Kolossov

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According to the structuralist theory, in the interpretation of A. Giddens, the state is a container of power. Under the conditions of globalisation, it tries to widen its influence in order to control external factors relevant to its activity. These actions require legitimisation by citizens and the strengthening of their political identity. But no state can control powerful global factors; even the largest states are forced to respect international law, at least to some degree, and thus to relinquish some part of their sovereignty.17

Neoliberals also stress that the boundaries of any state are too limited to cope with global economic, environmental and other problems. Therefore, no state can reach or maintain a satisfactory level of its citizens’ well-being in isolation. Moreover, global and macro-regional challenges (depressions in world markets, environmental disasters, etc.), force many countries to use non-democratic methods of governance. This situation decreases the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens and accelerates the erosion of its political identity, especially in border regions.18 For instance, in the Sahel countries, droughts, desertification and famine often aggravate the social situation and generate waves of refugees crossing their boundaries. As most African countries are multi-ethnic, cross-boundary flows of environmental refugees complicate the relationships among different national and regional groups of population and between neighbouring countries. Natural and social disasters provoke among populations living in peripheral regions a discontent with central government, undermine a weak common (political) identity, and contribute to the creation of guerrilla movements. In their turn, guerrilla and political instability push the governments to attempt to re-establish their control over the periphery by military, non-democratic means, which destabilise the situation in border areas even more . This vicious circle had already been described many years ago by specialists in global environmental problems and African countries.19

So, the problem of identity is closely related to an analysis of the functions of the state – defined as ‘a political-territorial unit with strictly delimited boundaries recognised by the international community, and within which the population has a specific political identity’. It is shaped, as a rule, by the state itself and by the nationalist political elite. Territorial boundaries are one of the major elements of ethnic and political identity. The result is a simple political formula: if there is no stable political identity, there are no stable boundaries, territory, no stable state, or political unit in general.

For example, most post-Soviet states are multi-ethnic. Moreover, the identity of their titular peoples has a strong regional component and varies widely. Therefore, new independent states have, first, to try to cement their titular ethnic groups into single political nations and, second, to forge a new political identity common to the whole population. However, this identity cannot depend on the ethnic background and/or the region. Several countries have still failed to solve this problem. Important ethnic, cultural or

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regional strata of their populations do not share officially proclaimed values, symbols and representations about the origin of the country and its historical mission, its boundaries and place in the world, ’natural’ allies or threats to national security, etc.

This dichotomy has provoked the de facto secession of a part of their territory and the creation of self-proclaimed republics – such as the Transniestrian Moldovan Republic in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaidjan. The regime of their boundaries does not match their official status according to international law. Selfproclaimed states and territories that for decades have not been controlled by central governments exist in many regions of the world (a large part of Afghanistan, of Columbia, the Turcic Republic of Northern Cyprus, etc.) and have become an intrinsic element of the geopolitical world order.20 Therefore, political boundaries are now more often created first in social representations and only then are they delimited on the map. The world-system theory is based on a classical geographical triad ‘centre–semi-periphery– periphery’. In limology, this concept means, first, a need to study boundaries at three territorial levels – the global, the national and the local. Second, it means that the notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ are relative. For instance, the German territory of Brandenburg is a part of the world ‘centre’. However, at the same time it is a ‘periphery’ of Germany, because its GDP per capita is considerably below the national average and because it is situated far from the most developed regions of Germany and Western Europe.

Later, these three levels were complemented with two more ‘layers’ – the macro-regional and regional layers.21 A good example of a macro-regional identity is the self-identification of millions of people in the post-Soviet space as ‘Soviet’. ‘Hierarchical’ multiple identities are peculiar to many areas of the post-Soviet space. During Soviet times, the ethnic heterogeneity in many republics and regions was so high that the share of mixed marriages reached more than 20 per cent and in a number of large cities, even more than 30 per cent. Not surprisingly, the role of the territorial factor was clearly salient, as the content of the ethnic ‘cocktail’ varied strongly between towns and the countryside, urbanised and rural areas, transitive cultural zones, and ‘internal’ areas with a more homogeneous population. Specific regional territorial identities developed according to local conditions.22 A remarkable example is the activity of EU countries aimed at the creation or the strengthening of a common ‘European’ political identity, though it is still relatively weak, and its content varies from country to country.

