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St.Petersburg,Kiev,andMinsk),themostcommonlyreportedactivities includedparticipationinorganizedcelebrationsofHighHolidays(Rosh Hashanah and Passover), attendance at concerts and film festivals, and free trips to Israel taken by the youth. Fewer respondents in these surveys celebrated Jewish holidays at home or contributed their time and money to charitable projects, such as aid to Jewish elders or orphans. Those younger Jews who became immersed in Israelrelated programs and / or religious life (including ba’alei tshuva, i.e., secular Jews who turned to Orthodoxy) have typically left Russia and Ukraine, making aliyah or emigrating to the West where Jewish lifeismoreestablished.AlloftheactivitiesalongtheJewishspectrum seem to have dwindled over the last decade. Western funding has diminished, while local funding and grassroots Jewish activism have remained relatively weak (Remennick 2009).

While historically Jewish converts to Christianity (vykresty in Russian) have been surrounded by the contempt and hatred of other Jews (Gitelman 2001), attitudes toward them have become much more lenientandacceptingoverthelastthreedecades.Thisreflectsthemental separation between the ethnic and religious components of Jewishness that is so prevalent among Russian-Soviet Jews.They do not experience anyconflictbetweenJewishethnicityandChristianfaith:beingJewishis a matter of birth, while becoming Christian is more of a mature spiritual decision. Thus, so-called Russian Orthodox Jews (provoslavnye evrei) do not stopseeing themselves asJewish after baptism. Some even assert thattheirJewishself-consciousnesshasgrownstrongeruponconversion (Nosenko-Stein 2010). Many emphasize the historic and theological continuity between Judaism and Christianity, seeing one as a version or an extension of the other, often referring to theJewish origins of Christ and his disciples. However, most chose Orthodox Christianity because

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they perceived it as a more spiritual faith, less centered on the mundane regulationofeverydaylifeandritualobservance.Giventheclosehistoric ties between the two religions, some Jews have become interested in joint sacral groups, such as Messianic Jews or Jews for Christ (Deutsch Kornblatt 2003; Gitelman 2009).

So-called civil (or civic) religions, usually sponsored by state ideologies and institutions, offer a common moral framework – or grand narrative – for their member-citizens, in lieu of the vanishing traditional religiosity. Typically framed by invented rituals (such as ceremonies, street rallies and parades, as well as memorials and museums), they present an alternative venue of spiritual mobilization. Although they are becoming much less popular inthecurrentpost-ideologicalera,someformsofcivilreligionarestill commonly found in many nation-states. For many Russians and Jews in the first half of the twentieth century, communism or its milder versions (‘socialism with a human face’, social democracy) played theroleofcivilreligion,withitsmultipleritualsandsymbolsoffaith. Israeli political scientists Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (1983: ix) have defined civil religion as «the ceremonials, myths, and creeds which legitimate the social order, unite the population, and mobilize the society’s members in pursuit of its dominant political goals. Civil religion is that which is most holy and sacred in the political culture. It forges its adherents into a moral community.» As will be shown later, the civil religion of the Zionist state became rather popular among many secular Russian Jews who moved to Israel during the 1990s.

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Russian-Jewish Immigrants

and Organized Religion

During and after the demise of state socialism, mass Jewish emigration became possible again, resulting in 1.6 million Jews and their non-Jewish family members leaving the former Soviet Union (FSU) to resettle in Israel or in the West (Remennick 2007; Tolts 2016). This great exodus, along with the ongoing demographic decline, has greatly depleted the ranks of Russian and Ukrainian Jewry, while at the same time fortifying the Jewish communities in the receiving countries.

TheorganicconflictbetweenRussian-Jewishimmigrantsofthelast 20yearsandthereceivingcommunities(bothinIsraelandintheWest) drew on very different understandings of what it means to be Jewish. As shown above, Judaism and its traditional practices were not part of the socialization and lifestyle of the post-war generations of Soviet Jews, whose main basis for Jewish self-identity was negative due to institutional and social anti-Semitism in their homelands. Invisible social boundaries definitely existed between Jews and non-Jews, but the content of Soviet Jewishness was ‘thin’and ‘diffuse’, having lostbothreligiousandsecularYiddish-basedculture(Gitelman2009). Rather, the sense of ethnic pride among Russian-Soviet Jews was based on their high professional and intellectual achievements, both historicallyandduringtheSovietperiod.Theirpersonalpantheonhad little to do with rabbis and Jewish sages; instead, it included images of Jewish Nobel Prize winners and cultural icons – Russian poets, artists, and scientists of Jewish origin (Remennick 2007).

Let us turn now to the Israeli context, given that over 60 percent of former Soviet-Jewish immigrants have resettled there. By and large, disappointment in the tenuous Jewish identity of the Russian-

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speaking crowds that flooded Israel in the early 1990s was common among veteran Israelis. Most public opinion-makers (mass media professionals, educators, immigrant aid institutions) found Russian and Ukrainian Jews wanting in terms of both Zionist sentiment and traditional observance. Russian immigrants, in turn, were often disappointed in their lukewarm reception by the old-timers and the lack of tangible ethnic solidarity, making it difficult for them to experience this immigration as an actual ‘homecoming’ (Remennick 2007).

