Political Theories for Students

Mexico

Mexico has also been governed according to the principles of patron–clientage. Until the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, throughout most of the twentieth century, Mexico was ruled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). PRI has claimed to be revolutionary, radical, Marxist, democratic, and nationalistic. None of these labels are entirely appropriate; Mexico could have been more accurately described as a patron–client system.

As in Japan, much of the patronage in Mexico has been exercised through a dominant political party. Until the year 2000, elections in Mexico did not reflect the principles of open democracy, even though the country had always claimed to hold competitive, multi–party elections. Throughout most of Mexican history, elections have not been authentic contests in which the ruling party risked losing its power. In fact, PRI’s dominance had been so great that the party sometimes secretly subsidized moderate opposition parties to maintain a façade of democracy, to make sure that the opposition remained moderate (feared biting the hand that fed it), and to weaken support for potentially more radical critical voices. In addition to supporting a non–threatening opposition, PRI leaders have actually disqualified some of their own candidates for parliament in order to make way for cooperative opposition leaders. In this way, even opposition parties benefited from the spoils of patronage.

In Mexico, the key figure in the patronage network has been the president, who traditionally served for one six–year term. As both head of the party and head of the government, the president was responsible for thousands of political appointments, which in turn provided numerous individuals with access to lucrative rewards. Party loyalists received positions in the cabinet, the bureaucracy, public corporations, and nationalized industries. Other faithful individuals were tapped to serve as regional governors. Historically, such people have benefited by an unwritten law that allowed them to participate in and overlook a certain level of corruption and/or political favoritism leading to personal enrichment.

Mexican society was structured into corporate associations that long have organized clients into manageable groups. For example, workers, farmers, professional people, businesses, and government employees were grouped together in associations that were expected to represent the interests of their constituents. In principle, that means the leaders of these groups could have an adversarial relationship with the government. In reality, the leaders of these groups were political clients approved by the PRI or the pres-

ident. Such leaders do not count success in terms of legislation or regulations that benefit their constituents, especially if such benefits come at the expense of the ruling elite; rather, they measure success in terms of the personal benefits they themselves receive. For example, government–approved labor leaders receive substantial personal benefits in return for making sure that labor unions do not become overly critical of government, that they do not go on strike, or that they do not make wage demands that could harm big business.

In the past, patronage flowed not just to friends of the regime, but also to potential opponents. University graduates, men and women who may have been radical critics of the government and the party during their years in school, were appointed to important government positions or were given contracts to serve as highly paid consultants. Such co–opted individuals soon softened their criticism; however, opponents who refused to take advantage of the spoils they were offered found themselves in great difficulty, such as being put in jail. But, if they repented and expressed their loyalty to the system, they sometimes moved directly from jail to high–level jobs in the government.

Propaganda and payoffs Another important element of the Mexican patron–client system has been the skillful use of propaganda and indoctrination. Through the press, educational institutions, and party rallies, people are told that they benefit greatly from the generous patronage of the PRI. For example, during presidential campaigns, the PRI candidate would visit every region of the country dispensing gifts and political favors. Several times in history, the government nationalized foreign corporations or seized and redistributed land to the poor. These acts were portrayed as having provided substantial payoffs to ordinary people who were expected to vote loyally for the party. Although in actuality, well–placed individuals or organizations tended to be the ultimate beneficiaries of such nationalization and redistribution, the media and the government were successful in convincing people otherwise. Since the government sold newsprint paper to favored newspapers at highly subsidized prices, it could also punish or threaten to punish uncooperative editors and publishers. Furthermore, the government was not afraid to use violence and intimidation against students, politicians, or labor leaders who expressed opposition or discontent.

While many people have criticized the Mexican political system as corrupt and inefficient, the actual record has been quite positive. First, the Mexican pa- tron–client system has proved to be extremely stable

Mobutu Sese Suko, president of Zaire from 1965–1997.

during most of the twentieth century. Mexico’s presidents have all served their full six–year terms. None have been ousted by a coup, and none have attempted to remain in power beyond their elected tenure. Second, Mexico’s military has been firmly under civilian control and makes no attempt to influence policy. Third, Mexico has experienced strong economic growth in the post–World War II period. Associated with this growth has been a substantial increase in personal income and a massive transformation of the population from rural to urban. Fourth, Mexico has managed to provide a reasonable level of social and educational services to a rapidly growing population. By the end of the twentieth century, Mexico had greatly reduced illiteracy. Finally, although not democratic itself, Mexico’s patron–client system provided the foundation for a transition to genuine democracy. Prior to the election of Vicente Fox (1942– ), President Ernesto Zedillo (1951– ), although an active participant in the patronage system, used his power and influence over the PRI to insist that the 2000 elections be free and fair. As a result, Vicente Fox of the opposition National Action Party (PAN) won the presidential election. While Mexico may continue to operate according to the logic of patron– clientage, the highest patrons will be subject to voter approval.