Integration in Europe and in other parts of the world may lead to the strengthening of macro-regional (supra-national) identity and, respectively, to the weakening of the barrier functions of their external boundaries. However, national identity is exposed to erosion not only from ‘above’ but especially from ‘below’ – from inside.23 The concept of nation-state, elaborated in the specific conditions of Western Europe in the nineteenth century,

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meant the creation of a homogeneous nation united by a common language and culture, economic ties and a legal system, and acting within strictly defined and safe borders. This approach cannot be applied to most states of the world whose population is culturally very diverse. Often, national identity fails to match ethnic/regional identities. In many countries, especially in Africa and Asia, national identity is rather weak. As a rule, a state with a weak national identity cannot well defend its land and sea boundaries, or even fully control its territory.

The attempts to strengthen national-identity in multi-ethnic states were hindered by new tendencies in economic and cultural development, such as, for instance, in the former Yugoslavia, in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, where ethnic/regional identities became stronger than political ones. National identity can be dramatically weakened even in highly developed and prosperous countries like Canada, Belgium and Spain. But in Europe, potential separatists cannot escape the common external boundaries of the EU, because the membership in this organisation became a necessary condition for the normal functioning of the economy of Westand Central European countries and because of their geographical location.

Another achievement of the world-system approach in limology was a deeper understanding of the role of the local level. Many scholars proved that local territorial communities are not merely subservient to the influence of central authorities but have themselves a considerable impact on the real regime, the formation of identity, and on the character and the perception of the boundaries in neighbouring countries. A particular border identity, based on common interests and culture, is often created in local territorial communities. Sometimes it is transboundary, especially if the populations of a border area have similar languages and culture. For example, American historian P. Sahlins showed that the population of Cerdania valley in Catalonia, divided by the boundary between France and Spain, has for a long time inventively manipulated its citizenship in its own interests, considering itself neither French nor Spanish. Thus, during the First World War, Cerdanian men became ‘Spanish’ to avoid mobilisation. Identity was based on self-identification with the local community, which successfully opposed itself to all others (‘we’–‘they’). Inhabitants of the valley played on differences between two notions of sovereignty – legal and territorial.24

The concept of ‘internationalist culture’ being shaped among populations of border areas that profit from transboundary contacts was worked out by the American scholar Oscar Martinez on the basis of long studies of the US–Mexico border. This culture is characterised by increased mobility and receptiveness to innovation. The inhabitants clearly understand what their interests are and are able to exist without conflict in several ‘cultural worlds’ – those of their nation-state and ethnic group, foreign cultures and the specific culture of the border area.25

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As the hierarchy of human identities is related to territory and boundaries, one of the main problems faced by social scientists, including border scholars, is the obvious contradiction between the intrinsic right of peoples to self-determination with another key principle of international law – the territorial integrity of sovereign states and inviolability of their boundaries. Nationalist movements remain a powerful force in many regions of the world. These important factors provoke strong doubts about the reality of the neoliberal scenario of the evolution of the world system of boundaries. According to this scenario, excesses of nationalism and of the inherent right of peoples to self-determination will be overcome by democratisation ‘in depth’ and ‘in large’ (the territorial diffusion of democracy to ‘new’ countries).26 The rapid development of cross-boundary cooperation in most regions of the world utilising similar models also inspires optimism.27

Clearly, it is hardly possible to make the world borderless. The discourse about a borderless world concerns only peaceful, ‘integrational’, open and internationally recognised boundaries, which can be found mostly in Europe and North America. They make up no more than about five per cent of the total length of the land borders of states.

The political boundary remains a considerable barrier, even in the regions where processes of integration are especially advanced. So, despite the high dependence of the Canadian economy on the United States, the total trade of an ‘average’ Canadian province with other Canadian regions, weighted by size of population and per capita income, is 12 times larger than with neighbouring American states, while the exchange of services is 40 times greater. Migrations between Canadian provinces, weighted in the same way, are 100 times more intensive than with American states across the boundary.28 The same picture can be observed in the EU.29

GEOPOLITICAL APPROACHES

The Impact of Globalisation and Integration on Political Boundaries

Postmodern concepts have allowed the gap in the study of international and domestic policy, boundaries between states and other boundaries to be overcome. Indeed, a state boundary or a municipal boundary is designed to separate the space controlled by members of a social group or a territorial community and to limit the rights to this territory of those who do not belong to the group. Re-phrasing an expression of Benedict Anderson, it is possible to say that any boundary looks outwards to reunite a social group, and inwards to separate it and its territory from neighbours. The problem is in redistribution of functions between boundaries of different types and levels under the impact of globalisation and integration, which are often called de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation.