Aboutone-thirdoftheimmigrantsfromtheFSU(around300,000) are non-Jewish by Halakha – that is, they were not born of a Jewish mother or converted by Orthodox rules – yet many regard themselves as Jews, since they have Jewish fathers or grandparents, or at least see themselves as part of Jewish families. Based on this demographic reality, the rabbinical establishment and the conservative Ministry of the Interior have insinuated on multiple occasions that most RussianJewsareinfactGentilesandthatmanyofthemcametoIsrael under false pretenses (Cohen and Susser 2009). Given that all bearers of a Russian accent are suspect by default, rabbinical courts have introduced stringent verification procedures that apply when these immigrants want to get married or register their newborn children as Jews. At the present time, a Jew and non-Jew can get married only abroad, while two non-Jews can register their union in an Israeli civil court. The burial of non-Jews remains a difficult trial for family members, due to both the scarcity of non-Jewish cemeteries and the additional costs involved.

These allegations and barriers have poisoned the air for many newcomers, especially those with Russian-sounding names and a moreSlavicappearance.Atthesametime,theoverwhelmingmajority

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of ‘Russians’ have undergone ‘social conversion’ into Israeli civil religion by the mere fact of being law-abiding, tax-paying citizens, speaking Hebrew, serving in the military, and contributing to every aspect of the economy and social life of the country (Cohen and Susser 2009; Leshem 2009). Thus, the gap between the strict

for Russian olim (immigrants), one not to be resolved in the near future, given the ongoing legislative impasse regarding the introduction of civil marriage and less rigid conversion procedures.

Despite high social tension regarding the issues of religion and social inclusion and exclusion in the discourse on the ‘great aliyah’ of the 1990s, little is known about the evolution of religious beliefs and practices among this large chunk of Israel’s Jewish population (20 percent nationally and over 30 percent in many localities). The single comprehensive study of the religious identity and attitudes toward religion-state relations among FSU immigrants dates back to the end of 1993, in the wake of their initial mass influx (see Leshem

as reported by Levy, Levinson, and Katz (1993). The findings have confirmed earlier sources of data (Brym and Ryvkina 1994; Gitelman 2001, 2003), showing that former Soviets manifested very low Jewish ‘performance’ in their daily lives. About 76 percent placed themselves in a secular, nonobservant category (compared to just 21 percent of all Israeli Jews), 16 percent identified as ‘traditional or somewhat observant’, and 8 percent as ‘religious or fully observant’.

Here are some comparisons between ‘Russians’ and other Israeli Jews in the early 1990s, as reported by Leshem (2001): fast on Yom

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Kippur: 32 percent versus 71 percent; keep strictly kosher: 9 percent versus 64 percent; never drive on Shabbat: 8 percent versus 26 percent; regularly pray in a synagogue: 2 percent versus 8 percent. Russians have also expressed more ‘radical’ positions on statereligion relations: 64 percent disagreed with the need «to preserve the religious Jewish nature of the state,» and 78 percent agreed that «religious laws in Israel should be revoked or significantly limited.» Over95percentofRussianolimagreedthat«civilmarriageanddivorce should be introduced in Israel,» 87 percent supported the opening of commercial and entertainment outlets on Shabbat, and 62 percent did not object to the free sale of pork. Across these survey items, there was no significant difference of opinion between Halakhic Jews and others, and no variance by education, age, and gender.

Leshem (2001) concluded that secular and anti-clerical Russian immigrants would significantly redress the balance between the existing religious and political camps in Israel. This proved to be true,atleastintermsofdemographiccompositionandthefortification of the political secular right, represented by parties such as Shinui, Likud, and Yisrael Beiteinu. The common pillars of Jewish identity have also been affected by the influx of Russians, with the ethnohistorical grounds (such as anti-Semitism and the Holocaust) being more prominent for them than for native Israelis and the religiousritualistic aspects less prominent (Levy 2009).

Since the early to mid-1990s, the main thrust of social inquiry has been directed toward the issue of conversion (giyur) for non-Jewish olim, with the overall discouraging finding that, in 20 years, about 5 percent of this group has successfully passed Orthodox conversion, the only procedure legally accepted in Israel.Among a total of about 4,000 converts per year (the average for 20002003), just under 1,000

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areRussian-speakingolim,mainlywomen(80percent).Thereislittle doubt that the rigorous demands of Orthodox giyur, with its implicit obligationtoleadahighlyobservantlifeinthefuture,areunacceptable formostformerSovietJews.Whattheyseekissocialinclusionandto become regular Israeli citizens, not Orthodox Jews (Machon Tsomet 2003). The recent controversy over the Chief Rabbinical Authority’s possible revocation of some 7,000 conversions by olim soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces may halt the whole project.

