- •Xford Introductions to Language Study
- •It furthers the .University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
- •No unauthorized photocopying
- •Readings
- •XII preface
- •XIV preface
- •4 Survey
- •The pragmatics wastebasket
- •Deixis and distance
- •10 Survey
- •14 Survey
- •Reference and inference
- •22 Survey
- •Presupposition and entailment
- •26 Survey
- •Cooperation and implicature
- •38 Survey
- •If the speaker goes on to describe those linguistics courses as in [13], then we can identify some more scalar implicatures.
- •Speech acts and events
- •46 Survey
- •56 Survey
- •Politeness and interaction
- •Self and other: say nothing
- •62 Survey
- •Say something: off and on record
- •I face saving act
- •Conversation and preference structure
- •72 Survey
- •74 Survey
- •Insertion sequence is provided, the second part (Ai) of the initial question (Qi) will follow. This pattern is illustrated in [13].
- •Discourse and culture
- •82 Survey
- •86 Survey
- •94 Readings
- •Text 10
- •Text 11
- •Text 12
- •Text 13
- •Text 14
- •Text 15
- •Text 16
- •Text 17
- •Text 18
- •Text 19
- •Text 21
- •Text 22
- •114 Readings
- •References
- •Il8 references
- •Indiana University Linguistics Club 1977
- •Chapter 6
- •122 References
- •126 References
- •128 Glossary
- •130 Glossary
- •13Z glossary
- •134 Glossary
- •Acknowledgements
Text 12
john searle: Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press 1969,pages 58-9
One crucial distinction between promises on the one hand and threats on the other is that a promise is a pledge to do something for you, not to you; but a threat is a pledge to do something to you, not for you. A promise is defective if the thing promised is something the promisee does not want done; and it is further defective if the promisor does not believe the promisee wants it done, since a non-defective promise must be intended as a promise and not as a threat or warning. Furthermore, a promise, unlike an invitation, normally requires some sort of occasion or situation that calls for the promise. A crucial feature of such occasions or situations seems to be that the promisee wishes (needs, desires, etc.) that something be done, and the promisor is aware of this wish (need, desire, etc.). I think both halves of this double condition are necessary in order to avoid fairly obvious counterexamples.
I> This paragraph lists several required features for a speech act to count as a promise. Do you agree that all these features are necessary? Are other crucial features not included here?
One can, however, think of apparent counter-examples to this condition as stated. Suppose I say to a lazy student, 'If you don't hand in your paper on time I promise you I will give you a failing grade in the course'. Is this utterance a promise? I am inclined to think not; we would more naturally describe it as a warning or possibly even a threat. But why, then, is it possible to use the locution 'I promise' in such a case? I think we use it here because 'I promise' and 'I hereby promise' are among the strongest
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READINGS 103
illocutionary force indicating devices for commitment provided by the English language. For that reason we often use these expressions in the performance of speech acts which are not strictly speaking promises, but in which we wish to emphasize the degree of our commitment. To illustrate this, consider another apparent counter-example to the analysis along different lines. Sometimes one hears people say 'I promise' when making an emphatic assertion. Suppose, for example, I accuse you of having stolen the money. I say, 'You stole that money, didn't you?'. You reply, 'No, I didn't, I promise you I didn't'. Did you make a promise in this case? I find it very unnatural to describe your utterance as a promise. This utterance would be more aptly described as an emphatic denial, and we can explain the occurrence of the illocutionary force indicating device 'I promise' as derivative from genuine promises and serving here as an expression adding emphasis to your denial.
> Do you agree that having used the words 7 promise', you could later claim that 'strictly speaking' you did not make a promise because you meant something else?
t> What seem to be the conditions for an utterance containing the IFID T promise' to serve as an emphatic denial?
t> Is the recognition of speech act conditions related at all to the cooperative principle as discussed in Text 10? (It may be helpful to refer to the discussion of felicity conditions in Chapter 6, pages jo-i.)