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Under new conditions and because of the growing mixing of different ethnic and other groups, identity is being deeply modified. More people have complicated identities, associating themselves with two or several ethnocultural groups. Cultural, linguistic, religious and socio-professional identities, which are not always clearly related to a territory, are being strengthened. Again, this process leads to a relative weakening of national (political) identity, because people often associate themselves with the concrete place where they live – a settlement, a municipality or a region, and want to erect an administrative fence separating themselves from ‘others’ (migrants, the poor, people of another persuasion or ethnicity, etc.).

The increasing individualism acts in the same way. People do not want to deal with the problems of ‘others’. This attitude reinforces their alienation from large administrative and political units. The elite and now the middle class wish to live in isolated, socially homogenous communities, which can be strictly controlled (e.g., gated communities). To become a member of a prestigious small neighbourhood in a suburb is often more difficult than to obtain citizenship in a West European country or the United States. Some almost invisible and unofficial boundaries between neighbourhoods represent social barriers that are extremely difficult to overcome. Moreover, the identity of social groups living on the opposite sides of such boundaries is based on their separation from each other and control over their respective territories.30

In the mass consciousness, the perception of external threat gives rise to the aspiration to minimise or to cease all contacts with an undesirable or dangerous neighbour. If it is impossible to get rid of him, to subordinate, control, or resettle him, the best solution will be to build a fence as a protection against him. This was the strategy of states that built ‘Great Walls’ – the Chinese, the Romans, who built Hadrian’s Wall separating England and Scotland, the Berlin Wall and nowadays, Israel (between Israel and the Palestinians). The survey we conducted in 2001 in the Stavropol territory (Russia) showed that the population of its eastern districts neighbouring Chechnia saw the solution of the Chechenian problem in the same way: separating ‘us’ from ‘them’.31 But in the main, ‘great walls’ only aggravate conflicts. Isolation gives rise to ignorance, ignorance to fear and mistrust, and such perception of the neighbour becomes the strongest obstacle for reconciliation and a real and long-term resolution of a conflict.

Therefore, political, administrative and cultural boundaries make up a single, integral and hierarchically organised social system.32 Bounding of different social and political communities of different hierarchical levels should be conceptualised as a single process.33 Elements of this system are very stable, despite frequent changes of borders. The French philosopher O. Marcard called political boundaries ‘scars of history’. Indeed, boundaries which existed in the remote past can usually be easily found in the cultural and political landscape, and sometimes even remain quite visible in the

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physical landscape. For instance, the small river of Zbruch served for many decades as a boundary between the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian empires. In the Soviet period, when the western regions of the Ukraine were joined to the USSR, it became an administrative boundary separating the Ternopol region and the Khmelnitsky regions.

However, it has never been a simple administrative boundary, but a cultural divide between historical regions of Ukraine – Podol and Galicia, clearly seen, for example, on electoral maps. It is enough to cross the Zbruch, and the cultural landscape changes dramatically: on the Galician side, one can see numerous chapels and crosses near the roads, temples belonging to Catholic and Greco-Catholic churches. Rural settlements most often look like small Central European towns and consist of two-story buildings sharing a wall. Such small towns were settled before the Second World War, but had a predominantly Polish and Jewish population. They are very different from traditional one-story white Ukrainian houses, built from clay mixed with manure and straw, and situated behind small front gardens and having vast kitchen-gardens.

Naturally, cultural boundaries delimiting an area with a similar identity do not always match formal (de jure) borders. Cultural (de facto) boundaries have, first of all, external functions of contact between cultural areas, while de jure borders assume mainly internal functions, contributing to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the state, as well as to the social and ethnocultural integration of its population. Former state borders sometimes become administrative and/or cultural boundaries, and vice versa. New political boundaries at all hierarchical levels almost never emerge ‘from zero’ and only seldom cross old boundaries. Most often, cultural boundaries are transformed into formal (de jure) borders. In their turn, former formal borders can, under certain historical circumstances, get their official status fully or partly back, becoming again the borders of the state or province.34

Some state borders coincide with ethnic, cultural and linguistic limits and have strong barrier functions. They can be termed frontal. Postmodern geopolitical approaches show an inconsistency in the interpretation of such borders as cleavages between the largest geocultural areas/civilisations.35 This situation leads to absolutisation and perpetuation of historically transient cultural and political limits as seemingly ‘natural’ impermeable divides, predetermining foreign policy, separation and hostility between large military/political blocs and to the return to old geopolitics of force in the style of the 1920s–1930s.