Africa

Of all the continents in the world, Africa has the most persistent and powerful patron–client political systems. Liberian Presidents William Tubman (held office from 1944 to 1971), William Tolbert (in office from 1971 to 1980), Samuel Doe (1980 to 1989) and Charles Taylor (elected in 1997) are examples of how chief executives function as chief patrons. These men used the resources of the state to channel funds and favors to loyal supporters. All relied on symbolic displays of largesse to show the people that they were generous patrons. At least one time, Doe reputedly drove around Monrovia tossing out $20 bills to people on the streets. All four presidents would attend important functions at schools, churches, neighborhoods, and villages where they “personally” donated large sums of money to grateful constituents. Like previous Liberian presidents, they maintained enormous farms clearly visible from busy roads. Critics of the presidents charge that the purpose of the farms—private operations heavily subsidized by public funds—was to satisfy the personal greed of the chief executives. However, since it would have been easier to pocket the state funds directly rather than channeling them through an agricultural enterprise, the true purpose of the farms was more complex. The farms were started as a high profile way of telling the Liberian population that as the country’s chief farmer, the president was the country’s chief provider. As important, but lesser patrons, government ministers also maintained farms, albeit on a somewhat more modest scale. In addition to portraying themselves as generous providers, Liberian presidents cultivated an image of power and strength that included cruelty and capriciousness. Like a strong father, the patron president either rewarded or punished depending upon the client’s degree of loyalty. The patron president’s image was carefully manipulated by the state–controlled media that presented him as strong and magnanimous. Media images of power, wealth, generosity, and harshness reinforced the perspective that all rewards and punishments ultimately originated from the nation’s chief patron who had both the resources and the will to reward and punish.

Zaire Generally seen as the champion of patron–clientage, President Mobutu Sese Seko (1930–1997) of Zaire presided over a vast patronage system that lasted from 1965 until 1997. Ruling through the army and his political party, Mobutu presented himself as the father of the nation, the founder of the political party, the head of state, and the dispenser of all benefits. Although he began his rule as a typical patron, not all that different from presidents

such as those who ruled Liberia, by the end of his tenure, virtually 90 percent of all state resources were channeled through his hands. Revenues from giant state–owned or state–controlled mining companies went directly into his personal accounts. While some of the money was used to support an ostentatious lifestyle, much of it was redistributed to political clients within the government or party. At the top of the client heap were the Grosses Legumes (roughly translated as big enchiladas or big shots) who gained enormous wealth in return for their loyalty and protection. These Grosses Legumes built patronage networks of supporters who received kickbacks, lucrative positions on boards of directors, or opportunities to siphon off money from state controlled banks or corporations. As a result, Zaire’s economy spiraled downward into virtually a complete collapse. By the end of his life, Mobutu’s only preoccupation was maintaining the support of his key clients. Since the economic system was no longer able to supply him with enough resources to pay off his clients, Mobutu simply turned his clients loose to plunder at will. These men and women were allowed to run illegal diamond mining and smuggling operations, to launder money and transport drugs for international criminals, and to extort money from the remaining businesses and travelers in the country. As a staunch ally (client) of the United States and France, Mobutu benefited from foreign aid, especially during the cold war. Instead of being used for development—for example improving roads, hospitals, or schools—the money from foreign aid was rerouted to maintain the patron–client system.

In the end, Mobutu’s patronage system collapsed because the beneficiaries were unable or unwilling to make a positive contribution to the economic life of the nation. Because both patrons and clients acted as parasites on the nation’s economy, the economy suffered. Many businesses, forced to make payments to predatory political patrons, either operated with very narrow profit margins or became bankrupt. Some businesses withdrew into a shadowy underground world where the line between legal and illegal activities became blurred. In the end, some of Zaire’s most successful businesses were connected to international criminal transactions that became central pillars of Zaire’s economy by the 1990s.

