Locke, of practical reason as involving a kind of reasonableness. That is, it is my view that we can distinguish between two forms of practical reasoning. We can think of practical reason as rational, or as reasonable. For the moment “rational” and “reasonable” are simply words, labels, and we do not know what the difference between them might be. In ordinary English both mean being consistent with or based on reason, in some way. But, in everyday speech we do seem to have a sense of the difference between them. We don’t usually use these terms synonymously. One might say of somebody, “He was driving a very hard bargain and being extremely unreasonable, but I had to concede that from his point of view he was being perfectly rational.” In that, we recognize the distinction, to some extent. We tend to use “reasonable” to mean being fair-minded, judicious, and able to see other points of view, and so forth; while “rational” has more the sense of being logical, or acting for one’s own good, or one’s interests. In my own work, and in this discussion, the reasonable involves fair terms of cooperation; while the rational involves furthering the good or advantage of oneself, or of each person cooperating.

Hobbes illustrates the view that practical reasoning is deliberating concerning what is the rational thing to do (where rational ≠ reasonable). Many of the Laws of Nature Hobbes lists fall under what intuitively we consider the Reasonable. The Laws of Nature formulate precepts of fair cooperation, or dispose us to virtues and habits of mind and character favor-

[ 54 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Hobbes’s Account of Practical Reasoning

able to such cooperation. For example, the first law is to seek peace and follow it and to defend ourselves as necessary; the second says that a man should be willing, when others are too, to lay down his right to all things, and be contented with as much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself; the third concerns honoring our covenants. The fourth through the tenth all have to do with one virtue or another involving cooperation: gratitude, accommodation to others, forgiveness and pardon; not showing contempt for other people, acknowledging others as equals, and the like. The 10th Law of Nature says not to reserve to ourselves a right we are not content that others should have as well, and so on. All have to do with the precepts of cooperation necessary for social life and a peaceful society (Leviathan, Chapters 14 and 15). But these reasonable principles, Hobbes urges, are rational for us to follow, on the condition that others follow them likewise. The role of the Sovereign is in part to guarantee that (enough) others follow them, so that it is rational for each to follow them. Thus Hobbes justifies Reasonable principles (with reasonable content) in terms of the Rational.

Hobbes, however, urges that it is rational for us to follow these reasonable principles, only on the condition that others also follow them. They will help us to achieve our own good. In other words, he is making an argument to the effect that this group of principles that we could accept as reasonable, in my sense of that term, are rational principles for us to follow, based on our fundamental interests, provided others follow them also. The appeal is to what is conducive to our self-preservation, conjugal affections, and means for commodious living, or in other words, to our own essential good. The role of the Sovereign is then, in part, to guarantee that enough others follow the laws of nature so that it is rational for us to follow them also, thus ensuring peace.

Later we will take up the social contract and what that actually does, which is to set up the Sovereign with sufficient powers to effectively achieve the conditions necessary to such a guarantee. The existence of the Sovereign changes the circumstances in such a way that there are no longer reasonable grounds, or rational grounds, for not complying with the laws of nature. But, the difficulty, which Hobbes, I believe, was one of the first to see, is that within the state of nature itself, it is hard to see how such agency could exist that would make it rational to make or to follow through on our

[ 55 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

h o b b e s

covenants. Therefore, one of the basic arguments of the book is that we take these reasonable principles of social cooperation and justify them in terms of the rational.

Let me try to explain in a bit more detail the contrast between rational principles and reasonable principles. There are two ways to do this:

(a)By their distinctive role in practical reasoning and in human life; and

(b)By their content, or what they actually say and direct us to do, which content we can usually intuitively recognize as belonging to the Rational or the Reasonable.

The distinction of (a) the role these principles play is this: I think of conceptions of social cooperation as being quite different from another notion, which would be merely efficient and productive coordination of social activity, for example, bees in a hive, or workers on an assembly line in a factory. They are engaged in coordinated activity, it’s productive, and certainly we’d say it’s social. But, it’s not necessarily cooperation. It is socially coordinated, and perhaps there are public rules of some kind which people know they’re supposed to follow, but they’re not cooperating in the normal sense. What, then, is the notion of cooperation that distinguishes it from socially coordinated and even productive activity?

Every conception of social cooperation (as opposed to the merely efficient and productive and coordinated social activity) has two parts:

(a)One part defines a notion of rational advantage for those engaged in cooperation, some idea of each individual’s or each association’s, good or well-being etc. An enumeration of principles of rational choice enters here as an essential, but not the sole, element in defining rational advantage. Rational advantage involves some idea of what each individual, or each association engaged in cooperation is going to gain from taking part in this activity. We suppose that they are rational and have reflected on this. It is an idea of their own good that hasn’t been imposed on them by other people, but that they hold on their own part, after reflection; and it leads them to be willing to accept the second aspect of the notion of cooperation;

(b)This second part defines fair terms of social cooperation, or just terms of cooperation, as may be appropriate. These terms involve some notion of mutuality or reciprocity, and how specifically this notion is to be interpreted in practice. This does not mean that there is a single interpretation of reciprocity, or of mutuality. There might be a number of them appropriate to different situations. These will be expressed in terms of the constraints that

[ 56 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Hobbes’s Account of Practical Reasoning

fair terms impose on efficient and productive and coordinated social activity so that this activity is also fair social cooperation. The principles defining these terms of fair social cooperation we define as the reasonable. This is their role: to interpret such a notion of reasonableness.