The Approach to Borders from the Perspective of Security

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well as capitals of many countries, are such symbolic territories. As boundaries clearly divide neighbouring regions and are designed to be the barrier separating inhabitants of the given territory from ‘others’, mass representations about them are of contrast (‘either–or’). This was especially characteristic of totalitarian regimes. In the Stalin epoch, the outside world was pictured as a continuous ‘territory of darkness’, from whence originated the threat of war and of enslavement by imperialist countries. This representation was the reason for sanctification of the borders separating ‘the socialist Motherland’ from the hostile environment (‘sacred limits of the Motherland’).36

Concepts about boundaries are closely related to the notion of national security and the use of force by the state apparatus to ensure it. Border areas are considered the natural location for border guards and customs services, of a high concentration of military units, especially facing directions from which danger threatens in the eyes of public opinion. Security is a complicated notion, incorporating military, economic, political, environmental security aspects, and so on. In the most general sense, security is understood as the safety of life-support systems and the absence of threats to the life of the people and their activities. From the perspective of border studies, it is important to identify who is responsible for security and what is its subject – a macro-region, the state, or one or more of its parts.

The perception of security of a concrete boundary depends on its symbolic role, historical traditions, image and contemporary discourse. For instance, in Finland, despite past conflicts, social representations about the boundary with Sweden are rather positive, while the boundary with Russia is viewed as a source of illegal migrants, criminality, pollutants and other threats.37 To take another case, mutual perceptions of security are a considerable obstacle for cross-boundary cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan. In Russia, there is a tendency to consider the boundary with Kazakhstan as a source of such major threats to national and regional security, such as the traffic in drugs, Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism, illegal immigration from Afghanistan and all of Central Asia, etc. In Kazakhstan, fears of support for possible Russian irredentism in regions to the north of the Russian territory are shared by a large part of the political elite and the titular population.38

The traditional understanding of the role of state boundaries in national security is based, first, on the prevention of military threat. Thus, as noted above, border areas become militarised zones with a special regime, where the highest priority is the fighting efficiency of military units ready to repulse the aggression of a potential enemy.

Second, the traditional securitisation of a border zone means the largest possible control over any transboundary flows. Karl Deutsch introduced the notion of security communities into the debate and considered the density of transactions as an indicator of an integration process leading to identity transformation,39 which can be interpreted as a threat. From this perspective,

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a boundary is understood as a front line destined to stop the penetration in depth of the state territory by undesirable individuals, goods, information, etc. The control of transboundary flows is easier if there are fewer inhabitants in the border zone and if economic activity there is weaker. Therefore, these zones sometimes became economically backward, not only because of their location at the periphery of their countries and of the structural disproportions it provokes, but because of deliberate limitations on investment in certain branches and of attempts to subordinate all social life to military needs.

Third, one of the features of the traditional approach to the security of state boundaries is an attempt by state institutions to foresee and forestall any possible problems.

Fourth, the concept of the border as security fence is based on securitisation of the state in general, which is supposed to be a major task of the state. It is also supposed that the security interests of border regions are similar to those of the state as a whole. Geoeconomy is subordinated to geopoltics. On the one hand, political leaders, who can initiate a political discourse, can transform a regional or local problem specific to a border area into a ‘geopolitical’ problem and a threat to national security. For instance, they may interpret foreign private investments there as an attempt to stimulate a secessionist movement, to colonise new lands abroad, etc. Therefore, they create difficulties in solving the particular problem at the proper level and in context. On the other hand, they are tempted to explain social and economic problems by blaming an inadequate boundary regime (too permeable or, on the contrary, too rigid). For example, it is easier to explain a crisis in the textile industry of a border region by the inflow of cheap produce across a ‘too open’ boundary, rather than by poor competitive ability or the lack of investment.

In postmodern studies, the functions of borders are seen in a different way. It is stressed that the whole state territory is involved in intensive economic exchanges with other countries. Following this approach, border regions can become locomotives for economic growth and centres of innovation. Transboundary systems are being shaped: urban agglomerations, industrial plants, etc. Demographic and social conditions in such regions lead to an increase in the number of inter-ethnic marriages and the change of the ethnic structure of the population and its identity. Mutual trust deepens, negative secular stereotypes in the perception of the neighbouring country and its people, as, for example, at the border between France and Germany, begin to disappear. Under these conditions, postmodern theorists believe it worthwhile to simplify or abolish traditional boundary controls and to use modern technology as a means of remote control. For instance, the presence of drugs or the smuggling of other illicit cargo may be tested for, without even stopping a vehicle. The objective is to find a delicate balance among the needs of border security, the development of cross-boundary

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cooperation, and the interests of the central governments and border regions.