Kenya Another example from Africa is the government of Kenya. In 1998 terrorists bombed the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, killing about 200 people. Local TV and radio coverage of the event illustrated the importance of the patron–client system for Kenyans. Instead of focusing primarily on the number of dead and injured, the government’s progress in tracking down

the terrorists, or the physical damage to downtown Nairobi, official media devoted the majority of their attention to stories praising President Daniel Arap Moi (1924– ). The media described Moi visiting the injured in hospitals, Moi promising to donate funds to assist families of the bereaved, Moi encouraging rescue workers, and Moi vowing not to rest until the “perpetrators were brought to book.” While the TV and radio did report on the dead and injured, on the destruction, and on the investigation, the main character in every story was the president. Some Kenyans and American observers saw this as a crass example of how Moi used a monumental tragedy for personal political advantage. But, many Kenyans were extremely grateful for the news coverage—it showed that in times of great adversity, the person at the very top of government took a personal interest in those who suffered. It also demonstrated that the patron was in charge and would work tirelessly for his people. At a time when the entire nation was in shock and mourning, the president responded to his clients’ deepest political concerns.

Parastatals In most countries of the world where pa- tron–client arrangements dominate politics, parastatal companies are critically important components of the system. A parastatal business is state–owned and managed, although it produces goods and services that would come from the private sector in a free–market economy. In countries such as the United States, the post office operates as a parastatal. But, in patron–client counties, energy, manufacturing, tourism, banking, telecommunications, and even agriculture might be dominated all or in part by parastatals. Because the state is either the sole or majority share–holder, the board of directors and the top management personnel are appointed by the government. As a result, such appointments often are made on the basis of ethnic, political, or personal loyalty rather than on the basis of competence or experience. Because the appointments are regarded as rewards, the patrons (those who make the appointments) expect the clients (those who are appointed) to continue expressing their fidelity by channeling money back to the patrons. This might be in the form of direct payments or it might be in the form of sweetheart contracts with companies owned by the patron. Also, because the appointments are seen as rewards, there is little effort on the part of the patron to insist on either competency or integrity on the part of the client. In turn, people appointed to high positions in parastatals function as patrons to friends and family members who receive jobs, below–market prices, or non–com- petitive contracts.

Often, parastatals are used by high government officials to strengthen their support among the citizenry. For example, a parastatal mill and bakery might produce bread at very low prices. Since, as the corporate owner, the government will underwrite any financial loss, the mill and bakery managers are not concerned if low prices take away any potential profits. Their main concern is pleasing their political and economic patrons at the top of government. For their part, the powerful political patrons running the government hope that low bread prices will win them favor in the hearts of the masses. Again, since operating losses are covered by government revenues and do not come out of the politicians’ own pockets, the high–positioned patrons are not concerned about profitability or efficiency. In the end, an important economic enterprise, in this example a mill and bakery, have been captured by the pa- tron–client system. Patron–client loyalty, rather than sound economic practices, becomes the guiding managerial concerns.

the “supporters” need the money to satisfy the expectations of their own clients. Migdal also notes that in a patron–client system, the patron at the top must constantly be alert to the possibility that a political competitor might build up a more robust network of clients and make a bid to unseat the patron. To avoid that danger, a head of state will engage in something Migdal calls the “big shuffle.” With the big shuffle, a leader periodically rotates top officials in order to prevent them from building a firm base of client support. For example, a president may dismiss an entire cabinet and then reappoint all or most of the members to new posts. Thus, a former minister of transportation might become minister of finance. While this process results in great inefficiencies, it undermines a minister’s efforts to establish a clique of supporters within his or her own ministry. Similarly, in order to dilute the power of a potential rival, a president might create a duplicate agency or department. This has the added advantage of creating an entirely new group of loyal clients. The disadvantage, of course, is inefficiency and confusion.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL RESPONSE

Today, patron–client systems are universally condemned by political theorists. Joel Migdal’s classic book Strong Societies and Weak States has outlined a number of the problems that plague patronage systems. It is tempting to see the patron–client system as a calculated effort on the part of the political elite to maintain itself in power by purchasing the loyalty of its immediate entourage and of the masses of the people. Migdal, however, suggests that the leaders in a patron–client structure are actually captives of a web of never–ending obligations that originate from below. To maintain his or her system of clients, a leader must constantly reward these clients because dissatisfied followers will shift their loyalty to a more generous benefactor. In order to stay in power, a patron president must provide top officials with a steady stream of favors or opportunities to make money. Those officials, in turn, must do the same for their immediate subordinates. The main goal of people in the system becomes survival, not policy implementation. In fact, the politics of survival often undermines policy. For example, a government budget may allocate funds for much needed roads, roads whose construction would improve the economy and advance government priorities. However, in order to keep the loyalty of high officials or political bosses, a president might be obligated to overlook massive fraud that diverts money designated for transportation into the pockets of his “supporters.” For their part,