Non-Jews aside, little is also known about the Jewish majority among the last wave of olim in terms of their attitudes and lifestyles vis-a-vis Judaism and the everyday routine of the Jewish state, including its civil religion. In line with the above-cited earlier survey by Leshem (2001), a few local studies and everyday experiences suggest that, with the exception of Bukharian, Georgian, and Caucasus Jews (who had kept Jewish traditions in the USSR / FSU and often became more observant in Israel), most olim remained uninvolvedinsynagoguesandreligiouslifeintheirnewcommunities. Yet, on a deeper level, having spent about 20 years in the Holy Land with its peculiar historical, political, and religious ambience, have Soviet Jews since become more religious? Have they embraced Judaism in its Orthodox version, prevalent in Israel, or drifted toward the few Reform or conservative communities and rabbis? Or have they largely remained secular and uninterested in organized religion, as they used to be in the FSU? How do they relate to Israeli official ceremonies and civil holidays? The current study set out to explore these issues, combining a survey and in-depth personal interviews (not reported here).

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The Study: Beliefs and Practices

in the Religious-Ritual Field

Thefirstphaseofthestudywasasurveybasedonanationalsample of 507 olim. Constructing representative samples among Russian Israelis is a well-known challenge for researchers and pollsters due to highresidentialmobilityandlowresponserates.Oursamplingscheme drew on the towns with a large representation of Russians. Eligibility criteria included arrival after 1990 and having lived in Israel for three years or more. We tried to recruit equal numbers of men and women and to focus on working-age adults (ages 25–60). We also wanted to reach out to less typical groups and identities, such as Orthodox Jews and practicing Christians. The resulting cluster-based sample was rather typical for the total Russian-speaking population in terms of social and demographic characteristics, but it overrepresented some small groups (ba’alei tshuva, practicing Christians). The questionnaire in Russian was developed by the authors, drawing on their previous research and personal experiences as immigrants in Israel. It was administered by sociology graduate students, mostly face to face (75 percent) or by e-mail (25 percent).About 80 percent of eligible candidates agreed to participate and completed the survey.

Socio-demographic Characteristics

As often happens in social surveys, women outnumbered men among the respondents (56.6 percent versus 43.4 percent). The mean age of the sample was 44.1 years, and the average tenure in Israel was 14.4 years, which meant that the majority had arrived in the early and mid-1990s – the high point of mass post-Soviet migration.

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In line with its source population, one-third had arrived from Russia, one-third from the Ukraine, and one-third from other republics in the FSU. Most respondents had lived in the major Soviet cities, including 19 percent in Moscow or St. Petersburg. In Israel, they settled in the towns of Gush Dan (33 percent); Beersheva and other Negevtowns(33percent);Haifaandthenorth(17percent);Jerusalem, Maale-Adumim,andModi’in(15percent);andWestBanksettlements (2 percent). Over 90 percent were of Ashkenazi origin, with the rest belonging to Bukharian or Caucasian minorities.

The socio-economic integration of immigrants is largely a function of their occupational mobility, that is, their ability to find jobs in line with their education and experience. In this sample, levels of education were very high, with 75 percent having a full college degree(12percentalsohavingapostgraduatedegree).Theremaining 25 percent reported having a technical or vocational diploma. The largest occupational categories in the sample, both before and after immigration, were science, engineering, and technology workers (35 percent and 32 percent, respectively), followed by civil servants and managers (31 percent and 16 percent), teachers (12percentand8percent),anddoctors(4percentand3percent).Every fifth respondentwasunemployedorhadapart-timeortemporaryjob. Personal income was defined by 47 percent as below Israel’s average, 40percentasaverage,and13percentashigherthanaverage.Over61 percent owned their homes, while 39 percent rented.

Over three-quarters (77 percent) of respondents were married, and only 8 percent were divorced; the average number of children was 2.2. Thus, the family composition in the sample was dominated by normative nuclear families with a relatively high number of children. The majority were Jewish by various criteria: 80 percent

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had Jewish mothers, 71 percent had been registered as Jews in their Soviet documents, and 73 percent self-identified as Jewish. Among those born of non-Jewish mothers, 17 percent had a Jewish father and most identified as Jews. Thus, the share of non-Jewish olim in our sample was lower than the oft-cited 30 percent.About 60 percent ofrespondentsweremarriedtoaJewishspouseand27percenttononJews; the rest had no partner. Drawing on this background, we set out to explore Jewish connections and practices among our respondents.

Religious Beliefs and Identities

The initial set of questions addressed religious and traditional practices in respondents’ families (parental and marital) before emigration. Only 8 percent of respondents said that in their family of origin they «regularly observed most Jewish traditions,» while 42 percent said that «selected Jewish traditions were sometimes observed.» Of all male respondents, 6 percent had been circumcised in the USSR, and 5 percent of the participants had had bar or bat mitzvot (both events being concentrated among the oldest or the youngest respondents). A quarter of respondents had been involved in the activities of Israeli and Jewish organizations in their former home cities, most commonly in various Sochnut events (sponsored by the Jewish Agency for Israel) (53 percent), and Hebrew classes (37 percent).

The next question, later used as an independent variable, referred to respondents’self-definition in relation to faith and religion (treated separatelybymostformerSoviets).Althoughthisitemwasnotoffered directly,mostrespondentswouldprobablyidentifyaskhiloni(secular) when facing the familiar Israeli scale used by Leshem (2001) and

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