2. Structural preconditions and agents of transitional processes

As regards the structural preconditions, agents and political forces of transitions, the initial distinction is to be made between external and internal forces of democratization. External forces range from current global and international economic and political agencies, such as the UN and World Bank, to military occupation, such as in post-1945 Germany and Japan, exported revolutions, such as in Nicaragua in 1979, and adopted state policies, such as Gorbachev’s campaign of glasnost and perestroika, effectively used by the opposition and party reformers to dismantle communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Global economic and political developments have made democratization a political priority of global agencies and organizations. For instance, responding to calls of distributing foreign economic assistance to empower agencies of democratization, the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other global organizations increasingly became involved in formulating specific policies and programmes of democratization, democratic rights and accountability (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The general correlation between economic aid, development and political democracy (Epstein et al. 2006) thus became a problem of global development and policy-making (Rudra 2005).

Internal forces of democratization include the authoritarian regime’s élites initiating changes from within the system, the democratic opposition, civil society campaigns and protest movements, or violent revolts and revolutions. Democratic transitions can be initiated by élites within the authoritarian leadership willing to change the form or constitutional settlement of the state. They also can result from a combination of the weak legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and public support and demand for political changes. Finally, they can be the outcome of a revolutionary situation and the overthrow of the regime by political forces and movements calling for democratization.

Transition’s success largely depends on the strength of civil society in holding political élites and state officials accountable and on the functional state’s operating as a rule of law and constitutional state (Holmes 1996: 5). It certainly has its international and global dimension but the centrality of the nation state and civil society in democratic transitions hardly can be disputed (Grugel 2002: 64-67).

The state, political élites and transition

Initial positions of democratic transition may vary significantly from the ruling élite’s internal plan to democratize the state after the dictator’s death (Portugal, Spain) to revolutionary protests against the unreformed repressive regime (the GDR, Romania). Democratic reforms coming from within the ruling élite or political negotiations between the representatives of authoritarian rule and the democratic opposition are possible only in those regimes actually consenting to the change; rigid and repressive authoritarian regimes, such as the Honnecker regime in the GDR or the Ceausescu regime in Romania, avoided any liberalization and reform until challenged by revolutionary forces.

The end of dictatorships inGreece,PortugalandSpainin the 1970s is a good example of regime power groups steering the democratization process and outlining state and constitutional changes. InPortugal, the internal conflict between different military officers even inspired a short-lived socialist revolution, contained by the free general election in April 1975 and subsequently by the Constitution of 1976 adopted by the Constituent Assembly that solidified the emerging liberal democracy (Manuel 1996: 17-36).

InSpain, the Francoist political élite was both technocratic and pragmatic and increasingly realised the need to join the common European market and achieve economic integration. After Franco’s death in 1975, the free general election and the new constitution of 1977 fundamentally changed the political map of the country and facilitated the Spanish Right and Left’s commitment to democratization and state consolidation. The transitional period, nevertheless, did not end with the adoption of the constitution. Separatist and extremist political violence continued and it was not until the failed military coup attempt in 1981 and the next general election in 1982 that the Spanish army was reformed and democracy finally became consolidated (McDonough et al. 1998: 4-10).

The strong role of the state in democratic transition combined with the élites’ commitment to political changes and public support was a feature not only of Southern European countries. It also defined democratic transitions initiated and controlled by military leaderships in Latin American countries, most notably in Chile and Brazil in the 1980s (Loveman 1994), and some countries of the Soviet bloc, most notably Hungary and Poland in 1989.

A minimum level of pre-existent liberalization by the authoritarian regime is necessary for further political transition (Przeworski 1991: 54-60). However, internally initiated transitions are typically ‘constrained’ by the ruling élite’s interests and power which may slow down the process of democratization and democratic consolidation significantly, as has happened in Latin American countries (Linz & Stepan 1996: 219-20).