Advantages

Although most political analysts denounce pa- tron–client systems, their pervasiveness and persistence suggests that they may offer benefits that must be acknowledged. First, patron–client systems are adaptable and flexible. Like weeds in a newly defoliated landscape, patron–client systems spring up to provide some sort of government where previously there was none. Nobles in the Middle Ages, warlords in collapsed modern states, and strongmen in the struggling regimes of the former Soviet Union all attempt to impose order, no matter how exploitative or corruptible, upon societies where formal government has ceased to function. In time, these nobles, warlords, and strongmen may succeed in establishing legitimate governments. Most of the monarchies of the world began from the seeds of patron–clientage. At a more mundane level, patron–clientage can step into a vacuum formal governments are unable to fill. For example, in the 1980s, the government of Nigeria expelled tens of thousands of guest workers because the Nigerian oil boom had faltered. These workers were forced to return to poor neighboring countries that had no formal resources or infrastructure to cope with a vast influx of unemployed people seeking housing and food. To the surprise of West African governments and international relief agencies, there was no crisis. The reason was that these thousands of people were able to access immediate help from patrons in their local communities. Coming home, they reattached themselves to a patron–client system

that provided them with lodging, food, and other resources.

Second, patron–client systems have proved to be remarkably stable. Their endurance over many thousands of years and in all regions of the world is proof that they can work. A key reason for their stability is that they offer rewards for the patrons at the top and benefits for the clients at the bottom. The elite gain prestige, authority, and economic dividends. Their client subordinates receive security, a direct and personal link to someone with power, and economic assistance in times of need. This relationship, which benefits both parties, is maintained mainly through a series of voluntary exchanges. The fact that all parties believe they profit from the arrangement accounts for the system’s persistence.

Compatibility

Third, patron–client systems are compatible with the customs of many traditional societies. Most traditional societies value hierarchy and respect. Elders, people with wealth, and individuals with power are elevated above ordinary people. The patron–client system affirms that hierarchical arrangement. In traditional societies, people at the bottom and people at the top are linked together through personalized relationships of reciprocity. Humble people offer support and deference, while more exalted people provide physical and economic security. The exchange is not abstract and impersonal. Rather, it is an exchange between people who consider themselves as friends. The patron–client system operates in that manner. Furthermore, in traditional society, people at the top can bend the rules or make exceptions to help those of lesser stature. People are treated as individuals. Rather than being controlled or limited by abstract budgets, uncaring bureaucracies, or inflexible laws, people in a patron–client system are part of a political structure that is responsive and relational. Individuals and groups within a patron–client network can turn to a person who has the wealth, standing, and power to assist them. People who retain many traditional values may prefer a political system featuring a strong and reliable patron. For them, such a patron seems to be the best protection against the disorientation of modernization, the uncertainties of the global economy, the capriciousness of the weather, and the insecurity and harshness of poverty.

Fourth, patron–client systems offer a type of accountability and service that many regard as effective. For one thing, the responsible person is always clearly identifiable and accessible. With a patron–client system, everyone knows who is in charge and who can

provide help. When machine politics dominated big American cities, an out–of–work individual could go into an alderman’s office and be given cash on the spot. The alderman also might use his connections to find a job for the petitioner. In Chicago, during the Richard J. Daley (1902–1976) era, construction contracts (many of them directly funded by government) provided work for thousands of city residents. For other people without the skill or strength to build highways, bridges, or skyscrapers, state and local government offered them work as elevator operators, doormen, security personnel, clerks, receptionists, janitors, and park workers. As part of the patron–client exchange, these workers were expected to kick back part of their paychecks as “voluntary donations” to the party machine. This money was then used to finance the political campaigns of elected officials. Another American example was the William Marcy Tweed era (1823–1878). Boss Tweed, as he was known, gained power in the New York City Democratic party, controlling party nominations and party patronage. He became a state senator in 1868, which extended his influence into state politics. Votes were openly bought and other dishonest vote–getting methods were employed. Through the control of New York City expenditures that defrauded the city to the extent of at least $30 million, he and his main supporters profited extravagantly. While today we see such things as corruption, many ordinary people regarded the system as their most secure form of protection.

