- •Selector controls
- •Override controls
- •Techniques for analyzing control strategies
- •Explicitly denoting controller actions
- •Determining the design purpose of override controls
- •Review of fundamental principles
- •Process safety and instrumentation
- •Explosive limits
- •Protective measures
- •Concepts of probability
- •Mathematical probability
- •Laws of probability
- •Applying probability laws to real systems
- •Practical measures of reliability
- •Failure rate and MTBF
- •Reliability
- •Probability of failure on demand (PFD)
- •High-reliability systems
- •Design and selection for reliability
- •Preventive maintenance
- •Redundant components
- •Overpressure protection devices
- •Rupture disks
- •Safety Instrumented Functions and Systems
- •SIS sensors
- •SIS controllers (logic solvers)
- •Safety Integrity Levels
- •SIS example: burner management systems
- •SIS example: water treatment oxygen purge system
- •SIS example: nuclear reactor scram controls
- •Review of fundamental principles
- •Instrumentation cyber-security
- •Stuxnet
- •A primer on uranium enrichment
- •Gas centrifuge vulnerabilities
- •The Natanz uranium enrichment facility
- •How Stuxnet worked
- •Stuxnet version 0.5
- •Stuxnet version 1.x
- •Motives
- •Technical challenge
- •Espionage
- •Sabotage
- •Terrorism
- •Lexicon of cyber-security terms
- •Design-based fortifications
- •Advanced authentication
- •Air gaps
- •Firewalls
- •Demilitarized Zones
- •Encryption
- •Control platform diversity
- •Policy-based fortifications
- •Foster awareness
- •Employ security personnel
- •Cautiously grant authorization
- •Maintain good documentation
- •Close unnecessary access pathways
- •Maintain operating system software
- •Routinely archive critical data
- •Create response plans
- •Limit mobile device access
- •Secure all toolkits
- •Close abandoned accounts
- •Review of fundamental principles
- •Problem-solving and diagnostic strategies
- •Learn principles, not procedures
- •Active reading
- •Marking versus outlining a text
- •General problem-solving techniques
- •Working backwards from a known solution
- •Using thought experiments
- •Explicitly annotating your thoughts
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CHAPTER 33. INSTRUMENTATION CYBER-SECURITY |
33.2.5Terrorism
This last motive is especially troubling when one considers the proliferation of digital technology and the disconcerting rise of terror-related attacks around the world. The goal of terrorists is quite simply to instill terror as a means of manipulating and/or punishing perceived enemies. Driven by ideology, terrorists tend not to discriminate when selecting their targets. Like arsonists previously mentioned, success is measured by the magnitude of terror and carnage instilled by the event. Common concerns of ethics are trumped by the dictates of the ideology.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 taught the world how ordinary technologies and systems (in that case, fully-fueled jet passenger aircraft) may be exploited as weapons capable of killing and injuring thousands of people. Industrial process designers would do well to think in similar terms, examining their systems not just from the perspective of their intended purpose but also as potential weapons wielded by terrorists.