Note too that a conception of social cooperation also supposes that people are capable of engaging it and honoring its terms, and has some view of what makes their cooperation possible. Later we will discuss the role of a sense of right and wrong, a sense of justice, in enabling people to engage in social cooperation.

Now, the precepts or principles that specify the fair terms of cooperation in any particular case will be reasonable. So, when we describe someone as being unreasonable when he is bargaining with someone else, although perfectly rational from his own point of view, what we are saying is that somehow he took advantage of some, perhaps accidental, fortunate position on his part to impose unreasonable (unfair or unjust) terms on the bargain. Although, we have to grant that given the situation and looking at things from his point of view, perhaps it was rational (furthering his own good) for him to do that.

I have already touched on some of the features of Hobbes’s account of practical reasoning as rational, in the sense that we discussed the self-related nature of the ends of human beings that Hobbes focuses on. Recall that those ends were those of our own self-preservation, conjugal affections, and the means of a commodious life. I will now go over these in somewhat more detail.

In Hobbes’s secular moral system, or in his political conception, people’s final ends are the states of affairs and activities which they strive for and enjoy for their own sake. These ends are focused on the self, being concerned with our desires for our own health, strength, and well-being; with the well-being of our family; or with obtaining the means to live a comfortable life. It is a relatively narrow concern, and it is in that sense that Hobbes gives a self-interested account of human nature for the purpose of his political view. Two points about these final ends or desires:

First, (a) these final ends or desires are all self-related, and object-depen- dent, as I define them. To say they are object-dependent means they can all be described without referring to or mentioning any reasonable or rational principle, or any moral notions generally. For example, take the desire for food and drink; or for friendship and company. I can describe a state of af-

[ 57 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

h o b b e s

fairs that I care about in terms of these and other “objects” in a broad sense; as one in which I have all I want to eat, or all I want to drink, in which I am secure, or my family is secure, and the like. There is no reference to notions like being treated justly, or to rights or other notions that have a moral character. (b) In Hobbes’s view, the most important final ends or desires that people have are non-social; that is, they are desires they are presumed to have in a state of nature, and not as members of civic society. They would remain as characteristics of human beings even if we were to think of society as if dissolved or degenerated back into its elements. What that means is that Hobbes’s social theory, or his account of the political doctrine, is not, on the whole, going to rely on ends and desires that have been created by social institutions. He thinks of these desires as more basic, as parts of the elements, the human beings, that go to make up society. These ends are features of the parts—the individuals—out of which the commonwealth is, as it were, mechanically assembled as an artificial body (cf. passage in De Cive EW ii, p. xiv). (Recall here the three parts of Hobbes’s scheme: body, man, citizen—each built up from the preceding.)

Second, on Hobbes’s view, people also have, in addition to these objectdependent desires, certain principle-dependent desires. These are higher-order desires and presuppose lower-order desires such as the object-dependent desires discussed above. In Hobbes, the only principle-dependent desires are those defined by the principles of rational choice as opposed to the principles of reasonable conduct. I call them principle-dependent because in order to describe them, we must cite some principle or other. They are rational as opposed to reasonable because they are desires to act in accordance with, or to deliberate in accordance with, a principle of rationality that we can describe and state. For example, a rational principle might be that we should take the most effective means to achieve our ends. The desire to deliberate and to act in accordance with that principle would be a rational desire. I think of these also as final desires or ends in the sense that we desire to act from such a principle and to deliberate in accordance with it for its own sake.

Now, let’s recall what Hobbes says at Ch. 11, p. 47 (1st paragraph): “. . . the object of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure forever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life.” Thus we have, each

[ 58 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Hobbes’s Account of Practical Reasoning

of us, a general inclination which Hobbes describes as: “. . . a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power that ceaseth only in Death.” There is no utmost aim which, once achieved, we can rest in the repose of a mind satisfied.

There are several points to be noted here:

(1)First, I understand Hobbes to be saying also that because of our capacity for reason, we have a conception of ourselves as an individual living a life over time and see ourselves as having a future and perhaps a far distant future. Not only do certain final desires move us now, but we foresee and we understand the possibility of a whole unending series of desires moving us in the future. These future desires are not desires that we actually have now. They are not now psychologically active, but we do foresee now that we shall have, or most likely shall have, such desires at certain times in the future. For example, I may know that in the future I am going to want food to eat, and I may want to assure that I can make provision for making sure the larder is filled; but that desire is not based on a present state of hunger. There is a higher-order desire which we do now have and always will have, to the extent that we are rational, and that is our desire to assure ourselves now, by some appropriate conduct in the present, based on some rational principle as earlier described, to make provision for these future desires. It is not the future desires, but rather, the higher-order desires that move us now; and in order to describe its object, that is, what it tries to do, it is necessary to refer to certain principles of rational deliberation. Higher-order desires move us and express themselves in actions just as other desires do.