Give and Take

In a study of post–Perón Argentina, sociologist Javier Auyero looks at the patron–client system from the perspective of those at the bottom of the socio– economic ladder. Rather than seeing themselves as being exploited by the people at the top, they regard themselves as beneficiaries of a system that helps them solve problems, links them to resources, and provides them with security. Although Juan Perón died in 1974, his political party continues to have strong support among Argentina’s poor. Many political scientists denounce the Perónist party as an organization crassly seeking to buy votes through helping people gain access to government resources and services to which people should be entitled by virtue of being citizens. Critics say the Perónists take advantage of the government social services agencies that distribute free food to the poor. Because the Perónists (acting as patrons) control the locations where food is distributed, their impoverished clients consider the food as a gift from patrons. Because the government welfare bureaucracy is too complicated for most people to understand, the assistance provided by the local Perónist

officials is seen as a generous favor. By monopolizing information and resources, these local political patrons who dispense knowledge or things to the people come to be regarded as protectors and saviors. While academic critics take a negative view of this arrangement, the poor people living in Argentina’s slums have a much different perspective of their patrons. To the poor, the patrons are friends who care about their welfare. The patrons are seen as people who listen to the people’s needs, who toil and sacrifice to help people meet those needs, and who are always available to assist. In the eyes of the poor, the patrons truly care about the people. Furthermore, the low–level local patrons have connections linking them to more powerful figures in the party or government. Normally, those people would be too busy or distant to be of any use to the very poor. But, through the efforts of local patrons (who are the clients of the more distant politicians), poor people can sometimes benefit from what goes on at the higher levels of society. Especially during election time, a low–level patron may be able to gain the ear of an important politician who might provide extra milk, field trips for poor school children, or even a government job.

Auyero also suggests that the local political patrons also see themselves as helpers, not as exploiters. They think of themselves as people with access to a larger network of individuals and organizations that have the resources to assist those at the very bottom of the socio–economic ladder. Without the help of the local patron, the poor would never be able to be connected to that assistance. The local patrons see themselves as channels and problem–solvers. They see nothing wrong with receiving favors in return for their services. From the poor, they gain respect and admiration, and from the people higher up in the system they get political promotions or a cut of the resources that are distributed to the poor. Local patrons who do a good job are able to build up a solid client base that enables them to mobilize supporters for political rallies and to deliver votes during elections. Such patrons may themselves be able to run for office and advance even higher in the system.

The fact that so many people in the modern world continue to cling to the patron–client system proves that it is a robust political arrangement. Highly educated leaders and citizens, people who are well informed about both democracy and authoritarianism, continue to choose patron–client systems over their supposedly more effective modern counterparts. People do not retain patron–client structures because they are unaware of alternatives. They keep the system because they believe it offers them more security and the greater rewards than other political systems.

TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY

•In the book of Samuel in the Old Testament, why did the Hebrew people want to exchange the pa- tron–client system for a monarchy?

•Heroic figures in both the Old Testament and in Ancient Greek legend engaged in activities most modern people would consider cruel or devious. Yet, writers and storytellers in ancient times praised such individuals. Why would people want patrons who acted in such a manner?

•What are the characteristics people want in a patron?

•How effective was Juan Perón as a political leader who met the real needs of his people?

•In what way do American politicians, for example members of Congress, act as patrons for their constituents? How much attention do successful politicians devote to solving constituent problems with bureaucratic agencies such as Social Security?

•What were the advantages of machine politics in large American cities? For example, why did New Yorkers support someone such as Boss Tweed?

•Are African political leaders who engage in patronage acting immorally or unwisely?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources

Auyero, Javier. Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001.

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, J.H. Burns and H.L. A. Hard, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Homer. The Odyssey. New York: Anchor, 1963.

John of Salisbury. The Statesman’s Book, in William Ebenstein and Alan Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers, Plato to the Present. New York: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000.

The Holy Bible, New International Version. Colorado Springs: International Bible Society, 1984.

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Yoder, John C. The Kanyok of Zaire: A Political and Ideological History to 1895. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Further Readings

Bayart, Jean–Francois. The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly. London: Longman, 1993. Bayart regards the patron– client system as a greedy predator or societies attempting to build democracies.