The perception of threats to national and regional security is also changing. It is based, first, on the assumption that it is impossible to cope with new challenges solely by the use of military, police, or paramilitary forces. Even the most powerful armies of the world cannot adequately counteract illegal migration, international terrorism, the traffic in drugs and weapons, the risk of epidemics, transboundary pollution, or global environmental disaster.

Second, many experts are now convinced that attempts to keep growing transboundary flows under control by the same old methods, as in strengthening the barrier functions of boundaries, are not only inefficient but objectively harmful to society and the economy. On the contrary, only close cooperation with neighbouring states, based on mutual trust, demilitarisation of border areas and open boundaries (desecuritisation), can bring positive results.

Third, according to the postmodern approach to boundary security, governments should contribute to the development of cross-boundary cooperation at the level of local authorities. The central power can no longer ignore the specific interests of border areas or create obstacles to their cooperation. Therefore, the notion of security acquires a considerable regional dimension.40

Fourth, a systematic approach to the defence of boundaries is being worked out. This approach requires national security to be defended throughout the territory of the country, and not only at its borders. The struggle against illegal immigration and drug trafficking cannot be reduced to defensive measures at the border. International experience shows that, at best, a mere 5–10 per cent of the traffic in drugs can be captured at the border, and almost all of it passes through official crossing points.41 Therefore, it is necessary to fight the sources of this traffic – international criminal organisations. The fight also requires openness – the transparency of information on transboundary flows, the possibility of their international scrutiny and remote control by the use of modern technologies.42

Therefore, the concept of ‘border space’43 now embraces not only the area along the boundary, but internal regions. The development of transport, international trade and communications creates boundaries deep within the state territory, for instance, around international airports, and special customs or free economic zones. The state boundary is now not merely the line marking the limits of the state territory and territorial waters.

Contemporary boundaries are thus becoming more differentiated: their permeability is not the same for various flows, types or subjects of activity. The state establishes different limits for them, often following different lines. As a result, various social groups and kinds of activity received their ‘own’ boundaries and border zones. For the economic elite or members of international

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criminal and terrorist groupings, the strictest visa and boundary regime is hardly a serious obstacle for penetrating and even living in any state they like. For large enterprises and especially for transnational companies, customs formalities and taxes rarely play a significant role, while for small and medium enterprises located in border areas, they become a serious obstacle stimulating them to re-orient their activity to the domestic or local market.

It should be noted here that political boundaries in the world’s oceans also make up a complicated system including territorial waters and economic zones. In total, the world system of boundaries has evolved from single lines to multiple limits and from physical, strictly demarcated lines to cultural borders – from high barriers to lines of interaction.

Fifth, boundary security is now a matter not only of the state. It must take into account the interests of local and international organisations and actors.

Sixth, a new view of boundary security involves not just an attempt to foresee or forestall all eventual situations (an impossibility), but the readiness to react to any challenge promptly and in an appropriate and flexible way.

Naturally, it is difficult to follow postmodern recommendations in real life. They are obstructed by the inertia of traditional views, geopolitical culture44 and imperatives of nationand state-building, which need the strengthening of the symbolical role of boundaries, the character of border space and other factors.

BOUNDARIES AS SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

As it has been already noted, the functions of boundaries and sometimes their very delineation are determined by the formation of discourse and mass representations, which have become in recent years an autonomous subject of border studies.45 The discursive nature of boundaries is especially important when they are disputed and provoke international conflict. Often political discourse perpetuating negative stereotypes causes the lack of communication between the sides involved in such a conflict.

Discourse about borders has several different layers that never completely fit. In the theory of critical geopolitics worked out by G. Toal46 and other authors, they distinguish ‘high’ and ‘low’ geopolitics. The former is a field of politicians and experts creating the concepts that they need in order to ground and justify the actions of the state at the international level. ‘High’ geopolitics is subdivided into the theoretical and the practical and deals first of all with studies of strategic, general questions (the world order, the structure of international relations, etc.). Its discourse concerns the place of the country in the world, the system of international boundaries and especially frontal boundaries. ‘Low’ geopolitics is a set of geopolitical concepts,