Hobbes describes men as having “a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more” (Leviathan, p. 47). Remember here that “the Power of a Man . . . is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good” (Leviathan, p. 41). The desire for “power after power” suggests that there is no utmost aim that, once achieved, we can rest and suppose ourselves to be completely satisfied with.

(2)The second point is: the general inclination that expresses itself as a desire for power after power (given the circumstances of human life) is a

[ 59 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

h o b b e s

principle-dependent desire in the sense that in order to describe the object of this desire, what it strives to achieve, it is necessary to refer to certain principles of rational deliberation (or rational choice) in the forming of our plans and intentions. The higher-order desires are desires to form and to pursue a scheme of conduct that is rational as defined by certain principles. Basic, selfcentered (lower or 1st order) desires cannot account for these higher-order desires, or explain the conduct in which they are expressed.

Some examples here will help: consider these principles of rational choice: Perhaps we can only define these by a list.

(i)Principle of Transitivity etc: (Complete Ordering) applied to Preferences (or over alternatives)

(ii)Principle of effective means

(iii)Principle of Preferring the Greater Probability for the more preferred outcome

(iv)Principle of the Dominant alternative

A rational being understands and applies these and other rational principles; and their higher-order desires as defined by these principles can be viewed as the desire to regulate their pursuit of the totality of their objectdependent (and natural) desires by these principles.

Thus it seems appropriate to call these desires rational desires. I shall not try to define “rational” or “rationality.” Instead, we proceed via examples and lists. For such a list consider the principles just enumerated. Contrast rational principles with other kinds of principles, for example, reasonable principles. Consider the principle that Hobbes uses to state a kind of directive for discerning the force of the laws of nature:

“Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy self.” I: 15: p. 79 (This comes after 19th Law of Nature and last Law of Nature L: 79).

This can be given as an example of a reasonable principle: someone who does not take effective means to advance their ends is being (let’s say) irrational (other things equal); whereas those who do to others what they would not have done to themselves (perhaps because they think they can get away with it) are being unreasonable. This does not imply that they are being irrational, given the aims of theirs they are seeking to further. But in violating this principle they are being unreasonable.

All of the principles Hobbes calls “the Laws of Nature” could plausibly be called reasonable principles. See especially the following:

[ 60 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Hobbes’s Account of Practical Reasoning

(i)Leviathan, p. 64, The first part of the first Law of Nature: everyone ought to endeavor peace, as far as they have hope of obtaining it.

(ii)Leviathan, pp. 64–65, the second Law of Nature: that we be willing, when others are so too, to lay down our right to all things and be content with so much liberty against others as we would allow others against ourselves. This is a principle of reciprocity.

And so on: Note numbers 10 through 19 of the Laws of Nature.

We may not accept these principles quite as Hobbes states them; but still, as stated, or as modified above, it seems fitting to call them reasonable principles and the desire to act from these principles for their own sake reasonable desires. Reasonable desires also are principle-dependent desires in the same sense that rational desires are. Desires of both kinds are specified by reference to rational or reasonable principles.

Now, let’s turn to what Hobbes says about voluntary actions:

(a)He states that the object of voluntary actions of human beings, when they are fully rational and have time to deliberate, is always some apparent good to themselves. Hobbes says: “. . . and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himself ” (Leviathan, p. 66). In other words, we do not act voluntarily contrary to our own good. When the apparent good turns out not to be an actual good, then, leaving aside the cases where people are motivated by pride and vainglory, he supposes that there is some error or misfortune in the situation, which although the action turned out badly is not to be attributed to the agents themselves (Leviathan, p. 66). Hobbes grants that some voluntary acts are against reason. Our deliberations at some point come to an end and the last (effective) desire at that point Hobbes defines as the will; and our deliberations and hence our will may be distorted by pride and vainglory, for example. But Hobbes thinks, I believe, that in any case, voluntary acts have as their tacit object some apparent good of ourselves. Even someone moved by pride and vainglory still strives for something they think is for their own good, although their reasoning is incorrect.

Hobbes makes this claim about voluntary actions in the context of explaining how some rights can never be abandoned or transferred. For example, we always have the right to resist the Sovereign in self-defense and to do what we think necessary to preserve our own life. Hobbes says that “The mutual transferring of Right is that which men call Contract” (Leviathan, p. 66), and in contracts, some basic rights are always reserved for ourselves.

[ 61 ]

Copyright © The President and Fellows of Harvard College