Ike, Nobutaka. Japanese Politics: Patron–client Democracy. New York: Knopf, 1972. Ike describes the way patron–client arrangements have influenced the practice of democracy in Japan.

Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States, State–Soci- ety Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Study of how pa- tron–client social values overwhelm “rational” state political systems.

Pye, Lucian W. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. One of the world’s leading experts on political culture, Pye examines the underlying social values that guide Chinese politics.

Royko, Mike. Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: Dutton, 1988. Royko, a popular Chicago columnist, first published the book in 1971 when Daley was still mayor. The book is an acclaimed inside account of how a patron–client system really worked in a big American city.

SEE ALSO

Communism, Populism, Republicanism, Socialism

OVERVIEW

Populism’s personalities have manifested themselves differently at various times: as an agrarian phenomenon backlash to industrialism, as a nationalistic phenomenon bypassing the existing power structures, and as a political phenomenon rebelling against the elite. At its heart, populism is a reaction against change. It tends to come from the lower and working classes, the so–called “common men,” against technological, intellectual, and political innovation. The populist impulse tries to preserve a way of life and a distrust outsiders, including the power elites who rule and make decisions and the immigrants and foreigners who compete against the populists in the marketplace. As populism began as a reaction against industrialism, it primarily is a product of the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty–first centuries.

Populism

WHO CONTROLS GOVERNMENT? Elected officials

HOW IS GOVERNMENT PUT INTO POWER? Elected by

popular vote

WHAT ROLES DO THE PEOPLE HAVE? Pressure big

business if unfair or unethical

WHO CONTROLS PRODUCTION OF GOODS? The people

WHO CONTROLS DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS?

The people

MAJOR FIGURES William Jennings Bryan; George

Wallace

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF GOVERNMENT People’s Party

in U.S South in the 1890s

CHRONOLOGY

1829: Andrew Jackson becomes president of the United States.

1857: In England, Aleksandr Herzen begins the newspaper Kolokol and with it the first free Russian press abroad.

1869: The Knights of Labor are founded in the United States.

1881: Members of the People’s Will terrorist society assassinate Tsar Alexander II.

1891: Delegates representing voter alliances, farm organizations, and reform groups meet in Cincinnati and discuss the formation of a Populist Party, also called the People’s Party.

1896: William Jennings Bryan delivers his “Cross of Gold” speech and is nominated as the presidential candidate of the Democratic and Populist parties.

1946: Juan Perón is elected president of Argentina.

1950: Senator Joseph McCarthy starts the Red Scare by announcing that communists have infiltrated the U.S. State Department.

1968: George Wallace runs for U.S. president as the candidate of the American Independent Party.

1979: Jerry Falwell founds the Moral Majority.

1992: Ross Perot runs for U.S. president as an independent candidate.

The seed of populist thought began with the War of Independence and its promise that the people could liberate their government from the hands of elites far away and take control of it themselves. The egalitarian spirit of the Declaration of Independence—“all men are created equal”—and the empowerment of the U.S. Constitution—“We the people”—reinforced this promise. Two visions informed this impulse. First, the experience of the Protestant Reformation in Europe and the subsequent Great Awakenings in North America fostered belief in a personal God who could be reached by individuals without the mediation of a religious hierarchy. This religious change also social-

ized people to expect breaks with old churches and the establishment of new ones, emotional rhetoric, vivid oratory, and communal meetings. In other words, people learned to question authority, break with tradition, and gather to enjoy intense community building.

Another building block of what became populism was the message of the Great Enlightenment, the idea that individuals could be reasonable and rational—and that the past and the people in it often were not. The permission to think for one’s self, and to criticize the traditions that came before, including the systems of government and privilege, fed into the populist mentality. Many revolutionary writers such as Thomas Paine, who supported the War of Independence, drew from the rationalist religion of the Enlightenment when appealing to the masses to rise up against England.

Thomas Jefferson, U.S. President from 1801 to 1809, served as a kind of proto–populist figure. Though not a true democrat in the sense that he did- n’t support direct decision making by all citizens for all affairs of state, Jefferson did present a striking change from his predecessors, George Washington and John Adams. Both behaved more like kings than commoners. Jefferson, on the other hand, downplayed ceremony, wore bedroom slippers to official meetings, and delighted in undermining the mystique surrounding public office. His heart, too, was with those he called “yeoman farmers,” the individuals who worked small subsistence farms, who supported themselves by their labor, and who guarded their rights with zeal. Jefferson believed these agrarians were the key to the survival and stability of the nation, and in this sense anticipated the foundations of populism.

Perhaps the first true populist leader in the United States was Andrew Jackson (1767–1845), president from 1829 to 1837. A war hero and frontiersman, Jackson ran on a “let the people rule” platform that appealed to the masses—who in turn stormed the White House after his inauguration to eat and drink and celebrate the election of one of their own. Jackson thanked his supporters by putting them into office, creating a new precedent called the “spoils system,” in which a leader dispensed appointments to loyal followers upon election.

The U.S. entered into a period of uncontrolled inflation, agitated by wild speculation in Western lands. In July of 1836, Jackson sought to stem the tide by issuing by issuing Specie Circular, which declared that the federal government would only accept hard money for the purchase of public lands. The edict simply added to the difficulties of sound banks, helping to precipitate the Panic of 1837.

BIOGRAPHY:

Andrew Jackson

Andrew Jackson is remembered as the first great populist leader of the United States. Common people identified with him and what he represented. His legend played into the mainstream’s vision of a man of the people. He was twice a war hero. At the age of 13 he fought in the War of Independence and was captured by the British. After the revolution he became a frontiersman in Tennessee, where he often was fighting and dueling. He built a reputation as a plainspoken and able attorney, and then became a war hero a second time in the War of 1812. “Old Hickory,” as he was called, led his troops to a remarkable victory against the British at the Battle of New Orleans.

Jackson approached his goal of the presidency differently than his predecessors. Before Jackson, candidates did not believe they should appear to want the position. They strove for disinterestedness. George Washington had started the tradition of acting like the Roman citizen Cincinnatus who, according to history, left his plow reluctantly when called to public service and returned to it when his duty was done. Washington and those who followed him allowed friends and supporters to pass good words along about their can-

didacies, but did their best to seem as if they preferred to be at their plow rather than in the president’s chair. Jackson changed this tradition. He willingly showed his desire for the position. He campaigned for himself and played to his legend whenever possible. Rather than appealing to the elites with quiet statesmanship, he played to the masses with assurances that he was one of them and he wanted to let the people rule.

The fact that he was irreverent, rowdy, western, loud, assertive, and clearly a Washington outsider endeared Jackson to the people. After his election in 1828, citizens from across the nation went to the inaugural celebration in Washington, D.C. After the swearing–in ceremony, the people stormed the White House eating, drinking, dancing, singing, and celebrating their victory—and damaging a costly amount of furnishings in the process. Jackson fulfilled many of their expectations, dismantling privilege and championing the interests of labor and small agriculture. The momentum of his election, reelection, and the subsequent age of the common man spawned reform movements including abolitionism and women’s suffrage that outlived his administrations but served as his most important legacy.

Jackson was also known for his policy of Indian removal. Believing that the massive transfer of Native Americans beyond the Mississippi River was ultimately the most human policy, he signed over ninety resettlement treaties with various tribes. Thousands of Indians found themselves forced to migrate along a “Trail of Tears.”

In May of 1830, Jackson vetoed appropriations for the Maysville Road, a major artery stretching from Maysville, Kentucky, to Lexington. In his message, he denied that internal improvements were a federal responsibility. Yet, by the time he left the presidency, he had authorized more federal funds for such activity than all of his predecessors combined, and was especially enthusiastic when they were sponsered by loyal democrats.

Jackson attacked those he saw as elites living off of the work of the common people and called for equality of opportunity and access for everyone. Labor unions, abolitionism, and suffrage and temperance campaigns blossomed as local grassroots reforms

gained momentum. Later, Abraham Lincoln, president from 1861 until his assassination in 1865, and his image—to many whites, the everyman who grew up without privilege in a small log cabin in the woods, and to many blacks, the great emancipator and champion of the disenfranchised—built upon the image of Jackson and further burned populism into the mind of Americans.

Farmers’ Demands

For the first century of its existence, the United States was primarily an agricultural nation. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, however, new economic realities meant that the traditional farming interest and the new labor interest were warily watching the growing industrial economy. Independent political groups with populist goals began to appear: the Patrons of Husbandry in 1867, the Knights of Labor in 1869, the Greenback Party in 1876, the New York Farmers’ Alliance and Texas Farmers’ Alliance in 1877, the Farmers’ Alliance in 1877, the Northern